JOHN GLENN RAYMOND v. FELIX LASSERRE SR (2023)

Writ application denied.

Cyberstalking is defined under La. R.S. 46:2172 as “any act that that would constitute the crime of stalking under R.S. 14:40.2 or cyberstalking under R.S. 14:40.3.” La. R.S. 14:40.2 A defines stalking as “the intentional and repeated following or harassing of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel alarmed or to suffer emotional distress. ․” La. R.S. 14:40.2 A. Cyberstalking is defined by La. R.S. 14:40.3 as the “action of any person to accomplish” a variety of activities, including “[e]lectronically mail[ing] or electronically communicat[ing] to another repeatedly, whether or not conversation ensues, for the purpose of threatening, terrifying, or harassing any person.” La. R.S. 14:30.3 B (2). However, La. R.S. 14:40.3 E states that the statute “does not apply to any peaceable, nonviolent, or nonthreatening activity intended to express political views or to provide lawful information to others.”

The United States Supreme Court noted in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003), that the “hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.” See also, United States v. Sryniawski, 48 F.4th 583, 587 (8th Cir.2022) (“The Free Speech Clause protects a variety of speech that is intended to trouble or annoy, or to make another timid or fearful”). Accordingly, not all repugnant behavior is unlawful.

In the instant matter, the lower courts found that Mr. Lasserre's conduct amounted to cyberstalking, warranting the issuance of a protective order ordering Mr. Lasserre not to “abuse, harass, assault, stalk, follow, track, monitor or threaten Mr. Raymond in any manner whatsoever.” The protective order further barred Mr. Lasserre from contacting Mr. Raymond, personally, through a third party or via public posting by any means, including written, telephone, or electronic communication without the expressed permission of the court.”

Importantly, as acknowledged by both the trial court and Judge Holdridge in his concurrence, some of the posts Mr. Lasserre made on social media outlets are protected speech under the First Amendment. In my view, the blanket order issued by the trial court paints with too broad a brush and must be more narrowly tailored to accomplish the task.

Hughes, J., would grant in part for reasons assigned by McCallum, J. McCallum, J., would grant in part and assigns reasons.