ANTHONY BUCCI v. STATE BOARD OF RETIREMENT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff appeals from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for preliminary injunction, which sought immediate distribution of accidental death benefits. The benefits had been approved by the defendant Massachusetts State Board of Retirement (board) but not by the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC). Because the plaintiff brought the action without exhausting his administrative remedies, we agree that the motion was properly denied and therefore affirm.

Background. The plaintiff's daughter was a Massachusetts State police trooper who died in the line of duty on March 4, 2022. As the closest surviving family member, the plaintiff applied for two types of death benefits: a one-time payment under G. L. c. 32, § 100A (killed in line of duty benefits) and a pension-based distribution under G. L. c. 32, § 9 (accidental death benefit). By letter of October 4, 2023, the board notified the plaintiff that it had voted to approve his application but advised that its approval was “subject to final approval” from PERAC.

Subsequently, PERAC returned the application to the board unapproved, explaining that the three affidavits submitted by the plaintiff in support of his application failed to establish his total dependency on his daughter, as required for accidental death benefits under G. L. c. 32, § 9.¹ PERAC advised the board that it could not approve the application without “detailed findings of fact, supported by substantial evidence, showing that [the plaintiff] was totally dependent upon [his daughter] at the time of her death.” It informed the board of the additional documentation necessary to properly support the application and that it would “continue its review” once the additional information was submitted.

The board thereafter scheduled a conference, preliminary to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the plaintiff's total dependency on his daughter. Prior to the conference, the plaintiff filed his action in Superior Court.

Discussion. We review the denial of a motion for preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. See Lieber v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 488 Mass. 816, 821 (2022). In doing so, we look to “the same factors properly considered by the judge in the first instance.” Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 615-616 (1980). A party moving for a preliminary injunction must show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable harm will result from denial of the injunction; and (3) that, in light of the moving party's likelihood of success, the risk of irreparable harm to the moving party outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving party. See Garcia v. Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 747 (2018).

Here, the motion judge determined that the plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, which is a prerequisite to judicial relief. See Luchini v. Commissioner of Revenue, 436 Mass. 403, 404-405 (2002) (litigant ordinarily may not seek judicial relief until available administrative remedies have been exhausted). The plaintiff contends that the judge erred in so finding because G. L. c. 32, § 9 (3) (a) provides that the board's decision “shall be final.” He contends that PERAC's review of the board's approval was “unauthorized,” and therefore the board's decision should have been considered the final step in the administrative process.

Notwithstanding the “shall be final” language of G. L. c. 32, § 9 (3) (a), the board's decision on an application for accidental death benefits is subject to several levels of administrative review. PERAC has “general responsibility for the efficient administration of the public employee retirement system.” G. L. c. 7, § 50. It is authorized to “approve any ․ determinations of any [retirement] board in order to effectuate [the] purposes of [chapter 32].” G. L. c. 32, § 21 (4). This authorization includes the power to remand a decision of the board for additional fact finding. See Plymouth County Retirement Ass'n v. Commissioner of Pub. Employee Retirement, 410 Mass. 307, 308-313 (1991) (affirming PERAC's ability to review accidental death benefit award by local retirement board and remand with instructions). After PERAC's review, an aggrieved party has a right to seek further review before the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board. See G. L. c. 32, § 16 (4).

Although the “shall be final” language of G. L. c. 32, § 9 (3) (a) appears to be at odds with the administrative process just laid out, it cannot be read in isolation; rather, it must be interpreted in harmony with the entire legislative scheme. See Zafar v. State Lottery Comm'n, 497 Mass. 536, 542 (2026). To accept the plaintiff's interpretation would mean that any decision by the board, favorable or unfavorable to an applicant, would be unreviewable. This is an unreasonable construction and inconsistent with explicit statutory provisions granting an aggrieved party a right of review. See Guinane v. Chief of Police of Manchester-by-the-Sea, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 412, 417 (2026) (courts will not adopt construction that leads to absurd or unreasonable results).

A reasonable interpretation is that language in G. L. c. 32, § 9 (3) (a) that the board's “decision shall be final,” refers to its findings of fact, and that the decision is otherwise reviewable according to the statutory scheme. See McCarthy v. Civil Service Comm'n, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 169 n.4 (1992) (language that decision “shall be final and conclusive upon the parties” applied only to findings of fact and did not preclude further review). See also Brockton Redev. Auth. v. Executive Office of Hous. & Livable Communities, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 691, 695 n.7 (2025) (though statute stated that bureau's disposition “shall be final,” court went on to review disposition). Here, the board made no findings of fact supporting its ultimate decision to award benefits. PERAC was authorized to remand the matter to the board for such findings. As the plaintiff filed his action in Superior Court prior to the conclusion of the administrative process, his complaint is not likely to succeed.

Because the plaintiff failed to establish likelihood of success on the merits, the motion judge properly denied his motion for preliminary injunction. See Foster v. Commissioner of Correction, 488 Mass. 643, 651 (2021) (likelihood of success is touchstone of preliminary injunction inquiry, absence of which renders other factors “matters of idle curiosity” [citation omitted]); Tri-Nel Mgt., Inc. v. Board of Health of Barnstable, 433 Mass. 217, 227 (2001) (“That the plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim is sufficient to deny injunctive relief”).

Order denying preliminary injunction affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The board's approval of the killed in line of duty benefits was not at issue.