JOHN FULLER v. STATE OF LOUISIANA JEFF LANDRY IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR ELIZABETH MURRILL IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL NANCY LANDRY IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE AND CHELSEY RICHARD NAPOLEON IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS (2026)

Assuming the plain text of § 32 supports the majority's conclusion (which it does not), the interpretation is still wrong. Plain text interpretations that undermine a law's purpose are absurd and must be avoided. La. C.C. art. 9, McLane S., Inc. v. Bridges, 11-1141, pp 8–9 (La. 1/24/12), 84 So. 3d 479, 485. As previously explained, the purpose of § 32 was to temporarily carry on the New Orleans court system subject to change by law under the same rules as applicable to similarly situated courts. The majority obliterates that purpose by saying New Orleans has less protection than the rest of the State. Thus, the Court violates the interpretive principle it has held for two hundred years and that the civil law system has had for five hundred years. Samuel von Pufendorf, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, Book V, Chapter XII, pp. 539-40 (1672); Nikolaos A. Davrados, Olivier Moréteau, Louisiana Civil Code Commentary: Articles 1 through 13, 16 J. Civ. L. Stud. 1, 46 (2024).

I dissent and would grant rehearing.

GRIFFIN, J., dissents and would grant rehearing.