SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY v. SADEK EIDHAH LOUISE HARRIS AND ALLSTATE PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

Appellant, Louise Jackson Harris, challenges a judgment making a foreign judgment executory. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 30, 2024, Ms. Harris was involved in a car accident in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, when the Nissan Pathfinder she was driving was allegedly struck by a Toyota Sienna operated by Sadek Eidhah. At the time of the accident, Mr. Eidhah had an automobile insurance policy from Safeway Insurance Company (“Safeway”).

Thereafter, Safeway sent correspondence dated October 2, 2024, to Ms. Harris through her attorney acknowledging receipt of the demand made on behalf of Ms. Harris and advising counsel that Safeway had a pending coverage question concerning a “potential material misrepresentation and breach of warranty” pertaining to Mr. Eidhah's policy for the date of loss of June 30, 2024. The letter further advised that Safeway had filed a declaratory action in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Mississippi, captioned, “Safeway Insurance Company vs. Sadek Eidhah, Louise J. Harris, and Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company,” bearing docket number 24-CV-509-LS (the “Mississippi action”), in order to address the coverage issue.

A courtesy copy of the complaint for declaratory relief was included with the correspondence. This complaint alleged that Mr. Eidhah is an adult resident of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and provided an address for service; the complaint further averred that when Mr. Eidhah obtained the policy of insurance at issue from Safeway, he listed his residence and the garaging address for the vehicle as Hazlehurst, Mississippi. Safeway alleged that had it known that Mr. Eidhah was a resident of and garaged his vehicle in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, it would have declined the risk and not issued the policy in question. Safeway then quoted various policy language,¹ informed the court that Mr. Eidhah was involved in an accident in Baton Rouge on June 30, 2024, and that Ms. Harris or her insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”), may make a liability claim against Mr. Eidhah and Safeway. Therefore, Safeway sought a declaration that the policy of insurance Mr. Eidhah obtained from Safeway was null due to his misrepresenting where he lived and where the insured vehicle would be garaged.

On October 11, 2024, Ms. Harris filed a motion to dismiss in the Mississippi action for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. On October 17, 2024, the Mississippi Circuit Court executed an agreed order of partial dismissal with prejudice, dismissing all of Safeway's “claims” against Ms. Harris in the Mississippi action.

Safeway drafted follow-up correspondence dated October 24, 2024, to Ms. Harris’ counsel, acknowledging receipt of Ms. Harris’ MRI report, and once again advising it was awaiting the outcome of a coverage issue in the Mississippi action. The letter referenced and included Safeway's October 2, 2024 letter and the filed complaint.

Ms. Harris’ counsel responded by noting that because Ms. Harris was dismissed from the Mississippi action, any judgment that may be rendered in the Mississippi action would be without effect as to Ms. Harris.

Safeway sent further correspondence dated October 30, 2024, once again noting the pending Mississippi action and explaining more fully that it was seeking a declaration of whether the policy issued to Mr. Eidhah was null due to his failure to inform Safeway of his change of residence. This correspondence further provided:

[Ms. Harris] had an opportunity to participate in the declaratory action She accepted service via certified mail on September 21, 2024. Ms. Harris declined the opportunity for involvement in the declaratory action. Instead ․ Ms. Harris’ attorney, David E. Stovall, filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms. Harris for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. We agreed to a partial dismissal of Ms. Harris with prejudice.

The correspondence concluded that once a judgment had been entered in the Mississippi action, Safeway would contact Ms. Harris’ counsel.

On January 15, 2025, a default judgment was entered against Mr. Eidhah in the Mississippi action, which stated:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that declaratory judgment by default be entered in favor of [Safeway] as follows: Safeway policy no. 4087283 issued to [Mr. Eidhah] is null and void ab initio, and that Safeway is not obligated under the policy of insurance in question to provide liability, uninsured motorist, collision, medical payments, or any other coverage under the policy in question for the accident of June 30, 2024, as described herein which occurred in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, involving the 2012 Toyota Sienna insured on the policy and a vehicle operated by [Ms. Harris].

On February 21, 2025, Safeway informed Ms. Harris’ counsel of the default judgment obtained in the Mississippi action and provided a copy of same. Safeway concluded that based on the judgment it would be unable to honor any claims for Ms. Harris’ loss as coverage had been denied.

On April 3, 2025, Safeway filed an ex parte petition to make foreign judgment executory in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, State of Louisiana, bearing docket number 761,299. Within the petition, Safeway alleged that it obtained a judgment against Mr. Eidhah declaring that the insurance policy issued to him by Safeway was null and void, and that there was no coverage for Mr. Eidhah under the policy. Safeway prayed that the aforementioned Mississippi judgment be made executory in Louisiana against Mr. Eidhah, Ms. Harris, and Allstate. Attached to the petition was Safeway's memorandum in support of its ex parte petition; the affidavit of Brandy Yates, a Safeway claims adjuster, who attested that Mr. Eidhah's last known address was in Baton Rouge, Louisiana; a file-stamped copy of the complaint for declaratory relief filed in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Mississippi; a certified copy of the insurance policy issued by Safeway to Mr. Eidhah; and a file-stamped copy of the default judgment against Mr. Eidhah.

Thereafter, Ms. Harris filed a petition for damages, bearing docket number 762,270, also in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, on April 23, 2025, naming Mr. Eidhah, Safeway, and Allstate as defendants. Then on April 28, 2025, Ms. Harris filed in the suit seeking to make the Mississippi judgment executory a rule to show cause why the Mississippi judgment should not be vacated, stayed, and nullified. Ms. Harris averred that the Mississippi judgment lacked decretal language, was issued by a court which lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Harris, and was obtained by fraud or ill practices on the part of Safeway. Ms. Harris further alleged that she had suffered emotional distress due to Safeway's lack of good faith and fair dealings with her claim, as well as the institution of the Mississippi action, which “could better be described as unfair trade practices.”

On June 26, 2025, an order to consolidate Safeway's petition to make the Mississippi judgment executory and Ms. Harris’ petition for damages was executed by the trial court.

On September 2, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Safeway's ex parte petition to make the Mississippi judgment executory and Ms. Harris’ motion to annul that same judgment. During the hearing, Safeway entered into evidence its ex parte petition to make the Mississippi action executory, which included the attached affidavit of Brandy Yates, the copy of the complaint filed in the Mississippi action, and the default judgment; the amended affidavit of Brandy Yates; the clerk of court's certified letters and returns to Mr. Eidhah, Ms. Harris, and Allstate; Safeway's memorandum in opposition to Ms. Harris’ motion to annul the Mississippi judgment; the clerk's certificate of authenticity, certificate of circuit judge, and certificate of circuit court with an attached copy of the Mississippi Judgment; and a certified copy of Safeway's insurance policy. Ms. Harris also testified. Following party arguments, the trial court ruled to make the Mississippi judgment executory.

The trial court executed a written judgment reflecting its oral ruling on September 17, 2025, which provides in part:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Safeway's] EXPARTE PETITION TO MAKE FOREIGN JUDGMENT EXECUTORY is granted, and the Default Judgment against Sadek Eidhah rendered on January 15, 2025, in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Mississippi, Case #24-CV-509LS, a certified true and correct copy of which is filed in the record of this matter, is hereby recognized and entered in this Court as a judgment as if rendered herein and hereby made executory in the 19th Judicial District Court, the Parish of East Baton Rouge and the State of Louisiana.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the request of [Ms. Harris] for the court to reject the Petition, to refuse to recognize the Mississippi Judgment, to VACATE and NULLIFY that Judgment in Louisiana, to award emotional distress, attorney fees and costs under article 2004, is DENIED, and JUDGMENT in favor of [Safeway] and against [Ms. Harris] is entered in regards to her claims in her filings and her live testimony.

It is from this judgment that Ms. Harris appeals, assigning the following as error:

1. The trial court was wrong, as a matter of law, when it determined that a foreign Judgment emanating from a default proceeding in Lincoln County Mississippi was entitled to recognition in Louisiana.

2. The trial court committed legal error in accepting the rule of law announced by [Safeway], when in trial, they declared “This Louisiana Court ․ [does not have] the authority to nullify or vacate a Mississippi Judgment” [.]

3. Under de novo review, the trial court was wrong rejecting the timely filed challenge by [Ms. Harris] showing that the judge in Lincoln [C]ounty Mississippi did not have the jurisdiction or the power to render a judgment against her.

4. The trial court erred legally in failing to find that Safeway engaged in a pattern of fraud and ill-practices, by failing to hire an attorney to represent their own insured in Mississippi, for naming a Louisiana resident in Mississippi without jurisdiction, using motion practice improperly, and making misstatements of fact and law to the trial judge, all for the purpose of foreclosing a review in Louisiana.

5. The trial court erred in applying the law to the facts proffered by [Ms. Harris], failing to award damages for emotional distress, attorney fees, and costs.

6. The trial court erred when it failed to apply various jurisprudential rules allowing Louisiana residents various avenues to attack, vacate, and nullify foreign judgments, including those using [La. Code Civ. P. art.] 2004.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, mandates that a judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect in every other court of the United States that it has in the state where it is pronounced. Schultz v. Doyle, 2000-0926 (La. 1/17/01), 776 So.2d 1158, 1164. However, a state may deny full faith and credit to a judgment rendered by a court of another state when it is shown that the court which rendered the judgment lacked jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter. Ault v. Bradley, 564 So.2d 374, 377 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 569 So.2d 967 (La. 1990); see also Schultz, 776 So.2d at 1164. Nevertheless, there is a general presumption that a court of a sister state had jurisdiction to render the judgment in the case before it, and it is incumbent upon the person attacking the judgment to show by clear and positive proof that the rendering court was without jurisdiction. KJMonte Investments, LLC v. Acadian Properties Austin, LLC, 2020-0204 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/20), 319 So.3d 354, 359. A party is free to ignore the original service of the proceedings in another state, risk a default judgment, and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding. O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc. v. White, 55,520 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 4/10/24), 384 So.3d 1194, 1203.

A state also may deny full faith and credit to a judgment rendered by a court of another state when a collateral attack on the foreign judgment would have been permitted in the state that rendered the judgment. Summers v. Pray, 2002-1840 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/03), 850 So.2d 46, 50, writ denied, 2003-2593 (La. 12/12/03), 860 So.2d 1155. Nonetheless, a litigant who seeks to deny a foreign judgment full faith and credit based on a collateral attack where rendered has the burden of proving the basis of availability of the collateral attack. Id.

A party seeking recognition or execution by a Louisiana court of a foreign judgment or decree may proceed by ordinary proceeding, to have the judgment or decree recognized and made the judgment of the Louisiana court, or through special proceedings provided in the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“EFJA”), La. R.S. 13:4241 et seq., which allows notice of the filing of the petition to be given by certified mail. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2541(A) & (C); KJMonte Investments, 319 So.3d at 359, citing Cajun Beverage, Inc. v. American National Can Co., 577 So.2d 172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991). Safeway proceeded under the provisions of the EFJA.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4241 defines a “foreign judgment” as “any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.”

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4242 provides:

A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of congress or the statutes of this state may be annexed to and filed with an ex parte petition complying with Code of Civil Procedure Article 891 and praying that the judgment be made executory in a court of this state. The foreign judgment shall be treated in the same manner as a judgment of a court of this state. It shall have the same effect and be subject to the same procedures, and defenses, for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be enforced in the same manner.

In her first, second, third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error, Ms. Harris challenges the trial court's failure to nullify the Mississippi judgment due to lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Ms. Harris emphasizes that the Mississippi court did not have personal jurisdiction over her in order to render a valid judgment against her in the Mississippi action. Ms. Harris further argues that Safeway's intent behind attempting to litigate insurance coverage in the Mississippi action could only be described as fraudulent or ill practices.

In support of her argument regarding Safeway's fraud or ill practices, Ms. Harris cites Mississippi Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 2001-0674 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/28/02), 818 So.2d 214. In Mississippi Farm Bureau, 818 So.2d at 215, two drivers were involved in an automobile accident in November 1995 in Baton Rouge. One driver died as a result of her injuries, and in February 1996, her parents filed a wrongful death action in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court against defendant driver and his alleged automobile liability insurer, Mississippi Farm Bureau. Id. Mississippi Farm Bureau was served with the petition, and then in June of 1996, Mississippi Farm Bureau filed a petition for declaratory judgment in Lincoln County, Mississippi, seeking a declaration that its policy issued to defendant driver did not afford coverage for the November 1995 accident. Id. Defendant driver defended the foreign action but ultimately a judgment was rendered in favor of Mississippi Farm Bureau finding there was no coverage in effect for defendant driver at the time of the accident. Id. In December 1997, Mississippi Farm Bureau filed a petition in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court seeking to make the Mississippi judgment executory in accordance with the EFJA. The action was assigned to a division different from the pending wrongful death action, and the trial court entered an order decreeing the Mississippi court's order be made executory in March 1998. Id.

The deceased driver's parents filed a petition to annul the March 1998 judgment based on ill practices, averring that despite Mississippi Farm Bureau's appearance in their wrongful death suit, it did not serve or otherwise notify them of the declaratory action in Mississippi, nor did Mississippi Farm Bureau inform them of its petition to make the Mississippi judgment executory. Id. at 215-16. The trial court denied the petition to annul, and the parents appealed. Id. at 216. This court found ill practices on the part of Mississippi Farm Bureau, noting Mississippi Farm Bureau rushed to judgment in Mississippi to foreclose a determination of the coverage issues by a Louisiana court where there was a prior and pending litigation against Mississippi Farm Bureau. Id. This court further warned of “foreseeable consequences of abuse by allowing determinations of issues in litigation pending in this state by courts of other states and then, without formal notice of the proceedings to the parties involved, having that judgment made executory in Louisiana.” Id. at 217.

Although Ms. Harris points to certain similarities between the instant action and Mississippi Farm Bureau, we find one glaring distinction making it inapposite to the present appeal. In Mississippi Farm Bureau, there was a pending action pursuant to a motor vehicle accident in Louisiana at the time Mississippi Farm Bureau sought and obtained a foreign judgment – without notice to the plaintiffs in the pending Louisiana suit – which was then made executory in Louisiana in a separate court. In the present appeal, there was no pending litigation in a Louisiana court when Safeway sought to determine the issue of coverage in the Mississippi action. Further, Safeway provided notice of its legal proceeding in Mississippi to Ms. Harris, Allstate, and her counsel through both service and regular correspondence regarding its position and actions vis-d-vis the June 30, 2024 accident. Ms. Harris never filed suit in Louisiana either prior to or throughout the life of the Mississippi action. Thus, it cannot be said that Safeway sought to foreclose the issue of insurance coverage between itself, a Mississippi insurance company, and its insured while the same issue was pending before a Louisiana court.

In her brief, Ms. Harris also attempts to distinguish a case relied upon by Safeway, Clark v. Durbin, 590 So.2d 633 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1991), from the instant action. Clark, 590 So.2d at 634, involved a motor vehicle accident where defendant's motor home rear-ended plaintiff's Chevrolet. Defendant's motor home was uninsured at the time of the accident. Within approximately an hour of the accident, defendant telephoned his wife who then secured a policy of insurance for the motor home, without informing the insurer of the accident that had just occurred. The insurance became effective that same day. Id. Once the insurer learned of the undisclosed accident, it had the policy declared null on the ground of fraud by a Texas court. Id. at 635. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a suit for damages against defendant and his alleged insurer. The insurer responded by asserting an exception raising the objection of no right of action, arguing that the Texas judgment declaring the insurance policy issued to defendant null and void was entitled to full faith and credit and precluded the defendants from suing the insurer; therefore, plaintiff likewise had no right of action against the insurer under the Direct Action Statute. Id. The trial court sustained the exception and the appellate court affirmed finding that full faith and credit was owed to the Texas judgment, which was conclusive of the merits of defendants’ inability to bring an action against the insurer.² Id. at 636.

The alleged fraud or misrepresentation perpetrated by the insured is different in the present appeal from that of Clark. However, the procedural aspects appear similar, with an insurance company seeking to invalidate an insurance policy in its home state, based on some type of alleged misrepresentation by their respective insureds, for an accident occurring in Louisiana, prior to a Louisiana action being instituted. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court properly found that Safeway had not committed fraud or ill practices such that the Mississippi action should be invalidated.

Ms. Harris alternatively argued that the Mississippi judgment should be invalidated for want of personal jurisdiction over her. In support of this argument, Ms. Harris cites O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc. v. White, 55,520 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 4/10/24), 384 So.3d 1194. In O'Reilly, the party against whom the judgment was rendered by a Missouri court was the same person over whom a Missouri court lacked personal jurisdiction when it entered its default judgment, therefore the Louisiana court annulled the judgment. In the present appeal, the party against whom the Mississippi judgment was rendered is Mr. Eidhah, not Ms. Harris. The judgment being appealed states specifically that “the Default Judgment against [Mr. Eidhah] rendered on January 15, 2025․ is hereby recognized and entered in this Court as a judgment as if rendered herein and hereby made executory in the 19th [JDC].” Although Ms. Harris is mentioned in the Mississippi judgment, she is not the party against whom the judgment is rendered, thus, the Mississippi court's want of jurisdiction over Ms. Harris is of no consequence. The judgment simply declares that Mr. Eidhah did not have a valid policy of insurance from Safeway when he was involved in a car accident with Ms. Harris.

In her fifth assignment of error, Ms. Harris asserts that the trial court wrongly applied the law to the facts when it failed to award her damages for emotional distress, attorney's fees, and costs. Once again, Ms. Harris relies on O'Reilly, wherein the party who was awarded damages and attorney's fees for having to defend a suit, which the plaintiff admitted to knowing was fraudulent, was the basis for nullification of judgment. This court has already found the present appeal distinguishable from O'Reilly, and does so again with respect to this assignment. We find the trial court committed no error in failing to award Ms. Harris damages or attorney's fees.

Without proving a reason to nullify the foreign judgment, or citing to any positive law or jurisprudence that would prevent this default judgment of an insurance coverage issue from becoming executory, we find the trial court did not err in its ruling making the Mississippi judgment executory and denying Ms. Harris’ request for damages and fees associated with this action.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's September 17, 2025 judgment making the January 15, 2025 judgment of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Mississippi, Case #24-CV-509-LS, executory in this state, and denying Louise Jackson Harris’ request for damages and attorney's fees. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Appellant, Louise Jackson Harris.

AFFIRMED.

I respectfully dissent, finding that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the September 17, 2025 judgment on appeal, which is not a final judgment. In response to Safeway's ex parte petition to make the January 15, 2025 Mississippi judgment executory, Ms. Harris filed a “Rule to Show Cause why Mississippi Judgment Should Not be Vacated, Stayed, and Nullified, to Extent Necessary, Answer, and/or Petition” (emphasis added), wherein she alleged Safeway refused to deal with her in good faith, causing her economic loss, inconvenience, and emotional distress. Ms. Harris prayed for the following relief: that the Mississippi judgment be vacated, nullified, rejected, or set-aside; and that all equitable relief be granted for emotional distress, inconvenience, economic loss, penalties, attorney fees and costs. The September 17, 2025 judgment granted Safeway's petition to make the Mississippi judgment executory; with regard to Ms. Harris's claims, the judgment provided as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the request of Louise J. Harris for the court to reject [Safeway's] Petition, to refuse to recognize the Mississippi Judgment, to VACATE and NULLIFY that Judgment in Louisiana, to award emotional distress, attorney fees and costs under [La. C.C.P. art.] 2004, is DENIED, and JUDGMENT in favor of SAFEWAY and against Louise J. Harris is entered in regards to her claims in her filings and her live testimony.

Thus, while it is evident from the face of the judgment that Ms. Harris's claims for emotional distress, inconvenience, economic loss, penalties, attorney fees and costs were denied, the judgment does not contain appropriate decretal language dismissing her petition. The absence of decretal language dismissing the petition renders the judgment defective, and thus, cannot be considered a final judgment for purposes of an appeal. See Sauce v. Burke, 2022-0541 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/22), 356 So. 3d 439, 445.

Therefore, I would remand the matter for the limited purpose of instructing the trial court to sign an amended judgment that is precise, definite, and certain and contains appropriate decretal language. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1918(A), 1951, and 2088(A)(11); Hill International. Inc. v. JTS Realty Corp., 2021-0157 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/21), 342 So. 3d 322, 327-28.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The policy provided that a material misrepresentation constitutes insurance fraud, could invalidate the insurance policy, and defined “material misrepresentation” as including the failure to disclose accurate vehicle garaging location.Under the subsection entitled “Policy Period and Territory” the policy stated in part:This policy is intended for Mississippi residents only as it is issued in accordance with Mississippi laws and statutes and is rated accordingly. If you and/or any listed driver shown in the declarations move to and/or reside in another state, or if your covered auto is being garaged in another state, you must inform us immediately regarding the change of address. Failure to give such notice may render the policy void.

2.   The court noted that the judgment did not specifically preclude suit by plaintiff against the insurer, but once the Texas declaratory judgment was recognized in Louisiana finding that defendants were precluded from bringing any suit against the insurer, the insurer was entitled to raise that defense against plaintiff by peremptory exception of no right of action based on a subsection of the Direct Action Statute. Clark, 590 So.2d at 637.

FIELDS, J.

Penzato, J., dissents and assigned reasons