ARMANI MADOSHUS v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiffs, Armani Madoshus and Kimberly Ann Madoshus (the plaintiffs), brought a two-count complaint against defendants, Nationstar Mortgage LLC, doing business as Mr. Cooper,⁴ and U.S. Bank National Association, as successor trustee to Bank of America, N.A., as successor by merger to LaSalle Bank, N.A., as trustee for Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3 (the defendants).

The first count alleges a violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41 (2021). The second count alleges a breach of contract for failure to comply with conditions in their mortgage agreement prior to the initiation of foreclosure. The facts underlying the case are well known to the parties and will not be recited here except where relevant to our discussion.

The case was decided on the allowance of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs have appealed. Our review of the allowance of a summary judgment motion is de novo. Kay v. Concord, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 369 (2025). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).

1. RESPA violation. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d) in several ways: They allege the defendants failed to provide the true, specific explanation for the denial of their fourth application for a loan modification. They assert they received two different explanations, and that at least one of them must be false. They allege that with respect to a previous loan modification, the notice of completeness was incorrectly sent to their bankruptcy attorney. Finally, they allege the defendants failed to provide -– in another letter written to the wrong attorney -- within thirty days of the application becoming complete, written notice of the outcome of the evaluation of available mitigation options. See 12 C.F.R. 1024.41(c)(1)(ii).

We will assume without deciding that mailing the notice to the bankruptcy attorney was a violation of RESPA –- although counsel conceded below that this is a question of first impression, that there was a timeliness violation with respect to the thirty-day requirement, and that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the true reason was given for the denial of the fourth modification application.

Nonetheless, this claim fails because the plaintiffs have shown no damages. To begin with, counsel for the plaintiffs conceded at argument that each of the individual violations of RESPA alleged produced no damages. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs argue that if the alleged violations are all proven, they will be entitled to statutory damages, under RESPA's “pattern or practice” provision. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(B).

Although it is mentioned once in their statement of the case on appeal, the plaintiffs did not make any argument as to how the violations they have alleged amount to a “pattern or practice,” or indeed, any argument about “pattern or practice” at all. The argument therefore is waived. F.W. Webb Co. v. Averett, 422 Mass. 625, 626 n. 2 (1996).

2. Contract claim. We turn next to the breach of contract claim. The plaintiffs claim that provisions of the mortgage were breached when the defendants initiated foreclosure without sending a required notice of default and acceleration in compliance with paragraph 22 of the mortgage. This suit was brought after the defendants filed a Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) complaint, and the acceleration of the mortgage. The motion judge did not reach the merits of this count, because the judge concluded that it was not ripe. The plaintiffs assert that the judge erred.

With respect to this argument, we do not write on a blank slate. An action under the SCRA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901 et seq., is brought to ensure that a mortgage holder who forecloses receives a title with no cloud on it. Although the filing of a suit under the SCRA therefore might, in some sense, be viewed as a first step in a foreclosure proceeding and that might therefore render the contract claim here ripe, the case law holds that it is not. In 1975, in Beaton v. Land Court, 367 Mass. 385, 390 (1975), the court held that actions such as bringing a Servicemembers Civil Relief Act suit “are not in themselves mortgage foreclosure proceedings in any ordinary sense.” In this case, no actual mortgage foreclosure has even been initiated. Since paragraph 22 of the mortgage mandates steps that must be taken for a foreclosure lawfully to proceed, it cannot yet have been breached. The motion judge therefore was correct that under Beaton, the second count is not ripe.

Consequently, the judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

4.   Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC, doing business as Mr. Cooper, is apparently wholly owned by Rocket Companies, Inc. Nothing in our decision turns on the ownership of Nationstar Mortgage LLC or Mr. Cooper.