STATE OF LOUISIANA v. HENRY TAYLOR (2025)

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

JLW

JDH

PDG

JMG

Supreme Court of Louisiana March 18, 2025

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2024-KH-00907

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

HENRY TAYLOR

On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans

PER CURIAM:

Writ granted. In 1981, an Orleans Parish jury found applicant guilty of one count of aggravated rape. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. This Court affirmed. State v. Taylor, 410 So.2d 224 (La. 1982). In April 2024, applicant filed an application for post-conviction relief into the district court arguing his conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution, namely that the reasonable doubt standard applied in his original case was flawed due to the erroneous Cage ¹ jury instructions.

Applicant has adequately demonstrated that his application for post-conviction relief overcomes the post-conviction procedural bars, as the state filed a written notice into the district court on May 24, 2024, waiving the procedural bars which may limit his application pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. arts. 930.4(G) (eff. until 8/1/24) and 930.8(D) (eff. until 8/1/24). The waiver was express, in writing, and filed by the state into the district court record, as required by those provisions.

While the legislature has since added a provision to those articles making the procedural bars mandatory, see La.C.Cr.P. arts. 930.4(G) & 930.8(E), at the time applicant filed his post-conviction application and the state filed its waiver, the district court was free to consider the application on the merits. As we have previously observed, if a defendant seeks post-conviction relief based on the finding of a legal defect pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3, a district attorney is not required to oppose the application. “For example, if a defendant claims his conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution, pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(1), because he was denied effective assistance of counsel or because the state withheld favorable evidence in violation of Brady [․], the district attorney may choose not to raise procedural objections even when they apply.” State v. Lee, 22-1827, p. 10 (La. 9/1/23), 370 So.3d 408, 416.

As the state has affirmatively waived procedural objections to the application, which is alleged to be based on a ground for relief found in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3, there is no barrier to the district court considering the application on the merits. The matter is remanded to the district court for further consideration of the merits of the claim, any required evidentiary hearing, or any hearing required by La. Const. art. 1, § 25 (“a victim of crime shall have the right to reasonable notice and to be present and heard during all critical stages of preconviction and postconviction proceedings”) or other applicable law if necessary.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

In a petition filed on April 23, 2024, defendant seeks post-conviction relief for a 1981 conviction for an aggravated rape that occurred in 1980. To evade the applicable two-year time limit to file the petition, defendant relies on a waiver filed by the state on May 24, 2024. At that time, such waivers were permitted in post-conviction proceedings under a 2021 amendment to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 930.4G and 930.8D. See 2021 La. Acts 104 (effective 8/1/21). Shortly after the state filed the waiver, the legislature again amended Articles 930.4 and 930.8 to eliminate the waiver provision and declare the procedural limitations on post-conviction relief “shall be jurisdictional and shall not be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney.” See 2024 La. Acts 10 (effective 8/1/24).

Defendant's petition is thus reviewable only because it was filed during a brief window of time when the legislature allowed the state to waive certain procedural objections in post-conviction proceedings. That window is now closed. If filed today, defendant's petition could not be considered by the court.

Our holding allows an evidentiary hearing on the petition but makes no findings on its merits. The request focuses on a jury charge and relies on a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court almost ten years after defendant's conviction. See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39; 111 S.Ct. 328, 329; 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam), disapproved of by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62; 112 S.Ct. 475; 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). This court has already held Cage does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292, 1299 (La. 1992). Nothing in today's decision changes that holding.

Our criminal justice system is designed as an adversarial process with the state and victims postured adversely with the accused, and the judiciary serving as the neutral arbiter, with checks throughout the process for protection of those interests. See La. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 13-20, 25; art. V; La. Code Crim Pro. arts. 17, 61-66; La. R.S. 46:1841-46. If those checks are realigned, the system of criminal justice risks failing. Another check against that potential failure is the constitutional authority for the Attorney General to intervene in proceedings as necessary for the protection of the state's interest. See La. Const. art. IV, § 8; State v. Lee, 22-01827 (La. 9/1/23), 370 So. 3d 408, 412, n.4, reh'g denied, 22-01827 (La. 10/19/23). For these reasons, I concur.

I concur in the Court's decision to remand this matter to consider the merits. The legislature recently acted to make the two-year deadline unwaivable. See Acts 2024, 2nd Ex. Sess., No. 10, § 1, eff. Aug. 1, 2024. However, the defendant's motion was filed prior to that change in the law.

The prior law enables a district attorney to waive procedural objections like timeliness, but the underlying motion still must be heard on the merits at the trial court. The waiver establishes, or at least strongly intimates, that the local district attorney supports the underlying motion. That could be entirely appropriate in the present case. However, I am concerned with the State's ability to preserve its interest in maintaining this long-final conviction through a meaningful representation in the normal adversarial process.

The Louisiana Constitution provides for the “fairness, dignity, and respect” of any person who is a victim of a crime.” La. Const. art. I, §. 25.¹ In my view, when a district attorney fails to oppose a post-conviction motion vacating an otherwise final conviction, he or she is taking a view contrary to that of the factfinder and the appellate courts, thus providing a reasonable basis for the state to consider an intervention. La. Const. art. IV, §. 8. If the victim does not join in the request for relief, it intensifies the concern that an intervention is justified to ensure all the state's interests are properly represented. There is no intervention motion pending, but if one is filed on remand, the trial court should carefully consider it.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990).

1.   Pursuant to La. R.S. 46:1844, the victim or designated family member of the victim has the right to be present at all “critical stages” of the prosecution. See La. R.S. 46:1842(4) (“ ‘Critical stage’ means any judicial proceeding at which there is a disposition of the charged offense or a lesser offense, or a sentence imposed pursuant thereto.”)

Crain, J., concurs and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., dissents. Cole, J., concurs and assigns reasons.