STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JONATHAN JONES (2026)

Writ application denied.

WHB

JLW

JBM

JMG

CRC

Supreme Court of Louisiana September 02, 2026

A court may reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence if it finds that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have reached a guilty verdict. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); La. Const. art. I § 2, La. C.Cr.P. art. 821. Further, Article I § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution's presumption of innocence “provides an additional guarantee against criminal conviction based on inadequate evidence.” State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1309 (La. 1988).

Assuming Mr. Jones had a gun, the only evidence that he unjustifiably aimed his firearm at the police officer was the officer's own conflicting testimony.¹ There was no corroborating testimony, distinctive descriptions of the firearm mentioned, radio for assistance, contemporaneous reporting, body camera footage, or dash camera footage. The driver of the stopped vehicle contradicted the officer. The driver was allowed to leave without citation. No firearm was recovered. As we said in Mussall, while “[e]ye witness testimony alone is usually sufficient in the mill run of cases, [ ] in this particular case even a reasonably pro-prosecution rational trier of fact is driven to have a reasonable doubt by the numerous eccentricities, unusual coincidences and lack of corroboration.” State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d at 1311. As a practical matter, the lower courts have held that so long as there is some evidence of guilt, the evidence is sufficient – that standard was rejected by this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson. See State v. Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170, 1178 (La. 1979). The evidence in this matter is insufficient for due process purposes and inadequate to protect the presumption of innocence noted in La. Const. art. I § 16.

The sufficiency of the evidence analysis applied by the lower courts, and not disturbed by this Court, undermines other provisions of the Declaration of Rights, whose provisions should be read in context of one another. For example, Section 11 of the Declaration of Rights states “[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction on this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny.” This provision is written differently and more broadly than its federal counterpart. Thus, I take no direction from the U.S. Supreme Court as to its meaning or its relationship to La. Const. art. I §§ 2 or 16, other than recognizing the federal law is baseline protection. Justice Piper D. Griffin & Dr. Derek Warden, Interpreting the Louisiana Constitution, 72 Loy. L. Rev. 193, 204 (2026). Assuming Mr. Jones had a gun, the only evidence he brandished it at the officer unjustifiably is the officer's own inconsistent, detail-lacking, contradicted, and uncorroborated testimony. There is no point in saying the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental and protected by strict scrutiny if this is all the evidence it takes to turn having a firearm into a conviction for assault. To give practical effect to this fundamental right, I would require at least something more than what was provided here. See State v. Stephens, 09-0631 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/24/09), 27 So. 3d 987. Gun owners of Louisiana beware.²

I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At first, he said he did not know if he was wearing his body camera that day. He then said his department did not have body cameras.

2.   Because I would overrule the conviction, I do not address Mr. Jones’ excessiveness claim.

Hughes, J., would grant. Griffin, J., would grant and assigns reasons.