STATE v. RILEY (2020)

Writ application denied. See per curiam.

Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and applicant fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Applicant has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a second or successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Applicant's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, applicant has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.

Byron Riley was fifteen years old at the time of the homicide for which he is convicted. He has been in prison for 23 years.¹ His accomplice, Marcus Cheffen who was 24-years-old at the time of this offense, apparently received a sweetheart deal in exchange for testifying against Mr. Riley at trial. Cheffen pled guilty to accessory after the fact to second degree murder and was sentenced to five years in prison for that charge. Cheffen was also convicted of two counts of attempted second degree murder and one count of armed robbery stemming from an offense that occurred three days after the murder at issue here. Cheffen was sentenced to thirty years on each attempted murder charge, to run consecutively, and to 35 years on the armed robbery, for a total of 95 years. Cheffen was paroled on February 17, 2020. Mr. Riley remains imprisoned.

Before his 1997 trial, Mr. Riley's counsel requested that the State disclose the arrest or conviction record of any of its witnesses. Although at least two of the State's witnesses had pending criminal charges, it appears that counsel for the State did not disclose this fact. However the extent or gravity of the non-disclosure remains unclear because the record of this case is muddled. Also unclear is whether the commissioner and district court entertained this portion of petitioner's Brady claim and, if they did, whether they credited the State's clearly erroneous argument that—because defense counsel requested witness impeachment before trial but was allegedly denied it—the defendant somehow waived his Brady claim. It is also incomprehensible that seven years elapsed between the commissioner issuing a report and recommendation in this matter and the district court adopting that recommendation. While there may be a case-specific reason that the matter took seven years, and the record here does not indicate whether there is, it should be a matter of some concern that this court has repeatedly seen inordinate delays in the disposition of prison inmates’ post-conviction proceedings in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court.

Mr. Riley has been in prison for murder since he was a teenager. The severity of the punishment, especially when compared to the lenient treatment his adult accomplice received, should demand vigilant adherence to proper procedures and the Constitution, and a heightened sensitivity to any possible violations.

Acting largely pro se in the district court, Mr. Riley attempted to present apparently undisclosed impeachment material relating to at least two of the State's trial witnesses. It is possible that those non-disclosures rise to the level of a constitutional violation. We should care to find out whether they do. However, because the record before us is inadequate to answer that question, I would grant the writ application and remand to the district court with instructions to immediately appoint defendant competent post-conviction counsel and promptly hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the State violated Brady and Giglio by withholding impeachment evidence at defendant's trial.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Riley was originally sentenced to life without parole but was re-sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after the Supreme Court remanded his case in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). Riley v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1359, 194 L.Ed.2d 343 (Mem) (2016).