IN RE: G. KARL BERNARD (2024)

Joint petition for consent discipline accepted. See per curiam.

Crichton, J., dissents and would reject the petition for consent discipline and assigns reasons.

Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

Griffin, J., dissents for reasons assigned by Crichton, J.

Supreme Court of Louisiana January 10, 2024

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent grossly mishandled his client trust account, resulting in the conversion of client and third-party funds, and represented a party although he realized that doing so would constitute a conflict of interest. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that G. Karl Bernard, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24294, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. All but thirty days of this suspension shall be deferred, followed by a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in the petition for consent discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the probation monitor, and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court's judgment until paid.

CRICHTON, J., would reject the petition for consent discipline and assigns reasons:

As I have previously noted, the Louisiana Constitution vests this Court with original jurisdiction in all “disciplinary proceedings against a member of the bar.” La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel have submitted this matter as a joint petition, I believe – as our Constitution provides – that the seven justices determine the appropriate result under that exclusive grant of jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re: Whiddon, 2020-0428 (La. 5/14/20), 296 So. 3d 604 (Crichton, J., would reject the petition for consent discipline as “too harsh”); In re: Hessler, 2022-00791 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So. 3d 622 (Crichton, J., dissents from consent discipline petition as “unduly harsh”); In re: Wells, 20-0063 (La. 7/2/20), 297 So. 3d 741, 742 (same); In re: Hardee, 18-1555 (La. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 329 (same); In re: Orgeron, 2023-00545 (La. 5/31/23), 361 So. 3d 447 (same). Though I do not condone the rule violations at issue here, in light of the mitigating factors presented, I would reject the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline.

CRAIN, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

I dissent, finding the discipline too harsh.