COMMONWEALTH V. HARRIS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant was seventeen years old on March 6, 2000, when he pleaded guilty to loitering, in violation of a municipal ordinance, see G. L. c. 272, § 59, carrying a firearm without a license, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10, assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 265, § 15B, and providing a false name, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 34A.¹ About twenty-five years later, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.² He claimed that his pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily due to his age, lack of familial support, and an allegedly defective plea colloquy which, he claims, did not adequately inform him of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty or the elements of the offenses. The motion was allowed, with one exception that is not relevant here, by a judge who was not the plea judge.³ The Commonwealth appeals, claiming that the colloquy was sufficient, there was no evidence of coercion, and the defendant, despite his age, knew he was receiving a favorable disposition thereby demonstrating that his plea was voluntary. We agree and reverse so much of the order that allowed the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.

Background. A change of plea hearing was held on March 6, 2000. The defendant was represented by counsel, and his adolescent cousin and his girlfriend were present in the courtroom. At the beginning of the hearing, the defendant's attorney informed the judge “there are [ ] three outstanding matters all of which we are submitting to with agreed upon disposition.” The plea judge then initiated a colloquy with the defendant by asking first whether the defendant understood that he had a right to a jury trial. The defendant, who was under oath, replied “yes.” The judge then asked the following series of questions and statements:

“Do you understand that in a jury trial the Commonwealth has to prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt? You don't have to admit anything or say anything. The Commonwealth has the entire burden. You could help your lawyer cross-examine the witnesses. Do you understand that? And you don't have to testify. And the jury verdict would have to be unanimous, do you understand that?”

The defendant responded “yes” again.

The judge then made inquiries about the defendant's age, schooling, mental health, and substance use. The plea judge asked the defendant how far he went in school to which the defendant replied, “I don't know,” and explained that he went to an alternative school and didn't know what grade he last completed but acknowledged that he had not finished high school. The defendant denied suffering from any mental illness. When asked by the judge “do you have a problem with drugs or alcohol” the defendant initially said “no” but then added “I got a weed problem, but it's not big.”

The colloquy continued with the prosecutor reciting the factual basis for the charges of carrying a firearm without a license and assault with a deadly weapon (docket number 0023CR1465). On February 10, 2000, around 2:30 A.M., the defendant was standing outside a building on James Street in Springfield when a taxicab driver arrived at the building to pick up a passenger and honked his horn. The defendant told the taxicab driver to stop, some words were exchanged, and then the defendant walked up to the driver's window. The taxicab driver saw a gun barrel protruding from the defendant's coat sleeve and was scared. After another short verbal exchange, the taxicab driver drove off and reported the incident to the police. The taxicab driver said that he believed the defendant might shoot him as the “gun was right there in front of me.” The taxicab driver subsequently identified the defendant at the scene and after the defendant was arrested he waived his Miranda rights and admitted that he had a gun, which the police later recovered with the defendant's assistance. The defendant did not have a license to carry a firearm.

After the prosecutor's recitation, the plea judge asked the defendant “is it true?” to which the defendant responded “no.” During the ensuing exchange between the judge and the defendant, the defendant acknowledged that he had a gun but did not show it to the taxicab driver. The judge asked the defendant “what is true” and “what did you do?” The defendant told the judge:

“The guy pulled up. I said, ‘stop blowing the horn, it 2:00 o'clock in the morning.’ He wouldn't listen so I walked up there. I said, ‘stop blowing the horn, it's 2:00 o'clock in the morning.’ He says something and then he says something about being a Christian and I said, ‘so what. A Christian, so what.’ And then he just pulled off and other words were said, but that's basically it.”

At that point, defense counsel asked for “just a moment to speak with [the defendant].” After a brief pause, defense counsel informed the judge that the defendant “was a bit confused ․ about what his position indeed is. He tells me that he now understands what's going on, he would like to proceed with the submission today.”

The judge then asked the defendant, “you're charged with ․ carrying [a firearm] without a license. Is that true?” and the defendant replied “yes.” The judge pressed on and asked, “you don't have a license and you had a pistol of some sort in your possession,” and the defendant again said “yes.” The judge then asked the defendant “now did you have that pistol in such a position that the cab driver could see it?” and the defendant replied “no.” The judge followed up asking “so you didn't assault him is what you're saying?” and the defendant corrected him saying “yep, I did.” The judge posed three additional questions regarding the events to which the defendant replied “yes.” The judge asked, 1) “did you threaten him with the gun?”, 2) “you had it (the gun) in a position where [the victim] could see it?”, and finally 3) “you were over there, you were talking ragtime and you had a gun that [the victim] could see?” The defendant answered yes to all three questions. The judge found sufficient facts to support both charges and imposed the agreed upon two-and-a-half-year sentence to be served concurrently in a house of correction.

The judge then asked the prosecutor for the facts supporting the charge of loitering (docket number 9923CR8477), which the prosecutor described them as follows. On August 13, 1999, the defendant was standing in the doorway of a building in Springfield that police officers knew was associated with drug activity. An officer approached the defendant, told him that the property prohibited loitering, and asked him to leave. The officer returned fifteen minutes later, spotted the defendant still standing in the doorway, and asked him to leave a second time. The defendant said “No I'm not leaving. This is a free country.” The defendant was then arrested. The judge asked the defendant “is that true sir?” to which the defendant replied “yes.” The judge then accepted the defendant's plea to the charge of loitering and the conviction was placed on file.

Lastly, the judge asked for a summary of the facts supporting the charge of providing a false name (docket number 9923CR9512). The prosecutor explained that during the booking process, the defendant gave the police a false name. He stated his name was “Laheem Johnson,” but a subsequent analysis of the fingerprints obtained at that time revealed a match with the defendant's fingerprints which were already on file due to previous arrests of “Darnel Harris.” Once again, the judge asked the defendant “is that true sir?” to which the defendant again replied “yes.” The judge imposed a sentence of one day on and after the house of correction sentence.

Due to the change of plea to new offenses, the defendant's probation was revoked, see footnote 2 supra. The judge initially imposed a six-month concurrent sentence, but defense counsel reminded the judge that the defendant had already served ninety days, meaning he “owes four and a half months.” Before the judge could respond, the defendant spoke and confirmed that he had “served 90 days of a six-month sentence. I owe four and a half.” Ultimately, after consulting with probation, the judge imposed a ninety-day sentence to be served concurrently with the two and one year sentence.

Given the passage of time, many of the documents associated with the proceedings were no longer available. However, one of the complaints and all of the dockets are part of the record. All three dockets contain identical entries regarding the guilty pleas. On the first page of each one the box next to preprinted language stating, “Guilty Plea or Admission to Sufficient Facts accepted after colloquy and after 278, § 29D warning” is checked with a handwritten “X.” The docket entries entered on the date of the plea hearing, March 6, 2000, contain a stamped notation that states, “Plea ruled as being made freely, willingly and voluntarily, with complete understanding of rights.”

As previously stated, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, which was allowed. The motion judge described the plea colloquy as “cursory,” and noted that the plea judge “never verbally makes a finding that the defendant's plea is done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” She also found that there is only one “surviving” change of plea form and that form was not endorsed by the judge with his signature.

Discussion. A motion to vacate a guilty plea is properly treated as a motion for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). See Commonwealth v. Resende, 475 Mass. 1, 12 (2016). “[A] judge may grant a motion for a new trial any time it appears that justice may not have been done” (citation omitted). Id. “We review the allowance or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to determine whether the judge abused that discretion or committed a significant error of law.” Id. Because the motion judge was not the plea judge and did not hold an evidentiary hearing, “we regard ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to assess the record.” See Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 845 (2008).

In this case, while there is no question that the judge did not fully comply with the procedures set forth in Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, as amended, 482 Mass. 1501 (2019), the record does not justify the withdrawal of the defendant's guilty pleas or the allowance of the motion for a new trial.

It is well settled that “[a] guilty plea must be made intelligently and voluntarily.” Commonwealth v. Brannon B., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 98 (2006). To be intelligent, the defendant must have knowledge of the elements of the charges against him and the “constitutional rights he foregoes by pleading guilty rather than proceeding to trial.” Commonwealth v. Hiskin, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 638-639 (2007). While it is true that the judge did not inform the defendant of the nature of the charges against him, the requirement that the defendant understood the offenses to which he was pleading guilty was met by his “admission [to] the facts constituting [the] crimes.” Id. at 639. In each instance, the facts recited by the prosecutor, which the defendant admitted were true, were sufficient to support the elements of the crimes at issue. Indeed, at one point, the defendant objected to the prosecutor's recitation of facts related to the charge assault by means of a dangerous weapon. In providing his own version of events and in his responses to questions posed by the judge, the defendant demonstrated that he was admitting to facts that satisfied the elements of the offense. Thus, while the absence of a formal explanation of the elements of the crimes by the judge is troubling, the record supports the Commonwealth's position that the defendant understood the elements of the crimes with which he was charged.

The record also supports the conclusion that the defendant made an intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. “The reason for requiring a plea colloquy is that, by pleading guilty, the defendant waives three constitutional rights — the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination ․” Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 470 Mass. 765, 769 (2015). In this case, the judge informed the defendant of those three rights and asked the defendant if he understood them. As we have noted, the defendant replied affirmatively. Where, as here, the defendant's challenge to the intelligence and voluntariness of a plea is grounded solely on the transcript of the plea hearing, “we necessarily rely on the defendant's sworn responses to the judge's informed questions made in the solemnity of a formal plea proceeding.” Hiskin, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 638. Here, “[t]he defendant's sworn responses matter greatly,” and they demonstrate an intelligent waiver of his rights. Id. at 638-639.

We also conclude that the defendant's guilty pleas were made voluntarily. “A guilty plea is made voluntarily if it is free ‘from coercion, duress, or improper inducements.’ ” Brannon B., 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 101, quoting Commonwealth v. Duest, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 631 (1991). The defendant alleges that the pause during the colloquy when he consulted with his attorney and then agreed that he did, in fact, assault the taxicab driver shows that he was coerced. While we do not know what was said between the defendant and his counsel, the record is clear that the judge engaged the defendant in an extensive inquiry of the facts. During this exchange the defendant responded appropriately and provided his own version of events. “[S]pontaneity and flexibility of the dialogue” between the judge and the defendant shows an awareness of the proceedings and the “voluntariness” of the defendant's decision. Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass 601, 605 (1973). See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 616, 620 (2009) (voluntariness established where defendant had no difficulty responding to the judge's questions despite claim that unmedicated state impaired judgment). The defendant further demonstrated his understanding of the proceedings as he informed the judge how much time was left to serve on his suspended sentence. And, the fact the defendant received a favorable outcome by pleading guilty also shows voluntariness. See Commonwealth v. Correa, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 719 (1997) (voluntariness may be inferred from defendant's awareness of favorable consequences of his plea). The defendant was facing multiple charges with considerable exposure to longer terms of incarceration in addition to facing the imposition of a suspended sentence due to having violated his probation.⁴ Furthermore, the sentences were to be served concurrently and not consecutively.

In addition, while the defendant acknowledged that he had “a weed problem,” his responses to questions posed by the judge during the colloquy reflect that he was competent to tender his pleas unimpaired by drugs, alcohol, or any type of medication. See Commonwealth v. Estrada, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 514, 518-519 (2007).

Lastly, the docket entries, which unequivocally indicate that the defendant's pleas were “ruled as being made freely, willingly and voluntarily, with complete understanding of rights,” support our conclusion that the defendant's pleas were made voluntarily. See Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 723, 727 (2014), quoting Savage v. Welch, 246 Mass. 170, 176 (1923) (“Docket entries ‘import incontrovertible verity’ and ‘stand as final’ unless corrected by the court”). See also Commonwealth v. Jean-Louis, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 356 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Podoprigora, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 930 (1999) (“docket sheet is ‘an even more explicit contemporaneous document reflecting the provision of’ ” immigration warnings than “ ‘standard practice’ ” as recalled by judge).

Conclusion. Based on the foregoing, although we agree with the defendant that the plea colloquy was not ideal, we nonetheless conclude that his change of plea was made intelligently and voluntarily. Accordingly, the order that allowed the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas entered on docket numbers 9923CR8477, 9923CR9512, and 0023CR1465 is reversed and a new order shall enter denying the motion in its entirety.

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The offenses were charged in three complaints.

2.   It appears from the record that similar motions were filed previously but not pursued.

3.   The defendant also admitted to a violation of probation stemming from his commission of the new charges to which he pleaded guilty, but that admission is not before us as the record reflects no notice of appeal from the defendant of the judge's denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea in that case.

4.   The maximum sentence that may be imposed upon conviction of the crimes of assault and battery by means of a deadly weapon and carrying a firearm without a license is a five-year term in prison. See G. L. c. 265, § 15B and G. L. c. 269, § 10(a).