COMMONWEALTH v. NAVI (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial in the Juvenile Court, the juvenile was found delinquent on charges of larceny from a person, G. L. c. 266, § 25 (b), reckless operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), and leaving the scene of an accident causing property damage, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). Where, when explaining his intent to an officer, the juvenile essentially admitted being present at the scene of the crimes, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence of the juvenile's identity. Further concluding that there were no errors in the jury instructions or the closing argument, we affirm.

Background. On August 20, 2022, Manuel Maldonado was working at a tow yard in Lawrence. The tow yard is surrounded by a fence with a gate to protect the vehicles, most of which were towed there because they were parked illegally. In the tow yard was a black Dodge Dart that had been towed from a condominium complex. The Dodge was registered to a woman who lived at an address in Brockton; the juvenile also lived at that address and has the same surname as she. To retrieve a vehicle, someone needs to show a driver's license and pay a $165 fee set by the Commonwealth.

That afternoon, Maldonado was helping a customer and opened the gate to take out a car. Two males arrived in a gray Acura, parked it on Winter Street, and entered the tow yard. Maldonado asked how he could help them. The taller male, inferrably the juvenile, said, “Nothing, don't touch me, I got a gun,” and then went to the tow yard office. The juvenile told the other male, inferrably his brother, to “[g]o in the car.” The brother ran to the Dodge and drove it toward the gate, crashing into vehicles as he did so. As Maldonado was trying to close the gate, the Dodge crashed through it, breaking Maldonado's fingers. The juvenile ran back to the Acura. On Winter Street, the Acura crashed into a garage and hit about seven cars. The Acura's bumper, with its license plate attached, came off.

Police arrived and conveyed “be on the lookout” alerts for the Dodge and the Acura. By checking the Acura's license plate number, police learned that it was registered to an address in Methuen, and went there. Parked across the street from that address was the Dodge. Behind a nearby house was the Acura, in which was a prescription bottle bearing the juvenile's name. Inside that house, in a third-floor apartment, police found the juvenile in a closet hiding under clothes. In his wallet was $233 in cash. Upon finding the cash, Officer Louis Olivo commented that the juvenile had the money to pay the tow yard storage fee. The juvenile replied that he intended to pay it, but “my brother did something wild.”

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of evidence. The juvenile argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his identity as the male who assisted in absconding from the tow yard with the Dodge without paying the storage fee and then fled in the Acura, crashing it into other vehicles. The juvenile argues that, because his prescription bottle found in the Acura was a “portable object,” it did not suffice to prove he was in the Acura at the time of the crimes. Commonwealth v. Renaud, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 264 (2012) (defendant's bank card found in burglarized house did not prove his identity as burglar). See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 422 Mass. 254, 258-259 (1996). We are not persuaded, because the evidence of the juvenile's identification included much more than the prescription bottle.

From the evidence set forth above, the jury could find that the juvenile drove the Acura away from the tow yard. Evidence that the juvenile shared a surname and an address with the owner of the Dodge tended to prove his motive to assist his brother in retrieving it without paying the storage fee. The juvenile's statements that he intended to pay the storage fee but his brother “did something wild” supported an inference that he was present. All that evidence, and not just the prescription bottle, sufficed to permit the jury to identify the juvenile as the male who drove the Acura. See Commonwealth v. Cuba, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 265 (2025) (identification not proven solely by defendant's fingerprints on exterior of victim's car, but also by video footage and victim's testimony). “The Commonwealth did not merely introduce evidence of the presence of ․ a portable object that happened to be found at the crime scene.” Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 462, 466 (2026).

2. Jury instructions. The juvenile argues that the judge should not have instructed the jury on the storage fee statute, G. L. c. 266, § 120D, or on consciousness of guilt. At the charge conference, when the prosecutor requested both of those instructions, the juvenile did not object. Nor did the juvenile object after the jury instructions. In those circumstances, we review both issues to determine if there was error, and, if so, if any error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 350, 359 (2015).

a. Storage fee statute. As to the storage fee statute, G. L. c. 266, § 120D, the juvenile argues that the judge's instruction was incomplete and burden-shifting.

“It is always open to a judge to instruct a jury on the applicable law,” so long as the judge “explain[s] fully [the] relevant portions” of a statute. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 386 Mass. 784, 791 (1982). To prove the indictment for larceny from a person, the Commonwealth was required to establish, among other things, that the defendant took the Dodge from Maldonado's possession and control. See Commonwealth v. Cartright, 478 Mass. 273, 283 (2017) (elements of larceny from a person). As to the element of “control,” the judge quoted G. L. c. 266, § 120D, and instructed the jury that “ ‘[a] person lawfully holding a vehicle removed’ from private property ‘may hold such vehicle until the registered owner pays the removal and storage charges.’ ” That instruction was an accurate statement of the law, and the juvenile does not contend otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 670-671 (2014) (in murder case involving intoxication defense, judge accurately instructed that blood alcohol “legal limit” in G. L. c. 90, § 24, did not apply); Commonwealth v. Grant, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 450, 464 (2010) (after defense counsel argued in closing that rape victim was motivated by civil suit, judge properly instructed, quoting G. L. c. 258B, § 3 [u], that victim had right to be informed of “right to pursue a civil action”).

Rather, the juvenile argues that the instruction on the storage fee statute was incomplete because it quoted only “one sentence of a lengthy and comprehensive statute,” and left out information such as the requirements for towing a vehicle and the fees for towing based on mileage. The argument is meritless, because no evidence was introduced at trial that might have supported an instruction on those other portions of the statute, and so the judge did not have to discuss them.

Nor are we persuaded by the juvenile's argument that the instruction was “burden-shifting” by injecting a presumption of the juvenile's intent to steal despite the evidence that the juvenile had enough cash with him to pay the storage fee. The instruction did not remove from the jury's consideration the credibility of the juvenile's statement to police that he intended to pay the storage fee until his brother “did something wild.” See Grant, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 464 (instruction informing jury of rape victim's statutory right to be informed of right to sue did not remove from jury's consideration defendant's argument that she had financial motive to fabricate). Cf. Commonwealth v. Tantillo, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 20, 28-29 (2023) (although proper for judge to take judicial notice that G. L. c. 94C, § 21, required pharmacists to affix labels to prescription bottles, that “does not mean the bottles in this case had labels on them”). Contrast Commonwealth v. Bankert, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 111-114 (2023) (after instructing from G. L. c. 164, § 126, that damage to gas meter at business was prima facie evidence that business caused damage, judge improperly instructed that jury “must consider th[e] conclusion that the business created the existing condition” absent “believable evidence to the contrary”).

We conclude that the judge acted within his discretion by instructing on the storage fee statute.

b. Consciousness of guilt. As to the juvenile's argument that the judge should not have instructed on consciousness of guilt based on the evidence that the juvenile fled in the Acura and then hid in the closet, we conclude that the instruction was within the judge's discretion.

With proper limiting instructions, like those the judge gave here, a jury may consider whether someone “who flees or hides after a criminal act has been committed” feels guilt concerning that act. Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 584 (1982). Contrary to the juvenile's argument, this case is not like Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 34 (2015), where the only evidence of consciousness of guilt was that the assailant fled, and “the only live issue at trial was identification,” and so the consciousness of guilt instruction injected an improper inference that the defendant was the assailant. The evidence that the juvenile hid in the closet under clothes distinguishes this case from Bastaldo.

3. Closing argument. The juvenile contends that in closing argument the prosecutor referred to facts not in evidence when she described what the video depicts.

“Where, as here, there was no objection to the challenged statements at trial, we review to determine whether there was error and, if so, whether it created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.” Commonwealth v. Cuffee, 492 Mass. 25, 32 (2023). The lack of objection “is some indication that the tone [and] manner ․ of the now challenged aspects of the prosecutor's argument were not unfairly prejudicial” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Beland, 436 Mass. 273, 289 (2002). Although a prosecutor may not misstate the evidence, she “may ․ in closing argument[ ] analyze the evidence and suggest what reasonable inferences the jury should draw from that evidence” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Goddard, 476 Mass. 443, 449 (2017). “The inference ‘need not be necessary and inescapable, only reasonable and possible’ ” (citation omitted). Id.

The prosecutor argued:

“The [juvenile's] brother walked straight to the [Dodge]. You can see that on the video. This [juvenile], he walked, he threatened Mr. Ma[l]donado and then he walked to that office to make sure there was no one else who was going to interfere. His job in that robbery was to make sure that there was no interference. And that's what you see him doing on that video.”

In addition to the video, that argument was based on Maldonado's testimony that the juvenile “went to [Maldonado's] office” while his brother went to the Dodge. Based on our review of the trial evidence, including the video, we conclude that the prosecutor's suggestion that the juvenile went to the office to make sure “there was no interference” was a fair inference. See Goddard, 476 Mass. at 449. Moreover, whether the juvenile went to the office was not a contested issue at trial; indeed, defense counsel argued, “Why would someone who says they have a gun then go into the office to presumably pay to get the car back? Why would someone who has planned with his brother to take the car back almost get hit by his brother as his brother's speeding through the tow yard?”

We conclude that no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice arose from the prosecutor's closing argument.¹

Adjudications of delinquency affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We are unpersuaded by the juvenile's argument that, even if no single error warrants relief, the cumulative effect of the asserted errors justifies a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Conley, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 517 n.23 (2023).