IN RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE J. RANDY GUIDROZ (2023)

Application for rehearing denied.

As the Judiciary Commission through the Office of Special Counsel points out in the request for rehearing:

In November 2021, the Supreme Court amended Rule XXIII, Section 22, regarding the payment of costs in Commission proceedings. Pursuant to this revision, the Commission may now, in its discretion, file a motion with the Court to recover any or all costs incurred by the Commission in the event a judge resigns after a matter becomes public but prior to the conclusion of the proceedings before the Court.1 Because former Justice of the Peace J. Randy Guidroz chose to resign from his position on September 26, 2023, while the Commission's recommendation of discipline was pending before this court, the commission was obliged to seek to dismiss the matter without prejudice due to the loss of jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Montalbano, 06-2340 (La. 10/27/06), 940 So. 2d 645). Considering the timing of the resignation-months after the Commission presented its recommendation to the Court, weeks after Justice of the Peace Guidroz notified the Commission that he did not intend to and failed to appear for oral argument before the court, and when the matter was pending before the Court for final consideration–the Commission determined that it was appropriate to seek to recover the $1598.02 incurred in hard costs pursuant to Rule XXIII, Section 22(b).

The Court granted the Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice, but the Court's order did not address the concurrently filed Motion to Recover Costs Pursuant to Louisiana Supreme court Rule XXIII, Section 22(b).

I agree with the Judiciary Commission and note that the “Introduction” to the Commission's “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations of Discipline” on page 2 states:

[The Judiciary Commission's case] arises from the twelve years that he spent employed as a full-time undercover intelligence officer for the Pointe Coupee Parish Sheriff's Office while simultaneously servicing as a justice of the peace, as well as his improper attempted involvement in a criminal matter on behalf of a friend's son. By acting as an intelligence officer tasked with covertly gathering information on the very same constituents whom he had been elected to serve as a justice of the peace, JP Guidroz blurred the line between the judiciary and law enforcement and created an ethically impermissible appearance of impropriety and partiality, especially considering that JP Guidroz earned a total of over $500,000, as well as various other benefits, from his employment with the Sheriff. The problematic nature of JP Guidroz's employment with the Sheriff was only underscored when, after a friend and fellow justice of the peace informed JP Guidroz that his son had been arrested for domestic battery, JP Guidroz undermined his integrity and trustworthiness as a judicial official and contacted the Sheriff-who was also his employer at the time-and an Assistant District Attorney in an attempt to ensure that the friend's son would be released from jail, not face any charges for the crime, and not have his parole revoked.

In footnote 3, on page 3, the “Introduction” further indicates:

After the OSC filed its brief, JP Guidroz in his brief stated that he had come to the realization that his actions, as stipulated, violated the Canons and Louisiana Constitution as alleged in the Notice of Hearing. (Justice of the Peace J. Randy Guidroz's Brief Regarding Stipulations of Fact, Conclusions of Law to be Drawn from the Factual Stipulations, and Recommendation of Discipline (․ “JP Guidroz's Brief”) at 2, VI at 46).

Because of the over $500,000 in proceeds, plus benefits, earned by the Justice of the Peace in the questionable employment relationship with the Sheriff; the delayed resignation; and amended Rule XXIII, Section 22, of the Rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was specifically enacted to address this very type of situation, court costs should be assessed to the Justice of the Peace. Alternatively, reasons why these court costs are not imposed should be explained so that the Judiciary Commission can comprehend when and why this court will exercise its discretion not to impose court costs despite the enactment of this specific rule.²

No court order is necessary for the former Justice of the Peace to voluntarily pay the costs requested, which seems a modest amount when considering all the time and effort expended due to his actions–actions he eventually acknowledged violated the Canons.

Because I would grant the Judiciary Commission's request for rehearing regarding the recovery of costs, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “ ‘A judge's resignation or retirement after a matter has become public under Section 23(a)(1) but prior to the conclusion of proceedings before the Commission of the Court shall not preclude the Commission, in its discretion from filing a motion with the Supreme Court to recover any or all of the costs incurred by the Office of Special Counsel, the hearing officer, and/or Commission ․ The Court, in its discretion, may tax all or any portion of the costs recommended by the Commission ․.’ La. Sup. Ct. Rule XXIII, Sec. 22(b).”

2.   With his resignation, it should be noted that former Justice of the Peace Guidroz also foisted upon taxpayers the obligation to pay the costs of an election to fill his position.

Weimer, C.J., would grant and assigns reasons. Crichton, J., would grant rehearing regarding costs.