WONG v. LEUNG (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant (husband) appeals from a judgment of divorce nisi issued to him and the plaintiff (wife) after a four-day trial and the introduction of ninety-six exhibits. The husband asserts that the judge of the Probate and Family Court erred in the division of marital property, namely, real estate located in South Boston and two companies -- Fuji Restaurant Corporation (Fuji) and Lucky River Transportation Corporation (Lucky River). The husband further contends that the judge abused his discretion by ordering the husband to obtain life insurance coverage with the wife as the sole beneficiary. Finally, the husband contends that another judge abused her discretion by denying his motion to amend the judgment.¹ We affirm.

Background. We summarize the relevant facts as found by the judge, supplementing them when necessary with undisputed evidence in the record. See Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 288 (2009). The parties were married in December 1995 and have three children. In December 2021, the wife filed a complaint for divorce. At the time of trial, the husband and wife, who were both in their early sixties, were in relatively good health, and each owned separate homes of comparable value. The parties lived a middle-class lifestyle and were prudent in their financial approach, allowing them to acquire substantial assets during the marriage.

During their marriage, the husband worked as an entrepreneur, primarily focusing his time and energy on restaurants, including the Fuji restaurant located in Brookline. The wife worked both in the restaurant business as a waitress and manager, and as a manager of Lucky River. The husband's ability to earn income was directly tied to his ability to operate Fuji, while the wife had “somewhat more limited” opportunity to earn an income.

After a four-day trial, the judge divided the marital assets between the husband and wife substantially equally. For example, the husband and wife each received homes that were of roughly equal value, and each maintained retirement accounts that were roughly equal in value. A special master was also appointed to assist the two in dividing their personal property equitably.

Three assets are relevant to this appeal. First, the husband and wife own property located at 38-48 Damrell Street in South Boston (Damrell Street). At trial, the husband and wife could not agree on the fair market value of the property. The husband's expert testified that Damrell Street was worth $12.9 million while the wife's expert valued it at $24.1 million. Considering this disparity, the judge determined that “the only fair and equitable approach to this property is to sell it and divide the net proceeds (after costs, commissions, taxes, and other expenses) equally between the parties.” Second, the parties own a bus company, Lucky River. While the experts agreed that Lucky River had a fair market value of $200,000, the parties could not agree on a valuation. The judge ordered Lucky River to be sold and the parties to share the net proceeds of the sale. Third, the husband requested that he retain ownership of Fuji. The judge agreed, noting that the husband's income was tied to the restaurant, and based on the parties’ stipulation, the judge found that Fuji's fair market value was $2.3 million. The husband was given 180 days to pay the wife $1,150,000 to buy out the wife's interest in Fuji. Additionally, the judge ordered the husband to pay alimony and child support and required the husband to maintain a life insurance policy worth one million dollars, with the wife designated as the sole beneficiary, until his alimony obligations end.

Discussion. Under G. L. c. 208, § 34, judges “possess broad discretion to divide marital property equitably.” Dalessio v. Dalessio, 409 Mass. 821, 830 (1991), S.C., 413 Mass. 1007 (1992). “[T]he purpose of § 34 is to ‘empower the courts to deal broadly with property and its equitable division incident to a divorce proceeding’ ” (alteration omitted). Lauricella v. Lauricella, 409 Mass. 211, 213-214 (1991), quoting Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371 (1985). “No specific formula need be followed to fashion an equitable judgment [under § 34]” (citation omitted). Dalessio, supra. Our review is limited to “examin[ing] the judge's findings to determine whether all relevant factors in § 34 were considered,” and the judge's determinations will not be reversed unless they are “plainly wrong and excessive” (citation omitted). Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 371 (2011).

Further, “[w]e review the judgment and the subsidiary findings of fact for abuse of discretion or other error of law.” E.K. v. S.C., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 409 (2020), quoting Murray v. Super, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 146, 148 (2015). “A trial judge's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” E.K., supra, quoting Altomare v. Altomare, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 602 (2010). “The reviewing court will give due regard to the judge's assessment and determination of credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” E.K., supra. Here, the husband does not quarrel with the trial judge's findings but rather contends that the judge abused his discretion and committed various errors of law in the division of marital property. With these standards in mind, we review each of the husband's claims regarding the division of marital assets.

1. Lucky River. In 2006, the husband purchased Lucky River, which operates a bus line between New York City and Boston. During the husband's ownership, Lucky River received loans totaling approximately $2,600,000. In his findings, the judge found that Lucky River “received a COVID hardship EIDL loan, which is personally guaranteed by Husband.” The balance of the loan was just under two million dollars, and the judge found that “this loan is paid by Lucky River. Wife was aware of the loan when he received it.”

The judge ordered Lucky River to be sold with the parties sharing the net sale proceeds “after payment of all costs, commissions, taxes, and other costs of sale.” The husband argues that the judge committed an error of law in the division of Lucky River by failing to specify in the order that both parties were equally responsible for Lucky River's debts. In support of his claim that the judge's order was unclear, the husband cites to another section of the judgment that provides that each party is responsible for their own liabilities and argues that the term “costs” is ambiguous. He argues that the judgment must be amended to clearly reflect that Lucky River's debt be deducted from the proceeds of the sale prior to equally dividing the net sale proceeds.² Otherwise, if the judgment stands and he is solely responsible for paying off Lucky River's loans, the result would be grossly inequitable under the G. L. c. 208, § 34 factors.

The husband's argument has no merit because the order is not ambiguous. The judge ordered the sale of Lucky River and that the parties share the net proceeds after the payment of all “costs, commissions, taxes and other costs of the sale.” In his findings of fact, the judge specifically noted that the loan was being paid by Lucky River and that the wife was aware of the loan. The husband has failed to identify a genuine factual or legal dispute about the division of Lucky River. We further note that, in her appellate brief, the wife conceded that Lucky River's debts must be accounted for when determining the net proceeds of the sale. There was no error in the division of Lucky River or in the denial of the motion to amend related to that division.

2. Damrell Street. Since 2007, the husband and wife have owned the Damrell Street property. The judge determined that:

“Inasmuch as the Court did not find the appraisals offered by either party to be credible, and in light of the vast disparity in putative values advanced by each. The Court has determined that the only fair and equitable approach to this property is to sell it and divide the net proceeds (after costs, commissions, taxes, and other expenses) equally between the parties. The Court is, of course, somewhat reluctant to do this inasmuch as the property is in present use. However, Wife's appraisal was not credible as it contained a variety of hypothetical theories, perhaps even flights of fancy and Husband's appraisal had several material errors that, in the Court's view, cast doubt on its validity.”3

The husband argues that there are inconsistent terms in the judgment and findings of fact regarding the division of Damrell Street. Despite these alleged inconsistencies, the husband contends that the judgment is sufficiently clear that he can pay $3,444,811.50 to buy out the wife's interest in the property.

The interpretation of the meaning of a term in a divorce judgment is a question of law that we consider de novo. See Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 490 Mass. 398, 413 (2022). “Where the language is clear, it determines the agreement's or judgment's meaning, but we may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ and the court's intent where the language is ambiguous.” Id. at 413. On the other hand, language is considered ambiguous only “when it can support a reasonable difference of opinion as to the meaning of the words employed and the obligations undertaken” (citation omitted). Id. To determine whether the disputed language is ambiguous, we look to the disputed language itself as well as to the text of the agreement or judgment as a whole. Balles v. Babcock Power Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 572 (2017).

We are unpersuaded by the husband's argument that the division of Damrell Street is ambiguous. The judge clearly stated, when inventorying the husband's assets, that Damrell Street was to be sold. This result is consistent with the judge's reasoning elucidated in his findings of fact that, due to the disparate valuations of the property (the wife's expert valued the property at $24.1 million while the husband's expert valued the property at $12.9 million), the sale of the property on the open market would be the only fair determinator of its value. Certainly, this result should have been of no surprise to either of the parties. During the trial, the judge explicitly expressed his concern that there was a $12 million difference between the parties’ valuations of Damrell Street. The judge expressed at one point that if the parties could not agree on valuations, “[t]here's a 100 [percent] foolproof way of finding the value of something, never failed.”

We are also unpersuaded by the husband's argument that a reasonable interpretation of the judgment allows for the husband to either sell Damrell Street on the open market or buy out the wife's interest for an amount of $3,444,181.50. The judge ordered the property to be sold and was clear that he did so because of the parties’ vastly different valuations.

Our conclusion that the judgment required sale of the property is supported by the context of the judgment as a whole. In some cases, the judge gave the husband the option to buy out the wife's interest in an asset, specifying the price and time for payment. For example, regarding the husband and wife's ownership of the 25-29 Beach Street property, the judge explicitly stated that the husband “may buyout Wife's interest by paying ․ $1,698,500 within one hundred and eighty (180) days of this [Judgment].” Similarly, when the judge allowed the husband to buy out the wife's interest in Fuji, he ordered that the husband pay the wife a specific lump sum ($1,150,000) within 180 days of the judgment. In other words, for the assets where the judge allowed the husband to buy out the wife's interest, he set a specific price to be paid by the husband and a time in which payment must be made. By contrast, the judge allowed only one disposition for Damrell Street: sale. Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that the judge set the fair market value of Damrell Street at $12,950,000 in his findings of fact, as the judge attempted to fix the nature and value of the property to be assigned under G. L. c. 208, § 34.

Finally, the husband argues that paragraph 11 of the judgment supports his interpretation that he may buy out the wife's interest in Damrell Street. This provision does not pertain to Damrell Street, but rather to the dissolution of 668 Enterprise LLC, the business entity holding title to Damrell Street. That entity, according to paragraph 11 of the judgment, shall be dissolved following “the buyout or sale” of Damrell Street. The language of “buyout or sale” does not create ambiguity about the disposition of Damrell Street given the judge's clear order that the Damrell Street property is to be sold.

3. Fuji. At trial, the husband requested that he be allowed to retain the sole and exclusive property rights to Fuji. The parties stipulated, and the judge found, that Fuji had a value of $2,300,000. The judge then ordered Fuji to be retained by the husband, as he had requested, and that the husband pay the wife fifty percent of the restaurant's value. Despite this position at trial, the husband now contends that this result is unfair and inequitable because, if he does not have the financial ability to buy out the wife's interest in Fuji, “he risks being held in contempt of court and may be forced to sell assets to comply with that portion of the judgment.” This argument is unavailing in light of the husband's position at trial, with which the trial judge agreed, finding that retaining Fuji was directly related to the husband's future earning opportunities. The husband has failed to articulate how the judge abused his discretion when he agreed with the husband's proposed division of Fuji.

4. Life insurance policy. Finally, the husband contends that the judge abused his discretion by requiring the husband to maintain a life insurance policy with the wife as sole beneficiary until his alimony obligations ended. It is “within the judge's discretion to require the [husband] to maintain a life insurance policy for the [wife's] benefit.” Robbins v. Robbins, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 579 (1983). In fact, G. L. c. 208 § 55 (a) specifically permits “reasonable security” for alimony in the event of the payor's death, including the maintenance of life insurance. Further, an order to maintain life insurance “shall be based upon due consideration of the following factors” including the age of the payor, the cost of insurance, and the duration of the alimony order. G. L. c. 208, § 55 (b). Here, the judge ordered the husband to pay child support, spousal support, and health insurance costs for the youngest of their three children.

The husband argues that his combined child support and alimony payments total approximately $432,000, and that the judge's order that he maintain a life insurance policy with death benefits of at least one million dollars to the wife was excessive, amounts to a windfall, and is an abuse of discretion. We discern no abuse of discretion, and the husband points to no specific error in the judge's order or any legal authority to suggest that the amount of life insurance ordered by the judge amounts to an abuse of discretion. Instead, the husband simply argues that the judge should have taken a different approach and reduced the amount of life insurance coverage. We conclude the order for life insurance was reasonable under the circumstances and that the husband has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.⁴ ,⁵

Amended judgment entered April 11, 2025, affirmed.

Order entered April 11, 2025, denying defendant's motion to amend or alter judgment, affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   After the trial judge retired, the husband filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, requesting that he be allowed the option to sell the Fuji restaurant, divide the proceeds, and to buy out the wife's interest in Lucky River. The husband maintains that the motion judge's denial of that motion was an abuse of discretion.

2.   Through his motion to amend the judgment, the husband sought to define the word “costs” expressly to include the payment of debt owned by Lucky River. The motion to amend was denied.

3.   The judge allowed for approximately nine months before the property was to be listed for sale in order for the husband to relocate the offices that house his businesses and to allow the husband time “to locate other venues to help service and maintain his main restaurant business.”

4.   For the same reasons discussed herein, we also conclude there was no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of the defendant's motion to amend or alter the judgment.

5.   We decline to award appellate attorney's fees.