JOHN FULLER v. STATE OF LOUISIANA JEFF LANDRY IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR ELIZABETH MURRILL IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL NANCY LANDRY IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE AND CHELSEY RICHARD NAPOLEON IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS (2026)

Application for rehearing denied.

WHB

JDH

JBM

CRC

Supreme Court of Louisiana August 04, 2026

This court's opinion addressed important constitutional issues on an expedited basis and without the benefit of oral argument. The result, a 4-3 majority opinion with three dissents and three additional concurrences, highlights the need to grant rehearing.

A constitution is not one word or phrase, or one article or section; rather, it is a complete document which must be read and analyzed in full, befitting its role in our government as the basic fundamental document of governance and liberties, and to which all other laws must yield. We begin, as we must, with the words of the document itself. Article V, § 15(D) clearly states that “[t]he Legislature may change the number of judges in any judicial district by law enacted by two-thirds of the elected members of each house.” (Emphasis added.) Each of the three Justices who dissented evaluated this language, along with the language of Article V, § 32. As I expressed in my original dissent, Article V, § 32 does give the legislature the power to “change by law” the court system of Orleans Parish. However, the constitutional power to alter the number of judges in a judicial district is not located in Article V, § 32. That power is provided to the legislature in Article V, § 15(D) and requires a two-thirds supermajority vote of both houses. Article V, § 15(D) must be read in pari materia with Article V, § 32 to determine whether Act 748 passes constitutional muster.

The concurrences seem to criticize the dissenters for looking at other sources, yet the per curiam opinion does also. If the law is clear as it is written there is no need to go further. See La. C.C. art. 9. The language of Article V, § 15(D) is clear: the phrase “in any judicial district” can only mean that the two judicial districts of Orleans Parish fall under Article V, § 15(D), and that the number of judges in those judicial districts may change only with a two-thirds majority vote in both houses of the legislature. Each of the dissenters, in various ways, confirmed that conclusion by evaluating the entirety of relevant constitutional language as well as citing other respected secondary sources to further support the conclusion that Orleans Parish courts are not excluded from this constitutional provision and, absent a two-thirds vote, the seats remain.

Article V, § 15(D) does not “override” Article V, § 32, and the two provisions do not conflict as the majority held. The provisions are complementary and can both be applied: Article V, § 32 authorizes institutional change by majority vote and Article V, § 15(D) prescribes a two-thirds vote when the change alters the number of district judges. Thus, the legislature by a majority vote could combine the criminal and civil divisions of Orleans Parish, which are outliers, but the legislature cannot terminate judicial seats in any judicial district without obtaining a two-thirds supermajority vote.

The Justices in the majority also placed too much focus on matters such as the dwindling population of New Orleans, comparative parish caseloads, and funding. While these concerns may justify legislative action to reduce the number of judges in Orleans Criminal District Court, they are not dispositive or even relevant to the issue of whether Act 748 was passed in compliance with our constitution.

For these reasons and the reasons expressed in my original dissent, and particularly considering the close vote and number of Justices writing separately, I would grant the rehearing and order the parties to present their side in open court for the public to see and hear prior to rendering a final opinion.

Assuming the plain text of § 32 supports the majority's conclusion (which it does not), the interpretation is still wrong. Plain text interpretations that undermine a law's purpose are absurd and must be avoided. La. C.C. art. 9, McLane S., Inc. v. Bridges, 11-1141, pp 8–9 (La. 1/24/12), 84 So. 3d 479, 485. As previously explained, the purpose of § 32 was to temporarily carry on the New Orleans court system subject to change by law under the same rules as applicable to similarly situated courts. The majority obliterates that purpose by saying New Orleans has less protection than the rest of the State. Thus, the Court violates the interpretive principle it has held for two hundred years and that the civil law system has had for five hundred years. Samuel von Pufendorf, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, Book V, Chapter XII, pp. 539-40 (1672); Nikolaos A. Davrados, Olivier Moréteau, Louisiana Civil Code Commentary: Articles 1 through 13, 16 J. Civ. L. Stud. 1, 46 (2024).

I dissent and would grant rehearing.

What is nonsensical about what this court affirms today is that the resulting impact of the elimination of the three judgeships on the efficiency of the court not only affects the rights of victims and their families to have their day in court and to find closure but also the speedy trial rights of the criminally accused. Justice delayed is justice denied. This is the very type of consequence resulting from political whim that the framers of the constitution wanted to avoid by requiring a supermajority vote of the legislature before any judgeships in the state would be eliminated. The framers of the constitution also wanted to protect the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence. The result of today's action erodes that protection.

As I pointed out in my original dissent, Section 32 expressly addresses its provisions to “the following courts and officers in Orleans Parish” and then goes on to expressly list what those courts and who those officers are. The settled rule of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing is based on the doctrine of Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius, which dictates that when there is an enumerated series of things, the omission of other items, which could have easily been included, is deemed intentional. See Filson v. Windsor Court Hotel, 04-2893, p. 6 (La. 6/29/05), 907 So. 2d 723, 728. As such, a plain reading of Section 32 reveals that it applies to an exclusive list of courts and officers in Orleans Parish, and as judges are not included among the enumerated list of officers contained in Section 32, a proper interpretation of Section 32 would dictate finding that Section 32 does not address or apply to the number of judges in the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.

Although I do not concede that La. Const. art. V, § 32 deals with the same subject matter as La. Const. art. V, § 15(D), I observe that to the extent the majority finds the two provisions both govern the number of judges in the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, the majority's holding ignores the basic principle that courts have a duty when interpreting a constitutional provision to adopt a construction that harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the same subject matter. See City of New Orleans v. Louisiana Assessors’ Retirement and Relief Fund, 05-2548, p. 17 (La. 10/1/07), 986 So. 2d 1, 15, 17. Rather than adhere to this principle, the majority focuses solely on the word “notwithstanding” and ignores the accompanying language “any other contrary provision of this constitution” (emphasis added) to hold that La. Const. art. V, § 32 applies to the number of judges in the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court to the exclusion of La. Const. art. V, § 15(D). Hence, despite the plain language of Section 15(D) that expressly addresses the number of judges in any judicial district, the majority engages in a tortured interpretation of Section 32 to find that provision also applies to the number of judges in the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, despite the absence of judges being among the enumerated officers expressly listed in the statute.

While the majority finds requiring the legislature to reduce the number of judges on the court by a supermajority vote but allowing the legislature to eliminate the entire criminal district court by a simple majority vote is an absurd result, there are sound, logical, and established reasons for the difference grounded in judicial independence that the majority chooses to ignore. Moreover, in properly reading the two provisions in the way that they should be read—that is, to harmonize and reconcile, rather than find conflict— the elimination of an entire court can be done consistent with Section 15(D), because once eliminated, there no longer would exist a judicial district to which Section 15(D) would apply. Notably, what may be an unintended consequence of the majority's decision today is that judges can be added to the Orleans Parish courts by a simple majority vote, while the addition of judges to courts in all other parishes will require a supermajority vote of the legislature.

For all the above reasons, I would grant the request for a stay, grant rehearing, and order oral arguments.

Weimer, C.J., would grant rehearing and assigns reasons. Griffin, J., would grant rehearing and assigns reasons. Guidry, J., would grant rehearing and assigns reasons.