COMMONWEALTH v. CARL DAVIS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant, Carl Davis, was convicted of furnishing false identification information to law enforcement, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 34A, and possession with intent to distribute a class A controlled substance (fentanyl), in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (a). On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the fentanyl, which was discovered in the course of a traffic stop. He also contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he had constructive possession of the fentanyl. He does not challenge his conviction of furnishing false information to law enforcement. We affirm.

Background. 1. Motion to suppress. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop on the ground that the traffic stop was improper.

After an evidentiary hearing, the judge found the following facts.¹ On May 3, 2024, Massachusetts State police Trooper Owen King was monitoring northbound traffic on Interstate Highway 91 just south of Bernardston, near the border with New Hampshire. At approximately 12:38 A.M., he took note of a gray sedan because its rear license plate was not fully illuminated. King followed the car. After confirming that the car was in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 6, which requires that the entire license plate number be “plainly visible at a distance of 60 feet,” King activated his emergency blue lights and executed a traffic stop. The driver pulled over promptly and without incident.

As King approached the car on the passenger's side, he observed two occupants. The defendant was the front seat passenger, and his wife was driving. King informed the driver that her rear license plate light was not working and then asked for her driver's license and vehicle registration. As the driver looked for her license, King asked the defendant where they were headed. The defendant responded that they were “going down to Birmingham.” King did not know of a town nearby called Birmingham and asked for clarification, to which the defendant responded, “It's a little past Brattleboro.”

After examining the driver's license, King asked her if the car belonged to her. She replied, “No, this is my friend's car.” King asked if she had the car's registration, and she responded that she did not. King then pointed to the glove compartment and asked if they could “check in there.” The defendant attempted to open the glove compartment and found that it was locked. The driver said that she did not have the key to the glove compartment, but King pointed to the key in the ignition and said, “It unlocks with that key, right there.” The driver removed the key from the ignition and handed it to the defendant. The defendant opened the glove compartment and began looking through it.

The defendant pulled out a white box that appeared to be an eyeglasses case. He then put the box back, pulled out the folder containing the car's registration, and handed it to King. King immediately pointed back to the glove compartment and asked, “What's going on with that purple stuff right there?” The defendant and the driver both said, “I don't know.” King asked the defendant to move the eyeglasses case out of the way, and he did, revealing a clear bag with the “purple stuff” inside.

King then asked the defendant to hand him the bag. The defendant replied, “I don't want to touch that, I don't know what it is.” The driver said, “I don't want to touch that either.” King then reached into the glove compartment and grabbed the bag himself. When he did so, several purple wax baggies spilled from the bag into the defendant's lap. King noted that the wax baggies were tied together in bunches with black rubber bands. He also noted that some of the wax baggies were folded and appeared to have something inside them. They “resembled the wax bags that [King had been] trained to ․ identify as narcotics.” Specifically, he believed they were “[c]onsistent with heroin/fentanyl packaging.”

King then called another trooper over, ordered the defendant to get out of the car, and handcuffed him. The troopers seized the suspected narcotics and searched the rest of the car. The troopers ultimately arrested the defendant and charged him, as relevant here, with trafficking in more than ten grams of fentanyl, a charge subsequently amended to possession with intent to distribute a class A controlled substance (fentanyl) in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (a), and furnishing a false identification to law enforcement in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 34A.

The judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the traffic stop was proper, and that King had “probable cause to ․ search what he had seen in plain view.”

2. Trial evidence. At trial, the jury viewed the body-worn camera footage and heard testimony about the traffic stop, the arrest, and the booking process. The following additional evidence was presented at trial.

King testified that he used his mobile data terminal to “run the plate” before initiating the traffic stop. King learned the identity of the car's registered owner, that the registration was active, and that the car had not been reported stolen. After learning those details, King executed a traffic stop. King testified that the driver and passenger were both calm, relaxed, and attentive when he first approached the car. He did not see any drug paraphernalia in the car until the defendant opened the glove compartment. After removing the defendant from the car and detaining him, King returned to the car to secure the occupants’ personal belongings. King found three cell phones in the car and determined that two of them belonged to the defendant.

Massachusetts State police Trooper Katherine Newell, who arrived on the scene to help search the driver, testified that while the defendant was detained in the back of the police cruiser, she asked him for his identifying information. The defendant told Newell that his name was “Edward S. Brown” and that he had a New York driver's license, and he gave her his date of birth. Newell was unable to confirm the defendant's identity based on that information, so she asked him for more information. The defendant then provided a social security number, and he told Newell that his middle initial was “G” rather than “S.” Newell provided this information to a dispatcher, who reported that the name corresponded to an expired Pennsylvania driver's license, and the social security number belonged to a female Massachusetts resident. The dispatcher sent a photograph to Newell, which also did not match the defendant. The defendant's wife eventually told Newell the defendant's true name while Newell was transporting her to the State police barracks.

A forensic scientist testified that 144 purple baggies were recovered from the glove compartment, and that they contained fentanyl. Finally, Deerfield police officer Timothy Boland, who had received training in narcotics trafficking offenses, testified about drug packaging and pricing, about “source cities” where traffickers can buy large amounts of drugs cheaply,² and testified further that Interstate Highway 91 was a known drug trafficking route from Connecticut to Vermont and New Hampshire. Boland also testified that drug traffickers frequently borrow or rent cars to avoid police detection, and that they often carry multiple cell phones.

The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty on the possession with intent to distribute charge, and the judge ³ denied the motion. The jury convicted the defendant of furnishing false identification information to law enforcement and possession with intent to distribute a class A controlled substance (fentanyl).

Discussion. 1. Probable cause. The defendant first argues that the judge erred by denying his motion to suppress because King did not have probable cause to seize the suspected narcotics found in the glove compartment. Specifically, he argues that King's knowledge of the car's registration status demonstrated that the driver had not committed any crime or offense, and so King lacked probable cause to search the glove compartment. We disagree.

First, this argument fails in part because it rests on evidence that was not introduced until trial. The defendant contends that King had no credible reason to inquire about the location of the registration because he had already reviewed the car's registration information in an electronic database before executing the traffic stop. But neither party introduced that evidence in the hearing on the motion to suppress. “We do not consider the testimony at trial in reviewing the motion judge's ruling on the motion to suppress.” Commonwealth v. Wittey, 492 Mass. 161, 174 (2023).⁴ The principle is particularly relevant here because King never had an opportunity to explain why he asked for the registration after confirming that the car was properly registered and had not been reported stolen. Moreover, the judge was never alerted that it might be necessary to make credibility findings about the reason King requested that the occupants open the glove compartment.

Second, King did not conduct a search requiring probable cause. After a lawful traffic stop, police officers may ask drivers to present their license and registration. See G. L. c. 90, § 11 (“Every person operating a motor vehicle shall have the certificate of registration for the vehicle ․ upon [her] person or in the vehicle ․”); Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 470 (1996). Here, the driver told King that the car belonged to a friend. King then asked her to produce the registration, and she claimed that she did not have it. In this context, it was reasonable to ask her to check the glove compartment. When the defendant explained that it was locked and the driver claimed she did not have the key, King reasonably suggested that the ignition key would open the glove compartment. Ultimately, based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the defendant opened the glove compartment in order to facilitate King's reasonable request to locate and produce the registration. This was not an improper search.

Moreover, when the defendant opened the glove compartment, he, not King, removed the white box, revealing a translucent bag containing several bundles of smaller purple wax baggies that King saw in plain view and immediately believed to be a large quantity of fentanyl packaged for sale. An officer is permitted to seize an object without a warrant when he is “lawfully in a position from which [he] view[s] [the] object” and when its “incriminating nature is immediately apparent.” Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 211 (1995). Because the defendant brought the bundles of purple wax baggies into plain view and their incriminating nature as fentanyl packed for sale was immediately apparent, King's warrantless seizure of the drugs was legal. The judge correctly denied the defendant's motion to suppress.⁵

2. Evidence of possession. The defendant next argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to prove that he possessed the drugs discovered in the car's glove compartment. The test for sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1970).

“To prove the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a class [A] substance (fentanyl) with intent to distribute, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) knowingly and intentionally (2) possessed a class [A] controlled substance (fentanyl), (3) with the specific intent to distribute it.” Commonwealth v. Lezynski, 466 Mass. 113, 118 (2013). “Proof of possession of a controlled substance may be established by circumstantial evidence, and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom.” Commonwealth v. LaPerle, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 424, 426 (1985). Inferences supporting a conviction “need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or inescapable” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Gomez, 495 Mass. 688, 693 (2025).

“Possession may be actual or constructive.” Commonwealth v. Sinforoso, 434 Mass. 320, 327 (2001). Here, because the drugs were not found on the defendant's person, the Commonwealth argued that the evidence established constructive possession. “Proof of constructive possession requires the Commonwealth to show ‘knowledge coupled with the ability and intention to exercise dominion and control.’ ” Commonwealth v. Cullity, 470 Mass. 1022, 1023 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 452 Mass. 142, 146 (2008). “[M]ere presence in proximity to the contraband is not sufficient to establish constructive possession.” Commonwealth v. Santana, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 265, 268 (2019). But “presence, supplemented by other incriminating evidence, ‘will serve to tip the scale in favor of sufficiency.’ ” Commonwealth v. Romero, 464 Mass. 648, 653 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Albano, 373 Mass. 132, 134 (1977). Indeed, “the defendant's presence, coupled with a ‘ “plus” factor,’ i.e., other incriminating evidence, may suffice.” Commonwealth v. Ortega, 441 Mass. 170, 174 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 48 Mass App Ct. 147, 149 (1999).

In this case, the jury heard testimony about various “plus factors” that could have supported their finding of constructive possession. The defendant gave the police a false name and social security number. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 222, 225 (1993) (defendant's use of false name allowed inference of consciousness of guilt in prosecution for trafficking with intent to distribute). He was carrying two cell phones. See Commonwealth v. Suarez, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 111, 118-119 (2003) (presence of multiple cell phones is evidence of drug distribution). He was a passenger in a borrowed car, and a police officer testified that drug dealers often attempt to conceal their identities by borrowing or renting cars. He was traveling late at night on a highway known for drug trafficking. He misrepresented their destination. See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 217 (2014) (“Evidence of ․ false statements to police ․ generally is admissible as some evidence of consciousness of guilt”). Finally, he appeared to shield the drugs from view. See Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 453 (2008) (inference of guilt may be drawn from defendant's attempt to conceal evidence). Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the contraband, along with both the ability and the intention to exercise control over it. The judge correctly denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty.⁶

Judgments affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The evidence at the suppression hearing consisted of witness testimony, cruiser camera footage, and body-worn camera (BWC) footage. Although the BWC footage was not formally introduced as an exhibit at the suppression hearing, the transcript makes clear that the judge viewed the relevant portions of the video recording and that he considered it as part of his analysis. As such, we do the same.

2.   Boland testified that source cities include Holyoke and Springfield in Massachusetts and Hartford, Bridgeport, and Waterbury in Connecticut.

3.   The same judge presided at both the suppression hearing and the trial.

4.   The defendant makes further arguments relying on facts only introduced at trial. He contends that giving a false name did not provide probable cause to believe a drug crime was occurring, that King did not observe any drug paraphernalia in the vehicle that gave him specific probable cause to search the glove compartment, and that the driver's and the defendant's calm demeanors cut against any suspicion that a crime was taking place. Pursuant to Wittey, 492 Mass. at 174, we decline to address these arguments.

5.   The defendant also argues that the traffic stop was pretextual and investigatory, and therefore, the fentanyl should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. A traffic stop is justified if the police have an objective reason to conduct it, even if there is some other subjective motive, such as suspicion of an ongoing crime. See Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 865-868 (2018). The defendant concedes as much.

6.   The defendant also argues that the judge erred in denying his motion to suppress because the Commonwealth introduced insufficient evidence in the suppression hearing to demonstrate that he possessed the drugs in the glove compartment. This argument conflates the admissibility of evidence with the sufficiency of the evidence. As explained above, the issue at the suppression hearing was the admissibility of the drugs, not the sufficiency of the evidence that the defendant possessed them.