DANIEL JEANNITE v. JEAN ROSENEY (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In this unfortunate action between two childhood friends, after a nonjury trial, the defendant, Jean E. Roseney, was found liable to the plaintiff, Daniel Jeannite, for conversion, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. Having found a breach of contract, the judge consequently rejected the plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment. See Chang v. Winkelvoss, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 202, 211 (2019) (“damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment are mutually exclusive”). The plaintiff was found not liable on two counterclaims, one for fraud and one for unjust enrichment.

The facts of the case are well known to the parties and are described clearly and in great detail in the memorandum of judgment and order issued by the judge after trial. They will not be repeated here, except to whatever extent is necessary in the course of discussion.

The defendant's liability on all counts depends on a conclusion of law reached by the trial judge: that the parties were engaged in a joint venture to share equally in the profits from the purchase and resale of a parcel of real property after recoupment of their expenses in, among other things, renovating that property.

On appeal, the defendant makes a single legal argument, that the judge's conclusion that there was a joint venture was prohibited by the statute of frauds, because there was no writing but only an oral agreement. The defendant has not demonstrated any error in the judge's conclusion, supported by Massachusetts law, that the statute of frauds is not implicated because an agreement to share in the profits and losses from a venture in real estate does not involve an actual interest in real estate. See Trowbridge v. Wetherbee, 93 Mass. 361, 364 (1865).

Although the defendant does not argue the statute of frauds with respect to the actual transfer of title to the property, we note that there is no error in the judge's independent conclusion that the transfer of the interest in property to the plaintiff was memorialized in writing by the deed transferring the interest purchased in the name of the plaintiff's straw, Vanessa Joseph, to the defendant and the plaintiff that was prepared and signed on the day of the closing, though never recorded.

All other issues raised by the defendant are quarrels with the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the trial judge. Of course, “we accept the trial judge's findings of fact absent clear error and defer to [the judge's] credibility determinations.” Commonwealth v. Knowles, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 628 (2018).

Although the defendant challenges it, the judge's finding that deeds were recorded with the defendant's authorization and were not forged was supported by sufficient evidence in the record and are not therefore clearly erroneous.

The defendant also complains that the trial court credited the testimony of the closing attorney. To begin with, nothing in the record indicates that, as the defendant alleges, the attorney violated the statute prohibiting unauthorized practice of law or the rules of professional conduct. And whatever the interests of the attorney, the judge was entitled to credit his testimony. The citation of the defendant to Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991), does not support the existence of any requirement that courts disregard testimony by parties that may have any interest in, or therefore bias about, the matter. In point of fact, even if the attorney was hired by the plaintiff, who was, after all, not only the source of the downpayment for the property, but also the purchaser's broker in the transaction, it creates no conflict of interest disqualifying him from testifying in this matter.

The defendant also argues that the judge's order, which included specific performance in the ultimate sale of the property, and the division of any profits left over after the downpayment, other expenses, and damages owed by the defendant to the plaintiff are paid, was inequitable. He further argues that the plaintiff had unclean hands and therefore was not entitled to an equitable remedy.

As to the first, we see nothing inequitable in the judge's order, and of course we must defer to his exercise of his equitable power unless it can be demonstrated that what he has done is an abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 794 (1978). Nor has the defendant demonstrated any facts found by the judge or otherwise disputed that indicate unclean hands on the part of the plaintiff with respect to the defendant.

In passing, the defendant also mentions an easement allegedly recorded by the plaintiff without the defendant's knowledge. The grant of easement which the defendant has included in his record appendix has never been presented to the trial court, nor has any argument about it been made there. In any event, it appears to be a grant of rights to the plaintiff and the defendant over a neighboring property, and it can have no bearing on the issues of this litigation.¹

Finally, the plaintiff has requested sanctions under Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019). We agree that this appeal is frivolous and order that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs against the defendant. The plaintiff may file an application for appellate attorney's fees and costs with this court within fourteen days of the issuance of this decision in accordance with the procedure described in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004). The defendant shall then have fourteen days within which to respond.

Judgment affirmed.

Appeals from single justice orders dated September 11, 2025 (as revised on September 15, 2025), September 23, 2025, and February 27, 2026, dismissed as moot.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The defendant has also appealed from three single justice orders -- issued on September 11, 2025 (as revised on September 15, 2025), September 23, 2025, and February 27, 2026 -- denying the defendant's motions to stay pending appeal. The motions were all denied based on the absence of a likelihood of success on the merits. We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the single justice orders, see C.E. v. J.E., 472 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2015), which, in any event, are rendered moot by today's decision.