IN RE: BRESHATTA DAVIS (2026)

Joint petition for consent discipline accepted. See per curiam.

JMG

JDH

PDG

CRC

WHB

Supreme Court of Louisiana September 22, 2026

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NO. 2026-B-1051

IN RE: BRESHATTA DAVIS

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent illegally possessed controlled substances without a valid prescription. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Breshatta Davis, Louisiana Bar Roll number 38713, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. It is further ordered that this suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to a period of probation to coincide with the term of respondent's monitoring agreement with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program. Any failure of respondent to comply with her monitoring agreement or the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court's judgment until paid.

WEIMER, C.J. dissents and would reject the consent discipline as too lenient.

I dissent from the majority's acceptance of the parties’ joint petition for consent discipline, as I find the proposed sanction unduly lenient given the seriousness of the respondent's misconduct. I would instead impose a suspension of one year and one day without deferral.

In spring 2025, respondent was stopped by the Monroe Police Department while riding in a vehicle with an individual reported to be a known drug trafficker. The ODC opened an investigation and learned that a search of the vehicle resulted in officers locating a loose hydrocodone pill in respondent's bag and a small amount of marijuana. At the scene, respondent stated that the hydrocodone had been prescribed to her following a recent car accident, but she was unable produce a prescription. Officers provided respondent two days to produce a valid prescription or face arrest.

Respondent's statement at the scene was untruthful; the hydrocodone had not been prescribed to her, and she could not produce a valid prescription. On March 9, 2025, respondent was arrested and charged with two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance (Schedule I and Schedule II), possession of drug paraphernalia, and permitting an unlicensed driver to drive. On March 10, 2026, respondent was formally charged with possession of hydrocodone (a felony) and possession of marijuana (a misdemeanor). These charges remain pending.

On August 12, 2026, prior to the filing of formal disciplinary charges, the parties filed a joint petition for consent discipline in this court, wherein they stipulated that respondent's conduct violates Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The parties stipulated that respondent participated in criminal conduct and violated duties owed to the public and the legal profession. For this misconduct, the parties propose that she be the beneficiary of a fully deferred suspension subject to probation. Because the misconduct involves both criminal behavior and an act of dishonesty toward law enforcement, I do not find a fully deferred suspension adequate to protect the public or preserve confidence in the profession.

Considering the totality of respondent's misconduct—her dishonesty, her pending felony charge, and the overwhelming evidence of her guilt—I find the proposed sanction too lenient and would impose an actual suspension of one year and one day.

Weimer, C.J., dissents and would reject the proposed discipline as too lenient. McCallum, J., dissents and assigns reasons.