ADOPTION OF IMANI v. << (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A Juvenile Court judge approved the child's proposed adoption plan over the plan of the Department of Children and Families (DCF), after a trial at which DCF advocated that the child be adopted by her maternal great aunt and at which the great aunt testified. After the time to appeal from that determination passed, the great aunt moved to intervene, and a Juvenile Court judge denied that motion. Concluding that the motion to intervene was untimely and that DCF adequately represented the great aunt's interest in trying to prove that adoption by the great aunt was in the child's best interests, we affirm.

1. Background. The child was born in March 2022 “substance exposed to multiple substances and weighing just six pounds.” She was diagnosed with multiple medical issues and remained hospitalized for more than two months. During this time, DCF identified a foster family capable of proving comprehensive foster care as a placement for the child. The foster family regularly visited the child in the hospital, as did the child's great aunt.

When the child was discharged from the hospital, she was placed with the foster family, where she has remained since. The great aunt immediately expressed a desire to assume care and custody of the child. New Hampshire child protective services approved the great aunt as an adoption resource, but DCF chose to continue placement of the child with the foster family, largely out of concerns related to the child's complex medical needs. The great aunt continued to visit the child.

In December 2023, after a trial, a Juvenile Court judge terminated the parental rights of the child's biological parents. No appeal was filed, and no party questions the propriety of these decrees.

In October 2024, DCF decided to place the child with the great aunt. Almost immediately, the child, through counsel, objected to this placement. The child supported adoption by the foster family. The Juvenile Court judge ordered that the child remain with the foster family with increased visitation for the great aunt while the matter was litigated.

In May 2025, the Juvenile Court judge held a trial on the competing adoption plans. DCF presented four witnesses, including the great aunt. The child presented eight witnesses. The judge concluded that the child's adoption plan was in the child's best interests, primarily because of the child's strong bond with the foster family and the foster family's demonstrated ability to address the child's complex medical needs.

Seventy-two days later, in September 2025, the great aunt moved to intervene in the underlying care and protection case to “share her side of the story and give [the child] a fair chance to be with her biological family or ․ give [the great aunt] a voice to advocate for the [the child] to stay connected with her family after adoption.” Both DCF and the child opposed the motion. On September 29, 2025, the judge denied the motion to intervene, finding that DCF had adequately represented the great aunt throughout the proceedings. This appeal followed.

2. Standard of review. “Although the rules of civil procedure are not applicable to proceedings in the Juvenile Court, Mass. R. Civ. P. 24, 365 Mass. 769 (1974), ‘may well be accepted as a cogent standard.’ ” Care & Protection of Richard, 456 Mass. 1002, 1002 n.3 (2010), quoting Care & Protection of Zelda, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 869, 871 (1989).

Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (a) allows intervention as of right “[u]pon timely application” by an applicant who “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and ․ is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” “A judge has discretion in determining whether an intervening party has demonstrated facts that entitle him or her to intervention as of right, and we accordingly review the judge's factual findings for clear error.” Holland Brands SB, LLC v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 745 (2024), quoting Galbi v. Cellco Partnership, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 262 (2022). “Whether those facts are sufficient to meet the requirements for intervention is a question of law, however, and is reviewed as such.” Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 217 (2011).

Permissive intervention is permitted under Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (b), again “[u]pon timely application,” when (1) “a statute of the Commonwealth confers a conditional right to intervene,” or (2) “an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.” “Permissive intervention is ․ a fact-dependent decision conferred to a judge's sound discretion,” Reilly v. Hopedale, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 384 (2023), and “we review for clear abuse of discretion.” Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. at 217.

3. Adequate representation. The Juvenile Court judge properly found that DCF adequately represented the great aunt's interests. See Galbi, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 263, quoting Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 409 Mass. 203, 206 (1991) (“[W]hen the applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same interests or ultimate objectives in the litigation, the application should be denied unless a showing of inadequate representation is made”). After a clinical review in October 2024, DCF concluded that any concerns DCF had regarding the great aunt had been “resolved” and named the great aunt as its preferred placement for the child. DCF increased visitation with the great aunt “to effectuate a transition.” DCF admitted that it did not make a best interests determination during the clinical review, but its position at the trial was that the great aunt was the “most appropriate adoptive resource for [the child],” and that, immediately following the trial, the child should be “permanently placed in the care of [the great aunt].” Although the trial judge ultimately was “not inclined to disrupt the secure attachment [the child] has with her caretakers of three years,” the trial judge concluded that the child is clearly “loved and cared for by both [the foster family] and [the great aunt].”²

The great aunt argues, however, that “DCF's representation was inconsistent and materially conflicted: DCF approved the appellant's placement then failed to defend it at trial.” In fact, the record reflects that DCF defended its adoption plan -- adoption by the great aunt -- and brought forth considerable evidence to support it. DCF called, in addition to three other witnesses, the great aunt to testify at the trial, and presented evidence that the great aunt had been involved since the child's birth, that the great aunt engaged in services, and that the great aunt's home was adequate for the child's needs. DCF argued that the great aunt's relative inexperience at handling the child's medical needs should be discounted as the great aunt “has not had as much time with [the child] and her providers as [the foster family].” It is evident that DCF's goal during the trial was the same as that of the great aunt: for the child to achieve permanency with the great aunt.

“If the interest of the prospective intervener ‘is identical to that of one of the present parties, ․ then a compelling showing should be required to demonstrate why this representation is not adequate.’ ” Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 485 (2015), quoting Mayflower Dev. Corp. v. Dennis, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 630, 637 (1981). Here, DCF's interest was to defend its own adoption plan by proving that placement with the great aunt was in the child's best interests -- precisely the great aunt's interest. That the great aunt believes different or additional evidence would be helpful does not negate the adequate representation that DCF provided for their joint objective. See Care & Protection of Zelda, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 873 (existing parties “can be expected to present to the court any contentions of merit that the applicants might offer” and “any information or opinions the applicants may have to convey”).

4. Timeliness. In considering the timeliness of a motion to intervene, a judge looks at “the totality of the circumstances.” Holland Brands SB, LLC, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 745, quoting Galbi, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 264. Whether the intervenor “ ‘knew or reasonably should have known that his interest was imperilled before he deigned to seek intervention’ is ‘the most important factor.’ ” Holland Brands SB, LLC, supra, quoting Galbi, supra. The judge may also consider “(1) whether the applicant could have intervened earlier; (2) whether delayed intervention would prejudice the central parties in the action; and (3) the force of the applicant's particular need to intervene.” Peabody Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1289, AFT, AFL-CIO v. School Comm. of Peabody, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 410, 413 (1990). As a general rule, “postjudgment motions to intervene, whether as of right or permissive, are seldom timely.” Reilly, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 384, quoting Bolden v. O'Connor Cafe of Worcester, Inc., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 61 (2000).

The great aunt could have moved to intervene earlier. The great aunt was well aware of the best interests trial and that DCF was litigating it. She knew at that time that she was “without party status,” and therefore could not “call witnesses” or “present evidence.” As she stated, “[s]he has been trying to seek counsel for three years and ha[s] not found anyone willing or able.” The motion was untimely because it should have been “apparent that [DCF] was not going to put on a case that met [her] standards” at least two months before she moved to intervene. Holland Brands SB, LLC, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 746.

Moreover, the action here did not take any “unexpected turn.” Holland Brands SB, LLC, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 745, quoting Johnson Turf & Golf Mgt., Inc. v. Beverly, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 390 (2004). Throughout the review and redetermination trial, DCF maintained its position that the great aunt was the most appropriate adoptive resource. As of July 13, 2025, when DCF relayed to the great aunt that it would “internally and independently make a decision as to whether [it] would like to take any further action regarding [the] matter,” the great aunt was on notice that DCF would not necessarily appeal from the judge's determination. Nonetheless, the great aunt took no action for more than seven weeks, until long after the time to appeal had run. Requirements of timeliness are construed strictly “in the context of determining custody for ․ children, where the interests of the children require particular attention to prompt action.” Ryan v. Lovendale, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 573 (2025). Accordingly, the denial of the motion to intervene is affirmed.

Order denying motion to intervene affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The great aunt “recommend[ed] the appeals court ․ request the photo albums from the lower courts ․ for review.” We have indeed viewed and considered the photographs in the albums, which demonstrate beyond any doubt the love the great aunt has for the child.