ST CHARLES SURGICAL HOSPITAL v. LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE INDEMNITY HMO (2026)

Motion to Recuse Chief Justice John L. Weimer granted in part. See per curiam and Order.

This Motion to Recuse presents itself as the result of a bitter internecine feud involving the Chief Justice and a former member of this Court who retired over a year and a half ago and has since been engaged in the practice of law. The motion, seeking to recuse Chief Justice John L. Weimer, was filed by Scott J. Crichton, an attorney currently appearing as lead counsel in this case. The motion was triggered by an escalating series of personal attacks on Mr. Crichton, culminating in two recent unorthodox letters penned by Chief Justice Weimer, incorporated herein by reference and contained in the record. Almost as disturbing as the extraordinary personal invective in the content of the letters is the fact that they are ex parte communications initiated by the Chief Justice and directed to an attorney involved in a case for which oral argument has already been granted. However, the unfortunate story behind Chief Justice Weimer's conduct here has a longer history.

According to the narrative offered by Mr. Crichton, the animosity on display in the letters extends back to the creation of an executive committee at the Court. As related by Mr. Crichton, the six associate justices at that time, having lost confidence in the Chief Justice, formed an executive committee and appointed Mr. Crichton as its first chairman. The executive committee assumed most of the administrative responsibilities and internal governance of the Court, while the Chief Justice retained his ceremonial duties. Mr. Crichton asserts that much of Chief Justice Weimer's personal contempt for him stems from his role as the first executive committee Chairman.

Mr. Crichton argues that “Chief Justice Weimer's fixated and obsessive disdain” for him, and other former colleagues, was repeatedly brought into public view by Justice Weimer long after his departure from the Court. He points out that there were well over a dozen references attacking him in voluminous materials transmitted as public documents by Justice Weimer to the Legislative Auditor, Judicial Compensation Commission, and Supplemental Compensation Board.

Mr. Crichton further cites instances displaying Chief Justice Weimer's continuing animosity against him and former colleagues exhibited in writings he forced unnaturally into unrelated court opinions. See, e.g., In Re: Judge Eboni Johnson Rose, No. 2025-00390 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So. 3d 1163 (Weimer, C.J., dissenting); In Re: Derrick D.T. Shepherd, No. 2026-00357 (La. 5/12/26), 432 So. 3d 742 (Weimer, C.J., concurring), reh'g denied, (La. 06/25/26), ––– So. 3d –––– (Weimer, C.J. concurring). In Shepherd, Chief Justice Weimer accused Mr. Crichton of the improper and unprofessional representation of a client before this Court despite the fact that the representation was ethically permissible due to a waiver. See Id. On rehearing, he repeated his personal criticisms and expanded his diatribes to include his view, that in making fiscal decisions, while he was an associate justice of the Court, Mr. Crichton was “trading on his position of service to our system of justice to further enhance his earnings.” Id, p. 2.

Chief Justice Weimer recently escalated his personal dispute with Mr. Crichton to dizzying heights. On his own initiative, the Chief Justice transmitted a highly vitriolic, written communication, tantamount to a demand letter, to Mr. Crichton and apparently other former justices of this court, dated July 4, 2026.¹ This letter, written on official Court letterhead and signed with the titular honorific, “Chief Justice,” repeated the Chief Justice's disagreement with various decisions made by all of his fellow justices over the years. It conveyed Chief Justice Weimer's view that Mr. Crichton's actions appeared “self-serving,” “self-centered,” and “entitled.” He additionally wrote, “[Y]ou have left the reputation of the Supreme Court in shambles,” and he accused Mr. Crichton of “taking advantage of the people.” Chief Justice Weimer further wrote: “I suggest you apologize to the people of Louisiana.” He concluded with an ultra vires demand, without consulting this Court, that Mr. Crichton either reimburse certain funds identified by Chief Justice Weimer or respond within 15 days. In so doing, not only did the Chief Justice violate his own ethical obligations against ex parte communications, but “demanded” Mr. Crichton do the same.

Perhaps improvidently, Mr. Crichton followed Chief Justice Weimer's demand and responded, in writing, which elicited a new letter by Chief Justice Weimer on July 20, 2026. In it, he further attacked Mr. Crichton, calling his response “disappointing and predictable.” In this newest missive, Chief Justice Weimer chastised Mr. Crichton, stating, “[W]hat you did do was never deviate from voting in such a fashion as to enhance your pay and benefits․and [you] were paid for work you did not do.” The letter included additional hyperbole expressing Chief Justice Weimer's disappointment in Mr. Crichton, suggesting he received “unjust enrichment” and claiming that “no other Justice or Judge can claim that ‘trifecta’ of taking advantage of the public.”

The Chief Justice also felt compelled to defend himself against Mr. Crichton's accusations of unethical or wasteful conduct. Chief Justice Weimer castigated Mr. Crichton, suggesting he has never truly worked for a living, as Chief Justice Weimer maintains he has. Mr. Crichton was further derided for residing in “a high-rise in New Orleans” and a Florida residence.²

Chief Justice Weimer also responded to Mr. Crichton's criticism of his casting the deciding administrative vote that allowed Chief Justice Weimer's daughter, who had recently graduated from law school, to become a licensed attorney without having to take or pass the bar examination. That vote, which allowed an entire “class” of law school graduates to become practicing attorneys without sitting for or passing the bar exam during the Covid Pandemic, passed on a 4-3 vote of the Court. The Chief Justice defended his action stating he was not required to recuse himself from the vote because he had disclosed his interest in the outcome to his colleagues, a statement questioned by contemporaneous media reports. He also defended against Mr. Crichton's criticism that, based on historical data, Chief Justice Weimer has maintained the most expensive district office among the justices even though he lives within a relatively easy commute from the courthouse. These instances, according to Mr. Crichton, suggest Chief Justice Weimer's ostensible obsession with frugality and transparency in certain areas is betrayed by robust hypocrisy in others.

With this background, we turn to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 157, which provides for the filing of a motion to recuse a supreme court justice, directing that such matters be decided by either the self-recusal of the justice or by a majority of the other justices serving in the case. Chief Justice Weimer refuses to self-recuse. Therefore, to recuse, the majority must find sufficient grounds for recusal under Article 151. Article 151, as recently amended, provides the following, pertinent provisions:

A. A judge of any trial or appellate court shall be recused upon any of the following grounds:

․

(4) The judge is biased, prejudiced, or interested in the cause or its outcome or biased or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the parties’ attorneys or any witness to such an extent that the judge would be unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings.

B. A judge of any trial or appellate court shall also be recused when there exists a substantial and objective basis that would reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from conducting any aspect of the cause in a fair and impartial manner.

Comment (b) to Article 151 further provides:

A new Paragraph B has been added to provide an additional mandatory ground for recusal when a substantial and objective basis exists that would reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from conducting any aspect of the cause in a fair and impartial manner. This provision is intended to serve as a catch-all supplementing the mandatory grounds for recusal set forth in Paragraph A and to incorporate a clearer, more objective standard than the language of Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that a judge should recuse himself when “the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

In Anderson v. Dean, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit considered the Legislature's recent amendments to Article 151:

[W]e must assume that the Legislature was aware of the laws of recusal when it drafted and enacted the newly revised Paragraph B in Article 151. Had the Legislature intended to adopt the appearance of impropriety standard, it could have done so. It did not. Instead, the Legislature decided to adopt new language intended to be clearer and more objective than the appearance of impropriety standard.

In adopting this new language, the Legislature clearly intended to broaden the mandatory grounds for recusal beyond the previously enumerated grounds, including the ground for bias or prejudice enumerated in Paragraph A(4). Whereas prior law recognized this mandatory ground for recusal only where there was a high probability of actual bias (proved either directly or circumstantially), the addition of Paragraph B recognizes that there may be instances in which actual bias or prejudice cannot be proven, but which nonetheless require the recusal of the judge. These instances occur where there exists a “substantial and objective basis that would reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from conducting any aspect of the case in a fair and impartial manner.” The words “substantial” and “objective” present the first two requirements. “Substantial” means something of substance, material, real, and not imaginary. Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This may be understood as requiring the mover to support his motion to recuse with material evidence, and not mere allegations. “Objective” means something externally verifiable, as opposed to the feelings of one individual. Id. “Basis” means some foundation or starting point on which something may rest. Id. This is a broad term clearly intended to cover more instances than solely “bias.” The phrase “any aspect of the cause” additionally broadens the scope of this ground for recusal beyond the obvious and public aspects of the judge sitting on the bench in the courtroom. Finally, the phrase “reasonably expected” recognizes that there may be substantial and objective bases claimed that a neutral observer would not expect to prevent the judge from trying the cause in a fair and impartial manner.

Anderson v. Dean, 22-233, pp. 17-18 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/25/22), 346 So. 3d 356, 368-69. We agree with the Fifth Circuit's analysis, and we apply the Legislature's amended standard for recusal to the matter at hand.

The escalating personal attacks on an attorney involved in a case granted, docketed, and scheduled to be imminently heard before this Court crossed a line from which an objective observer would recognize an intolerable risk of bias. Even if Chief Justice Weimer were capable of separating his personal animus toward Mr. Crichton from his adjudicative function, it is difficult to imagine that either Mr. Crichton or his client could have confidence in the fair and impartial consideration of the case. Chief Justice Weimer's repeated actions to advance his personal agenda against the enrolled lead counsel of record in a docketed case crossed the threshold of what can reasonably be tolerated in fair proceedings.

If Chief Justice Weimer were allowed to participate in this matter, his ultimate decision would be subject to attack by either side. Should Mr. Crichton's client prevail, the opposing parties might take the position the Chief Justice's decision was based on his desire to prove his impartiality. Conversely, should Mr. Crichton's client fail to prevail, Chief Justice Weimer's decision would be subject to attack on the basis of perceived bias.

This Court has a particular responsibility to exercise professional restraint in its dealings with lawyers and the public out of respect for the imbalance in power resulting from its supreme authority over litigants and attorneys. Chief Justice Weimer's letters were an attempt by one in a superior position to exert influence over another in a weaker position. Unfortunately, the Chief Justice's actions have forced this Court to act to protect the integrity of the judiciary from further harm.

As this Court has long recognized, we have a unique obligation to apply the “paternal recommendation of the first, the great, Chief Justice of Louisiana, Judge [Francis Xavier] Martin, when he said: ‘All those who minister in the temple of justice, from the highest to the lowest, should be above reproach and suspicion. None should serve at its altar whose conduct is at variance with his obligations.’ The trust to enforce this lesson of wisdom has been confided to the supreme court, and, although the task is unpleasant, it must be performed impartially and fearlessly.” State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Lazarus, 39 La. Ann. 142, 161, 1 So. 361, 376 (1887).

Before becoming licensed attorneys, bar applicants are required to take an oath containing, among others, the following obligations: “To opposing parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness, integrity, and civility, not only in court, but also in all written and oral communications; I will abstain from all offensive personality ․.” The professional conduct that this Court expects of others should be exemplified in its own actions. Unfortunately, the conduct of Chief Justice Weimer falls short of that standard.

In light of the above, this Court finds that a substantial and objective basis exists that would reasonably be expected to prevent Chief Justice Weimer from participating in this case in a fair and impartial manner. For these reasons, we grant the Motion to Recuse Chief Justice John L. Weimer in these consolidated matters. In all other respects, the motion is denied. An Order implementing the terms of this Per Curiam has been signed and filed into the record of this case.

ORDER

Considering the Motion to Recuse Chief Justice John L. Weimer, and for the reasons set forth in this Court's contemporaneously issued Per Curiam,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to recuse is granted, in part, and that Chief Justice John L. Weimer is hereby recused in the above captioned, consolidated matters.

NEW ORLEANS, Louisiana this 28th day of July, 2026.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ _

JUSTICE, LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Mr. Crichton indicates he received the letter on July 2, 2024, the letter is post-dated July 4, 2026. There is nothing to indicate any significance to it being dated on the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence.

2.   Chief Justice Weimer, in the correspondences to Mr. Crichton, stated, “Residing in Florida and in a high-rise in New Orleans is not conducive to identifying with everyday people and ordinary folk who pay their taxes.”

Guidry, J., concurs in the result.