STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JAMES CHARLES (2025)

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

WJC

JLW

JBM

CRC

Supreme Court of Louisiana November 19, 2025

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-KK-00816

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

JAMES A. CHARLES

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of St. Landry

PER CURIAM

Writ granted. The court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court's judgment denying defendant's motion to suppress. Finding the subject vehicle was not in the curtilage of defendant's home, we hold the seizure and search of the vehicle were reasonable and reinstate the trial court's ruling.

Responding to a reported shooting, Opelousas police officers spoke with an eye witness who identified the shooter as James Charles. The witness confirmed Charles was driving a silver car and lived in a mobile home in a trailer park on Montgomery Lane. The shooting victim likewise confirmed the shooter was a man driving a silver car.

Officers went to the trailer park and found the described mobile home with a silver car parked next to it. A license plate check confirmed the car was registered to “Wilbert James Charles.” The car, which had visible bullet holes and a flat tire, was parked between the trailer and a gravel access road into the trailer park. The area was not enclosed, had no fencing or signs, and additional vehicles were parked nearby. Other trailers were in close proximity, and nothing visibly designated parking areas for each trailer.

Officers knocked on the front door and got no response but heard movement inside the home. An officer then walked over to the silver car, wiped dew off the window, and, cupping her hands to the window, looked in the car and saw empty shell casings on the seat. She did not open the car's doors, and it was not searched at the scene. Instead, the vehicle was towed to a police lot where it was later searched after a warrant was issued. The officer testified it was not safe to search the vehicle at the scene because they were investigating a domestic shooting, people were inside the trailer, and the driver of the vehicle may have still been armed and dangerous. After the vehicle was searched pursuant to a warrant, the empty shell casings were collected as evidence. Defendant was eventually arrested and charged with attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and felon in possession of a firearm.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the empty shell casings, arguing the vehicle was searched and seized without a warrant. Defendant maintains an unlawful search occurred when the officer looked in the vehicle's window, after wiping dew off the glass, while the vehicle was parked within the curtilage of the house. A warrantless seizure likewise occurred when the vehicle was towed. Defendant relied on jurisprudence holding that a vehicle within the curtilage of a home does not fall within the general automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 601; 138 S.Ct. 1663, 1675; 201 L.Ed.2d 9 (2018). The state countered that the vehicle was not parked in the home's curtilage but was in a communal, unmarked, and unenclosed parking area.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, but the court of appeal reversed, finding “the search was conducted within the curtilage of the home.” See State v. James, KW 25-00201 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/17/25) (unpublished writ action). We disagree.

The curtilage of a home is that “area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). The area must be “so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301; 107 S.Ct. at 1134. Four considerations are useful in making this determination: the proximity of the area to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. Id.

The court of appeal based its curtilage determination entirely on the proximity of the car to the trailer. The remaining Dunn factors all indicate the car was not inside the home's curtilage. The car was not parked in an enclosure surrounding the home, no steps were taken to protect the area from view, and it was not visibly identified for, or otherwise restricted to, parking exclusively for defendant's residence. Based on the evidence, the area was not “so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection.” See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301; 107 S.Ct. at 1134; see also State v. Brown, 395 So. 2d 1301, 1310 (La. 1981) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in driveway area of a residence where no evidence established property was fenced or driveway had a gate); State v. Washington, 591 So.2d 1388, 1390 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in apartment complex common area easily accessible by the general public).

The court of appeal relied on Collins, which is factually distinguishable. There, a motorbike was covered by a tarp and parked at the top of a driveway in a partially enclosed area behind and abutting the front of the house. See Collins, 584 U.S. at 593; 138 S.Ct. at 1670-71. Here, the area was not enclosed or marked in any manner and the car was not under a tarp.

The officers had probable cause to search and seize the car given the information they knew at the time. Because the car was not in the home's curtilage, a warrant was not required to search and seize the vehicle under several exceptions to the warrant requirement.¹ The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress.

COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

The Supreme Court has made clear that officers may seize evidence of a crime that is in plain view when the officer is lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, and has a lawful right of access to the object itself. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990). In this case, officers clearly had a right to approach defendant's trailer and the surrounding area, including the vehicle. This court has explained:

[I]it is black-letter law that the police have the same right as other members of the public to approach the doorway of a home and see what was exposed by the owner to the view of the general populace. Even an area around a building that is otherwise considered to be part of the “curtilage” (i.e., the “area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life”) may be entered by the police if that area is also open to the public.

State v. Hilton, 16-0325, pp. 1-2 (La. 3/24/16), 187 So.3d 981, 982 (internal citations removed). Further, even if the vehicle was in the curtilage of defendant's home, “police with legitimate business may enter the areas of the curtilage which are impliedly open to use by the public, and ․ in so doing they are free to keep their eyes open and use their other senses.” State v. Washington, 12-2203, p. 4 (La. 11/16/12), 104 So.3d 401, 404. As detailed in the per curiam, officers were conducting a legitimate investigation at the time they approached the vehicle in a parking area which was not enclosed or otherwise marked as inaccessible to the public.

While outside of the defendant's home, the officers could see, in plain view, the shell casings on the vehicle seat. The fact that there was dew on the vehicle window did not create a reasonable expectation of privacy. The dew is a naturally occurring event, rather than something applied by defendant to obscure the vehicle from public view. Although the officer had to wipe dew from the window to see inside, that action is no different than an officer shining a flashlight into a vehicle because it is dark outside. See State v. Edsall, 385 So.2d 207, 210 (La. 1980) (court found plain view doctrine applicable, despite the fact that the officer had to step up on the side of the truck to shine his flashlight into its cab.)

In my view, the whole discussion about curtilage is the proverbial “strawman” holding a “red herring.” Based on the facts of this case, I agree that the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court's judgment denying defendant's motion to suppress, as no unlawful search occurred before issuance of the search warrant.

The majority paints an inaccurate picture of the area where the vehicle was located to hold that it was not in the curtilage of the home. What is most misleading about the picture painted by the majority is the portrayal of the parking area as an open, unrestricted, and communal parking lot similar to what is used for multi-family dwellings such as apartment complexes. While the area where the car was parked was open and unrestricted, the majority's description of the area as communal is a bit of an exaggeration. This exaggeration is primarily aided by the majority's failure to appreciate that the location was an actual neighborhood of single-family dwellings comprised of mobile homes, referred to more commonly by the disparaging phrase “trailer park.”

A photo of the mobile home shows the front of the home is oriented to face Montgomery Road with a grass covered yard and a deep but narrow ditch separating the home from the road. What appears to be a gravel road can be seen to the right of the right end of the mobile home when viewing the home from Montgomery Road. Notably, the bottom edge of the mobile home appears to be indented inwards several feet on the right end of the mobile home. Parked near that indented end between the mobile home and the gravel road appear two vehicles—a white pickup truck and the subject vehicle. The mobile home is the first home on the left when turning onto the gravel road from Montgomery Road. Anyone viewing the photo would associate the vehicles with the mobile home based on where and how the vehicles are parked.

Further, the State failed to present the search warrant or testimony regarding the content of the search warrant and therefore failed to meet its burden of proof under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Similarly, the court of appeal correctly found that the trial court's ruling was not based on exigent circumstances or the automobile exception.

Therefore, I would find no error in the court of appeal's determination that the car was parked within the curtilage of the mobile home. As a result, law enforcement's physical intrusion onto the curtilage to gather evidence constituted a search that was unreasonable absent a warrant.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466; 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014; 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (automobile exception); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42; 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981; 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (automobile exception); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130; 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2304; 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (plain view); State v. Hilton, 16-0325 (La. 3/24/16), 187 So. 3d 981, 982 (plain view); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 93 S.Ct. 2796, 37 L.Ed.2d 757 (1973) (exigent circumstances); State v. Brisban, 00-3437 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 927 (exigent circumstances). Although the officer had to wipe dew from the car's window to see inside, this action is analogous to shining a flashlight into an automobile at night. See State v. Edsall, 385 So. 2d 207, 210 (La. 1980) (Officer was entitled as a precaution for his own safety to generally survey vehicle, although he had to step on the side of the truck to shine his flashlight into its cab.)

Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Hughes, J., dissents and would grant and docket. Griffin, J., dissents. Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons.