VAUCRESSON v. NIGHTHAWK RADIOLOGY HOLDINGS INC (2026)

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court denied motions for partial summary judgment addressing allegations of gross negligence on the part of Dr. Kelsey Webb. For the following reasons, we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand with instructions to consider the principles set forth infra, when ruling on the motions.

Certain salient facts are undisputed. Plaintiff, Julie Vaucresson, presented to the Iberia Medical Center emergency room for complaints of severe abdominal pain on December 24, 2005, and was discharged based on Dr. Webb's assurance to the emergency room physicians that she would evaluate Mrs. Vaucresson and perform an ultrasound at her clinic on December 26. Mrs. Vaucresson attempted to follow these instructions, but discovered the clinic to be closed on December 26, and although open the following day, Dr. Webb was unavailable. She was instructed to follow-up with her obstetrician at her regularly-scheduled appointment on January 6, 2006. However, her condition thereafter deteriorated, ultimately requiring emergency surgery on January 3, 2006.

Plaintiffs filed the instant medical practice lawsuit against Dr. Webb, who moved for summary judgment, contending that her conduct did not rise to the level of gross negligence as required by the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act, La. R.S. 29:760, et seq.¹ Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that Dr. Webb's conduct amounted to gross negligence. Dr. Webb's position relied on the unanimous medical review panel opinion that found she did not breach the standard of care, as well as expert testimony that concluded she met the appropriate standard of care. Plaintiffs, in turn, offered the affidavit and deposition of Mrs. Vaucresson's treating physician, Dr. Lapeyrolerie, who opined that Dr. Webb's inaction constituted a breach. The trial court denied both motions, citing conflicting testimony regarding whether the standard of care was breached.

We granted the plaintiffs’ writ application to clarify that, in this matter, summary judgment as to the standard of care is not dependent on expert testimony, as the trial court held. Under La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3), summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. While expert testimony is generally required to establish the standard of care and breach in medical malpractice cases, we recognized in Pfiffner v. Correa, 94-0924 (La. 10/17/94), 643 So. 2d 1228, a narrow class of cases in which expert testimony is unnecessary because the alleged negligence is so obvious that a layperson can identify it without medical expertise. There, we found:

[E]xpert testimony is not always necessary in order for a plaintiff to meet his burden of proof in establishing a medical malpractice claim. Though in most cases, because of the complex medical and factual issues involved, a plaintiff will likely fail to sustain his burden of proving his claim under LSA–R.S. 9:2794’s requirements without medical experts, there are instances in which the medical and factual issues are such that a lay jury can perceive negligence in the charged physician's conduct as well as any expert can, or in which the defendant/physician testifies as to the standard of care and there is objective evidence, including the testimony of the defendant/physician, which demonstrates a breach thereof.

Id., 94-0924, pp. 9-10, 643 So. 2d at 1234.

In Pfiffner, we identified a number of circumstances for which expert testimony is not required, including “fracturing a leg during examination, amputating the wrong arm, dropping a knife, scalpel, or acid on a patient, or leaving a sponge in a patient's body.” Id., 94-0924, p. 9, 643 So. 2d at 1233. More pertinent to this matter, we further observed: “Failure to attend a patient when the circumstances demonstrate the serious consequences of this failure, and failure of an on-call physician to respond to an emergency when he knows or should know that his presence is necessary are also examples of obvious negligence which require no expert testimony to demonstrate the physician's fault.” Id.

In this matter, the record does not reflect that the trial court considered the nature of the alleged negligence, as contemplated by Pfiffner, and focused instead on the medical experts. Before concluding that the presence of competing expert testimony necessarily precludes summary judgment, a district court must consider whether, under Pfiffner, the facts and evidence are such that expert testimony is not required to determine whether conduct constitutes negligence, ordinary or gross. We express no view on whether this case ultimately qualifies; we hold only that Pfiffner must be addressed as part of the summary-judgment analysis. We therefore vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this per curiam.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i) provides immunity for doctors practicing during a declared public health emergency, except in cases of gross negligence and willful misconduct.

PER CURIAM.