JOHN ROBIN v. EDUGIE OMOREGBEE JAMES NORIEGA ACADIANA FOOT CENTERS LLC QUENTIN ROMERO LAFAYETTE GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER LAFAYETTE GENERAL SOUTHWEST (2026)

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

JMG

JLW

JDH

JBM

PDG

CRC

AHP

Supreme Court of Louisiana June 02, 2026

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

Nos. 2026-CC-00387

2026-CC-00391

2026-CC-00397

JOHN ROBIN

VS.

EDUGIE OMOREGBEE, D.P.M., JAMES NORIEGA, D.P.M., ACADIANA FOOT CENTERS, LLC, QUENTIN ROMERO, M.D. LAFAYETTE GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER D/B/A LAFAYETTE GENERAL SOUTHWEST

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Lafayette

PER CURIAM

We are called upon to determine whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the judgment of the district court and granting a mistrial. For the reasons that follow, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, and we reinstate that judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against five health care providers. The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the twelve-person jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. The verdict form contained separate questions asking the jury whether each of the five defendants breached the standard of care in the treatment of plaintiff. The jury answered “no” to all five questions.

Plaintiff's counsel requested that the jury be polled. In response to a query from the court, plaintiff's counsel advised she wanted a “general” poll, not a poll for each specific question on the verdict form. The poll was conducted verbally. Four of the twelve jurors indicated they did not agree in general with everything on the verdict form. No additional polling or clarification was requested by plaintiff. After polling was completed, the district court discharged the jury.

Plaintiff then filed a motion for mistrial. Plaintiff argued that the jury polling showed that the verdict did not conform with La. Code Civ. P. art. 1797(B), which provides “[i]f trial is by a jury of twelve, nine of the jurors must concur to render a verdict unless the parties stipulate otherwise.”

The district court denied the motion. In oral reasons for judgment, the district court explained it instructed the jurors prior to deliberations that nine jurors must agree with each question on the verdict form. It found that the results of the general polling did not establish that the jury failed to follow this instruction.

Plaintiff applied for supervisory review. The court of appeal summarily granted writs and reversed, finding the “jurors’ responses to general polling called into question the issue of whether the jury complied with La. Code Civ. P. art. 1797(B)․” The court of appeal therefore granted the mistrial and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants now apply to this court in three separate applications. On our own motion, we consolidate the applications for consideration.

DISCUSSION

In Gotch v. Scooby's ASAP Towing, LLC, 2019-0030 (La. 6/26/19), 285 So. 3d 459, 462–63, we succinctly discussed the law applicable to mistrials in civil cases. We stated:

Prior to 1995, the Code of Civil Procedure did not expressly provide for mistrials in civil cases. However, our jurisprudence recognized that “this device is not precluded when no other remedy would afford relief.” Spencer v. Children's Hosp., 432 So.2d 823, 825 (La. 1983). In 1995, the legislature codified this jurisprudence in La. Code Civ. P. art. 1631(C), which provides, “[t]he court on its own motion, or on the motion of any party, after hearing, may grant a mistrial.”

The case law, both before and after the enactment of La. Code Civ. P. art. 1631(C), has consistently held that a trial court is afforded vast discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial, since mistrials are not a matter of right. See, e.g., Boutte v. Kelly, 02-2451 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/17/03), 863 So.2d 530, 549; Searle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 557 So.2d 321, 323 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990). An appellate court may not disturb a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Beaumont v. Exxon Corp., 02-2322 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/10/04), 868 So.2d 976, 985.

Because a mistrial is a drastic remedy, it should be granted only when the error results in substantial prejudice sufficient to deprive a party of any reasonable expectation of a fair trial. See Succession of Houston, 52,181 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 253 So.3d 836, 845, writ denied, 2019-0458 (La. 5/20/19), 271 So.3d 1274; see also Estate of Cristadoro ex rel. Jones v. Gold-Kist, Inc., 2001-0026 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/23/02), 819 So.2d 1034, writ denied, 2002-1325 (La. 9/13/02), 824 So.2d 1171.

Applying these precepts to the instant case, we find the district court did not abuse its vast discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for mistrial. Although the general polling revealed that four jurors did not agree with “everything” in the verdict, this evidence does not establish the jury disregarded the court's instructions that at least nine jurors must agree with each question on the verdict form. Because there are five defendants in this action, there are multiple ways where at least nine jurors could agree to each individual question, even though four jurors did not agree to everything in the verdict.

Plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing of prejudice to invoke the drastic remedy of mistrial. Accordingly, the court of appeal erred in reversing the judgment of the district court denying plaintiff's motion for mistrial.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the consolidated writs are granted and made peremptory. The judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the district court denying the motion for mistrial is reinstated. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.