DOMONIQUE WHITE v. MICHAEL JOHN RYALL JR (2026)

Appellant, the father of a minor child, appeals a judgment of custody granting him and the mother equal physical custodial time with the child and granting the mother authority to make major medical and educational decisions affecting the child. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal involves the custody of the minor child, BMR (DOB 5/12/20). The mother and father of the minor child were never married. On September 24, 2021, the parties reached a consent judgment in which they agreed to share joint legal custody and equal physical custody of the child according to a 2 day/2 day/5 day/5 day physical custody schedule. The parties agreed that neither would be named domiciliary parent, but both reserved the right to litigate that issue in the future. They further did not name a parent to be in charge of making major decisions on behalf of the child. A second consent judgment was executed by the parties on May 17, 2022, keeping the previously-mentioned stipulations in place.

On October 27, 2023, the father filed a petition to modify custody, for supervised visitation, treatment and costs pursuant to the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act (“PSFVRA”), and for child support. According to the petition, the father sought sole custody of the child, alleging the mother had been physically abusive to the child. The motion described an incident on October 20, 2023, when the child developed a large bruise on his buttocks while in the mother's custody. When the father brought the child in for medical treatment that day, the child allegedly told the medical providers that “his mommy hit him[.]” The father further alleged a history and pattern of abuse or neglect by the mother from May 30, 2022 - October 20, 2023, noting the child had sustained multiple injuries during the mother's custodial time. The father also filed a petition for protection from abuse on October 24, 2023. A protective order was issued against the mother but was later dismissed following a hearing.

The father moved to recuse the family court judge, Judge Baker, and also to disqualify the mother's attorney, Laurie N. Marien.² The family court contacted the Louisiana Supreme Court to appoint an ad hoc judge for this matter, prior to the custody hearing scheduled in October 2024. Thereafter, the Louisiana Supreme Court appointed James E. Kuhn as supernumerary ad hoc judge to preside over this matter.

On August 16, 2024, the family court executed a judgment ordering that the child be assessed by “Pupil Appraisal” through the Livingston Parish School System to determine if he qualified for special instruction programming within the school district. The order continued that should the child qualify for special instruction, then the child should attend Juban Parc Elementary for Pre-K4. However, if the child did not qualify, then the child would attend Pre-K4 at Central Private School, with a permanent school choice being reserved for trial.

Also, in August 2024, the father filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 3601 pertaining to the school the child would attend and a petition for ex parte custody in September 2024. The father's request for ex parte emergency custody was denied. The mother also filed a petition for ex parte custody and child support in September 2024; her request for ex parte custody was also denied and both pleadings were set for a hearing. In late September 2024, the mother filed a second petition for ex parte custody.

On October 7, 2024, the family court held a hearing on the father's motion to disqualify the mother's attorney, Ms. Marien. Certain facts were stipulated by the parties, such as Ms. Marien's employment as the Director of Women's Policy for the Governor's Office, which the father suggested was over the Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”). The father further stated that DCFS is an organization involved in this case. The father then submitted evidence into the record in conjunction with the motion to disqualify but was not allowed to call Ms. Marien as a witness. Following party arguments, the family court: denied the motion, finding that the father had not met his burden of proof.

The custody hearing was held on October 21, 2024, and November 15, 2024. Both parties testified, called witnesses, and introduced evidence. Much of the father's case focused on his allegations of abuse perpetrated by the mother against the child. As for the mother, she denied being abusive to the child and focused on the father's aggressive behavior during exchanges and his desire for unilateral decision making on the child's education and medical treatments. Once both parties rested, the family court took the matter under advisement.

Eventually, the mother moved for a status conference in order to determine whether the family court had rendered judgment in the case. On February 25, 2025, the family court held a “status conference” in open court, noting that it had hoped the parties would have obtained a psychological evaluation of the child as previously discussed, but even without it, the court would be making its decision shortly.

A judgment of custody and reasons for judgment were executed on February 28, 2025. The family court found that the breakdown in the parents’ relationship, their inability to communicate, and the general lack of respect they had for each other constituted a material change in circumstances warranting a modification of the physical custody schedule. Thus, the family court ordered that the parties have joint legal custody of the minor child and exercise physical custodial time on a rotating weekly schedule. The family court further ordered that the mother be given authority to make decisions on the child's schooling and major medical issues, while the father was given this authority in regards to the child's extracurricular activities.

Also on February 28, 2025, Judge Kuhn executed an order that provided:

IT IS ORDERED the appointment of James E. Kuhn as Supernumerary ad hoc Judge in the above-captioned case has terminated.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any and all orders previously rendered by Supernumerary ad hoc Judge James E. Kuhn in this case, specifically those pertaining to the filing of new pleadings with the Clerk of Court, are hereby rescinded.

The father filed a motion for new trial. At the hearing on the motion, the father argued that the custody judgment was contrary to the law and evidence and that the father had discovered at the end of the custody trial undisclosed evidence not provided by the mother. The father also questioned the validity of the custody judgment in light of Judge Kuhn's final order terminating his role in the case and rescinding any and all orders he previously rendered. Following a hearing on the motion for new trial held on May 16, 2025, the father's motion for new trial was denied.³

The father filed the instant appeal, asserting the following as error:

1. The family court erred in rendering and maintaining the February 28, 2025 custody judgment under irregular procedural circumstances concerning the authority of the presiding judge and the timing of the signing and filing of the judgment.

2. The family court abused its discretion in awarding shared custody despite evidence presented at trial regarding injuries to the minor child and the existence of pending criminal charges against the mother arising from allegations of abuse.

3. The family court improperly limited testimony and interfered with the development of the record by restricting examination of witnesses and limiting cross-examination on matters relevant to the safety and best interest of the minor child.

4. The family court abused its discretion by granting the mother unilateral authority over major medical and educational decisions affecting the minor child while declining to designate a domiciliary parent as required by La. R.S. 9:335.

5. The family court failed to properly evaluate and weigh evidence relevant to the best-interest factors under La. Civ. Code art. 134, including evidence concerning repeated injuries to the minor child, the parties’ respective caregiving roles, and each parent's ability to meet the child's medical and developmental needs.

6. The family court erred in pretermitting the parties’ contempt rules despite the relevance of the alleged conduct to the best-interest analysis required under La. Civ. Code art. 134.

7. The family court abused its discretion by implementing an equal custodial schedule despite evidence regarding the mother's work schedule and ability to personally care for the minor child.

8. The family court erred in failing to award or consider child support to the father during the period the minor child primarily resided with him pursuant to a criminal protective order.

9. The family court erred in denying the motion to disqualify opposing counsel.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Validity of Judgment

In his first assignment of error, the father contends that the February 28, 2025 custody judgment is invalid because surrounding circumstances imply that the judgment may have actually been signed at a later date, once Judge Kuhn's appointment had terminated. The father avers that the judgment was not filed into the record until March 19, 2025, nearly twenty days after the termination of Judge Kuhn's appointment. Meanwhile, Judge Kuhn's termination order also dated February 28, 2025, was filed into the record on February 28, 2025, which the father asserts supports his argument that the custody judgment was not actually signed on February 28, 2025, but rather a later date when Judge Kuhn was without jurisdiction. The father argues, “[w]hen the record raises uncertainty as to whether the signing of the judgment occurred before or after the termination of the judge's authority, the judgment cannot be presumed valid.” Moreover, the father alleges that at a status conference held on February 25, 2025, Judge Kuhn acknowledged that he had not yet completed his judgment and reasons, which further suggests that a judgment could not have been validly executed by Judge Kuhn on February 28, 2025. Thus, the father argues this judgment is an absolute nullity, as it was executed by a judge who lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and should be vacated.

As a general rule, final judgments are presumed to be valid. Cage v. Adoption Options of Louisiana, Inc., 94-2173 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/23/95), 657 So.2d 670, 671. However, a final judgment shall be annulled if it is rendered by a court which does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2002(A)(3). The father does not dispute that Judge Kuhn had the authority, and therefore jurisdiction, to sign the custody judgment and reasons in support thereof on February 28, 2025, the date written on the judgment. Instead, the father relies on the subsequent filing date of the judgment to argue that it could not have been signed on February 28, 2025. Without any factual evidence to support that Judge Kuhn signed the judgment on any date other than the one that is written on the judgment, February 28, 2025, the father has presented only conjecture regarding the discrepancy between the date of the judgment and the date of its filing This assignment lacks merit.

Domestic Violence Accusations and Failure to Abide by the PSFVRA

In his second assignment of error, the father asserts the family court legally erred in awarding equal, unsupervised custodial time to the mother despite his allegations and proof that the mother perpetrated abuse against the child, in violation of La. R.S. 9:364 of the PSFVRA. The PSFVRA was designed to protect a child's interest by restricting the right of visitation of the abusing parent in families with a history of family violence. See Michelli v. Michelli, 93-2128 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 1342, 1346. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:364(A) creates a presumption that “no parent who has a history of perpetrating family violence” shall be awarded sole or joint custody of the children. Moreover, if the court finds that a parent has a history of perpetrating family violence, the court shall allow only supervised child visitation with that parent pursuant to La. R.S. 9:341.⁴ La. R.S. 9:364(E) (Emphasis added).

Once the PSFVRA has been triggered by a finding of a history of family violence, an additional burden of proof is imposed upon the parent who has been found to have a history of perpetrating family violence. Nettles v. Nettles, 2013-1164 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/27/13), 2013 WL 6858325, *2 (unpublished). That parent must overcome the presumption that he cannot be awarded sole or joint custody of the child by proving that he has completed a court-monitored domestic abuse intervention program as defined by the PSFVRA; that he is not abusing alcohol or using illegal drugs; and that the best interest of the child requires him to be the custodial parent because of the other parent's absence, mental illness, or substance abuse, or such other circumstances negatively affecting the child. La. R.S. 9:364(B).

In most child custody cases, the trial court's determination is based heavily on factual findings. Yepez v. Yepez, 2021-0477 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 36, 41. It is well settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a trial court's findings in the absence of manifest error or unless the findings are clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). If the findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse those findings even though convinced it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id.

During the custody hearing, the father testified that he believed the mother was abusing the child. The father focused on the October 20, 2023 “incident” where he found a significant bruise on the child's buttocks, which became the basis of his failed protective order in family court and the still on-going criminal matter in Livingston Parish. The father also testified about other marks on the child that he found concerning, including carpet burns on his spine, claw marks on his back, and belt marks on his buttocks. In conjunction with this testimony, the father introduced photographs of the child's buttocks with the bruise and a photograph of the child's arm with bruises, as well as several messages from the mother explaining bruises, scratches, and bumps that the child incurred while in her care. The father testified that he took the child to the emergency room on October 20, 2023, upon suggestion of the parenting coordinator, and that this visit initiated the DCFS and criminal proceedings against the mother. On cross-examination, the father stated that DCFS's findings regarding its investigation of abuse were inconclusive and that the criminal protective order that was put in place in Livingston Parish had been dissolved. However, he testified that the criminal charges against the mother were still pending.

Renee McCarthy, the parties’ court-appointed parenting coordinator, testified after being qualified as an expert in social work and counseling. Ms. McCarthy stated that her role is to assist the parties with co-parenting and resolving disputes amicably, with an effort in putting the focus back on the best interest of the child. Ms. McCarthy stated that the parties agreed the child was a “tough and rumbly” child who gets bruises, and it was not until the marks on him became a continuing, ongoing issue that it had to be addressed. Ms. McCarthy testified that with the particular picture of the bruised buttocks she advised the father to seek the guidance of the child's pediatrician, because in her role as parenting coordinator she did not come into contact with the child. Once a report of abuse was made, she no longer saw the parties. Ms. McCarthy testified on cross-examination that she was “horrified” to learn that following the reporting of the alleged injuries to the authorities, the mother was prohibited from seeing the child for over six months. She further explained that in her opinion, the information surrounding the alleged injuries may have been more of a case of neglect rather than physical abuse of the child by the mother.

The mother also testified in connection with the allegations of abuse. The mother testified that the child is a little boy who is going to have bumps and bruises, but those are a result of his play, which she considers normal. Along with her testimony regarding the child's play and behavior, the mother introduced into evidence the child's daycare records for the previous year. These daycare records noted that the child was active and had behavioral issues, not only by defying orders like cleaning up toys and napping, but also getting physical with other children, hitting them, elbowing them, and choking them. These records also contained copies of incident reports for the child at school accumulating bumps, bruises, and scratches during play on the playground or in the classroom. The mother further testified that since the initiation of the criminal proceedings, she is a “nervous wreck,” constantly making sure nothing is going to happen to the child to the point where she no longer lets the child ride his bicycle for fear of him getting more bruises. The mother also stated that the child fell twice during her October 2023 custodial time, resulting in significant bruises. Additionally, the mother testified that her previous relationship with the father was abusive, with the father pushing her and damaging her belongings, as well as the home they lived in, and that the child had incurred injuries while in the father's care, sustaining burns on his hands.

In its reasons for judgment, the family court specifically found that based on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the mother did not physically abuse the child. The family court also referenced the father's previously filed petition for protection from abuse and its dismissal by the family court based on the father's failure to prove the allegations. The testimony presented was that the child is active and often gets bruises, burns, and abrasions. There was also testimony that the child suffers from behavioral issues. This testimony was corroborated by the evidence admitted. After reviewing the record before us, we cannot say the family court was manifestly erroneous in failing to find a history of family violence perpetrated by the mother; thus, the presumption of the PSFVRA was never triggered. This assignment is without merit.

Modification of Custody

In his fourth, fifth, and seventh assignments of error, the father contends the family court improperly granted the mother decision-making authority over the child's medical and educational needs; failed to properly weigh the best interest factors when awarding custody; and wrongly implemented a week-to-week physical custodial schedule.

Each child custody case must be viewed in light of its own particular set of facts and circumstances, with the paramount consideration being the best interest of the child. La. Civ. Code art. 131; Underwood v. Underwood, 2021-0277 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/21/21), 332 So.3d 128, 139. It is the child's emotional, physical, material, and social well-being and health that are the court's very purpose in child custody cases, and the court must protect the child from the real possibility that the parents are engaged in a bitter, vengeful, and highly emotional conflict. C.M.J. v. L.M.C., 2014-1119 (La. 10/15/14), 156 So.3d 16, 28, citing Turner v. Turner, 455 So.2d 1374, 1379 (La. 1984). The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the best interest of the child given the unique circumstances of the particular case. Gutierrez v. Bruno, 2019-1537 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/5/20), 310 So.3d 560, 565. The trial court's determination on child custody matters is entitled to great weight, and its discretion will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. Mulkey v. Mulkey, 2012-2709 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 357, 368.

In child custody cases where two parents are fervently competing for custody and domiciliary status of the children, frequently the trial court must determine the best interest of the children solely from the testimony of the parents and their respective relatives or friends. This naturally passionate and self-interested testimony is rarely objective, leaving it to the trial court, who is in the best position to view firsthand the demeanor and tone of the witnesses, to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and decide how much weight to give the testimony in light of the factors in La. [Civ. Code] art. 134.

Fuller v. Fuller, 54,098 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 7/21/21), 324 So.3d 1103, 1114, writ denied, 2021-01223 (La. 9/27/21), 324 So.3d 621.

The paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. See La. Civ. Code art. 131. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335(A)(2)(b) provides that to the extent it is feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody of the children should be shared equally. Furthermore, La. Civ. Code art. 134 directs the trial court to consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child.⁵ The weight to be given each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court. Hodges v. Hodges, 2015-0585 (La. 11/23/15), 181 So.3d 700, 703. In making its determination, the trial court is not bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all of the statutory factors listed in Article 134 but should decide each case on its own facts and circumstances in light of Article 134 and other relevant factors. Underwood, 332 So.3d at 140.

(2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.

(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.

(4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.

(5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.

(6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.

(7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.

(8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any party.

(9) The mental and physical health of each party. Evidence that an abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other parent shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody.

(10) The home, school, and community history of the child.

(11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.

(12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party, except when objectively substantial evidence of specific abusive, reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable concerns for the child's safety or well-being while in the care of the other party.

(13)The distance between the respective residences of the parties.

(14)The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.

Finally, there is a distinction between the burden of proof needed to change a custody plan ordered pursuant to a considered decree and that needed to change a custody plan ordered pursuant to a consent decree or stipulated judgment. Richard v. Richard, 2009-0299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/12/09), 20 So.3d 1061, 1066. If a prior award of custody, as in this case, has been made by consent decree, the party seeking a change in custody must prove that a change materially affecting the welfare of the child has occurred since the original decree. The proponent for change must also show that the proposed modification of custody is in the best interest of the child. Id. The family court found that the deterioration of the parties’ relationship was the change in circumstances that warranted a modification of a custody agreement that had these parents seeing each other quite often. The parties’ failure to communicate well has been held to constitute a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child. Gregoire v. Wriborg, 2024-1290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/11/25), 417 So.3d 68, 75. We agree that the family court's finding of a material change in circumstances based on the breakdown in the parties’ in-person communication to be well-supported by the record, as evidenced by the parties’ own testimony and the testimony of John Johnson, the mother's boyfriend, who stated that at exchanges the father displayed very aggressive behavior towards the mother.⁶

We must next address whether the family court abused its discretion in how it modified the previous 2 day/2 day/5 day/5 day physical custody arrangement that provided for no domiciliary parent or parent with decision-making authority. During the custody hearing, the family court heard from the father who began his testimony by explaining the origin of the parties’ 2 day/2 day/5 day/5 day physical custodial schedule, which was confected to best accommodate the parties’ work schedules. He testified that early on, the child demonstrated a developmental speech delay, which caused the father to seek out speech therapy for the child. The father also stated that the mother was not “on board” with the treatment. He also testified that the child was treated by an occupational therapist due to behavior issues. The father stated that he has a loving relationship with his son, and an activity they enjoy doing together is riding a four wheeler. The father also testified that he attends Journey Church, a nondenominational church, which the child attends with the father when in his physical custody. He said during the pendency of the protective order, he had no communication with the mother, per the protective order, and as he essentially had sole custody of the minor child, he enrolled him in Central Private School. The father also testified that during this time, he took his son to the chiropractor and did not inform the mother of any chiropractic treatments had by the child either before or after the visit. Finally, the father testified that he is agreeable to maintaining the current custody schedule, or if the court was inclined to modify, then to allow him to be the domiciliary parent.

Ms. McCarthy explained that in her role as parenting coordinator, she identified what each parents’ “issues” were, the father's being help with speech and school, while the mother's were getting consistency with schedules, parenting, communication, notification, and collaborating about appointments. Ms. McCarthy testified that she met with the parties once per month over a fifteen month period, mainly discussing the issues of therapy treatments and schooling for the child. Ms. McCarthy recalled that the father was a greater proponent of the child participating in speech therapy, while the mother was more reluctant, but eventually came around

Mr. Johnson, the mother's boyfriend, testified that in his opinion, the mother exhibited a lot of natural grace and patience when it came to parenting the child. Mr. Johnson testified that the child has some behavioral issues and he has never once seen the mother frustrated or angry with the child. He also testified that the child is very attached to the mother in return.

The mother testified that she believed a more traditional custodial schedule would be beneficial, with the child staying with her during the week, and spending the weekends with his father. The mother stated this type of schedule would eliminate some of the exchanges between the parties that tend to go poorly. Upon questioning by the court, the mother admitted that she had been arrested for the current criminal proceeding; she further testified that the father had previously been arrested for domestic abuse.

In conjunction with the testimony, evidence was introduced demonstrating that the child qualified for special instruction and speech language therapy services in Livingston Parish. The mother also offered evidence to show that the father took the child to the chiropractor and had an adjustment, after the child complained of pain while sleeping. That chiropractor's chart notes provide that the child's father reported the following: the child's pain had been present since late December 2023 and had lasted about a month; and also noted the child was experiencing increased anxiety at school and increased episodes of conduct-related incidents at school.

The father argues that the testimony of the parenting coordinator along with his own testimony demonstrates that he actively addressed the child's developmental and medical needs, unlike the mother. He further contends that the evidence demonstrated that he pursued educational opportunities for the child, all while the mother faced pending criminal charges.

The record reflects that the issue of school choice was a controversial issue, which was addressed via temporary order as well as at the hearing at issue. By the August 16, 2024 judgment, the family court ordered that the child be assessed by “Pupil Appraisal” to determine if he qualified for special instruction programming within the school district; until such time, the child would attend Juban Parc Elementary. The child was found to qualify for special instruction. During the custody hearing, the family court heard testimony that Juban Parc Elementary offered services for an Individualized Education Program (IEP), which could address the child's developmental delay in speech and language. In its written reasons for judgment, the family court found that although the father requested the child attend Central Private School, the private institution was neither equipped nor required to provide the therapies the child needed both in and out of school. Based on the foregoing, it appears the family court chose the school that could provide the best services for the child, or put another way, the school that was in the best interest of the child and his specific needs. Accordingly, the family court could have designated the parent it thought would best implement the court's order regarding school choice, which is the mother. Similarly, the family court could have designated the mother with the authority over major medical decisions, as the record reflects that she did not make unilateral decisions on behalf of the child with regard to his medical care. Although the father maintains he was instrumental in getting the child into speech therapy, he did not want the child assessed with such a developmental delay or to be able to receive special services in school. Further, the father took it upon himself to have the child attend chiropractic sessions after the child reported pain while sleeping and was demonstrating anxiety with school. Thus, we find this assignment is without merit.

The father also argues that the family court did not weigh the evidence that was presented in light of the best interest of the child. However, the father's chief argument here again is that the child is unsafe while in the mother's care, referencing the same allegations of abuse previously discussed. The court has much discretion in making its factual determinations and determined that there was no abuse being perpetrated by the mother against the child. Furthermore, the family court found that both parents have a significant bond with the child, including love, affection, and emotional ties. The family court also found that both parents deeply care for the child and are committed to acting in the child's best interest; however, both parents lack willingness and ability to facilitate and encourage a close, continuing relationship between the child and the other parent. The family court therefore found that it was in the child's best interest for the parents to have less frequent exchanges in order to reduce potential conflict to which the testimony alluded. After a review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion by the family court that a modification of the previous custody award was warranted. These assignments are without merit.

Limitations on Trial Testimony and Presentation of Evidence

In his third assignment of error, the father alleges the family court erred in its conduct at trial, preventing him from presenting evidence and unduly restricting his examination of witnesses. Specifically, the father asserts the family court repeatedly interrupted the examination of the parenting coordinator and did not accept her as an expert. A review of the record demonstrates that Ms. McCarthy was accepted as an expert in social work and counseling. Moreover, the record reflects the family court restricted Ms. McCarthy's testimony in regards to hearsay. Under Louisiana Code of Evidence article 703, an expert may rely on a number of sources, including inadmissible hearsay, to form her opinion or inference. However, an expert's testimony cannot be used to elicit inadmissible hearsay evidence. State in Interest of J.S., 2017-0908 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2/7/18), 23 8 So.3d 600, 604, writ denied, 2018- 0375 (La. 4/16/18), 240 So.3d 923. The court allowed Ms. McCarthy's testimony regarding her opinions and observations of the parties but limited her testimony regarding what the parents said to each other on specific topics during sessions, which the parties themselves could testify about during the hearing. We find no error here on the part of the family court.

The father also asserts he was unable to question Mr. Johnson who referenced the existence of a recorded conversation between the father and Mr. Johnson, preventing the father from “fully explor[ing] the circumstances of the recorded conversation[.]” The father asserts that because he was unable to question Mr. Johnson about the recording, the record was incomplete, and the father was prevented from addressing the credibility of the statements attributed to him in that recording. We first note that during the custody hearing, both when Mr. Johnson testified regarding a recording, and when he was recalled by the court to provide the recording, the father made no objection either to the testimony regarding, or the production of, the recording to the family court. However, at the status hearing on February 25, 2025, the father objected to the recording, and the mother's counsel agreed to remove it from the record.

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 103(A)(1), which is the article governing rulings admitting evidence, clearly sets forth a two-fold procedure for objecting. It requires both a contemporaneous objection and an enunciation of the specific grounds for the objection. The purpose of this rule is to afford the trial court an opportunity to prevent or correct prejudicial error. Jeansonne v. Bosworth, 601 So.2d 739, 744 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), writ not considered, 614 So.2d 75 (La. 1993). If no objection is made, the party is precluded from raising the issue on appeal. See Id. at 744. As such, because the father made no contemporaneous objection at the trial, and because the recording was subsequently removed from the record, there is no issue in regards to the recording to be raised on appeal. Thus, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.

Pretermitting Rulings on Contempt and Child Support 7

In his sixth and eighth assignments of error, the father argues that the family court erred in pretermitting the parties’ contempt rules despite their relevance in a determination of the child's best interest, as well as his request for child support for the time the mother was unable to exercise custodial time with the child. The father's complained of contempt rule centered on the school-choice issue and having the child evaluated. The record before us reveals that school choice was discussed by the parties at the custody hearing, and evidence was introduced by the parties regarding the child's eligibility in special programs, curriculum offered at each school to address the child's needs, and steps taken to evaluate the child. Furthermore, the child's neurology report was submitted for the court's consideration as well. Therefore, although a ruling on contempt was pretermitted at a previous hearing, we cannot say, especially with the reasons for judgment offered by the family court, that these matters were not considered when rendering the custody judgment.

Moreover, as to the family court's failure to address the father's claim for child support while the mother was unable to see the child due to the criminal protective order, silence in a judgment as to any part of a demand made in a litigation is construed as a rejection of that part of the claim. Hendrix v. Hendrix, 457 So.2d 815, 818 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). We find these assignments to be without merit.

Disqualification of the Mother's Attorney

In his last assignment of error, the father asserts the family court erred in denying his motion to disqualify opposing counsel. The father argues that allowing Ms. Marien to proceed as the mother's counsel — even though Ms. Marien is the Director of Women's Policy for the Governor's Office, which has ties to DCFS, which has been involved previously in this custody matter — goes against public perception and creates doubt in. the public's trust of the judicial system.

A court's ruling on a motion to disqualify counsel is reviewable by application for a supervisory writ. Touchet v. McGehee, 2024-1283 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/15/25), 418 So.3d 438, 452. Although the father failed to file any supervisory writs with this court following the family court's ruling on the issue, he wishes this court to review the matter now on appeal. When an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment, the appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse interlocutory rulings prejudicial to him, in addition to review of the final judgment appealed.⁸ Id.

A motion to disqualify counsel requires the court to balance several important factors, including the right of a party to retain the counsel of his choice and the substantial hardship which might result from disqualification as against the public perception of and public trust in the judicial system. Keith v. Keith, 48,919 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 5/15/14), 140 So.3d 1202, 1209. The disqualification of counsel must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Succession of Armand, 2019-751 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2/27/20), 297 So.3d 37, 40. The burden of proving disqualification of an attorney or other officer of the court rests on the party making the challenge. Gregoire, 417 So.3d at 78. The decision or refusal to disqualify an attorney is typically subject to review under the manifest error standard. Stevens v. St. Tammany Par. Gov't., 2019-1555 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/21), 322 So.3d 1268, 1277, writ denied, 2021-00800 (La. 11/3/21), 326 So.3d 898.

Based on the arguments presented to the family court at the hearing on the motion to disqualify, this court believes that the father is arguing that Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule. 1.11, may be implicated in this matter.

Rule 1.11 provides in pertinent part:

(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee:

(1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and

(2) shall not:

(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or

(ii) (e) negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).

As noted supra, the motion to disqualify Ms. Marien as counsel is not contained in the record on appeal, nor is the accompanying memorandum; however, the record does contain the transcript of the October 7, 2024 hearing on the motion to disqualify Ms. Marien as counsel, as well as the family court's oral ruling. According to the transcript, the father did not assert that Ms. Marien would be a necessary witness in the custody matter. Rather, the father argued that Ms. Marien's relationship with the State of Louisiana, through her appointment as the Director of Women's Policy for the Governor's Office, creates an appearance of impropriety in general, or a possibility that a specific impropriety will occur. Expounding on that argument, the father asserted that the likelihood of public suspicion from the impropriety outweighed Ms. Marien's ability and interest to represent the mother. Because DCFS investigated the mother in conjunction with the October 20, 2023 allegation of abuse, possibly while Ms. Marien was seeking employment with that department and potentially while actively working with IRIS, a domestic violence organization to aid victims, the father argued she should be disqualified from representing the mother. The father also asserted that the veracity of the testimony of any DCFS witness may be called into question if Ms. Marien is allowed to stay on as counsel. The family court reasoned that during the custody hearing, should a DCFS employee be called as a witness, the father could object to any issues with testimony at that time. The family court further found that the facts and argument presented did not demonstrate that Ms. Marien's employment with the state rose to the level or indicated prejudice such that she should be disqualified from this action

Disqualification is a severe remedy that has been used when the integrity of the adversarial process is at stake. Stevens, 322 So.3d at 1278. It follows that a violation of professional ethics rules does not alone trigger disqualification; rather, a trial judge should primarily assess the possibility of prejudice at trial that might result from the attorney's unethical act. Id. We find the trial court addressed any potential unethical issue that would arise if a witness from DCFS was called to testify during the custody hearing, and we further note that no such witness was called by either party. We therefore find this assignment to be without merit.

CONCLUSION 9

For the foregoing reasons, the family court's February 28, 2025 custody judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the father, Michael John Ryall, Jr.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. MOTION TO STRIKE, EXCEPTIONS OF RES JUDICATA, REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS/DAMAGES FOR FRIVOLOUS APPEAL DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   This motion is not contained within the designated record that was provided to this court; however, the mother's opposition to this motion and the transcript from the hearing were provided.

3.   The motion for new trial was heard by Judge Vanessa Harris, sitting ad hoc. Regarding the rescission order signed by Judge Kuhn, the family court found that specific order to be invalid.

4.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:341(A) restricts the visitation of a parent with a history of family violence to supervised visitation “until such parent proves by a preponderance of the evidence at a contradictory hearing that the abusive parent has successfully completed a court-monitored domestic abuse intervention program, as defined in La. R.S. 9:362, since the last incident of domestic violence or family abuse.”

5.   The factors in determining the child's best interest listed in La. Civ. Code art. 134 include: (1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children's Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration.

6.   Mr. Johnson illustrated this with examples of the father doing things in what appeared to be an attempt to intimidate the mother such as “kind of throwing [the child] into her, or throwing his shoulder into [the mother] to knock her off balance.” Mr. Johnson added that the father would sometimes drop things he was handing to the mother on the ground in front of her. Mr. Johnson testified the aggression was very visible such that strangers would approach and ask if everything was all right. Mr. Johnson also recalled one specific time at an exchange when the mother forgot an item at drop off with the father, and the father began getting very volatile with her. After the mother attempted to leave, the father placed the child in front of the car to block her, and he stepped to the side, opened the passenger door where Mr. Johnson was seated, and began yelling until Mr. Johnson stepped out of the vehicle.

8.   In the mother's motion to strike, exceptions of res judicata, request for sanctions/damages, she requests this assignment be stricken, or that this court grant the exception of res judicata arguing this ruling was a separate final judgment. Because the ruling on attorney disqualification is an interlocutory ruling, it cannot serve as the basis of a plea of res judicata. Talbert v. Restoration Hardware, Inc., 2017-0986 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/31/18), 251 So.3d 532, 536, writ denied, 2018-1102 (La. 10/15/18), 253 So.3d 1304. Likewise, we deny the motion to strike this assignment as a separate final judgment.

FIELDS, J.

Penzato, J., concurs