MARGARET REICHENBACH v. TIMOTHY HAYDOCK (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a fifteen-day trial in the Superior Court, a jury found the defendants liable for violating the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA),³ trespass, and intentional interference with contractual relations (interference with contract). The jury awarded the plaintiffs damages totaling $3.7 million. After the trial, the judge granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their property. Then, the judge denied postjudgment motions by the defendants to stay the injunction, for a new trial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts (JNOV), and to alter or amend the judgments. On appeal, the defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient at trial and that various trial errors resulted in an unfair trial, the jury's damages award was improper, and the permanent injunction is unconstitutionally vague. We affirm.⁴

Background. We briefly summarize the procedural history of the case and the facts as the jury could have found them, reserving certain facts for later discussion. In 2008, the plaintiffs bought oceanfront property (the property) in Dartmouth, planning to build a new home. The defendants, Haydock and Moss, lived near the property, and Haydock had partial ownership of a lot abutting the property. The plaintiffs began construction on the property in 2009 and received a certificate of occupancy in 2014, but for reasons discussed later in this decision, they did not finish construction until 2016. They filed this lawsuit in 2015, alleging that the defendants engaged in myriad efforts to stymie the construction of their residence, extending construction time and cost.

These efforts, which we do not detail comprehensively, took the form of both petitioning and nonpetitioning activity. For example, on numerous occasions the defendants petitioned the town's conservation commission as well as the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) seeking to stop or delay construction. When those efforts were unsuccessful, the defendants also interfered with the work of the plaintiffs’ surveyor, repeatedly harassed the plaintiffs’ contractors, blocked the workers’ vehicles, moved garbage cans to the property line close to the plaintiffs’ residence, and trespassed on the property -- all nonpetitioning activity. The defendants filed an “anti-SLAPP” motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ petitioning-related claims pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, which the motion judge denied in an order this court affirmed on interlocutory appeal. See Reichenbach v. Haydock, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 576 (2017).

During the fifteen-day trial, the jury took a view of the property and the surrounding neighborhood, heard testimony from nineteen witnesses, and reviewed 181 exhibits. The jury returned verdicts in the plaintiffs’ favor and answered special interrogatories regarding when the plaintiffs’ claims accrued for purposes of the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiffs subsequently moved for a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from harassing them further, which the judge granted. The defendants moved to stay the permanent injunction pending their appeal and moved for a new trial, for JNOV, and to alter or amend the judgments. The judge denied each motion in a single order, and this appeal followed.

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendants raise several issues that, in essence, call into question the sufficiency of the evidence as to both plaintiffs, for each of the three causes of action. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV in a civil trial, we are to decide whether “anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the [nonmoving party].” Motsis v. Ming's Supermkt., Inc., 96 Mass. App. Ct. 371, 380 (2019), quoting Dobos v. Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634, 656, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). Applying that standard, we have no difficulty affirming the judge's denial of the defendants’ motions. We will analyze each of the three claims in turn.

a. Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. We turn first to the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendants violated the MCRA. To establish a violation of the MCRA, the plaintiffs were required to prove that the defendants interfered with their exercise or enjoyment of a constitutional or statutory right through threats, intimidation, or coercion. See Barron v. Kolenda, 491 Mass. 408, 423 (2023), quoting Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermkts., Inc., 469 Mass. 752, 762 (2014). The MCRA, “like other civil rights statutes, is remedial. As such, it is entitled to liberal construction of its terms.” Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 822 (1985), citing 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 72.05, at 392 (4th ed. 1974). “Whether conduct constitutes threats, intimidation, or coercion under the statute is tested against a reasonable person standard.” Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 749 (2002). As used in the MCRA, a threat “involves the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm.” Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 474, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 (1994) (Planned Parenthood II). Intimidation “involves putting [another] in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring conduct.” Id. Coercion is “the application to another of such force, either physical or moral, as to constrain him to do against his will something he would not otherwise have done” (citation omitted). Glovsky, supra at 763. Here, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants interfered with their use and enjoyment of the property. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to offer evidence that the defendants interfered with their property rights or used threats, intimidation, or coercion. They also argue that Haydock's interaction with the property was too minimal to constitute a violation of the MCRA.

We are unpersuaded, as the defendants’ arguments require construing facts in their favor rather than the appropriate standard of review, which is that we draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. Motsis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 380. The record does not support the defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs introduced no evidence that the defendants interfered with their property rights. On the contrary, the plaintiffs introduced ample evidence that the defendants interfered with their enjoyment of their property by causing the construction project to take much longer than anticipated. They also introduced testimony that the defendants’ behavior toward them affected their ability to host events at the property such as their daughter's wedding. Drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, the first prong of the MCRA was satisfied. Id.

Next, the defendants characterize their conduct toward the plaintiffs as mere petitioning activity because a large portion of it came in the form of repeated attempts to convince the conservation commission and the DEP to intervene and stop or delay the plaintiffs’ construction. Petitioning activity, they reason, cannot constitute “threats, intimidation, or coercion” under the MCRA because threats to engage in lawful activity do not constitute a cognizable harm under the statute. See Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 506 (2006). Even if we were persuaded that the defendants’ ostensible petitioning activity was “lawful” for the purposes of Haufler, supra -- which arguably would require an inference in the defendants’ favor rather than the plaintiffs’ -- the plaintiffs introduced abundant evidence of the defendants’ nonpetitioning activity that a jury could have reasonably concluded constituted threatening or intimidating behavior. For example, the fact that Moss stood near the property boundary approximately three hundred times during construction, while often taking photographs of the activity there, along with her other behavior aimed at interfering with the construction of the home, supports the inference that a reasonable person in the place of the plaintiffs would have been intimidated or “put in fear” by the defendants’ conduct. See Planned Parenthood II, 417 Mass. at 474.

Lastly, as to the defendants’ argument that Haydock had insufficient contact with the property to sustain a claim under the MCRA, we note that there is no specific quantum of evidence required by the statute. One threat or instance of intimidation or coercion that interferes with a protected right can suffice. See Batchelder, 393 Mass. at 823 (uniformed security officer ordered plaintiff to stop soliciting on one occasion). Here, we have several instances of Haydock's non-petitioning activity that a jury could have determined were threatening or intimidating. This conduct included a heated altercation with the plaintiffs’ general contractor on the property, forcing the plaintiffs’ painter off the road and yelling at him, and hiding in bushes near the property while staring at the plaintiffs’ son, who has a disability. In sum, the evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to find that both of the defendants interfered with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their property and did so through threats or intimidation.

b. Trespass. The defendants next claim the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to prove that they trespassed on the property. A trespass occurs when “a person ․ enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so, created by the possessor's consent or otherwise” (citation omitted). Gage v. Westfield, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 681, 695 n.8 (1988). Specifically, the defendants argue that no evidence would permit the jury to infer that Moss entered the property at all, and no evidence would permit the jury to infer that Haydock entered without permission. These arguments suffer from the same infirmity as the defendants’ arguments with respect to the MCRA. In the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the jury were free to infer that Moss entered the property without permission based on testimony of a security guard who saw her returning to her car from the direction of the property at night. Haydock's altercation with the plaintiffs’ general contractor on their property also suffices, as the jury were free to infer he lacked permission, particularly where the defendants introduced no affirmative evidence that the plaintiffs ever granted the defendants permission to enter their property not covered by easements.

c. Intentional interference with contractual relations. The defendants next argue the plaintiffs failed to prove their claim for interference with contract. Their argument rests on the premise that the plaintiffs failed to show that any party breached a contract or, in the alternative, that the plaintiffs failed to show that their performance of the contract became more difficult or expensive. Because the judge's instructions simply required the plaintiffs to show that the defendants caused their performance to be more expensive or burdensome, we treat the defendants’ argument first as a challenge to the jury instructions.⁵ Jury instructions are reviewed under a two-part test: “[W]hether the instructions were legally erroneous, and (if so) whether that error was prejudicial.” Kelly v. Foxboro Realty Assocs., LLC, 454 Mass. 306, 310 (2009), quoting Masingill v. EMC Corp., 449 Mass. 532, 540 n.20 (2007).

The judge's instructions follow the text of § 766A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) (Restatement), endorsed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Shafir v. Steele, 431 Mass. 365, 369 (2000). The crux of the defendants’ argument is that the court in Shafir, supra, limited adoption of § 766A in Massachusetts when it noted that the only difference between § 766 of the Restatement and § 766A is that “§ 766A involves interference preventing the plaintiff from performing his own part of the contract.” Id., citing Restatement § 766A comments b and c. According to the defendants, the court's characterization of § 766A, along with the fact that there was an actual breach in Shafir, supra, precluded the judge from instructing in this case that the plaintiffs needed only to show that the defendants caused performance of the contract to be more expensive or burdensome. We are unpersuaded, however, that the court so limited adoption of § 766A. Later in its opinion, the court said that it was recognizing § 766A and cited favorably cases from other jurisdictions that had done so. See Shafir, supra at 370 (declining to recognize § 766A “prospectively only”). Furthermore, the court's holding that § 766 of the Restatement focuses on a third party's contractual performance while § 766A focuses on performance by a plaintiff is harmonious with the rest of § 766A. Id. at 369. Accordingly, the judge committed no error of law in instructing the jury on the tort of interference with contract, and the plaintiffs were not required to prove a breach occurred.⁶

The remainder of the defendants’ argument rests on the presumption that “performance” in the context of § 766A requires something more than the payment of money, as in a contractual obligation to maintain a highway that was intentionally damaged. See Restatement § 766A comment g. The defendants argue that, because the plaintiffs’ only contractual requirement was to pay their contractor for services rendered, and the defendants did not make it more expensive or burdensome for the plaintiffs to literally transmit money to their contractor, the defendants cannot be liable under the theory outlined in § 766A. This argument is unavailing because it ignores the ways in which the defendants’ interference affected the scope of the plaintiffs’ contract for the construction of their home, therefore subjecting them to financial losses. See id. Forcing the plaintiffs to pay their surveyor to re-survey the plot after the defendants’ improper removal of boundary stakes is directly analogous to damaging a highway and forcing its maintainer to pay for its repair. In this light, the jury heard evidence that the defendants’ interference increased the costs of the construction by at least $2 million. The evidence was, accordingly, sufficient to prove that the defendants interfered with the plaintiffs’ contractual relations.

2. Trial issues. The defendants argue they were prejudiced by three errors made by the judge at trial. First, they argue the judge improperly allowed the plaintiffs to introduce evidence of harms that were time-barred by applicable statutes of limitations. Second, they argue the judge erred in allowing the plaintiffs to examine Moss about allegedly spoliated evidence. Third, they argue the judge failed to order a mistrial when the plaintiffs’ counsel gave an improper closing argument. As a threshold matter, we do not address the third argument, as the defendants waived their challenge to the closing argument when they did not object to the judge's curative instruction. See Cormier v. Pezrow New England, Inc., 437 Mass. 302, 311 (2002) (claimed error in jury instructions waived by failure to object). The defendants raised objections to the plaintiffs’ closing argument, and in response the judge gave a curative instruction, to which the defendants assented. In fact, the judge adopted the bulk of the defendants’ proposed curative instruction, albeit with less specificity.⁷

The defendants’ two remaining arguments concern the judge's evidentiary rulings. We review an evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, recognizing that a trial judge “has broad discretion to make evidentiary rulings, and substantial discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant” (quotation and citations omitted). Laramie v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 488 Mass. 399, 413 (2021). An abuse of discretion occurs “where we conclude the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.” Luppold v. Hanlon, 495 Mass. 148, 154-155 (2025), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). We address the arguments in turn.

a. Statutes of limitations. The defendants argue the judge abused his discretion by failing to decide that the plaintiffs’ MCRA and interference with contract claims accrued before October 1, 2012, and therefore that all evidence relating to events taking place before that date should have been excluded. For purposes of the statute of limitation, claims under the MCRA accrue once a plaintiff knows “all the facts necessary to make out” the claim. Pagliuca v. Boston, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 820, 823 (1994). Tort claims generally accrue from the date of injury, or “if the wrong is ‘inherently unknowable,’ when the plaintiff knows or should know that she has been injured.” Id. at 824, quoting Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 245-248 (1991). For both causes of action in question, knowledge of the injured party is at issue. “[A]ny disputed issues relative to the statute of limitations ought to be decided by the jury.” Riley, supra at 248.

For the MCRA claim here, the point at which the plaintiffs began to feel threatened or intimidated by the defendants’ conduct was at issue. See Planned Parenthood II, 417 Mass. at 474. As to the interference with contract claim, the point at which the plaintiffs knew or should have known that the defendants were intentionally and improperly interfering with performance of the contract was at issue. See Restatement § 766A. In contrast with cases like Pagliuca, supra, in which the complained-of injury unquestionably happened on a specific date, the defendants’ course of conduct in this case happened over an extended period of time, both before and after the relevant accrual date. The judge appropriately left to the jury the question when the plaintiffs discovered that the defendants had begun to injure them.⁸

b. Spoliation of evidence. The defendants claim the judge committed prejudicial error by allowing the plaintiffs to cross-examine Moss regarding pictures they believed were on a laptop they alleged she destroyed despite her duty to preserve it for discovery. “The doctrine of spoliation permits the imposition of sanctions and remedies where a litigant ․ negligently or intentionally loses or destroys evidence that the litigant ․ knows or reasonably should know might be relevant to a possible action, even when the spoliation occurs before an action has been commenced.” Scott v. Garfield, 454 Mass. 790, 798 (2009). The defendants argue the judge affirmatively found that no spoliation occurred because he denied the plaintiffs’ motion in limine requesting the entry of default as sanction for spoliation. We disagree with this interpretation, and rather conclude that the judge found the plaintiffs had failed to establish that sanctions for destruction of evidence were warranted. We further disagree that the judge's permitting the plaintiffs to cross-examine Moss about the laptop in question was a sanction for spoliation. Rather, it appears the judge was confirming that his pretrial ruling would not prevent the plaintiffs from cross-examining Moss on the topic -- which they were permitted to do as a matter of course, assuming no other rule of evidence excluded it. See Kippenhan v. Chaulk Servs., Inc., 428 Mass. 124, 128 (1998) (“We are aware of no jurisdiction that has suppressed a party's evidence or drawn an adverse inference against a party where neither that party nor anyone acting on that party's behalf was the spoliator”). Furthermore, a judge has discretion to allow a plaintiff to make use of the fact that evidence was lost despite declining to issue an adverse inference instruction. See Santiago v. Rich Prods. Corp., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 583 (2017). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's evidentiary rulings.

3. Damages. The jury awarded the plaintiffs damages totaling $3.7 million, with $1.5 million allocated to the MCRA claim; $200,000 to the trespass claim; and $2 million to the interference with contract claim. The defendants, arguing the damages were excessive, moved for a new trial or a remittitur pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59, 365 Mass. 827 (1974), which the judge denied. We review a trial judge's decision on such a motion for abuse of discretion. See W. Oliver Tripp Co. v. American Hoechst Corp., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 748 (1993). A trial judge should grant a motion for a new trial in a civil case only where “the verdict is so markedly against the weight of the evidence as to suggest that the jurors allowed themselves to be misled, were swept away by bias or prejudice, or for a combination of reasons, including misunderstanding of applicable law, failed to come to a reasonable conclusion.” Id. Furthermore, “[a]n award of damages must stand unless ․ to permit it to stand was an abuse of discretion on the part of the court below, amounting to an error of law.” Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson, 471 Mass. 272, 299 (2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1113 (2016), quoting Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 824 (1997). “It is an error of law if ‘the damages awarded were greatly disproportionate to the injury proven or represented a miscarriage of justice.’ ” Reckis, supra, quoting Labonte, supra.

Here, the defendants argue that the damages awards were speculative and excessive primarily because they were greater than what the defendants claim the plaintiffs requested at trial. We are unpersuaded. We note first that $700,000 of the total damages award was comprised of emotional damages, which are “inherently difficult to prove with certainty, to rebut, and to evaluate” (citation omitted). Labonte, 424 Mass. at 825. The jury heard testimony from both plaintiffs regarding the effects the defendants’ conduct had on them and were free to compensate the plaintiffs for these effects. See Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 467 Mass. 525, 545 (2014) (“that there may be an element of uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not bar their recovery” [citation omitted]).

Next, the defendants claim that the MCRA award duplicated the economic damages for the interference with contract award because the plaintiffs requested damages for fees charged by their consultants in response to the defendants’ numerous appeals. We disagree with the defendants’ characterization of the plaintiffs’ requests for damages, either in their complaint or their closing argument. Our review of the record reflects that the plaintiffs alleged a combination of economic and intangible harm without attributing either to a specific cause of action. The jury were instructed not to duplicate damages, and we presume the jury followed that instruction. See Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 468 n.25 (2011), S.C., 490 Mass. 698 (2022). Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought compensation for the loss of use and enjoyment of their property as part of their MCRA claim. The jury heard evidence that the plaintiffs could not move into the property as early as expected; that, even when they received their occupancy permit, the home remained unfinished and they could not enjoy the full use of the home; and that, even after the house was fully finished, the defendants’ threats and intimidation caused them diminished enjoyment. Given this evidence and the particularities of the property, we see no reason the jury's award of $1 million for non-emotional distress damages could not be fully accounted for by compensating the plaintiffs for their loss of use and enjoyment.

Finally, the defendants attempt to perform an accounting of the specific economic harms the plaintiffs alleged through testimony and invoice evidence, arguing the award was excessive because it did not match specific amounts adduced at trial. The defendants have cited no authority, nor have we found any, holding that damages in an interference with contract case must be proven with any special mathematical particularity. Rather, “[a] reasonable approximation of compensatory damages is permissible in cases of business torts in which close measurement is impossible and some indefiniteness is attributable to the wrongdoer's conduct.” Castricone v. Mical, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 602 (2009). The tort of interference with contract is meant to compensate the plaintiffs for harms caused by the defendants’ interference, and those harms are defined as “caus[ing the plaintiffs’] performance to be more expensive or burdensome.” Restatement § 766A. Here, the jury heard evidence that the cost of the project ballooned from an initial estimate of approximately $4.2 million on the low end to a final cost of $10 million. Furthermore, the jury heard evidence of the plaintiffs’ expenditures of personal time and effort in attending planning meetings and appeals, as well as meeting with counsel and consultants. Given this evidence, and the fact that how “burdensome” the plaintiffs’ performance became defied close measurement, the jury's award of $2 million is not “markedly against the weight of the evidence.” W. Oliver Tripp Co., 34 Mass. App. Ct. at 748. Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial due to excessive damages.

4. Permanent injunction. The defendants argue that the permanent injunction granted by the judge, the text of which is set out in the margin,⁹ was unsupported by the evidence and is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We review a judge's grant of injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. See LightLab Imaging, Inc. v. Axsun Techs., Inc., 469 Mass. 181, 194 (2014). The defendants first argue that no evidence suggested the defendants would use threats, intimidation, or coercion to interfere with the plaintiffs’ property rights in the future. A jury found the defendants liable for violating the MCRA, which requires as an element that the defendants engaged in threats, intimidation, or coercion. Furthermore, the defendants’ actions took place repeatedly over several years, ceasing only when the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. In this light, we cannot say the judge abused his discretion in fashioning this prohibition.

Next, the defendants argue that the injunction is unconstitutionally vague because reasonable minds could differ in their understanding of what certain terms mean. An injunction is unconstitutional if it forbids an act “so vague that [people] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 714 (1990), S.C., Planned Parenthood II. The defendants point out certain terms of the injunction that theoretically could be interpreted in constitutionally problematic ways. They fail, however, to show why the possibility of differing interpretations of a given term means a reader must “necessarily guess at its meaning.” Here, the language of the injunction plainly prohibits the defendants from harassing or surveilling the plaintiffs or others while on the property and from engaging in conduct a reasonable person would consider interfering with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their property. Because their conduct is subject to an objective analysis, the defendants’ constitutional rights are protected from any potential bad faith readings of the text of the injunction.

Finally, the defendants argue the injunction is overbroad because it extends to individuals who were not parties to the case. Where the plaintiffs introduced evidence of Haydock's behavior directed at their child as well as contractors in their employ, the language of the injunction was reasonably tailored to ensure the plaintiffs will be undisturbed by the defendants going forward. Furthermore, the prohibited conduct with respect to the people covered by the injunction is narrow. The defendants are prohibited from harassing, intimidating, photographing, coercing, or surveilling the persons in question. Absent other facts, we do not read the injunction as permitting them to be punished, as they suggest, for waving to the wrong person or for politely asking someone who happens to be covered by the injunction to move a vehicle blocking their driveway. Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion in fashioning the injunctive relief in question.

Conclusion. The judgments in favor of the plaintiffs on their claims for violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I, for trespass, and for intentional interference with contractual relations, and imposing permanent injunctions on each defendant, are affirmed. The order denying the defendants’ postjudgment motions for a stay of injunction, for a new trial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts, and to alter or amend the judgments, is also affirmed. The plaintiffs further request appellate attorney's fees and costs. They are entitled to those fees and costs pursuant to G. L. c. 12, § 11I, and may, within fourteen days of this decision, submit a detailed and supported submission of the fees and costs sought, in accordance with the procedures set forth in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10 (2004). The defendants may file a response within fourteen days thereafter.

Judgments affirmed.

Order denying postjudgment motions affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

3.   G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I.

4.   We acknowledge the amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs submitted by the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys.

5.   The judge instructed the jury that“the Plaintiff[s] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff[s] had a binding contract with [the contractor]; that the Defendants knew about the contract and intentionally and improperly interfered with the Plaintiffs[’] performance of that contract by preventing the Plaintiffs from performing or causing the Plaintiffs’ performance to be more expensive or burdensome. Third, the Defendants’ interference, in addition to being intentional, was improper in motive or in means. And fourth, the Plaintiff[s] suffer[ed] pecuniary loss or harm due to the Defendants’ actions.”

6.   To the extent the defendants argue the judge abused his discretion by giving the jury preliminary instructions under a § 766 theory of liability and then final instructions under § 766A, we are not persuaded. Even were we to take issue with the judge allowing the plaintiffs to “switch their theory of liability midtrial,” we discern no prejudice where the judge noted that his preliminary instructions were not a substitute for the final instructions, the complaint tracked the elements of § 766A, and the defendants were on notice that the plaintiffs would pursue liability under § 766A as early as July 2016.

7.   The defendants suggest that, regardless of their waiver, we may review the prejudice from the closing argument for plain error and manifest injustice. We decline to do so, as their argument for why it amounts to plain error merely recapitulates their other arguments.

8.   Although the defendants point to Margaret Reichenbach's testimony that Moss threatened her in January 2011 as dispositive of when she should have known that her MCRA claim had accrued, that question was for the jury to decide. Particularly where, in the same trial, Moss claimed that the threats never happened, and where the jury heard evidence of the defendants’ conduct that occurred after October 2012, we cannot say that the weight of the evidence was clear as to when the plaintiffs’ causes of action accrued or whether the jury awarded damages based on conduct which occurred before that date.

9.   “[T]he defendants, their agents, servants, and employees are permanently enjoined from threatening, harassing, intimidating, photographing, or coercing, surveilling the plaintiffs, their immediate family members, employees, tenants, contractors, vendors and others lawfully on the property, and further are permanently enjoined from conduct which an objectively reasonable person would conclude has the effect of interfering with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their property located at [address].”