BRYAN v. AYMOND (2025)

This case concerns the court of appeal's removal of Chantel G. Aymond (“Chantel”) as Trustee of the Dalila Carol Aymond Trust (the “Trust”). For the reasons set forth herein and in the companion case Succession of Carol James Aymond, Jr., 2025-01101 (La. 11/25/25), ––– So. 3d ––––, we find Chantel did not breach the duty she owed to the Trust, nor did she breach the prudent administrator standard set forth in the trust statutes. La. R.S. 9:2082; La. R.S. 9:2090; La. R.S. 9:2127. We therefore reverse the court of appeal, reinstate the judgment of the trial court, and remand.

BACKGROUND

Carol James Aymond Jr. (“testator”) died testate on February 26, 2021. His will divided his estate between his daughter, Chantel, and his younger daughter, Delila Aymond (“Delila”). Delila, a minor, is represented in this litigation by her tutor and mother, Valentina Bryan. Testator's will left a usufruct of one-half of his estate to Chantel, for her life. He left the remainder of his estate to the Trust that named Delila as sole beneficiary with Chantel appointed as sole Trustee. After the testator's death, Chantel was confirmed as Independent Executrix of the succession, in accordance with the will. Thus, under the combined provisions of the Trust and the will, Chantel had separate roles as Independent Executrix, Trustee, and usufructuary.

Section 5.1.1 of the Trust prohibited the Trustee from alienating the immovable property held in trust. As explained in the related case, the will did not contain a similar prohibition. During the estate administration, Chantel, in her capacity as Independent Executrix, sold a portion of the immovable property that formed part of the estate. After consultation with tax attorneys, Chantel believed the succession lacked the liquidity to pay likely estate tax obligations. Chantel invested the proceeds of the sale in certificates of deposit held by the succession.

Ms. Bryan, as Tutrix of the trust beneficiary, objected to the sales and sought, among other remedies, to remove Chantel as Trustee of the Trust.¹ The trial court dismissed Ms. Bryan's claims. A divided five judge panel of the court of appeal reversed. Bryan v. Aymond as Trustee of Dalila Carol Aymond Trust, 2024-334 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/30/25), 417 So. 3d 96. It also remanded the matter to the trial court to appoint a new Trustee and to decide the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by the Trust and to assess those fees and costs to Chantel. Id.

ANALYSIS

The crux of this dispute is whether Chantel had the authority to sell the immovable property. Chantel had multiple roles in her father's estate planning, and each of those roles came with distinct rights and obligations. As explained in the related case, when Chantel sold the immovable property, she was not acting in her capacity as Trustee, and her failure to act as Trustee to oppose the sale of the immovable property is not a valid ground for her removal. La. R.S. 9:1789 (“A trustee shall be removed ․ by the proper court for sufficient cause.”).

A trustee may not be removed without “sufficient cause.” La. R.S. 9:1789. The jurisprudence has set forth that no cause for removal exists unless the trustee materially impairs or interferes with the proper administration of the trust. McCaffery v. Linder, 2018-163, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/27/18), 263 So. 3d 1205, 1210, writ denied, 2019-0140 (La. 3/18/19), 267 So. 3d 89 (citing Succession of Noe, 398 So. 2d 1173, 1177 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1981), writ denied, 405 So. 2d 530 (La. 1981)); See also 11 La. Civ. Law Treatise, Trusts § 5:7 (3d ed.) (“[R]emoval of a fiduciary is a drastic step.”) (internal quotations omitted).

The administration of this Trust in this case has not yet commenced. The Trust has not been placed in possession of the property; therefore, it was impossible for Chantel, as Trustee, to sell or otherwise dispose of Trust property that was not yet under the Trust's control. It follows, therefore, that the only grounds for the removal of Chantel as Trustee would be for her failure to object to the sales. As explained in the related case, as Independent Executrix, Chantel had a fiduciary duty to file the estate tax return and remit any taxes owed. 26 U.S.C. § 2002 (2025). By objecting to the sale as Trustee, Chantel would have been acting contrary to the fiduciary duties owed by her as the Independent Executrix—a situation that does not rise to the level of a “material impairment” or “interference” with the Trust that would warrant her removal.²

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal removing Chantel G. Aymond as Trustee of the Dalila Carol Aymond Trust. We also vacate the court of appeal's order requiring Chantel to pay attorney fees and costs to the Trust, finding no grounds for the imposition of any such fees. We reinstate the judgment of the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including any further proceedings relating to the administration of Dalila Carol Aymond Trust as may be necessary.

REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED; AND REMANDED.

While I concur with the per curiam in these matters because no funds have been finally expended, I note that the issue of self-dealing has been raised. The naked owner may require security from the usufructuary in order to ensure the will of the testator.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the related matter, Ms. Bryan sought to remove Chantel as independent executor and to terminate her usufructuary rights over the proceeds of the sale. Succession of Carol James Aymond, Jr., 2025-01101 (La. 11/25/25), ––– So. 3d ––––.

2.   Indeed, as found by the trial court and as noted by the dissents in the court of appeal, the sales substantially increased the assets and stream of income that would go to the Trust, thereby further eroding any argument that she acted in any way to impair the Trust.

PER CURIAM

Hughes, J., concurs and assigns reasons. Griffin, J., concurs.