COMMONWEALTH v. L.T.1 (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The Commonwealth appeals from the orders of two District Court judges to seal the records of the petitioner, L.T. Where the judge considered and applied the factors under Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 316 (2014), we discern no abuse of discretion and thus affirm.

Background. On July 29, 2022, the petitioner was arraigned in the District Court on five counts.² He pleaded to sufficient facts to warrant a guilty finding, and all counts were dismissed after being continued without a finding, except for a count of assault and battery on a police officer, which was dismissed at the request of the Commonwealth.

On March 10, 2023, the petitioner was arraigned in the District Court on one count of possession of “crack” cocaine, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, § 34. On June 30, 2023, the petitioner was arraigned on two additional criminal charges.³ On July 13, 2023, the petitioner pleaded to sufficient facts to warrant a guilty finding on both dockets, and all counts were continued without a finding.

On August 7, 2023, the petitioner filed a pro se motion requesting the dismissal and sealing of the 2023 charges (“case one”). On that same day a District Court judge dismissed the charges. On August 16, 2023, a District Court judge allowed the petitioner's petition to seal in case one. On June 17, 2024, the petitioner filed a second pro se petition to seal the record related to his July 29, 2022, charges (“case two”). On July 19, 2024, a different District Court judge allowed the petition to seal the record.

In both cases, the judges had similar evidence before them. At both hearings, the petitioner presented details of his political activism and community service, along with his claim that the public records would “stop [him] from housing, employment” and “[his] business entity as far as it growing or anything [he] want[s] to do in [the] political spectrum.” At the hearing on case two, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the petitioner had made a statement, among others, to the arresting officer on July 28, 2022, that he was “going to keep doing what he's doing no matter what anyone thinks or tells him to do.” Despite the Commonwealth's opposition, both judges found that the factors articulated in Pon, 469 Mass. at 316, weighed in favor of sealing. The Commonwealth appeals from both orders to seal the petitioner's records.

Discussion. The Commonwealth makes two primary arguments on appeal: (1) that the judges’ findings that the Pon factors weighed in favor of allowing the petitions to seal constituted an abuse of discretion; and (2) that the judges failed to consider the Commonwealth's arguments and make sufficiently detailed findings. We review the judges’ decisions to seal a record for abuse of discretion or error of law. Pon, 469 Mass. at 299. “Under the abuse of discretion standard, the issue is whether the judge's decision resulted from ‘a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision ․ such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.’ ” Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 672 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

In Pon, 469 Mass. at 321-322, the Supreme Judicial Court “announce[d] ․ a lower standard for sealing” a criminal record under G. L. c. 276, § 100C, requiring that a petition to seal should “set[ ] forth facts that demonstrate good cause for overriding the presumption of public access to court records.” The petitioner has the burden to show good cause for sealing based on the following factors:

“the particular disadvantages identified by the defendant arising from the availability of the criminal record; evidence of rehabilitation suggesting that the defendant could overcome these disadvantages if the record were sealed; any other evidence that sealing would alleviate the identified disadvantages; relevant circumstances of the defendant at the time of the offense that suggest a likelihood of recidivism or of success; the passage of time since the offense and since the dismissal or nolle prosequi; and the nature of and reasons for the particular disposition.”

Pon, supra at 316. The Pon factors are not exclusive, as the judge “may consider any factors relevant to their weighing of the interests at stake.” Commonwealth v. J.F., 491 Mass. 824, 842 (2023). In the end, the judge must employ a balancing test to determine whether the petitioner's right to privacy outweighs the public's right of access. Pon, supra.

1. Application of Pon factors. The Commonwealth first argues that the petitioner did not provide evidence that his criminal record caused him to experience particular disadvantages within the meaning of Pon factor one. We disagree. The evidence presented at both hearings was sufficient to allow the judges to conclude that he had shown the disadvantages he had experienced (or could experience) stemming from the availability of his criminal record. Pon makes clear that a petitioner need only make a credible allegation of “some disadvantage stemming from [criminal offender record information] availability that exists at the time of the petition or is likely to exist in the foreseeable future. This can include, but is not limited to, a risk of unemployment, underemployment, or homelessness ․” Pon, 469 Mass. at 316-317. The petitioner raised concerns about his employment or potential underemployment including that “[his record is] going to stop [him] from basically [his] business entity as far as it growing.” Moreover, the petitioner argued that he would have difficulty finding housing and raised the potential for negative impact on his political activities or participation. To be sure, the Commonwealth's arguments -- including its contentions regarding the petitioner's “systematic reoffending” -- have a degree of persuasiveness, and we recognize that different judges might have reached different conclusions. Nevertheless, in view of the evidence presented by the petitioner, we cannot say the judges here abused their discretion in finding factor one of the Pon standard applied.⁴ See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27.

The Commonwealth next argues that the petitioner's statement that he would continue to reoffend demonstrates that he did not take meaningful steps towards rehabilitation, and thus the judges improperly applied Pon factor two. Here again, there is a measure of persuasiveness to the Commonwealth's argument. However, the petitioner's statements are a single factor among many the judge must consider under Pon. See J.F., 491 Mass. at 841-842. Considering all the facts in the record, including, inter alia, that the petitioner started his own business, alleged difficulty in searching for housing, and raised concerns regarding impacts on work and related activities, we cannot conclude that the judges abused their discretion in determining that the petitioner “demonstrate[d] good cause for overriding the presumption of public access to court records.” Pon, 469 Mass. at 322. See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27.

The Commonwealth also argues that the judges should not have found that Pon factors three through six weigh in favor of sealing the petitioner's records because the nature and extent of his record suggests a lack of rehabilitation. This argument fails. Under Pon factor three, the judges considered the nature of the underlying crimes, stigma or stereotypes attached to the crimes, and whether the petitioner is a safety threat to community. The record supports the judges’ conclusions. Indeed, in support of Pon factor three the petitioner noted that he would benefit from sealing because it would not “bring harm to the public” or “impact the community in a negative light.” As to the remaining Pon factors, the Commonwealth challenges their application based on the petitioner's extensive criminal history. However, where the charges were dismissed, continued without a finding, or nol prossed, and where the petitioner completed his probationary period, we discern no abuse of discretion in the determination that the petitioner's circumstances at the time of the offense support a likelihood of success in not reoffending (factor four),⁵ that the passage of time supports good cause for sealing (factor five), and that the nature and reason for the dispositions support good cause for sealing (factor six). See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27.

2. Detailed findings. Citing Commonwealth v. J.F., 491 Mass 824, 841, 847 (2023), the Commonwealth argues that the judges’ failure to specify the reasons for their decisions compels a remand. We disagree. J.F. stands for the proposition that judges must establish that they have engaged in the appropriate balancing of the interests and explicitly state the factors that were considered. Id. at 844. In concluding that the petitioner's records should be sealed, the judges considered the oral and written arguments of both parties. They were actively engaged in the hearing and asked questions of the petitioner and the assistant district attorney who appeared for the Commonwealth. The judges also checked boxes on the relevant form or made a record reflecting that they had considered each of the relevant Pon factors. The evidence presented at the hearings provided adequate support for the judges’ findings and orders, and, in the present context, the judges did not abuse their discretion by failing to further articulate why they did not accept the Commonwealth's arguments.⁶

Orders allowing petitions to seal records affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Operating after a suspended license, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 90, § 23; resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B; disorderly conduct, G. L. c. 272, § 53; assault and battery on a police officer, G. L. c. 265, § 13D; and failure to stop for the police, G. L. c. 90, § 25.

3.   Operating after a suspended license, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 90, § 23, and possession of heroin, G. L. c. 94C, § 34. He was also charged with, and later found responsible for, a civil motor vehicle infraction.

4.   The Commonwealth asks us to review the judges’ decisions de novo, arguing that the judges misinterpreted G. L. c. 276, § 100C. This is not the case; the judges weighed the relevant Pon factors which we review for abuse of discretion as discussed supra.

5.   In case one, the judge found that factor four applied while in case two, the other judge did not.

6.   To be clear, however, in circumstances where the Commonwealth presents arguments detailing why a petition to seal should be denied, it would be advisable for judges to address those arguments in greater detail.