IN RE: Judge John C. REEVES (2026)

JUDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA

In 2026, the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) filed two Notices of Hearing against Judge John C. Reeves. The Notices of Hearing contain a total of five counts of alleged misconduct by Judge Reeves. Stated briefly, it is alleged that Judge Reeves: (1) issued a legally deficient verbal order of visitation in a child custody case; (2) issued a legally deficient verbal search warrant in a criminal case; (3) allowed two members of his court staff to seek appointment as reserve deputies of the Catahoula Parish Sheriff's Office; (4) failed to timely recuse himself in a criminal case and gave the appearance of bias; and (5) failed to comply with the Code of Criminal Procedure in reducing, revoking, and subsequently reinstating the defendant's bond in a criminal case. Judge Reeves and the Commission now submit a joint petition for consent discipline in which Judge Reeves stipulated to the facts and admitted that his conduct violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Having reviewed the petition, and considering the unusual facts of this matter,

IT IS ORDERED that the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Judge John C. Reeves of the 7th Judicial District Court for the Parishes of Concordia and Catahoula be suspended from judicial office, without pay, for four months. The four-month suspension shall be served from August 31, 2026 through the end of Judge Reeves’ term of office on December 31, 2026.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judge Reeves be assessed with total costs of $6,148.57.

I reluctantly agree to this consent discipline.

Recently, this individual was sanctioned by this court. See In Re: Reeves, 25-01587 (La. 5/1/26), 432 So.3d 137. The ink was not yet dry on that opinion when the Judiciary Commission subsequently filed this new petition for discipline.

I concurred in part and dissented in part in the prior matter, suggesting that it was an “isolated and unfortunate, one-time incident.” I was led to believe that was the situation. I now realize, based on the current filing, that I was misled. The complaints in this matter were all lodged in 2024 according to the complaint numbers. The Judiciary Commission knew about each of these matters while this court considered the so-called “$100 handshake matter.” As indicated, I dissented in part urging a lesser sanction, because I did not have the information of the multiple offenses. Whether or not these other matters are sanctionable is of no moment, given the fact that consent to discipline was negotiated on each and every one of these charges.

Because this individual will only be in a position to potentially engage in further misdeeds for a short time before his term ends December 31, 2026, I reluctantly must join in this consent discipline. To reject the consent discipline would result in him continuing in office and, given the delays demonstrated, he could serve the rest of his term without facing discipline.

While I agree there are benefits to postponing the imposition of the sanction in this matter, I respectfully dissent from that delay believing swift justice and immediacy of the imposition of the sanction are important features of the disciplinary process.

This matter arises from a joint petition for consent discipline filed by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) and Judge John C. Reeves of the 7th Judicial District Court for the Parishes of Concordia and Catahoula, Division “B.” Judge Reeve assumed office on January 1, 2015. His current and final term in office will end on December 31, 2026. For the following reasons, I agree that Respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct concerning Case No. 0406 – Count I and Case No. 0410 and I concur in the discipline recommended. I dissent however in the finding that he committed sanctionable violations in the other three matters.

On May 1, 2026, this court suspended Judges Reeves for twenty days without pay for accepting a $100 bill from a litigant for whom Judge Reeves signed a judgment of possession in a succession case. In re: Reeves, 25-1587 (La. 5/1/26), ––– So. 3d –––– (“Reeves I”)¹ (C.J. Weimer, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

This Court now considers two additional cases against Judge Reeves. The first, Case Number 0406, was filed in March 2025 and contains four counts of alleged misconduct. The second, Case Number 0410, was filed in May 2025 and contains one count.

Having agreed with the joint petition with respect to Case No. 0406–Count I and Case No. 0410, I now address those counts which I do not believe reflect violations of the Judicial Canons.

Case No. 0406 – Count II

The Catahoula Parish Sheriff's Office arrived at the home of Shannon Butler after receiving a tip that a stolen boat motor was concealed on the property. Ms. Butler gave law enforcement permission to search her yard, but not her home.

A sheriff's deputy contacted Judge Reeves at approximately 1:11 p.m. requesting a search warrant for the home. Judge Reeves issued a verbal order for a search but did not comply with La. Code Crim. P. art. 162.1 regarding warrants issued upon oral testimony.² After obtaining the verbal search warrant, and over Ms. Butler's protests, law enforcement searched her home and seized incriminating evidence unrelated to the missing boat motor, including illegal drugs, cash, and weapons. Judge Reeves signed a written search warrant for the search of Ms. Butler's home approximately three hours later. The prosecution of Ms. Butler was ultimately discontinued.

This count involves the errant issuing of a search warrant requested by law enforcement officers at work in the field under exigent circumstances. Judge Reeves made a spur-of-the-moment decision without allowing himself sufficient time for due consideration of the applicable procedure. However, isolated human error does not always equate to a violation of the Judicial Canons. In this instance, I find it certainly does not.

Case No. 0406 – Count III

Judge Reeves’ judicial assistant and judicial administrator became concerned about their safety when no armed security was present in the courthouse. They sought to become reserve deputies of the Catahoula Parish Sheriff's Office so they could undergo firearms training through the Peace Officers Standards and Training Council (POST). Judge Reeves agreed with this plan,³ which would allow them to carry a concealed weapon in the courthouse.

Ms. Johnson and Ms. Crawford, the two court employees, appeared in the Catahoula Parish Clerk of Court's Office, recited the verbal oath of office to become reserve deputies of the Catahoula Parish Sheriff's Office, and signed the written oath of office. Both oaths of office were administered by the deputy clerk of the 7th Judicial District Court, on April 4, 2024.

On April 9, 2024, defense counsel made an oral motion to recuse Judge Reeves in State v. Kheyonte Chapman, alleging that the appointment of court staff to a law enforcement position violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and created a situation in which a reasonable person could question the impartiality of Judge Reeves’ court. On the same day, Ms. Johnson and Ms. Crawford signed a motion withdrawing their applications and oaths for the position of reserve deputies of Catahoula Parish. A sheriff's deputy also sent correspondence to the Catahoula Parish Clerk of Court instructing the clerk to cancel the commission requests for Ms. Johnson and Ms. Crawford “effective immediately.”

On April 23, 2024, Judge ad hoc James Boddie conducted a hearing on the motion to recuse. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Boddie denied the motion to recuse, noting the oaths taken by Ms. Johnson and Ms. Crawford had been rescinded before either woman had taken any affirmative action as reserve deputies.

In my opinion, it is clear this count merely reflects the concern that Judge Reeves has for those with whom he works. A suggestion that any danger presented by the lack of courthouse security could be remedied by a simple phone call ignores the practical realities facing rural parishes, where resources are stretched thin. In fact, Judge Reeves’ behavior was so benign that the ad hoc judge ultimately denied the motion to recuse. Adding irony to the finding of a violation is the fact that Judge Reeves, like all Louisiana judges, is statutorily authorized by La. R.S. 14:95(H)(1) to obtain annual qualification in the use of firearms by the Council on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST Certification).

Case No. 0406 – Count IV

In State v. Myles McMillin, Judge Reeves signed an arrest warrant and a search warrant relating to a longtime personal friend. Two days later, Judge Reeves recused himself from the matter, stating, “the defendant is a long-time personal friend of this Judge and the complainant is the Sheriff of Catahoula Parish with whom the undersigned must work on a daily basis.”

Rather than being sanctioned for the behavior described in this count, Judge Reeves should be commended. In my opinion, Judge Reeves could have been sanction had he refused to sign the search and arrest warrants, After all, signing a search and arrest warrants directed at any individual is no way to keep a friend. In this instance, Judge Reeves recognized the exigencies typically associated with search warrants and overcame personal biases to find probable cause and sign warrants. His subsequent recusal demonstrates his recognition that once the urgency of the warrants passed, the long-term disposition of the case was best left in other hands. In my opinion, this does not rise to the level of a Judicial Canon violation.

Judge Reeves’ actions in signing the warrants negate any suggestion that he acted out of compassion for a friend. To the contrary, his signing the warrants shows instead that he was acting in the interests of justice. Nor do I find that he was motivated by a desire for personal gain. Additionally, Judge Reeves has cooperated in the investigation into these matters, and as is evidenced by the instant request for consent discipline, as part of which he agreed not to run for re-election even if eligible to do so, he recognizes the error in his actions and regrets the harm they have caused. Judge Reeves’ term ends in December of 2026, leaving him little time on the bench.

The conduct that I have agreed is sanctionable highlights the unique circumstances encountered by judges, and particularly rural judges, on a daily basis as they perform their jobs. They are frequently called upon to adjudicate matters concerning those with whom they worship, recreate, and work. This unfortunate case should be the impetus to redouble our efforts to avoid such conduct even when it is uncomfortable to do so.

I reluctantly join in the consent discipline. To reject the consent discipline would result in the individual continuing in office and, given the delays demonstrated, he could serve the rest of his term without facing discipline.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to a joint motion filed by the parties and granted by the Court, Judge Reeves served the twenty-day suspension imposed in Reeves I from May 9, 2026, through May 28, 2026.

2.   La. Code Crim. P. art. 162.1 provides in pertinent part as follows:A. In addition to the provisions of Article 162, a search warrant may issue only upon probable cause established to the satisfaction of the judge by the sworn oral testimony of a credible person reciting facts establishing the cause for issuance of the warrant.B. The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the judge, and the oath may be administered by the judge, by telephone, radio, or such other electronic method of communication deemed appropriate by the judge. If the judge determines that the warrant should issue, he shall order the applicant to affix a facsimile of his signature to the warrant which the applicant has prepared and to note thereon the date and time of the determination. The sworn oral testimony, the contents of the warrant issued, the order to affix the signature facsimile, and the date and time of the determination shall be electronically recorded by the judge, who shall cause the recording to be transcribed and fixed in the record within seven days. The judge shall certify the accuracy of the transcription.* * *D. The testimony may also be communicated to the judge by facsimile transmission signed by the applicant, after the administration of the oath by the judge by telephone, radio, or such other electronic method of communication deemed appropriate by the judge. The judge shall certify on the facsimile transmission the date and time of the administration of the oath. If the judge determines that the warrant should issue, he shall affix his signature to the warrant which the applicant has prepared and forwarded to him by facsimile transmission. The judge shall transmit to the applicant, by facsimile transmission, the warrant which he has executed together with the written testimony and certification of oath. The original application for the warrant with the applicant's signature and the facsimile copy with the original signature of the judge shall be preserved in the same manner as an original warrant signed by both the applicant and the judge.

3.   Judge Reeves believed the women would be deputies “in name only” and would never perform any of the duties, or obtain any of the privileges, of an actual sheriff's deputy. However, Judge Reeves subsequently acknowledged that the benefit of being able to carry guns in the courthouse was a privilege that would not have been available to any other court staff.

PER CURIAM

Weimer, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons. Hughes, J., concurs in part, dissents in part for the reasons assigned by McCallum, J. McCallum, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons. Guidry, J., concurs and assigns reasons. Cole, J., concurs in part, dissents in part for the reasons assigned by McCallum, J. Burris, J., concurs in part, dissents in part for the reasons assigned by McCallum, J.