DELPHINE SANDQUIST v. CHARLES BOSWORTH (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Delphine Sandquist appeals from an amended judgment of divorce, raising several claims concerning the division of the marital estate. Charles F. Bosworth cross-appeals, arguing that the judge impermissibly treated his business as both an asset in the division of the estate and as a source of income for alimony purposes. Concluding that one claim raised by Sandquist has merit, we modify the judgment to increase the lump sum equalizing payment that Bosworth was ordered to make to Sandquist; with this modification, we affirm the judgment.

Background. The parties married in 1998 and separated in 2019; Sandquist commenced this action for divorce in 2021. The parties have three children, all of whom had reached the age of majority by the time of the divorce. During the marriage, the family enjoyed an “upper-class” lifestyle and amassed a marital estate valued at approximately $9 million. The marital estate included Bosworth's family construction business, David A. Bosworth Company (DAB Co.); homes in Westwood, Massachusetts, and Naples, Florida; and multiple country club memberships. Sandquist worked sporadically throughout the marriage, cared for the children, and performed most household chores. Their lifestyle was financed primarily by Bosworth's employment at -and later, ownership of -- DAB Co.

Discussion. 1. Sandquist's appeal. “General Laws c. 208, § 34, governs the division of marital assets in this Commonwealth.” Brash v. Brash, 407 Mass. 101, 104 (1990). “The ‘ultimate goal of G. L. c. 208, § 34,’ is ‘an equitable, rather than an equal, division of property.’ ” Adlakha v. Adlakha, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 860, 864 (2006), quoting Williams v. Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 626 (2000). In reviewing a judge's division of marital property under § 34, we undertake a two-part analysis: “First, we examine the trial judge's findings to determine whether all relevant factors were considered (and whether irrelevant factors were disregarded). Next, we decide whether the rationale underlying the judge's conclusions is apparent and whether these flow rationally from the findings and rulings” (quotation and citations omitted). Hassey v. Hassey, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 518, 524 (2014). Probate and Family Court judges enjoy “abundant discretion” in dividing marital property. Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 374 (2011), S.C., 466 Mass. 1015 (2013). “The judge's reasons for [her] conclusions, however, must be apparent in [her] findings and rulings,” and “[a]ny failure in the decision-making process to consider and explain the effect of an important fact may require reversal of the judgment in order to permit consideration and explanation of the omitted subject.” Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 102, 108 (1986).

a. Lump sum payment. The judge ordered “an approximately equal division” of the marital estate. Because Bosworth retained a greater share of the estate's assets -- including his entire interest in DAB Co., which the judge found to be worth $3,050,000 -- the judge ordered Bosworth to make an equalizing lump sum payment of one half of the difference between the value of the assets allocated to him and the value of the assets allocated to Sandquist. This amounted to $1,228,206.67. However, upon Bosworth's motion to amend the judgment, the judge reduced the value of DAB Co. by $291,000, to $2,759,000, and amended the judgment by deducting the full $291,000 from the lump sum equalizing payment owed to Sandquist, reducing it to $937,206.67. Sandquist moved for reconsideration, asserting that because the reduction in value of DAB Co. decreased the value of the assets assigned to Bosworth by $291,000, the calculation of fifty percent of the difference between the value of the assets now allocated to Bosworth and the value of the assets allocated to Sandquist should have reduced the amount of the equalizing payment by only $145,000. Because the trial judge had retired, a different judge considered the motion and denied it, stating that she was “not in a position to reconsider [the trial judge's] judgment or to assess whether an error, clerical or otherwise, should be identified and/or corrected.” Sandquist renews her argument on appeal.

We agree with Sandquist that reducing the lump sum payment by $291,000 was inconsistent with the judge's intent to effect an equal division of the marital estate. We discern no “cogent explanation” for the new lump sum payment amount. Bernier v. Bernier, 449 Mass. 774, 787 (2007). “Mathematical precision is not required of equitable division of property,” Fechtor v. Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 859, 861 (1989), but the judge's conclusions must still “flow rationally from the findings and rulings.” Williams, 431 Mass. at 631. The amount of the lump sum payment due by Bosworth to Sandquist must be increased by $145,000, to $1,082,706.67, to correct the judge's irrational application of the reduction in value of DAB Co.

b. DJB Trust. In October 2019, a few months after the parties separated, Bosworth's mother died, and Bosworth inherited a twenty-five percent interest in the Dorothy J. Bosworth 2015 Trust (DJB Trust). The trust holds title to the mother's former home in Milton, where Bosworth was residing at the time of the trial. The trial judge was unable to determine the value of Bosworth's interest in the trust, noting that Bosworth did not list a value for the property on his financial statements or testify about its value at trial. Sandquist's grandmother also passed away after the parties had separated, and Sandquist estimated she would inherit up to $20,000 from the sale of her grandmother's home in France, although the property was not yet on the market. The trial judge awarded inheritances “to the receiving party without offset to the other.”² Sandquist contends that the trial judge erred in allowing Bosworth to retain his full interest in DJB Trust.

As a threshold matter, we reject any suggestion that the judge erred by failing to consider Bosworth's interest in the DJB Trust as part of the marital estate subject to possible division under § 34. The judge listed DJB Trust as the third of five real estate or trust interests in the marital estate. See Williams, 431 Mass. at 625 (“The judge clearly knew the law on the point because she listed these assets in her findings as part of the marital estate”). Accordingly, we consider only whether the judge abused her discretion in awarding Bosworth's interest in DJB Trust to him, without offset to Sandquist.

The judge cited the following factors as reasons for excluding Bosworth's interest in DJB Trust -- and Sandquist's future inheritance from her grandmother -- from the remainder of the marital estate, which was divided equally: “the sources of the inheritances, that the inheritances were kept separate and not commingled with any joint property, and, most importantly, the timing of the passing of the individuals whose inheritances are it issue, which was after the parties had decided to end their marriage.” Sandquist argues that the judge placed undue emphasis on the timing of Bosworth's inheritance, failing to recognize that Bosworth's interest in DJB Trust was commingled with the marital estate, and treating it differently from Sandquist's inheritance during the marriage of $1 million from her father.

It was clearly within the judge's discretion to treat the inheritances differently from the other assets of the estate. See Williams, 431 Mass. at 626 (“Once the judge included these assets as part of the marital estate, she had broad discretion to determine how to divide the entire estate equitably, including discretion not to divide the inherited and gifted assets between the parties” [citation omitted]). We discern no error in the judge's finding that the inheritances were kept separate and not commingled with any joint property. Sandquist points to the work performed by DAB Co. to renovate the Milton house and the fact that Bosworth paid rent to live in the house as evidence of commingling, but these activities all occurred years after the parties had separated in 2019 and support, rather than contradict, the judge's finding. Nor did the judge overlook the fact that Bosworth benefited from Sandquist's earlier $1 million inheritance. The judge cited the “$1 million inheritance she received during the marriage” as a key factor in concluding that Sandquist contributed equally to the marital enterprise and was entitled to an equal share of the marital estate. The judge appropriately considered the § 34 factors, including “the respective contributions of the parties to the marital partnership,” as well as “the source of the assets, each [party's] role in managing the assets, and whether the assets in question had been kept separate or commingled with the couple's jointly owned property.” Id. at 626-627. The judge also cited Bosworth's interest in DJB Trust in concluding that he had a far greater opportunity than Sandquist to acquire income and assets in the future. See G. L. c. 208, § 34. Because the judge considered the relevant factors and her treatment of the inheritances does not fall “outside the range of reasonable alternatives,” L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), the judge did not abuse her discretion.³

c. Other assets. Sandquist argues that the trial judge's division of marital property was erroneous in two other respects: the judge failed to dispose specifically of Bosworth's interest in the 485-487 Blue Hills Parkway Trust LLC (BHP LLC), and the judge assigned the Florida home separately from the Florida country club membership.

Sandquist's contentions concerning Bosworth's interest in BHP LLC do not warrant disturbing the judgment. The judge made substantial findings concerning the activities of the LLC and valued Bosworth's interest at $450,000 based on his contributions as shown on his trial financial statement. The judge specifically stated in her findings of fact and conclusions of law that Bosworth would retain this interest. Although, in an apparent oversight, the judge omitted a specific reference to BHP LLC in the amended judgment, the math underlying the valuation of the marital estate and the calculation of the lump sum payment to compensate for the greater share of the assets retained by Bosworth depends on allocating BHP LLC's value of $450,000 to Bosworth. To the extent that the $450,000 valuation from the financial statement is inconsistent with Bosworth's trial testimony, it was within the judge's discretion to determine which evidence to credit, and because her valuation was supported by the evidence, it was not clearly erroneous. See Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 863 (“Unless clearly erroneous, the trial judge's determination of value will stand”).

Finally, nothing in the record suggests that it was an abuse of discretion to award the Florida home to Sandquist but the country club membership to Bosworth. The evidence supports the judge's findings that Sandquist had no interest in retaining the country club membership and that Bosworth did. Most importantly, neither party, at trial or on appeal, could point to any evidence or articulate any basis for concluding that ownership of the house and membership in the country club were linked in any meaningful way other than geographical proximity. Based on the evidence before her, the trial judge was entitled to order what she determined to be “a fair balance of sacrifice between the wants and needs of the two parties.” Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 298 (2009).

2. Bosworth's appeal. In his cross appeal, Bosworth argues the judge's treatment of DAB Co. as both an asset assigned to him and a stream of income for alimony purposes was improper “double dipping.” In his valuation of DAB Co., Bosworth's expert factored in $270,000 to account for “reasonable compensation” to Bosworth. Although the judge accepted the expert's valuation, she calculated Bosworth's alimony obligation based on an income of $800,000 -- a rough average of Bosworth's total gross income from the four years of tax returns in evidence.

“Commentators use the phrase ‘double dipping’ to describe the seeming injustice that occurs when property is awarded to one spouse in an equitable distribution of marital assets and is then also considered as a source of income for purposes of imposing support obligations.” Champion v. Champion, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 219 (2002). “While disfavored, double counting is not prohibited as a matter of law.” Ludwig v. Lamee-Ludwig, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 39 (2017). Instead, “the judge must look to the equities of the situation to make her determination.” Croak v. Bergeron, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 750, 759 (2006). “[W]e decline to disturb an award ․ for inequitable ‘double dipping’ where it is possible to ‘identify separate portions of a given asset of a divorcing spouse as the separate bases of the property assignment and any alimony or support obligations.’ ” Adams, 459 Mass. at 394, quoting Dalessio v. Dalessio, 409 Mass. 821, 828 (1991).

The trial judge provided a detailed rationale demonstrating “that [she] considered whether double dipping had occurred, and whether [her] orders were consistent with the principles” that govern asset division and support obligations. Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 377 (2004). She correctly observed that the accountant's “task in valuing DAB Co. is entirely different than the Court's task in determining Husband's gross income for support purposes.” Generally, the object of a valuation is to determine the fair market value of a business, or “the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller” (quotation and citation omitted). Bernier, 449 Mass. at 779 n.8. Factored into this price is an estimate of the “reasonable compensation” that the hypothetical buyer might draw from the company. By contrast, a spouse's alimony obligation must be based on his or her actual gross income. See Calvin C. v. Amelia A., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 719 (2021). Thus, the compensation included in the valuation of DAB Co. and the income used to calculate Bosworth's alimony obligation were based on entirely different considerations. In fact, Bosworth's expert's report specifically stated that Bosworth's “actual compensation” had been “added back into the profits” of DAB Co., and instead, a “reasonable compensation” figure was used for the valuation. Given this distinction, it was proper for the judge to calculate Bosworth's alimony obligation using his actual income rather than the one included in the valuation of his business.

Indeed, the judge may have been required to do so. “Even were we to conclude that the trial judge had given [Sandquist] a ‘double benefit,’ we would conclude that to have done otherwise would have resulted in an inequity.” Champion, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 222. Bosworth's actual income was nowhere close to $270,000. It was well within the judge's discretion to focus her analysis on Bosworth's most recent tax returns. See Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 243 (2014) (judge may award support based on parties’ current incomes). The trial judge therefore did not err in ascribing to Bosworth an income of $800,000 for the purpose of calculating his alimony obligation and also adopting a valuation for the company based on the expert's $270,000 salary approximation.

Conclusion. The amended judgment shall be modified to increase the amount of the lump sum payment due from Bosworth to Sandquist by $145,500, from $937,206.67 to $1,082,706.67. As so modified, the amended judgment of divorce, dated December 26, 2024, is affirmed.⁴

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The judge treated the parties’ personal bank accounts in the same fashion.

3.   Sandquist also argues that the judge rewarded Bosworth for not including the value of DJB Trust in his financial statements or providing any evidence of its value at trial. It does not appear that Sandquist presented this argument to the trial judge, who was uniquely positioned to fashion sanctions if she was so inclined. See Rule 401(g) of the Supplemental Rules of the Probate and Family Court (2012). Moreover, the value of the interest (or lack of evidence thereof) was not a factor in the trial judge's analysis.

4.   The parties’ requests for attorney's fees are denied.