COMMONWEALTH v. CHRISTOPHER MEDEIROS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant, Christopher K. Medeiros, appeals from his convictions on three counts of indecent assault and battery. We affirm.

Based on the evidence at trial, the jury could have found that from about the age of five to eighteen (2000 through 2014), the victim lived with his mother and the defendant, who was the mother's boyfriend and “[l]ike a stepdad” to the victim. The victim had “learning disabilities” and had a “pretty low” intelligence quotient. The defendant physically abused the victim by striking him with his hands and a belt. He also sexually abused the victim on more than twenty occasions. The victim revealed the abuse in 2014, after the defendant moved out of the family home.

1. Missing evidence. We disagree with the defendant's contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the judge had an obligation to dismiss the complaints under Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 (1980). He argues that Bowden required dismissal where the police did not preserve screenshot images (screenshots) of messages from the defendant's cell phone showing that the victim asked to live with the defendant after the alleged sexual assaults. Bowden, however, stands for the proposition that a judge may not instruct a jury “that the nonexistence of certain scientific tests and other evidence was not to be considered in reaching a judgment.” Bowden, 379 Mass. at 485. As far as we can discern from the record, the judge here gave no such instruction, did not deny a defense request “for a Bowden motion,” as the defendant puts it in his brief, and did not deny a motion to dismiss on the basis now claimed. Thus, we discern no error creating a “substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.” Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 597 (1997).

We also disagree with the defendant's claim that the judge “erred in conducting a trial without the [police preserving] exculpatory evidence of screen shots that were contained on the [d]efendant's cell phone.” Defense counsel raised this issue on the third day of trial, during his cross-examination of a police detective. Defense counsel represented to the judge that the screenshots depicted text messages from the victim to the defendant in 2016 or 2017 in which the victim told the defendant that “he wanted to come live with him.” The judge, sua sponte, held a voir dire hearing. During the voir dire, the detective could not recall whether the defendant's cell phone was ever analyzed or whether the contents were ever preserved.

Assuming the police failed to preserve cell phone evidence showing that the victim expressed a desire to continue to live with the defendant after the alleged abuse occurred, the judge was not required to suspend the trial as the defendant maintains. “If a defendant establishes that the Commonwealth has destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence, then the judge next must consider the appropriateness and extent of remedial action to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Sasville, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 21 (1993). “[T]he judge has discretion concerning the manner in which to protect the defendant's rights.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 317 (1992). As a remedial measure here, the judge allowed the defendant to testify to the content of the cell phone messages and allowed defense counsel to argue that the defendant provided the messages to the police. See Commonwealth v. Gabbidon, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 536 (1984) (no prejudice from missing evidence where defendant conveyed information “through examination of the witnesses and argument to the jury”).

We discern no abuse of discretion in this remedial action that placed the substance of the missing evidence before the jury. See Sasville, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 21. According to the detective, who recently retired, the defendant in 2017 pointed out text messages on his cell phone. Though initially excluding testimony about the content of the text messages, the judge later allowed testimony about the content of the messages after learning that the defendant did not possess the messages or the cell phone. The defendant then testified that in 2016 or 2017 the victim “friend requested me on Facebook.” The defendant further testified that the victim responded to a Facebook message and “asked me if I can come get him and to move in with me.” The defendant provided the messages to the police and provided his consent to search his cell phone.

The judge also permitted wide latitude to defense counsel in his closing argument. Defense counsel referred to the message on the cell phone: “[The victim] reached out to him and asked to move in with him, for him to come see him, something to that effect, something that he testified he told the detective during that recorded interview. Showed him the phone. Gave him the phone.” Counsel also told jurors that this testimony was never rebutted by the Commonwealth: “That is uncontradicted, his testimony․ You better believe if it was, it would have been shown to you.” Thus, we discern no error in the remedial measures taken by the judge where jurors heard evidence and argument regarding both the content of the messages on the cell phone and the police possession of those messages.

2. Juror. We next discern no error in the trial judge not excusing a juror for cause. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 842 (2010). The juror initially revealed that he had concerns with being fair and impartial because he had a son with autism, and noted, “I guess I can more understand the case, the fact that I know what autism is or kids with disability, their vulnerabilities against this type of predators.” The judge asked the prosecutor and defense counsel, “You know, the juror indicated that he would in part hold it against the defendant because he has a similarly aged son to the alleged victim [inaudible] is there a cause challenge?” Defense counsel responded, “No,” but the prosecutor invoked a challenge for cause because the juror worked for the information technology department in a prosecutor's office. The judge denied the prosecutor's request.

The judge then invited defense counsel to ask further questions, while the judge continued the questioning. The juror explained that despite cognitive disabilities his son can tell the truth, and “[h]e's usually truthful.” Defense counsel followed up and asked, “Do you make room for the possibility that somebody who has similar issues, a different person, might not tell the truth?” The juror responded, “Oh yeah. Oh, yeah; because I caught him lying sometime. I mean it happens. He's not perfect.” Defense counsel probed further, “So could you assess the credibility of the witness based on his circumstances and the evidence regarding him and kind of leave out the personal experiences that you have with your own son?” The juror responded, “I believe so, yeah.”

Questioning then focused on the juror's command of the English language because he expressed some concern. After further discussion, the judge concluded that the juror's English language abilities “seem excellent.” The judge gave defense counsel an opportunity to confer with the defendant about exercising a challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge. Defense counsel responded, “I don't -- well, I'm not asking to strike him for cause.” After the prosecutor said he was content, the judge concluded that the juror was indifferent and seated him. Neither party exercised a peremptory challenge.

On appeal, the defendant now reverses course and claims the juror should not have been seated. “[W]e will not conclude that the judge abused [her] discretion by empanelling the juror unless juror prejudice is manifest.” Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. 439, 443 (2001). Here, the judge thoroughly examined the juror on two areas of concern -- potential bias due to the juror's expressions of concern about his own experience and English language skills, then found the juror indifferent, and both parties ultimately indicated they were content. On this record, we cannot say that the judge erred.

3. Mother's statement. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the judge did not preclude impeachment of the mother with a prior inconsistent statement. At trial, the mother testified that the defendant had genital warts (a fact that the victim also testified about). Defense counsel then attempted to impeach her by asking, “So if you were asked by that detective if you saw anything distinctive on [the defendant's] penis during the time of your relationship and your answer was no, that would have been an honest answer, right?” The mother agreed, “Yeah. Yeah, honest answer.” While the form of the question was imperfect, defense counsel did have the chance to inquire about the mother's prior inconsistent statement to the police.

4. Victim's knowledge of sexual matters. We discern no error from the judge's exclusion of evidence that the victim (as an adult) allegedly had naked photographs of himself and his girlfriend in 2019. On appeal, the defendant contends that the existence of these photographs, which were taken after the defendant moved out of the family's home, should have been admissible to impeach the mother's testimony that the victim acted out when the defendant was present. As the judge noted when defense counsel sought to introduce this evidence, “I don't see how that has anything to do with his testimony about what he alleges the defendant did to him between the ages of, you know, 14 or 15 and 18. It doesn't go to [inaudible] it postdates this and it happens when he's an adult.” Defense counsel responded, “Okay. I think I made the best argument I can make.” The judge replied, “I just don't think that this -- I just don't think that this particular incident is relevant.” We agree with the judge's assessment of the proposed evidence. The photographs were taken after the defendant moved out, and the defendant at trial and on appeal has not offered an explanation showing how the photographs were relevant.

5. Closing argument. Finally, we discern no error and no prejudice from the prosecutor's closing argument. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 140-141 (2007). The defendant contends that the prosecutor, when responding to the defense argument, mischaracterized the defense argument that the victim had been “coached.” In his summation, defense counsel did not use the word, “coached,” but he questioned the lack of detail in the victim's statement to an interviewer and questioned why follow up questions had to be asked to elicit the victim's statement about the details of the sexual abuse. In his own summation, the prosecutor argued, “It was suggested that [the victim] was coached, that he was led along.” The prosecutor's argument was not improper. A prosecutor is entitled “to respond to the defendant's closing argument.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 822 (2018). Arguments allow for some measure of excusable hyperbole. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kozubal, 488 Mass. 575, 591 (2021) (no error where prosecutor stated “[d]efendant says that he wasn't her teacher,” but defense counsel described defendant as “tech guy” rather than teacher).

Judgments affirmed.