COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD v. NEWTON TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This appeal concerns a complaint for contempt filed by Peter Doe and his son Pat ³ against the Newton Teachers Association (NTA), Jane Roe, and Jake Roe.⁴ The Does allege that Pat was harmed by the illegal public teacher strike conducted by the NTA between January 19, 2024, and February 2, 2024, and they seek permanent injunctive relief. A judge of the Superior Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte, finding that the NTA and Roe teachers had already fully complied with the court's preliminary injunction, that the nonparty Does had no authority to enforce the preliminary injunction, and that, even if they could successfully intervene as parties, the Does could not identify an unequivocal command violated by the individual Roe teachers that could conceivably support a finding of contempt. We affirm.

Procedural Background. Since 2022, the Newton School Committee (NSC) and the NTA had been negotiating new collective bargaining agreements for school teachers and other employees in the Newton Public Schools. On January 16, 2024, the NSC filed a strike investigation petition with the Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (CERB) pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 9A, alleging that the NTA was preparing to strike and requesting that CERB order the NTA to cease and desist. CERB completed an investigation and ordered the NTA not to strike.

Despite this order, the NTA went on strike on Friday, January 19, 2024, resulting in the closure of the Newton Public Schools. On the same day, CERB filed an action in the Superior Court, requesting a preliminary injunction to end the strike, and the NSC filed a motion to intervene. A judge of the Superior Court granted both motions and entered a preliminary injunction ordering the NTA to end the strike and for employees to return to work on Monday, January 22, 2024. When the strike continued, CERB and the NSC filed a complaint for civil contempt. After a hearing, the judge found the NTA in contempt and ordered a series of daily escalating fines. On February 2, 2024, the NTA and NSC reached a return to work agreement ⁵ and subsequently filed a joint motion for compensatory relief in the Superior Court. School resumed on February 5, 2024. On February 20, 2024, a Superior Court judge entered final judgment ordering the NTA to pay $350,000 in coercive fines and $275,000 in compensatory fines.

Factual Background. Pat Doe was a student at Newton South High School (NSHS) during the 2023-2024 academic year. Almost one year after the strike, on January 10, 2025, Pat and his father Peter Doe filed a complaint for contempt in the Superior Court. The complaint named the NTA along with Jane Roe, Pat's mathematics teacher, and Jake Roe, the head of the mathematics department at NSHS that year. The Does alleged that the NTA strike caused a precipitous decline in Pat's academic performance. Before the strike, Pat maintained a grade of B in Jane Roe's mathematics class in each of the first two quarters of the academic year. Following the strike, he earned a C on a trigonometry exam.⁶ Pat's difficulties with the content of the class grew, his math grade continued to decline, and he ultimately received an F for the remaining two quarters of the academic year, resulting in a final grade of D+. In their complaint for contempt, the Does requested the removal of the third and fourth quarter grades from Pat's transcript, the change of his final mathematics grade from a D+ to a “Pass,” and the award of compensatory fines. Although a different Superior Court judge initially docketed the matter for a hearing to determine whether the defendants would be required to answer the complaint, the judge who presided over the original dispute between CERB and the NTA dismissed the Does’ complaint sua sponte.

Discussion. We review the decision to dismiss the complaint for contempt for an abuse of discretion. See Koshy v. Sachdev, 477 Mass. 759, 773 (2017).

The Does base their contempt complaint on the January 19, 2024 preliminary injunction ordering the NTA to end the strike and return to work. A preliminary injunction “does not survive the entry of a final decree [which becomes effective as soon as entered], whether relief is thereby granted or denied.” Carlson v. Lawrence H. Oppenheim Co., 334 Mass. 462, 465 (1956), quoting Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 189-190 (1943). “The preliminary injunction at issue in this appeal was vacated when the judge entered the final judgment ․” Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation (No. 2), 424 Mass. 471, 472 (1997). Moreover, the entry of a final judgment resolves the underlying dispute and orders remedial relief for the applicable parties as necessary. “If the plaintiff is then deemed entitled to an injunction, the final decree can provide it” (citation omitted). Carlson, supra.

“A complaint for contempt ‘is intended to achieve compliance with the court's orders for the benefit of the complainant’ ” (quotation and citation omitted). Koshy, 477 Mass. at 773. Here, the entry of final judgment confirmed that the NTA had complied with the court's return to work order. Final judgment provided only for remedial relief to the Commonwealth and the Newton Public Schools. It is undisputed that the Does filed their contempt complaint on January 10, 2025, nearly a year after final judgment had entered. It follows that the preliminary injunction had long expired, and the Does could not obtain relief for alleged contempt because the preliminary injunction they sought to enforce no longer existed. See Carlson, 334 Mass. at 465.

The Does cite to Allen v. School Comm. of Boston, 400 Mass. 193 (1987) (Allen II), for the proposition that they may obtain compensation for contempt of an order issued years earlier. Allen II, however, involved an ongoing consent decree, not a preliminary injunction that was no longer in effect. Id. at 194. Here, where the final judgment did not involve permanent injunctive relief, there was no active order to be enforced by a complaint for contempt.

The Does also argue that the judge erred when he concluded that the Does’ complaint failed to meet the threshold requirement of seeking to coerce compliance with the court's order. They contend that contempt proceedings are not limited to either a coercive or compensatory purpose and, again relying on Allen II, 400 Mass. at 195, that G. L. c. 150E, § 9A, does not preempt private parties from seeking compensatory remedies for harm caused by public employee strikes. We are not persuaded, as their position has no support in our case law. See id. (allowing damages award to compensate parties to consent decree). Insofar as sanctions may be imposed in civil contempt proceedings, see Labor Relations Comm'n v. Salem Teachers Union, Local 1258, MFT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 431, 435 (1999), they presume the existence of an active court order being violated. Here, the preliminary injunction was no longer in force at the time of the Does’ complaint. See Carlson, 334 Mass. at 466.

Conclusion. The preliminary injunction requiring the NTA to comply with the court's return to work order was resolved upon the entry of final judgment. Because the Does filed their complaint after this expiration, there was no longer an active order of which the NTA could be held in contempt. The complaint for contempt was properly dismissed.⁷

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

3.   Pseudonyms.

4.   Pseudonyms.

5.   As part of the return to work agreement, the parties further agreed on a provision to schedule makeup days to meet the requirement for 180 days of school, which included four makeup days during the typical February break period.

6.   Prior to that exam, Pat's teacher covered class material during makeup days over the February break, which Pat did not attend. Pat relied on a statement by Newton's Superintendent of Schools that students would not have grades or credit affected by absences during that period.

7.   The NTA suggest that the Doe's appeal is frivolous and requests double attorney's fees and costs under Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019). Although the argument has some force, we decline to allow the motion for attorney's fees and costs.