ANTHONY IANNUCCILLO v. MARK IANNUCCILLO (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The issues in this case stem from a family dispute concerning the ownership of property located at 94 Haverhill Road in Amesbury (property). The plaintiff, Anthony Iannuccillo, the successor trustee of the Loretta Iannuccillo Revocable Trust (trust), and the defendant, Mark Iannuccillo, are brothers. Loretta Iannuccillo, who died in 2019, is the donor of the trust and the parties’ mother. Anthony Iannuccillo Sr., who died in 2016, was Loretta's husband and the parties’ father.³ As we discuss in more detail later, Mark has been living on the property, a twenty-seven-acre tract of land with multiple buildings including a farmhouse, barn, and two garages, since the property was purchased in 1978. At that time, Anthony Sr. and Loretta took title to the property as tenants by the entirety. Anthony Sr. died intestate, and the property passed by operation of law to Loretta who placed it in the trust, which became irrevocable when she died. Under the terms of the trust, one year following Loretta's death, the property is to be divided among Loretta and Anthony Sr.’s five children in varying percentages with Mark entitled to 44 percent. When Anthony, in his role as trustee, began to make arrangements to sell the property and distribute the proceeds in accordance with the terms of the trust, Mark objected. Mark claimed that, at the time the property was purchased, he and Anthony Sr. had agreed that Mark would own it and that he had improved and maintained the property. Ultimately, Anthony filed a complaint in equity against Mark in the Probate and Family Court seeking a declaratory judgment to settle ownership of the property and require Mark to cooperate in selling it. Mark filed a counterclaim, seeking a declaratory judgment that the property is in a constructive trust for his benefit and for ownership to be conveyed to him.⁴

Following trial, the judge concluded that equity required that a constructive trust be imposed on the property for Mark's benefit. She found, among other things, that (1) prior to the original purchase of the property, Mark and his father agreed that Mark would own it, (2) a fiduciary relationship between Mark and his father existed, and (3) Anthony Sr. committed a breach of that duty by not conveying the property to Mark. The judge further determined that Loretta's estate “would be tremendously unjustly enriched should the Amesbury property remain [there],” particularly in light of the fact that Mark had contributed to the purchase price, made monthly payments to Anthony Sr. to cover the mortgage, and improved the property over the years. Consequently, the judge issued a judgment that ordered Anthony to execute a deed transferring the property to Mark and ordered Mark to pay the trust for the costs of insuring the property.

On appeal, Anthony argues that the judge erred because a constructive trust cannot be imposed on property held by the survivor of a tenancy by the entirety based on the unilateral actions of the deceased spouse. He further argues that any result other than leaving the property within the trust would undermine Loretta's testamentary intent. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts from the judge's detailed and comprehensive findings. Loretta and Anthony Sr. had five children: Anthony, Mary, Mark, Elena, and Christine. All five siblings testified at trial. Based on their testimony, which the judge carefully assessed, the judge found that Anthony Sr. told Mark that he and Loretta “would be listed as the owners of the property on the deed,” but “the property would belong to Mark and eventually be deeded to him,” and that Mark “had no reason not to believe his Father,” whom he trusted. The judge noted several times that Mark testified credibly and she explicitly found that “Mark understood that the property was his and the title would be in his parents’ name, he would live there and operate a business on the property.” Even years later, in 2012, when Anthony Sr. convened a family meeting to discuss how his various properties would be divided among the children and stated that he intended to divide the property so that one-third would go to Mark, one-third to Anthony, and one-third to himself and Loretta, Mark still believed that his parents would honor the agreement and the property would be transferred to him. In fact, at one point, Mark's sister told him that she was concerned that title was not in his name, but Mark was not worried. He responded that he trusted his parents “with his life” and later was “shocked” when he learned that the property had not been left to him. The judge determined that Mark's understanding that the property would be his was “credible” given the following circumstances.

First, Mark found the property. Soon thereafter, he told his father he wanted to buy it, live there, and open a salvage-pool business. Anthony Sr., who was a former judge and tax attorney, was accustomed to giving Mark advice, which Mark followed.⁵ The two toured the property together and the decision was made to buy it around April 1978. The asking price was $120,000, but after Mark's negotiations, the property was purchased for $70,000. Although Mark had consulted his uncle, who was in the real estate business, about financing the purchase, Anthony Sr. took over the process and Mark agreed to his father's suggestions.

Second, Mark contributed to the $10,000 down payment. Mark gave his father $7,000 in April 1978. In addition, unbeknownst to Mark until litigation commenced, Anthony Sr. asked Anthony, who was an optometrist and through the years gave his parents significant financial assistance, for the remaining $3,000.⁶ Mark and Anthony's sisters did not contribute any money toward the down payment. Mark had no discussions with them or his mother about the purchase. Anthony Sr. then obtained a $56,000 loan from the Amesbury Co-operative Bank, and on May 2, 1978, the deed to the property was recorded, and the property was transferred to Anthony Sr. and Loretta as tenants by the entirety.⁷

Third, for the following ten years, Mark covered the cost of the mortgage.⁸ In addition, when Anthony Sr. refinanced the mortgage on the property in 1998 and obtained a new $75,000 loan, Mark paid his father $10,000 a year from 1988 through 2001 for a total of $130,000. Anthony Sr. used the money from the loan primarily for his own expenses.⁹ Mark did not receive any of the funds. In total, Mark paid approximately $200,000 to his father, excluding additional monies spent on improvements to the property, which were many, and maintenance costs.¹⁰

Fourth, although Anthony Sr., Loretta, and the siblings and their families visited the property often for social gatherings, used the garages for storage, and jointly maintained a large garden, Mark lived on the property with his wife and children, and the property was referred to as “Mark's house” by family members including Anthony Sr.

Lastly, the judge considered Mark's relationship with his father, which was different from the relationship Anthony Sr. had with Mark's siblings. Mark was the only child who did not have a college degree. He lived relatively close to his parents who visited him frequently. As one sister put it, Mark had “an unquestioned obedience” for his parents and always did whatever they asked of him. For example, Mark made automobile and home repairs at his parent's primary home in Larchmont New York, and their vacation cottage in Salisbury. This relationship, the judge found, contributed to Mark's confidence that his father would honor their agreement.

As we have noted, Anthony Sr. died intestate in April 2016, and Loretta became the sole owner of all Anthony Sr.’s real property after his death. That included their home in Larchmont, New York and vacation cottage in Salisbury. At some point thereafter, Loretta executed an estate plan, which included a will and a revocable trust. The will gave Mark fifty percent of the property and specified that Mark could live there to the exclusion of his siblings for 365 days after her death, but during that period Mark would be solely responsible for the bills associated with the property.¹¹ On May 3, 2017, Loretta executed a codicil to the will that reduced Mark's percentage of the property to forty-four percent. Around this time Loretta told one daughter that she anticipated Mark would challenge this disposition of the property. The judge found that Loretta's concern that Mark would object shows that she knew about the agreement between Mark and his father.¹² The trust was created about six months later and its terms were consistent with the 2017 codicil.

Based on the foregoing, the judge found that Anthony Sr. and Mark had a fiduciary relationship. The judge concluded that by having Mark make substantial contributions to the property and then failing to leave Mark the property, ignoring their 1978 agreement, Anthony Sr. committed a breach of his fiduciary duty to Mark. As a result, the judge determined that leaving the property in Loretta's estate would result in unjust enrichment and imposed a constructive trust on the property for Mark's benefit.

Discussion. “We review the judge's findings of fact for clear error, [her] rulings of law de novo, and the imposition of equitable remedies for abuse of discretion.” Citizens Bank of Mass. v. Coleman, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 609, 611 (2013).

A constructive trust “is a flexible tool of equity designed to prevent unjust enrichment resulting from fraud, a violation of a fiduciary duty or confidential relationship, mistake, or other circumstances in which a recipient's acquisition of legal title to property amounts to unjust enrichment” (quotation and citation omitted). Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 449 Mass. 235, 246 (2007). Here, as the judge correctly noted, “a constructive trust will be present if (1) there was a fiduciary relationship between Mark and Father, and Father violated his fiduciary duty to Mark; and (2) [Loretta's estate] was unjustly enriched by such violation at Mark's expense.” The judge concluded that “the facts and circumstances of the case clearly establish that a fiduciary relationship between Mark and Father existed; Father breached his fiduciary duty, and such breach led to an unjust enrichment of the Donor's estate.”

Anthony acknowledges that Mark and his father had an agreement that Mark would own the property and does not dispute that Anthony Sr. owed Mark a fiduciary duty. In addition, as we understand his argument, he does not challenge the judge's finding that Anthony Sr. committed a breach of that duty. He claims, essentially, that none of those conclusions reached by the judge are relevant because “Father and Mother's ownership as tenants in the entirety preceded any claim for a constructive trust ․” It follows, he asserts, that because Loretta is not alleged to have engaged in any wrongdoing, the property belongs to her as the surviving spouse of a tenancy by the entirety. This argument is belied by the record which supports the judge's explicit finding that the constructive trust “was initiated through the 1978 agreement” between Mark and Anthony Sr., and that agreement was made before the tenancy by the entirety was created on May 2, 1978. Therefore, as the judge explained, “the 1978 ownership of the property by Father and [Loretta] as tenants by the entirety does not eliminate the constructive trust.”

Furthermore, it matters not, as Anthony argues, when Anthony Sr. committed a breach of his fiduciary duty.¹³ Anthony's reliance on Meskell v. Meskell, 355 Mass. 148, 151 (1969), in support of his position that the breach had to occur before the tenancy by the entirety was created, is misplaced. In that case, the Supreme Judicial Court held that, unlike here, no constructive trust could be imposed because there was insufficient evidence of a fiduciary relationship in the first instance. See id. Additionally, it matters not that Loretta was not alleged to have engaged in any wrongdoing. The constructive trust existed before she took title with her husband and, as the judge found, she had knowledge of the agreement between Anthony Sr. and Mark.

Lastly, the facts leave no doubt that Anthony Sr., and subsequently Loretta's estate, were unjustly enriched. Mark paid $7,000 toward the down payment of the home, before the closing took place in May 1978. Thereafter, as detailed above, Mark made a series of payments over the years which totaled over $200,000, and made numerous improvements to the property.

In sum, while Anthony relies on case law that protects the surviving spouse of a tenancy by the entirety, none of those cases apply here given the judge's specific findings regarding the timing of the agreement, the breach of fiduciary duty, and the continuous unjust enrichment. Those findings, which were based on the judge's assessment of the witness's credibility, are entitled to deference. See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., 424 Mass. 501, 510 (1997) (credibility of witnesses in bench trial is province of judge and as “the judge's account is plausible in light of the entire record,” we “decline to reverse it”); Rosen v. Rosen, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 677, 690 (2016) (“assessment of [each party's] credibility ․ is quintessentially the domain of the trial judge” [quotation and citation omitted]).

Based on the foregoing, Anthony's second argument, that a constructive trust benefiting Mark is contrary to Loretta's testamentary wishes, requires little discussion. Because the constructive trust predated the tenancy in the entirety, the property “was not properly transferred into the trust.” The judge explained:

“[Loretta's] statements regarding her concerns Mark may create an issue with the Amesbury property support her knowledge that there was already an agreement and a constructive trust as to how the Amesbury property would be handled. Regarding [Loretta's] revocable trust, the Court finds the property was not properly transferred into the trust. There was already a constructive trust benefiting Mark commencing in 1978.”

Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Loretta's testamentary intent has any bearing on the equitable result reached by the judge.

Judgment affirmed.¹⁴

FOOTNOTES

3.   As the parties share the same last name, we use their first names for ease of reference. We also sometimes refer to Loretta as the “mother” and Anthony Sr. as the “father.”

4.   Mark also argued that, in the alternative, he should be compensated for the improvements he made to the property during the almost three decades that he had lived there. Given her conclusion, the judge took “no action[ ]” on “this request for relief” and denied it. We take no action on the claim. In addition, Anthony filed an amended complaint to enforce the trust's in terrorem clause and assert a claim of unjust enrichment against Mark. The judge's rulings with respect to these claims are not before us.

5.   The judge made a number of findings relating to the family's dynamics. It suffices to note that Anthony Sr. was uniformly described as “domineering.” He expected each child to contribute to the family according to his or her strengths. Mark was expected to and did perform manual labor for the family such as maintenance and repairs on his parents’ other properties and automobiles.

6.   The court did not credit Anthony's testimony that he gave Anthony Sr. an additional $5,000 in cash toward the down payment.

7.   The judge found that Mark was not present at the closing because Anthony Sr. told him he did not need to attend.

8.   Mark paid his father $600 per month in cash from May 1978 through December 1987. Those payments totaled $69,000 for the first 115 months and were approximately $139 per month more than the actual monthly mortgage payment.

9.   Anthony testified at trial that the funds were used to cover Mark's credit card debt, but the judge rejected this assertion as unfounded.

10.   The buildings, including the farmhouse were in disrepair and, immediately after the closing in May 1978, Mark moved to the property and began to make various improvements. Although some repairs were paid for by Anthony Sr., Mark was in control of the work and paid for the majority of the expenses incurred in renovating the buildings. For example, among other things, throughout the years, the foundation of the barn was restored, and new insulation, windows, and floors were installed in the farmhouse. Mark also refurbished the electrical and plumbing systems, renovated two bathrooms, and installed a new furnace, radiators, and new lighting throughout the house.

11.   Anthony was to inherit the Larchmont, New York property as he had loaned his parents approximately $450,000 over the years. The Salisbury property was to be divided equally between Anthony, Christine, and Elena as tenants in common.

12.   Anthony's claim that the finding that Loretta was aware of the agreement is clearly erroneous is belied by testimony which the judge expressly found credible.

13.   To be sure, Anthony Sr.’s breach was continuous as he never made any arrangements to transfer the property to Mark.

14.   Mark has requested an award of appellate attorney's fees. That request is denied.