JOHN DOE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO 528525 v. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a Superior Court judgment affirming a Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) hearing examiner's decision classifying the petitioner as a level two offender and ordering Internet publication of his sex offender registry information. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts as found by the hearing examiner, “supplemented by undisputed facts from the record,” and reserve certain facts for later discussion. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 606 (2011).

Doe pleaded guilty in April of 2022 to one count of trafficking a person for sexual servitude, G. L. c. 265, § 50. The victim (victim 1) first met Doe in 2017 when Doe began to sell her crack cocaine. Eventually, instead of charging victim 1 money for the crack cocaine, Doe persuaded her to begin prostituting herself. Doe advertised her availability to perform sexual services, secured the hotel rooms where she lived, and kept her earnings in exchange for providing the drugs she used. Victim 1 was afraid of Doe; he would physically threaten her when she contemplated stopping prostitution and leaving Doe's control.

The hearing examiner also considered Doe's prostitution of another woman (victim 2) in 2020 as further sexual misconduct. Victim 2, like victim 1, met Doe through Doe's drug dealing. They began an intimate relationship, and when Doe learned that victim 2 had engaged in prostitution in the past, he persuaded her to do so again. Doe helped victim 2 place advertisements for sexual services and rent hotel rooms; he retained her earnings and gave her food, drugs, and only enough money to rent the rooms she used. Doe physically abused victim 2 when she did not do what he asked.

The examiner concluded that Doe's actions with victim 2 were nearly identical to the facts of his offense against victim 1. Although a sexual trafficking charge against Doe was dismissed as part of a plea agreement for non-sex offenses,¹ the examiner “[found] there to be sufficient reliable and credible evidence to find it as fact” that Doe trafficked victim 2 for sexual servitude. “Victim 2 gave a detailed description of how [Doe] instructed her to rent hotel rooms, how to place advertisements for sexual services, controlled the proceeds and assaulted her when he did not receive the amount of money he demanded.”

Discussion. “In our review of an agency's decision for an abuse of discretion, we consider ‘whether the decision was reasonable.’ ” Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 6969 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537 (2021), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 209081 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 478 Mass. 454, 457 (2017). “In reviewing SORB's decisions, we ‘give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency.’ ” Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 602 (2013) (Doe No. 205614), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7). “The decision may only be set aside if the court determines that the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law.” Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356011 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 76 (2015), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006).

Doe does not challenge the examiner's conclusion that Doe posed a moderate risk to reoffend or a moderate degree of dangerousness. Instead, he challenges the examiner's conclusion that a public safety interest would be served by Internet publication of Doe's registry information. He maintains that conclusion was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the examiner failed to make sufficiently detailed and individualized findings. We are not persuaded.

To determine the efficacy of Internet publication, a hearing examiner must “ask whether, in light of the particular risks posed by the particular offender, Internet access to that offender's information might realistically serve to protect the public against the risk of the offender's sexual reoffense.” Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 655 (2019). “Where a sexually violent offender presents a moderate risk to reoffend and a moderate degree of dangerousness, Internet publication will almost invariably serve a public safety interest by notifying potential victims of the risks presented by the offender in their geographic area.” Id.

The hearing examiner made express findings that the Internet publication of Doe's registry information served a public safety interest. To begin, the examiner found by clear and convincing evidence that Doe posed a moderate risk of reoffense and presented a moderate degree of dangerousness. Doe does not challenge that finding. The examiner explained that Doe “violently traffick[ed] multiple extrafamilial female [v]ictims” and “exhibited a concerning level of violent, threatening and harassing behavior towards women.” The examiner determined that the evidence showed that “[s]hould [Doe] re-offend, it would likely be against extrafamilial women in the community.” What is more, the examiner considered that Doe committed the underlying sex offense against victim 1 while on supervised probation for a different offense, and he committed the additional sexual misconduct against victim 2 despite having been previously investigated, arrested, and charged with a prior sex offense. The examiner concluded that, based on the pattern of behavior Doe exhibited in his offenses against victim 1 and victim 2, women “subject to economic and/or other vulnerabilities that may be exploited, should have access to [Doe's] registry information to take steps to protect themselves.” “We cannot say that a contrary conclusion was required by the evidence.” Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 23656 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 483 Mass. 131, 146 (2019).

We are also unpersuaded by Doe's assertions that the examiner's conclusion should be set aside because there was insufficient evidence that his conduct was sexual or violent, or that he groomed the victims. Doe's conviction under G. L. c. 265, § 50 is a “[s]exually violent offense” under G. L. c. 6, § 178C. Doe introduced victim 1 to prostitution, charged her a high price for crack cocaine, and, using threats of physical violence, forced her to continue working as a prostitute. Victim 1 was afraid of Doe due to his threats, and when she began a treatment program for her substance misuse Doe successfully pressured her to return to prostitution.

The examiner found that Doe's conduct towards victim 2 was “nearly factually identical” to his conduct towards victim 1. And so it was. Doe showed similar violence and control towards victim 2, used her drug dependence to pressure her into prostitution, and controlled her finances and living situation. Doe “threw [the victim] down, punched and strangled her,” took three hundred dollars from her, and stole her car. When she, too, was able to briefly remove herself from prostitution and his control, Doe successfully pressured her to return. Although a sex trafficking charge arising from this conduct was ultimately dismissed, the hearing examiner acted within his discretion to consider it as additional sexual misconduct. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 390261 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 219, 224 (2020).

We need not decide whether, as Doe asserts, the examiner improperly intruded on expert territory by concluding that Doe showed “a pattern of grooming his [v]ictims.” The critical element in the examiner's reasoning is not the label he applied, but Doe's repeated behavior toward both victims. Because there was ample evidence that Doe recruited both victims through the same methods, we decline to disturb the examiner's conclusion. See Doe No. 205614, 466 Mass. at 602.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Doe pleaded guilty to single counts of deriving support from prostitution, violation of an abuse prevention order, receiving a stolen motor vehicle, unarmed robbery, and two counts of assault and battery on a household member.