VINTON HARBOR TERMINAL DISTRICT v. REUNION ENERGY COMPANY (2026)

Application for rehearing denied.

This court granted the original writ to determine whether Vinton Harbor has a right of action to pursue claims for damage to its property or whether such claims are barred by extension of the subsequent purchaser rule articulated in Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 10-2267 (La. 10/25/11), 79 So.3d 246, to mineral leases. While I agreed with the majority on original hearing that the subsequent purchaser rule can generally be applied in cases involving mineral leases, consistent with my dissent in Eagle Pipe, I disagreed with application of the rule in all cases, regardless of the facts. As I detailed in my Eagle Pipe dissent, the subsequent purchaser rule should not be applied in cases where the property damage was hidden or non-apparent at the time of the sale of the property because in that circumstance the only landowner who sustains an interference with his use of the property, and incurs a loss of property value, is the owner of the property at the time the hidden damage is discovered See Eagle Pipe, 10-2267 at 7, 79 So.3d at 287 (Weimer, J., dissenting). Despite my disagreement with the majority, I would nonetheless deny rehearing on this issue. The issue was fully considered by the court on original hearing and nothing is raised in the rehearing applications to warrant this court's reconsideration.

However, the court's analysis on original hearing should have stopped at this issue. Because Vinton Harbor did not seek relief on the issue of whether it has a right of action under Mineral Code art. 122, and this issue was not briefed by the parties, I would grant rehearing in part and vacate that portion of the original opinion.

I concur in the denial of rehearing for the reasons given by Cole, J. I note again however that Eagle Pipe has been wrongfully applied due to a misapprehension of civil law. Faulty jurisprudence, no matter how often repeated, cannot displace legislation. The Legislature has decreed that mineral rights are real rights (“mineral rights are real rights” ․), La. R.S. 31:16. For both lessor and lessee. The rules of personal obligations applicable to commercial lease, as found in Eagle Pipe, no matter how steeped in Civilian Tradition they may be, are inapplicable to mineral rights.

I would grant the application for rehearing in part for the reasons previously assigned by Justice pro tempore Penzato in the original opinion.

I agree with the denial of rehearing. With respect to Vinton Harbor's arguments concerning the 1870 Civil Code, the Court's original opinion does not narrow implied obligations under the Civil Code, nor does it overrule this Court's holding in Prados v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 329 So. 2d 744 (La. 1975), concerning obligations that may arise upon the termination of a lease. See Vinton Harbor & Terminal District v. Reunion Energy Co., 25-0971, p.13 n.7 (La. 5/29/26), ––– So. 3d ––––. Likewise, the opinion does not narrow the scope of any restoration obligations previously recognized by this Court in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368, pp. 37-38 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So. 3d 234.

Weimer, C.J., would grant rehearing in part and assigns reasons. Hughes, J., concurs and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by Justice Cole. Griffin, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by Justice Hughes. Guidry, J., would grant rehearing in part and assigns reasons. Cole, J., concurs and assigns reasons. Burris, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by Justice Cole.