COMMONWEALTH v. ADAMS (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

From his position stopped at a traffic light behind the defendant's car, a State police trooper saw a crack in the defendant's windshield and stopped the car. On interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, the defendant argues that the stop was unlawful.² We affirm.

The defendant maintains that although the windshield crack would have prevented his vehicle from passing the annual safety inspection, it was not proper grounds for a stop because it was not a traffic violation. He further argues that the crack did not sufficiently impede his view to violate G. L. c. 90, § 13, which prohibits a motor vehicle operator from “permit[ting] to be on or in the vehicle ․ anything which may interfere with or impede the proper operation of the vehicle.”

For an investigatory stop to be justified under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, police must have reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred. See Commonwealth v. Rivas, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 217 (2010). General Laws c. 90, § 20, proscribes operation of “a motor vehicle ․ that fails to meet the safety standards” established by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. Promulgated under G. L. c. 90, § 7A, those safety standards direct that a vehicle will be rejected from passing inspection if its windshield has a “[s]ingle line crack[ ] which extend[s] more than three inches into the critical viewing area,” 540 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.04(8)(c)(3) (2018), defined as “the area covered by the sweep of the wiper(s) exclusive of the outer two inches within the perimeter of the wiper(s) sweep,” 540 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.04(8)(b) (2018). Based on the testimony of the trooper and photographs in evidence, the judge found that the crack was at least six inches long and in the driver's viewing area. She ruled that a vehicle that does not meet the safety standards is subject to suspension of registration pursuant to 540 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.01 (2018), and so is not permitted to travel on public ways. We agree.

Observation of the crack in the windshield gave the trooper reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving with an uncorrected safety defect in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 20. See Rivas, 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 218. Reasonable suspicion for a safety defect is grounds for a lawful stop. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472 Mass. 767, 776 (2015) (motor vehicle stops based on reasonable suspicion of violation of safety standards enable police “to immediately address potential safety hazards on the road”). See also Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. at 36 (cracked windshield and expired inspection sticker); Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 207 (1995) (broken taillight).

Because the trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle for a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 20, we need not address his contention that the windshield crack did not interfere with or impede operation of his vehicle in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 13.

Order denying motion to suppress affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The defendant does not claim that the trooper did not have grounds to order him out of the car and pat frisk him. The motion judge credited the trooper's testimony that the defendant had suspiciously “checked” the trooper's approach in the rear-and side-view mirrors, had a pocket knife next to him in the console, and was “shielding” “an unnatural bulge protruding from his ․ lower abdomen/waist area” while sitting in the car. Concerned for his safety and suspecting that the defendant was concealing a firearm, the trooper ordered him out of the car and pat frisked him; feeling the bulge, the trooper recognized it as having “the same size, shape, and feel of a firearm.” The judge ruled that the exit order and patfrisk were justified out of concern for the trooper's safety. The trooper also had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was “armed and dangerous,” as the standard was clarified recently in Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 37-38 (2020).