COMMONWEALTH v. AARON STOKOWSKI (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a bench trial, a District Court judge convicted the defendant, Aaron J. Stokowski, of assault and battery. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove more than his mere presence at the scene of the assault and battery and that the prosecution improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in its closing argument. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). On March 21, 2024, around 10:30 P.M., the victim was at a McDonald's restaurant in Northbridge. He pulled his car alongside another car at the drive-through window and made a comment to the car's occupants about its bumper stickers. One of the passengers got out of the car, approached the victim, and punched him on the left side of his face. The other occupants “call[ed] the individual [who punched the victim] to get back in the car,” and they left the scene. The incident lasted about thirty seconds and occurred in a well-lit area. The victim took a photograph of his injuries immediately following the attack, and the photograph was entered in evidence at trial.

The morning after the attack, the victim sought medical treatment and was sent to the emergency room at a local hospital. He was treated for a corneal abrasion and a large laceration under his left eye, which had swollen shut. The victim reported the incident to Northbridge police the day following his hospital visit. About three days later, a Northbridge police officer spoke to the defendant regarding his possible involvement. The defendant initially said he did not recall whether he was at the McDonald's on the night in question. He then admitted that he was at McDonald's, and that “a vehicle pulled up alongside his buddy's vehicle in the drive thru.” The defendant stated that the person “started mouthing off about some stickers on the back of his friend's vehicle.” The defendant further stated that he “got out and confronted that party.” Although the defendant denied hitting the victim, he told the officer that “whoever did hit him, the guy deserved it.”

At trial, the victim described his assailant as “a white male between 35 and 50, large in stature,” and he believed that the man had a beard. The officer identified the defendant as the person to whom he had spoken about the incident.

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (citation omitted). Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677. “The inferences that support a conviction need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable” (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133 (2018).

Here, the defendant does not dispute that the victim was assaulted and battered but contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove more than his mere presence at the scene. See Commonwealth v. Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 399 (1987). He asserts that “it was just as likely that the vehicle's owner struck the victim.” We disagree.

The victim testified that one occupant got out of the car at the drive-through window and punched him. The defendant admitted that he got out of his friend's vehicle and “confronted” the victim. The judge was not required to credit the defendant's further statement that this “confrontation” with the victim stopped short of a physical assault. See Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 380 Mass. 840, 850 (1980) (factfinder “not required to accept completely the defendant's version of the facts”). Although this evidence alone was sufficient to establish that the defendant was the person who struck the victim, see Commonwealth v. Blackmer, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 483 (2010) (evidence of “defendant's guilt may be primarily or even wholly circumstantial”); Commonwealth v. Frongillo, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 677, 680 n.8 (2006) (factfinder may rely on common sense when analyzing evidence and reasonable inferences), there was additional evidence of the defendant's guilt. The judge was able to see the defendant and compare his appearance to the description given by the victim. See Blackmer, 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 483. In addition, the defendant's statement that the victim “deserved” to be punched could have been construed by the judge as evidence of the defendant's motive. See Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 480 Mass. 275, 279 (2018) (defendant's statement showing racial animus was evidence of motive to kill victim). Moreover, the judge could have inferred consciousness of guilt from the defendant's initial denial of any memory that he was at the McDonald's. See Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 593 (2012) (consciousness of guilt evidence strengthens circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt).

In sum, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to establish that it was the defendant who intentionally struck the victim “with such violence that bodily harm [was] likely to result” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 482 (1983).

2. Prosecutor's closing argument. The defendant also argues that the prosecution shifted the burden of proof to the defendant during its closing argument by improperly calling the judge's attention to the defendant's failure to call a witness. See Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 787 (2011). A party may argue the absence of a witness only after presenting evidence establishing that “(1) whether the case against the defendant is [so strong that,] faced with the evidence, the defendant would be likely to call the missing witness if innocent; (2) whether the evidence to be given by the missing witness is important ․ ; (3) whether the party who fails to call the witness has superior knowledge of the whereabouts of the witness; and (4) whether the party has a ‘plausible reason’ for not producing the witness” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 471 (2004). See Commonwealth v. Salentino, 449 Mass. 657, 667-668 (2007).

Here, during its closing argument, the prosecution stated, “there's nobody else here to accept responsibility for [the incident] and you would expect that there would be.” Immediately preceding this statement, in response to the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty, the prosecutor argued, “there's no buddy here to testify today․ [The defendant]’s the only person who was spoken to about this and he didn't bring in anyone else to take responsibility.” The Commonwealth does not dispute that the foundational requirements were not met before the prosecutor argued the absence of the witness in this case. We conclude that the arguments crossed the line of proper argument. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statements, therefore we review them to determine whether they created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Staines, 441 Mass. 521, 535 (2004). “A substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice exists when there is a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made” (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Cash, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 815 (2005).

“Because this was a jury-waived trial, we are not concerned with the effect of the prosecutor's [improper] statements on a jury.” Commonwealth v. Daley, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 257 (2006). Absent a contrary indication, which we do not discern here, we presume that the judge understood that the closing arguments were not evidence, accurately instructed himself on that point, and did not consider the prosecutor's improper statements. See Commonwealth v. Brunette-Silveira, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 731, 733 (2026) (“A trial judge sitting without a jury is presumed ․ to have correctly instructed himself” in role as factfinder). In addition, we think the evidence against the defendant was strong. See Commonwealth v. Boyajian, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 866, 869-870 (2007) (no substantial risk of miscarriage of justice from misstatements in prosecutor's opening and closing based, in part, on strength of trial evidence). Ultimately, although better left unsaid, we are satisfied that the prosecutor's statements did not create a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice in this case.

Judgment affirmed.