EMILY TOOKE v. LAURIE WHITE (2026)

This appeal presents a procedural issue regarding the timeliness of a “request” for service under the general service-of-process statute, La. C.C.P. art. 1201, and the more specific, state-defendant statute, La. R.S. 13:5107(D)(1). Plaintiff, Emily Tooke (hereinafter “Tooke”), seeks review of the trial court's March 14, 2025 judgment granting the declinatory exception of insufficiency of service of process filed by Defendant, retired Criminal District Court Judge Laurie White (hereinafter “White”). After consideration of the record before this Court and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court's March 14, 2025 judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.¹

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2

On December 4, 2023, Tooke filed a petition for damages against White. In her petition, Tooke named White as a defendant in a dual capacity—individually and officially. According to the petition, when the alleged wrongful conduct occurred, White was an Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Judge; Tooke was employed as White's secretary; and White was Tooke's supervisor.³ At the end of the petition, Tooke requested that the Clerk of Court “HOLD SERVICE” on White.

Within ninety days of filing the petition (in February 2024), Tooke e-filed a letter to the Clerk of Court requesting service on White. Eight days later, citation and service copies were issued. Six weeks later (in April 2024), a citation and service copy of the petition was returned unserved to the Clerk of Court. The copy was stamped “RETURNED TO CLERK FOR NONPAYMENT.”

In December 2024, White filed a declinatory exception of insufficiency of service of process and a peremptory exception of prescription. As the petition named White in a dual capacity, she based her exceptions on La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) and La. R.S. 13:5107(D)(1). Tooke opposed the exceptions. Following a contradictory hearing, the trial court granted the insufficiency of service of process exception, dismissed the suit without prejudice, and denied the prescription exception as moot.⁴ This appeal followed.⁵

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A de novo standard of review applies under the facts for two reasons. First, “[w]here, as here, the facts are not disputed, the ruling on exceptions of insufficiency of citation and service of process is subject to a de novo standard of review.” Brown v. Chesson, 2020-00730, p. 2 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So.3d 834, 836. Second, this Court's interpretation of La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) and La. R.S. 13:5107(D)(1) presents a legal question subject to a de novo standard of review. Id.

DISCUSSION

Although Tooke assigns numerous errors, the dispositive issue is whether a “request” for service under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) and La. R.S. 13:5107(D)(1) requires payment of all service-related fees within the applicable ninety-day period.⁶ As a threshold matter, we note that the “request” requirement in both statutes is the same.⁷ However, the statutes differ in a significant respect; La. R.S. 13:5107(D)(3) provides a harsh sanction for noncompliance—prescription is neither interrupted nor suspended.⁸ For the first time on appeal, Tooke raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to classify all her claims as individual-capacity claims, making La. R.S. 13:5107(D) inapplicable. We decline to address this issue.

The well-settled general rule is that “ ‘appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time in this court, which are not pleaded in the court below and which the district [court] has not addressed.’ ” Gitter v. Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exch., 2025-0726, p. 23 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/15/26), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 1362002, *11, writ denied, 2026-00851 (La. 9/30/26), ___ So.3d ___, 2026 WL 2935790 (quoting Geiger v. State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Hosp., 2001-2206, p. 11 (La. 4/12/02), 815 So.2d 80, 86). Based on La. C.C.P. art. 2164 and La. Unif. R. Ct. App. 1-3, the jurisprudence has recognized an “interest of justice exception” to this rule. Id.⁹ The exception does not apply here.

We find, the narrow issue is whether the “request” requirement was satisfied. Given our finding that Tooke satisfied the “request” requirement, no issue is presented regarding La. R.S. 13:5107(D)(3)’s sanction for noncompliance. Regardless of which service-of-process statute applies, the result is the same. This Court interprets the “request” requirement in the two statutes the same. See Walker v. GoAuto Ins. Co., 2020-0331, p. 6, n.3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So.3d 918, 921 (characterizing the “request” requirement in the statutes as “analogous”).

On appeal, White argues that a valid “request” requires not only requesting service within the ninety-day period, but also paying all service-related fees within that period. Citing this Court's holdings in the Walker and DaRouse cases, Tooke counters that the word “request,” simply means ask.¹⁰

In March 2025, when the trial court rendered its judgment granting White's insufficiency of service of process exception, there was a split in the circuits—between the Fourth Circuit and First Circuit—on the “request” issue.¹¹ Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court granted writs in DaRouse to resolve the split.¹²

The Supreme Court, in DaRouse, framed the issue presented as “the appropriate meaning to be given to the use of the word ‘requested’ in La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C).” 2025-00078, p. 1, 421 So.3d at 886. The Court observed that “[s]ome appellate court decisions [in the Fourth Circuit] have held that a party need only ‘ask’ for service within the ninety-day period, while other appellate decisions [in the First Circuit] have held that there is no proper request unless it is accompanied by the requisite fees for service.” Id. at p. 2, 421 So.3d at 886 (footnotes omitted). The Court adopted the Fourth Circuit's interpretation and rejected the First Circuit's contrary interpretation.¹³ Focusing on the ordinary and generally prevailing meaning of the term, the Supreme Court interpreted “request” to mean ask only.

Bolstering its interpretation, the Supreme Court emphasized that the statute “does not say that all fees for service must also be paid during that ninety day period.” Id. at p. 3, 421 So.3d at 887. Declining to impinge on the Legislature by judicially rewriting the statute, the Supreme Court observed that “[i]f the Louisiana Legislature had intended that a party must ask for service of citation and also must pay for service of citation within ninety days, it could have easily so stated.” Id. at p. 4, 421 So.3d at 887. The Supreme Court, thus, held that “request” simply means ask.

Applying DaRouse, we find Tooke satisfied the “request” requirement by requesting (asking) for service within the ninety-day period; she timely e-filed the request. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting White's exception of insufficiency of service of process.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court's March 14, 2025 judgment granting the declinatory exception of insufficiency of service of process is reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   When the trial court ruled on White's exceptions, the law required only that a plaintiff “request” service on a named defendant within ninety days of the commencement of the action. See Brown v. Chesson, 2026-0271, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/15/26), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 3082562, * 2 (citing DaRouse v. P.J.’s Coffee of New Orleans, LLC, 2025-00078, p. 3 (La. 10/24/25), 421 So.3d 885, 887). In 2026, the Louisiana Legislature amended La. C.C.P. arts. 1201(D)-(E) and 1672(C). As a result, “[t]he law now requires both that service be requested and all associated fees designed by the clerk of court be paid within ninety days.” Brown, 2026-0271, p. 5, n.4, ___So.3d at ___, 2026 WL 3082562, * 2 (citing La. C.C.P. art. 1201(D)-(E)). The 2026 amendment is not retroactive; it does not apply.

3.   In the petition, Tooke asserts three claims against White: (i) violation of La. R.S. 51:2256 (conspiracy to violate human rights and discrimination laws); (ii) violation of La. R.S. 23:967 (Louisiana Whistleblower Statute); and (iii) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

4.   The dismissal was pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1672(C), which before the 2026 amendment provided:A judgment dismissing an action without prejudice shall be rendered as to a person named as a defendant for whom service has not been requested within the time prescribed by Article 1201(C) ․ upon the sustaining of a declinatory exception filed by such defendant ․

5.   The trial court initially denied Tooke's motion for appeal as untimely. This Court granted Tooke's writ application, reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded. Tooke v. White, 2025-0465 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/13/25), 417 So.3d 1281.

6.   Tooke assigns as error the following:1. The trial court erred in sustaining Defendant's Declinatory Exception of Insufficiency of Service of Process, where the Clerk of Court's own file-stamp establishes that Plaintiff's request for service was received on February 18, 2024, the 90th day after the Petition's filing.2. The trial court erred in its computation of the 90-day period prescribed by La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) by relying on a filing date inconsistent with the record and its own findings, and by failing to apply La. C.C.P. art. 5059.3. The trial court erred in applying La. R.S. 13:5107(D)’s fee-payment requirement to Plaintiff's individual-capacity claims against Defendant, where those claims do not arise from the discharge of Defendant's official duties or the course and scope of her employment.4. The trial court erred to the extent it treated payment of service fees, rather than the request for service itself, as the operative act required within the applicable statutory period under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C).

7.   The wording of the “request” requirement in the service-of-process statutes is almost identical. See La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) (providing that “[s]ervice of the citation shall be requested on all named defendants within ninety days of commencement of the action”); and La. R.S. 13:5107(D)(1) (providing that “service of citation shall be requested within ninety days of the commencement of the action”).

8.   See William E. Crawford,12 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Tort Law § 10:7 (2d ed. August 2026 Update) (citing La. R.S. 13:5107(D) and observing “[s]erious sanctions are provided”).

9.   See La. C.C.P. art. 2164 (providing that “[t]he appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal”); and La. Unif. R. Ct. App. 1-3 (providing that “[t]he Courts of Appeal shall review issues that were submitted to the trial court and that are contained in specifications or assignments of error, unless the interest of justice requires otherwise”).

10.   In support of her argument on appeal, Tooke cites in her appellant brief not only this Court's decision, but also the Supreme Court's decision in the DaRouse case. DaRouse v. P.J.’s Coffee of New Orleans, LLC, 2024-0689 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/17/24), 414 So.3d 602, aff'd, 2025-00078 (La. 10/24/25), 421 So.3d 885. The Supreme Court handed down its decision while this appeal was pending. In another case in which the appeal was pending when DaRouse was handed down, the parties filed a joint motion to remand, which this Court granted. Alonzo v. New Orleans Aviation Bd., 25-0626 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/5/26), 437 So.3d 975. Neither Tooke nor White filed a motion to remand.

11.   Summarizing the state of the jurisprudence at that time, a federal district court observed:Louisiana's intermediate appellate courts have split on the question whether a “request[ ]” requires payment of all service fees. The First Circuit says “yes”; the Fourth Circuit says “no.” Compare, e.g., DaRouse v. P.J.’s Coffee of New Orleans, LLC, 2024-0689, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/17/24); 2024 WL 5134401, at *6 holding that service was “requested” despite plaintiff's failure to timely pay service fees to sheriff) with Methvien v. Our Lady of the Lake, 2020-1081, p[p]. 4-5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21); 318 So. 3d 329, 332-33 (holding that service was not “requested” because plaintiff failed to timely pay service fees to sheriff).For its part, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has seemingly sided with the First Circuit: A “request[ ]” requires payment of “the required service fees.” Carrie v. S. Univ. at New Orleans, 2024-060, p. 1 (La. 3/12/24); 380 So. 3d 555, 555 (Mem.) (per curiam).Angers v. Franco, No. 2024-688, 2025 WL 624027, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2025) (unpub.).In Carrie, the Supreme Court cited Jenkins v. Larpenter, 2004-0318, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So.2d 656, 659, which held that “ ‘a request for service without payment of required fees, or without leave of court excusing such payment because of pauper status, simply is no proper request at all.’ ” Carrie, 2024-00060, p. 1 (La. 3/12/24), 380 So.3d 555 (quoting Jenkins, supra). At the hearing before the trial court in this case, White cited the Carrie case as the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the “request” issue.

12.   In DaRouse, the plaintiff timely requested service in the petition but failed to pay the all the service-related fees within the ninety-day period. Contending that payment of the fees was required to satisfy the “request” requirement, the defendants filed an exception of insufficiency of service of process and a motion for involuntary dismissal. The trial court denied the exception and motion. This Court granted the defendants’ writ but upheld the trial court's ruling. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ writ and affirmed.

13.   In its opinion, the Supreme Court observed that although it “previously ruled according to the various factual scenarios of similar matters in summarily-issued writ actions, ․ these prior writ actions are not authoritative.” DaRouse, 2025-00078, p. 2, 421 So.3d at 886.

Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase