KURT ILLINGER v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2021, the plaintiff, Kurt Illinger, filed a civil action in the Superior Court against the defendant, State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., seeking damages up to the limits of his automobile insurance policy after being injured in a car accident with an underinsured driver. Following a trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff $214,000 in damages, and the judge awarded him $98,709.21 in prejudgment interest. The judge allowed the defendant's postjudgment motion to alter or amend the judgment and reduced the judgment to the policy limit of $100,000. The plaintiff now appeals from (1) the amended judgment; and (2) the denial of the plaintiff's motion to further amend the judgment to restore prejudgment interest and costs (motion to reconsider). We affirm.

Background. This appeal stems from a car accident in December 2016. The plaintiff was rear-ended by an underinsured driver while stopped at a red light in Massachusetts. The plaintiff's vehicle was “totaled,” and he sustained severe injuries. The plaintiff suffered damages including over $12,500 in medical expenses, diminished earning capacity, and pain and suffering. The at-fault driver had a liability policy coverage limit of $20,000. The plaintiff maintained an automobile insurance policy (policy) with the defendant at the time of the accident. With the defendant's consent, the plaintiff settled with the at-fault driver's insurer for the full $20,000 limit.

The plaintiff's policy provided coverage for accidents with underinsured (and uninsured) drivers. The policy's applicable recovery limit for a single insured's bodily injuries resulting from an accident with an underinsured driver is $100,000.

After settling with the at-fault driver, the plaintiff made a demand on the defendant for $80,000, the remaining underinsurance policy limit. The defendant offered the plaintiff an amount lower than $80,000. The plaintiff then brought suit against the defendant.

After trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff $214,000 in damages. The judge added $98,709.21 in prejudgment interest for a total award of $312,709.21. The defendant then filed a postjudgment motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to the policy's underinsured motorist coverage limit of $100,000. The plaintiff agreed that the jury's verdict should be reduced to the policy limit, but he argued that the policy limit should not preclude the addition of prejudgment interest, costs of suit, and postjudgment interest. The judge disagreed and reduced the judgment to $100,000 in accordance with the express terms of the policy. The plaintiff then filed a motion to further amend the judgment to restore prejudgment interest and award costs of suit. The judge treated that as a motion to reconsider and denied it. The plaintiff appealed.

Discussion. 1. Prejudgment interest. The plaintiff argues that the judge committed reversible error by allowing the defendant's motion to alter or amend the judgment to exclude prejudgment interest. Because this is a contract interpretation claim, we review it de novo. Balles v. Babcock Power, Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 571-572 (2017).

The plaintiff is a New Hampshire resident, and his policy included a New Hampshire choice of law clause. Accordingly, the judge applied New Hampshire law to the substantive contractual issues, and we do the same.

The plaintiff focuses on the distinction between the terms “damages” and “judgment” throughout the policy. He cites the following language: “The limit shown under ‘Each Person’ is the most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one insured injured in any one accident ․” The plaintiff agrees that the insurer's obligation to pay damages is subject to the $100,000 limit, but argues that the limit should only apply to damages, and that it should not preclude his recovery of interest or costs, even if the total judgment exceeds $100,000. We disagree.

Another clause in the policy, found on the same page as the language quoted above, provides as follows: “Regardless of the amount of any award, including any judgment or default judgment, we are not obligated to pay any amount in excess of the available limits under the coverage of this policy” (regardless clause). The meaning of this language is plain: regardless of the total amount of “any judgment,” the defendant's obligation to pay does not exceed the policy limits. Thus, we read the regardless clause to cap the total award of money as a result of an accident with an underinsured motorist at $100,000, including pre- or postjudgment interest and court costs.

The plaintiff cites a New Hampshire statute in support of his argument:

“In all other civil proceedings at law or in equity in which a verdict is rendered or a finding is made for pecuniary damages to any party, whether for personal injuries, for wrongful death, for consequential damages, for damage to property, business or reputation, for any other type of loss for which damages are recognized, there shall be added forthwith by the clerk of court to the amount of damages interest thereon from the date of the writ or the filing of the petition to the date of judgment even though such interest brings the amount of the judgment beyond the maximum liability imposed by law.”

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 524:1-b. This statute allows injured parties to recover prejudgment interest in a sum beyond any maximum liability “imposed by law.” Id. In this case, however, the defendant's liability limit is imposed by the express language in the policy, not “by law.”

The New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed this statute in National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith. 133 N.H. 279, 281 (1990). The court first noted that the underinsured motorist provision in the policy at issue “disclose[d] an express distinction between ‘damages’ and ‘interest’ on any judgment.” Id. Based on this distinction, the court held that the policy relieved the insurer of any obligation to pay prejudgment interest, implicitly holding that parties could legally agree to waive statutory interest obligations. Id. at 281. The court then recognized that § 524:1-b “provides generally for the addition of interest to civil verdicts, and ․ expressly distinguishes ‘interest’ as outside the scope of ‘pecuniary damages.’ ” Id. Finally, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to postjudgment interest pursuant to § 524:1-b in addition to damages. Id. at 282.

We pause to note a distinction between this case and National Grange. The opinion in that case gives no indication that the balance of the damages and postjudgment interest the insurer was obligated to pay exceeded any underinsured policy limit. Id. at 281. In fact, the opinion does not refer to any underinsured policy limit at all. Therefore, it did not address whether an insurance policy can cap liability in spite of a statutory obligation to pay interest on judgments.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court revisited the reasoning in National Grange just a few years later in Metropolitan Prop. and Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ralph. 138 N.H. 378, 382-384 (1994). Although Metropolitan is a plurality opinion, it is instructive. First, the plurality noted that the policy at issue was materially identical to the policy in National Grange; that is, both policies made the distinction between damages and interest. Id. at 382-383. Despite that, the plurality then held that the term “damages” in an insurance policy necessarily included prejudgment interest. Id. But they added a caveat. The plurality concluded that N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 412:6 “limit[s] [an insurer's] statutory insurance obligation to the policy limits.” Id. at 383. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 412:6 (bodily injury liability policies bind insurer to pay all judgments “to the extent of the liability assumed by the policy”). In other words, although the term “damages” can be read to include prejudgment interest, pursuant to § 524:1-b, the total judgment still may not exceed the policy limits, pursuant to § 412:6.¹

In light of the plurality's reasoning in Metropolitan, we read the regardless clause to be the controlling language in the plaintiff's underinsured motorist policy with the defendant. See Metropolitan, 138 N.H. at 382-384. And “[w]e interpret [that] clause to limit the statutory insurance obligation to the policy limits,” consistent with § 412:6. Id. at 383. Thus, we agree with the judge that the plaintiff's policy capped the defendant's liability at $100,000 pursuant to § 412:6, regardless of any prejudgment interest that the plaintiff may have been statutorily entitled to recover pursuant to § 524:1-b.

2. Motion to reconsider. The plaintiff argues that the judge erred in denying his postjudgment motion to restore prejudgment interest and award costs. We review a judge's denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. See Audubon Hill S. Condominium Ass'n v. Community Ass'n Underwriters of Am., Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 461, 470 (2012).

A motion to reconsider “should specify (1) ‘changed circumstances’ such as (a) newly discovered evidence or information, or (b) a development of relevant law; or (2) a particular and demonstrable error in the original ruling or decision.” Audubon Hill, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 470, citing Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 600 (1940). The plaintiff's motion to further amend the judgment identified no such changed circumstances. Instead, the plaintiff attempted to relitigate his claims after an unfavorable outcome. “There is no error in the denial of a motion that merely seeks, as this one did, a ‘second bite at the apple.’ ” Liberty Square Dev. Trust v. Worcester, 441 Mass. 605, 611 (2004). We discern no error in the judge's original decision, and thus no basis to disturb her denial of the plaintiff's motion to reconsider.

Amended judgment entered March 28, 2025, affirmed.

Order denying motion to reconsider affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the plurality in Metropolitan affirmed the trial judge's award of prejudgment interest, the total award of damages plus prejudgment interest did not exceed the policy limit of $250,000. See Metropolitan, 138 N.H. at 380. That difference distinguishes Metropolitan, like National Grange, from this case.