COMMONWEALTH v. BANGARI (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Rajindra Bangari, appeals from the denial of a petition to vacate an order revoking his bail.² On appeal, the defendant argues G. L. c. 276, § 58B, does not authorize a court, other than the court before which the original matter is pending, to revoke bail. We affirm.

Discussion. Contrary to the defendant's claim, G. L. c. 276, § 58B, does not confine the authority to revoke bail to the original court. Pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58B,

“A person who has been released after a hearing pursuant to section[ ] ․ 58 ․ and who has violated a condition of his release, shall be subject to a revocation of release and an order of detention. The judicial officer shall enter an order of revocation and detention if after a hearing the judicial officer finds (1) that there is probable cause to believe that the person has committed a federal or state crime while on release ․; and (2) the judicial officer finds that there are no conditions of release that will reasonably assure the person will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community; or the person is unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions of release.”

This statute authorizes a judge to revoke a defendant's bail for up to ninety days. G. L. c. 276, § 58B. A similar statute, G. L. c. 276, § 58, allows for revocation of bail for up to sixty days if there is probable cause to believe the person committed a subsequent offense and a determination that releasing the person will endanger the community or any person. Section 58 explicitly grants authority to revoke bail to “the court before which the person is charged with committing a subsequent offense.” The defendant argues that the absence of similar language in § 58B indicates that the Legislature intended the revocation authority under § 58B to be limited to the court that originally granted bail.

When interpreting statutes, we look “first to the statute's plain language.” Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 604 (2019). “[W]here the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent.” Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118 (2018), quoting Malloch v. Hanover, 472 Mass. 783, 788 (2015). Section 58B grants authority to “the judicial officer.” There is no language in § 58B that such authority is limited to the judicial officer of the court that released the defendant on the original complaint. Thus, we disagree that the Legislature intended such a limitation.

The defendant argues that confining § 58B to the original court “is reasonable” because, on the one hand, § 58B focuses on the conditions of release and allows for a ninety-day revocation, and, on the other hand, § 58 focuses on subsequent offenses and allows for a sixty-day revocation. As the Supreme Judicial Court has noted, however, the differing requirements of proof under the two statutes explains the difference in length of time for which bail can be revoked. See Josh J. v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 716, 723 (2018) (“the dual bail revocation mechanisms established by §§ 58 and 58B are constitutionally sufficient, in part, because the Commonwealth can move for a sixty-day revocation, with a reduced showing, under § 58, or for a ninety-day revocation, with a heightened showing ․ under § 58B”). Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that “a trial court judge may revoke bail under either § 58 or ․ § 58B, if the Commonwealth is able to make the requisite showing under the respective statute.” Id. at 724. Once the requisite showings have been made, as they were here, we see no limitation in the statutory scheme that precludes the judge of a different court considering a subsequent offence from revoking a defendant's bail pursuant to § 58B.

Order of single justice affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The defendant appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to the Supreme Judicial Court order entered on June 3, 2020, “Order Regarding Transfer of Certain Single Justice Matters During the Covid-19 Pandemic.” Accordingly, we do not have the benefit of thorough briefing by both sides which generally precedes the issuance of a memorandum and order pursuant to rule 23.0.