CITY OF BOSTON v. SALARIED EMPLOYEES OF NORTH AMERICA LOCAL 9158 (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This litigation originated from a dispute regarding whether third-party overtime work ² was governed by collective bargaining agreements (CBA) between the plaintiff, the city of Boston (city), and three unions, including the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 103 (IBEW),³ the defendants here, Salaried Employees of North America, local 9158 (SENA), and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 93 (AFSCME).⁴ In 2022, after the city changed the management of their overtime work lists, resulting in SENA members no longer being offered third-party overtime assignments, SENA filed a grievance pursuant to their CBA. An arbitrator found that the city's changed practices resulted in a violation of SENA's CBA and also, importantly for this appeal, that the city's CBAs with AFSCME and IBEW do not govern third-party overtime. The city filed suit in Superior Court, requesting vacatur or modification of the award, and a judge confirmed the arbitration award and allowed SENA's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Claiming the Superior Court judge erred, the city ⁵ essentially contends on appeal that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by interpreting CBAs involving parties not present before the arbitrator, by issuing an award that would require the city to violate existing contracts and law, and by issuing an award that violates public policy. The city also argues that they are entitled to declaratory relief. We affirm.

“We review the allowance of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo.” Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill, 464 Mass. 145, 147 (2013). However, judicial review of arbitration awards under G. L. c. 150C is quite limited. See Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 Mass. 813, 818 (2005) (DiSciullo). See also School Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 228 (2001) (Cordy, J., concurring). “Absent proof of one of the grounds enumerated in G. L. c. 150C, § 11, to vacate arbitral awards, we are strictly bound by the arbitrator's factual findings and conclusions of law, even if they are in error.” School Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 758 (2003). See Geller, supra. Section 11 (a) of G. L. c. 150C provides that an arbitration award stemming from a CBA will be vacated if, as relevant to this proceeding, “the arbitrators exceeded their powers or rendered an award requiring a person to commit an act or engage in conduct prohibited by state or federal law.” G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3). “An arbitrator exceeds [his] authority if [he] awards relief beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement, beyond that to which the parties bound themselves, or enters an award prohibited by law.” Conway v. CLC Bio, LLC, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 503, 506 (2015). Importantly, “[t]he fact that an arbitrator [may have] committed an error of law does not alone mean that he has exceeded his authority” (citation omitted). Boston v. Professional Staff Ass'n, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 112 (2004) (Boston).

As a preliminary matter, and particularly fatal to the majority of the city's arguments, the arbitrator determined that the city's CBAs with AFSCME and IBEW do not govern third-party overtime work. While the city disagrees, review of this determination is not within the scope of our review as we are strictly bound by the arbitrator's factual findings and conclusions of law, even if the determination was in error. See School Comm. of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. at 758; Boston, 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 111-112 (“in an arbitral setting, the interpretation adopted by the arbitrator will be controlling ․ we have no business overruling an arbitrator because we give a contract a different interpretation”).

The city also claims that the CBA did not provide SENA with the ability to grieve this issue, and also that “the facts, as found by the arbitrator, do not support a past practice between SENA and the [c]ity for the distribution of overtime.” Again, these arguments ignore the applicable standard of review, as we must accept the arbitrator's factual findings and rulings of law, even if erroneous. See School Comm. of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. at 758.

The city's first contention, that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by considering CBAs that were not the subject of the instant arbitration, is without merit. The city offered its CBAs with AFSCME and IBEW as exhibits to the arbitrator as part of its defense and asked the arbitrator to consider those contracts as governing third-party overtime work. Unfortunately for the city, the arbitrator disagreed with the city's interpretation of those CBAs. The city cannot now argue that the arbitrator's consideration of those contracts is outside his authority, when invoking those CBAs was part of the city's defense.⁶ Accordingly, we do not disturb the arbitrator's subsequent conclusion after considering the contracts that “it cannot be stated that having SENA employees perform these third-party paid details conflicts with the overtime provisions of the AFSCME and IBEW [CBAs].” See generally Weston Sec. Corp. v. Aykanian, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 79 (1998) (“the arbitrator is empowered to determine whether ․ the arbitral process ․ is applicable to the facts before him ․ it is the arbitrator -- not the court -- who first determines whether the code can be applied to the claim asserted”).

Providing guidance to our analysis of the city's first argument is JCI Comm., Inc. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42 (2003).⁷ There, an arbitration arose from a labor dispute, and as its primary defense at arbitration, the employer submitted a separate agreement to the arbitrators, suggesting that it covered the dispute. Id. at 47-48. After issuance of the arbitration award, the employer then petitioned to vacate the award, alleging that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by deciding on an issue governed by an agreement that was not the labor agreement authorizing arbitration. Id. However, in denying the request to vacate, relevant to the court's analysis was the fact that the employer essentially invited the arbitrators to rule on the separate agreement by relying on it in its defense at arbitration. Id. at 48. Here, the city also invited the arbitrator to consider the city's CBAs with AFSCME and IBEW when submitting those contracts as exhibits and relying on those contracts in defense, without reserving the issue of the meaning of the language in those CBAs. See id. at 49 (“Once the submission to the arbitrator[ ] was made without ․ reservation, it was for the arbitrator[ ] to determine the scope of their own authority”). In addition, the arbitral award here does not purport to be binding on AFSCME or IBEW members, and no relief is ordered as to those unions. See id. Therefore, we conclude that there is no merit in the city's first claim.

Likewise, the city's second argument contending that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in issuing an award that would require the city to violate their contracts with AFSCME and IBEW, as well as existing law, is also without merit. The city's argument that the award requires the city to violate the duty to bargain in good faith with AFSCME and IBEW, and therefore violate G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), rests on the premise that AFSCME's and IBEW's CBAs govern third-party overtime work -- a premise with which the arbitrator disagreed. Again, we are not permitted to review the arbitrator's finding on this issue. See DiSciullo, 443 Mass. at 818. Given that the arbitrator found that the contracts do not govern third-party overtime, that third-party overtime work “did not belong exclusively to just one union,” and that there was a past practice of SENA supervisory inspectors being offered third-party overtime in the same rotational manner as the AFSCME inspectors, we do not hold that having SENA employees perform third-party overtime work conflicts with the city's CBAs with IBEW and AFSCME, or violates G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5).

The city's third claim in support of the argument that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, that the award violates public policy by “binding a third party to an arbitration proceeding that they were not a party to,” is also without merit. Indeed, “extreme deference to the parties’ choice of arbitration does not require us to turn a blind eye to an arbitration decision that itself ․ offends strong public policy.” DiSciullo, 443 Mass. at 818. However, “because the public policy doctrine allows courts to by-pass the normal heavy deference accorded to arbitration awards and potentially to ‘judicialize’ the arbitration process, the judiciary must be cautious about overruling an arbitration award on the ground that it conflicts with public policy” (citation omitted). Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Pub. Safety, 430 Mass. 601, 604 (2000).⁸

The city argues that this award violates public policy because the arbitrator “unilaterally modif[ied] or limit[ed] another union's contract,” not party to the arbitration and therefore violated the public policy in Massachusetts of strongly encouraging collective bargaining and arbitration when parties contract. See generally New Bedford v. New Bedford Police Union, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 506 (2020). However, yet again, such an argument relies on the premise that AFSCME's and IBEW's CBAs covered third-party overtime work, which, according to the arbitrator, they did not.

Finally, with reference to the argument for declaratory relief, we note that a “judge enjoys some discretion in deciding whether a case is appropriate for declaratory relief.” Pazolt v. Director of the Div. of Marine Fisheries, 417 Mass. 565, 569 (1994). “The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to afford a plaintiff relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, duties, status, and other legal relations.” Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 388 (1983). For a judge to grant declaratory relief, the petitioning party must show there is an “actual controversy,” meaning that the pleadings:

“set forth a real dispute caused by the assertion by one party of a legal relation or status or right in which he has a definite interest and the denial of such assertion by the other party, where the circumstances ․ indicate that, unless a determination is had, subsequent litigation as to the identical subject matter will ensue” (citation omitted).

Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 304 (1989). The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the city's request for declaratory relief because he was bound by the arbitrator's finding that “third-party overtime was not bargained for in AFSCME's CBA,” and therefore an actual controversy regarding AFSCME's interest to third-party overtime did not exist.

Judgment and order entered May 13, 2025, affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Third-party overtime entails private entities paying the city to pay union inspectors to complete inspections outside of regular business hours, essentially allowing entities to pay a premium for inspections to be completed sooner than those scheduled during regular business hours.

3.   IBEW is not a party to this litigation.

4.   AFSCME requested to be an interpleader defendant in this litigation and also filed an appellate brief with this court as an appellant. However, we note that SENA has challenged AFSCME's standing in this case, and AFSCME has failed in their appellate brief to reply to SENA's argument. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). Assuming, arguendo, that AFSCME has standing to seek modification or vacatur of the arbitration award, we, as discussed in this decision, discern no error in the judge's denial of such relief.

5.   Given that AFSCME adopts the arguments made in the city's brief, for convenience, we refer only to the city when discussing the appellants’ arguments.

6.   As part of their argument, the city cites to several arbitration awards. These decisions are not binding precedent on us.

7.   We are not persuaded by the city's argument that the instant case is materially distinguishable from JCI Comm., Inc. While that decision involved federal law regarding arbitration and is not binding on us, it constitutes persuasive authority and is instructive.

8.   In his analysis of the claim that the award violated public policy, the judge utilized a three-part test that is ordinarily applicable in cases involving reinstatement of discharged employees. The city argues, and SENA concedes, that here, the proper analysis would be to solely analyze the first prong: whether the public policy is well defined and dominant, and is ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Carmen's Union, Local 589, 454 Mass. 19, 26 (2009). Regardless, given that the city does not meet its burden of proof on this prong, as discussed above, the award does not require the city to violate public policy. See Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686 (1993) (“It is well established that, on appeal, we may consider any ground apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the lower court”).