COMMONWEALTH v. LAWRENCE BLAND JR (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant, Lawrence Bland, was convicted of two counts of masked armed robbery, kidnapping, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and one count of assault, larceny over $1,200, and larceny from a building. He appeals, arguing that (1) the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the trial judge erred in admitting identification testimony and certain police testimony, (3) his conviction of larceny over $1,200 is duplicative of two of his other convictions, and (4) the combination of errors requires a new trial. We reverse the conviction of larceny over $1,200 and affirm the remaining judgments.

Facts. 1. Motion to suppress. a. The crime and the initial investigation. Late on June 8, 2019, Barnstable police department detectives responded to an ice cream shop for a report of an armed robbery. As the employees of the shop (victims) were leaving for the night, a masked man approached them, brandishing a small, yellow folding knife. After the masked man announced, “[T]his was a stick-up,” the victims reentered the store, opened the safe, and gave him money. They described the suspect as an older, light-skinned Black male, approximately six feet, two inches tall and in his forties, who was wearing a dark sweatshirt with a white logo on the chest, dark sweatpants, a dark mask, blue latex gloves, and red sneakers with black and white accents.

Surveillance video footage (video) was provided to the police that depicted the suspect both masked and unmasked, prior to and during the robbery. An e-mail message was sent to all Barnstable police officers with still images from the video, capturing the robber's face while he was unmasked. After viewing the images, Officer Joseph Cairns identified the individual as “Larry Bland.” He and the defendant grew up and attended high school together. They played youth baseball together and first met approximately forty years prior to the robbery.

On June 10, 2019, detectives who were conducting surveillance watched the defendant as he drove to a nearby liquor store. Detective Colin Kelley followed the defendant into the store. He noted that the defendant matched the approximate height, weight, and physical description of the suspect in the video. The defendant was also wearing the same or similar sneakers and sweatpants as the person depicted in the video. As Detective Kelley left the store, the defendant stared at him and continued to do so as he put items in his car. The defendant drove out of the parking lot “very slowly” and continued to drive at “a speed slower than reasonable” while “looking [around] in his mirrors.” At one point he drove toward the beach, turned around, and drove right back to the main road.

b. The stop. The police stopped the car after the defendant ran a red light; they ordered him to exit, and moved him to the rear of his car. Detective Kelley approached the defendant and read him his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966). The defendant stated that he understood his rights and agreed to go with detectives and speak with them at the police station.

The defendant's car was stopped on a one-way street with no direct parking. Detective Kelley asked the defendant if there was anything in the car that could hurt him. The defendant replied no, but said that there was some marijuana in the center console. Traffic was being directed around the car, so Detective Kelley moved it to a privately-owned parking lot next to where the stop had occurred.¹ A sign posted in the lot stated, “Violators will be towed at their own expense.” Since Detective Kelley previously had told the defendant that they were not going to have his car towed, police could not leave it in a private spot that towed violators.

Prior to removing the car from traffic, Detective Kelley entered it, opened the unlocked center console, and saw a knife with a yellow handle, which he believed was used in the robbery. He left the knife in the car and informed Lieutenant Mark Mellyn of his discovery. Lieutenant Mellyn, who also saw the knife, decided to move the car to the police station for an inventory search because it was not practical to do an inventory search at the private lot. The Barnstable police department motor vehicle inventory searches policy ² permitted vehicles to be inventoried at a location other than the stop when it would not be safe or practical to conduct the inspection and inventory on scene. The search revealed, among other things, the yellow-handled knife, a bank deposit slip, lottery tickets, and an empty box of latex gloves.

2. The trial. a. Motion in limine.³ At trial, the defendant moved to exclude Officer Cairns's identification as inadmissible lay opinion testimony, arguing that his familiarity with the defendant was insufficient.⁴ Over the defendant's objection, the judge found that the prior relationship between the two combined with Cairns's fast, positive identification of the defendant, were sufficient to permit Officer Cairns to offer an opinion that the person depicted in the video and the still photographs was the defendant.

b. Trial testimony. On the evening of June 8, 2019, three employees were leaving the ice cream shop when an armed, masked man approached them and demanded money. The next day, Officer Cairns identified the suspect as the defendant from still photographs produced from the video of the robbery. Officer Cairns testified consistently with his testimony at the motion to suppress hearing, adding that the defendant's nose and “jaw line area” were what made him “sure” that the defendant was the same person depicted in the still images. He also testified that “[the defendant] was more like ․ a man-child in high school. He was a big, athletic man.” Officer Cairns remembered the defendant because he “really wanted to be a good baseball player, so when [he] saw somebody else that was athletic, it ․ made [him] remember who people were.”

On June 10, 2019, the police surveilled the defendant, eventually stopping him in his car and arresting him. Based on his training and experience from hundreds of narcotics surveillances, Detective Kelley testified that the defendant's manner and actions on June 10, as we have described above, “[were] consistent with counter-surveillance.” At the police station, the defendant admitted walking in the area around the ice cream shop the evening of the robbery. During their investigation, officers recovered a yellow-handled knife from the defendant's car, along with a bank deposit slip dated June 10, 2019, in the amount of $1,705, an empty box of blue latex gloves ⁵ and lottery tickets.⁶ They also recovered red sneakers and a blue Champion-brand sweatshirt with a white logo on the chest from his apartment.

c. The defendant's case. The defendant claimed that he did not commit the robbery and that Cairns's identification was inaccurate. He called an expert witness who testified that memory becomes less accurate as time progresses; people's appearances change over time, decreasing the accuracy of later identifications; and cross-racial identifications are less accurate.⁷ He conceded that he could not predict Cairns's independent memory or memory performance.

Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. The defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a warrantless search of his car because the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply. “In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear error but conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate findings and conclusions of law” (quotations and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015). “For the principle of inevitable discovery to apply, subsequent discovery of the evidence in question must be ‘certain as a practical matter.’ ” Commonwealth v. Ilges, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 503, 514 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 547 (1990). “The certainty of discovery must exist at the time of the unlawful seizure, Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 117 n.4 (1989), not develop as a result of circumstances occurring thereafter.” Ilges, supra. Evidence that would be admitted as a result of inevitable discovery may nonetheless be suppressed depending on “the severity of the constitutional violation,” O'Connor, supra at 118; if, for example, there is evidence that the police conducted an unlawful search in a bad faith attempt to accelerate the discovery of evidence. See id.

Here, we agree with the motion judge that the defendant was in custody when the police conducted the inventory search. See Commonwealth v. Quintos Q., 457 Mass. 107, 109 (2010); Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 145 (2001). With no one else present to lawfully remove the car from the busy roadway, the police were responsible for it, see Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 474 Mass. 10, 14 (2016), and were permitted to impound and search it pursuant to the department's motor vehicle inventory searches policy. See Commonwealth v. Bienvenu, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 634-635 (2005). The police could not have “lawful[ly] or practical[ly]” honored the defendant's requested alternative (to secure and park his car so that it would not be towed) because the only nearby parking spaces were privately owned. Commonwealth v. Goncalves-Mendez, 484 Mass. 80, 83 (2020). Even if they could have honored the request, the police would still have had to “remove[ ]” the car from traffic in order to leave it in a location where it would not be towed for a fee -- a condition for a search expressly permitted under the motor vehicle inventory searches policy. There was no evidence that the defendant's car was used in the robbery, which occurred two days prior to the search. As the judge found, the police had no reason to believe evidence from the robbery would be found in the car. Thus, we discern no error in the judge's conclusion that Kelley's opening of the center console was not a bad faith attempt to accelerate discovery of evidence of the robbery. See Commonwealth v. Lobo, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 809-810 (2012). There was no error.⁸

2. Identification. The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in admitting Officer Cairns's identification because it was inadmissible lay opinion testimony. “The defendant objected to this testimony, and we therefore review under the prejudicial error standard.” Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 429 (2019). “Making a determination of the identity of a person from a photograph or video image is an expression of an opinion.” Id. “A lay witness is permitted to identify an individual depicted in a video recording or photograph if that testimony would assist the jurors in making their own independent identification.” Id. “The general rule is that a witness's opinion concerning the identity of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph is admissible if there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury.” Id. at 429-430, quoting Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 441 (2014). “Put another way, such testimony is admissible ․ when the witness possesses sufficient[ly] relevant familiarity with the defendant that the jury cannot also possess” (citation omitted). Pina, supra at 430. “Absent this foundation, a witness's identification of a defendant from a video [recording] or a photograph invades the province of the jury to draw their own conclusions about who is who.” Id. “There is no question that officer testimony regarding familiarity with a defendant can be prejudicial․ The question, however, is not whether admission of the officer's testimony was prejudicial; it is rather whether it was unduly prejudicial, or more prejudicial than probative” (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 126 (2021).

Here, when Officer Cairns identified the defendant from a still image, he was a police officer; the risk of prejudice was lessened, however, because his familiarity with the defendant was based on their shared childhood and not from law enforcement. See Henley, 488 Mass. at 126. The defendant's size, athleticism, and physical maturity left a lasting, decades-long impression on Officer Cairns. Contrast Commonwealth v. Belnavis, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 798, 802-803 (2024) (officers’ infrequent and sporadic encounters with defendant were not memorable and “the jury could have inferred that [the officers] knew the defendant only through policing”).

In addition, Officer Cairns quickly recognized the defendant based on his distinctive facial structure, nose, and jawline. Contrast Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 476 (2019) (“[T]he four officers who offered opinions regarding the surveillance footage [were not] specifically familiar with the defendant, such that they could provide special insight into his appearance”). Moreover, Officer Cairns's familiarity with the defendant goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 325-326 (2000), citing United States v. Jackson, 688 F.2d 1121, 1123, 1125 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1043 (1983).

In addition, the testimony “did not overwhelm the other compelling, properly admitted evidence against the defendant.” Vacher, 469 Mass. at 442. The jury could also have compared the appearance of the suspect in the robbery videos to the defendant's appearance in the booking and lottery purchase video footage and made their own determination about the still images. Moreover, the prosecutor acknowledged in closing argument that the jury could give “very little weight” to the identification and still have enough evidence to support a conviction. And the trial judge instructed the jury on identification twice, which mitigated any potential for prejudice.⁹

3. “Countersurveillance” testimony. The defendant further argues that the trial judge erred in admitting testimony that the defendant engaged in “countersurveillance.” “Whether evidence is relevant and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect are matters entrusted to the trial judge's broad discretion and are not disturbed absent palpable error.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 578-579 (2001). “The relevance threshold for the admission of evidence is low. Evidence is relevant if it has a rational tendency to prove an issue in the case, ․ or render a desired inference more probable than it would be [otherwise]” (quotations and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 144 (2004).

Detective Kelley testified, based on his training and experience, that he believed the defendant was engaged in “countersurveillance” as he left the liquor store. This testimony was properly admitted as consciousness of guilt evidence. See Commonwealth v. Frongillo, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 677, 683 n.13 (2006). And “[t]he defendant's contention ․ that [Detective Kelley's] opinion was based on inadequate information goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the testimony.” Commonwealth v. Rintala, 488 Mass. 421, 429 (2021). To the extent that the defendant suggests that this evidence was more consistent with innocence, “[i]f the evidence lends itself to several conflicting interpretations, it is the province of the jury to resolve the discrepancy and determine where the truth lies” (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 401 (2003). There was no error.¹⁰

4. Duplicative convictions. Finally, the defendant argues that his conviction for larceny over $1,200 is duplicative of his convictions for masked armed robbery and larceny from a building. The Commonwealth concedes the conviction is duplicative of the former. Having independently reviewed the claim, see Commonwealth v. Poirier, 458 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2010), we agree.¹¹

Conclusion. On the indictment charging larceny over $1,200, the judgment is reversed, the verdict is set aside, and judgment shall enter for the defendant. The judgments as to the defendant's remaining convictions are affirmed.

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   There was no public parking in the area.

2.   The policy provided, in relevant part: “Motor vehicles that are towed, removed, impounded, seized or stored at the direction of Barnstable police officers shall be inspected and inventoried as directed by this policy․ The interior of the vehicle should be inspected, including: [p]assenger compartment[;] [u]nder the seats[;] [g]love compartment[;] [c]onsoles[;] [t]runk, when accessible via keys, trunk release, etc.[;] and [a]ny containers found within the above areas of the vehicle.” (Emphasis added.)

3.   The defendant argued that Officer Cairns's identification was unreliable in a motion to suppress, and equivocal in an opposition to the Commonwealth's motion in limine to admit lay testimony. Both motions were denied, and the defendant does not renew these arguments on appeal.

4.   The defendant also moved to exclude the identification testimony of another officer; that motion was allowed for reasons not relevant to this appeal.

5.   A detective later discovered a box of the same brand and size of the latex gloves at the defendant's place of employment.

6.   An investigator from the Massachusetts State Lottery testified that the lottery tickets were purchased from a Dennis liquor store on the evening of the robbery. Surveillance footage of the purchase from the liquor store captured the defendant's face and gait; he was also wearing pants and shoes like those worn by the robber.

7.   The defendant is Black; Officer Cairns is not.

8.   Because we conclude that the tow and search of the car was inevitable, we need not reach the defendant's other claims that the search was neither supported by probable cause nor valid as a search incident to arrest.

9.   The defendant does not argue that those instructions were erroneous.

10.   Because we conclude that none of the challenged rulings addressed supra constituted error, we reject the defendant's contention that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors requires a new trial.

11.   Because the parties agree that there is no basis for resentencing, we need not remand the case. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 54 n.12 (2011).