K.G. v. A.L.H. (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, A.L.H., appeals from the extension of a harassment prevention order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, § 3. On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge abused her discretion in extending the order because (1) the plaintiff did not present any new evidence establishing a continued need for the order, and (2) the judge did not make findings on the record supporting a two-year extension. We affirm.

Background. On July 29, 2024, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte harassment prevention order against the defendant.¹ The plaintiff's affidavit in support of the order described the following: On July 16, 2024, the defendant arrived at the plaintiff's business for an appointment. The defendant brought all her belongings into the room. At the end of the appointment, the defendant left, “seemingly satisfied with” the services. The next day the plaintiff stated that the defendant began sending her harassing e-mail messages, accusing her of stealing the defendant's purse and damaging her personal belongings. For instance, in one e-mail message, the defendant told the plaintiff that she would “come after [the plaintiff] unlike you have ever seen before” and that the “floodgates would open” if the plaintiff tried to cash the check the defendant gave her for the appointment. The defendant also wrote, “I am going to have someone do the same thing to you and all the others as you did to me ․ An eye for an eye!” In another email message, the defendant told the plaintiff that she would put her “out of business and then I am going to get someone to go into your belongings so you can see how it feels to be violated.” In a separate e-mail message, the defendant again said that she would put the plaintiff out of business and stated that she had “a member of her private security gain access to the building [where the plaintiff's office is located] long before [the defendant] arrived [for the appointment].”

The plaintiff continued to receive e-mail messages from the defendant through July 26, 2024. The defendant repeated her accusations of theft and stated that she would “get someone to do the same exact thing you did to me to you and your family.” The defendant called the plaintiff “trash” and said, “I am going to make sure you never work in your profession again.” She also wrote that “going silent won't get you out of this mess, the previous trash did the same thing. I am not going away and I don't care how long it takes me.”

At a two-party hearing on August 8, 2024, the judge extended the harassment prevention order for a period of one year (until August 7, 2025).² A year later, on August 7, 2025, the plaintiff again asked the judge to extend the order, testifying, “I do not want to open myself up to any chance that [the defendant] will send me hateful emails and voicemails like this.” The plaintiff did indicate that the defendant had not contacted her in the past year. The defendant, who opposed extending the order, testified that she wanted the plaintiff “out of my life” and did not want the plaintiff's name connected to hers. After hearing from both parties, the judge extended the order for two years, as requested by the plaintiff. This appeal followed.

Discussion. We review the decision to extend a harassment prevention order for abuse of discretion. See Yasmin Y. v. Queshon Q., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 252, 256 (2022). When a G. L. c. 258E order is already in place, the defendant is not permitted to challenge the evidence underlying the initial order, and the plaintiff is not required to reestablish the facts sufficient to support the initial grant of an order. See id. at 258; Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 740 (2005). Rather, the plaintiff must establish a continued need for the order to protect her from the effects of the past harassment, even if further harassment is not reasonably imminent. See Yasmin Y., supra at 259; Vera v. Seymour S., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 317 (2020).

The defendant argues that the judge abused her discretion in extending the order because the plaintiff did not present new evidence supporting a continued need for the order. We disagree. “The fact that harassment has not occurred during the pendency of an order shall not, in itself, constitute sufficient ground for denying or failing to extend the order, or allowing an order to expire or be vacated or for refusing to issue a new order.” G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (d). Indeed, compliance with the order does not prove that it is unnecessary, as defendants subject to harassment prevention orders are expected to comply with them. See MacDonald v. Caruso, 467 Mass. 382, 388-389 (2014) (explaining why passage of time with no violations does not amount to change in circumstances warranting modification of order). The plaintiff was not required to present new evidence of harassment to establish a continued need for the order. See G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (d).

The defendant's reliance on Danny D. v. Eli E., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 902 (2023), is misplaced. In concluding that a hearing judge abused her discretion in extending a harassment prevention order, a panel of this court did not hold that plaintiffs seeking extensions of harassment prevention orders must submit new evidence of harassment. Id. at 902 n.5. The panel was careful to note that “acts supporting the issuance of a harassment order in a different case could, in and of themselves, be of such a serious or threatening nature as to establish, without more, a continuing need for protection for a duration extending beyond the term of the initial order.” Id.

The defendant also contends that the judge abused her discretion in extending the order for two years without making findings of fact to support the extension. We disagree. No specific findings are required if, after reviewing the record, we can “discern a reasonable basis for the order in the judge's rulings and order.”³ G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 396 (2018). Additionally, the duration for which the order should be extended is also a matter of discretion, based on a showing of continuing need for the order. The specific question to be determined by the judge is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated reasonable, continuing fear of harassment. If so, the judge has the authority “to extend the order for any additional time reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff or to enter a permanent order.” G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (d). Here, the plaintiff testified that she found the defendant's messages “very threatening” and stated, “I do not want to open myself up to any chance that she will send me hateful emails and voicemails like this.” Based on each party's respective testimony, the judge reasonably found a continued need for the order to protect the plaintiff and her decision to extend the order for two years did not fall outside the range of reasonable alternatives. See Constance C. v. Raymond R., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 394 (2022).

Extension order, dated August 7, 2025, affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record appendix includes the plaintiff's affidavit in support of the harassment prevention order, but it does not include a transcript from the ex parte hearing on July 29, 2024.

2.   We note that the defendant's record appendix does not include a transcript from the August 8, 2024, hearing. The defendant does not challenge on appeal whether the plaintiff established at this hearing “[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property.” Orla O. v. Patience P., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 127 (2021), quoting G. L. c. 258E, § 1.

3.   Contrary to the defendant's portrayal of the case, Danny D., 102 Mass. App. at 902, does not require the hearing judge to make oral or written findings supporting an extension. There, we noted that the hearing judge did not make any written or oral findings of fact, and that “[t]he judge's general comment that he was extending the orders ‘based on the affidavits and ․ the credible testimony’ does not permit us to infer a finding that extension of the orders was reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiffs.” Id. at 902 n.6. Unlike Danny D., supra, the present case presents circumstances, where, even in the absence of oral or written findings, the record does enable us to “discern a reasonable basis for the order in the judge's rulings and order.” G.B., 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 396.