MARLA ANN THOMAS TRAHAN THIGPEN v. RONALD WAYNE THIGPEN (2026)

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-84

MARLA ANN THOMAS THIGPEN

VERSUS

RONALD WAYNE THIGPEN

Judgment rendered and mailed to all parties or counsel on November 12, 2026. Applications for rehearing may be filed within the delays allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922.

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2024-4681 HONORABLE LAURIE A. HULIN, DISTRICT JUDGE

WILBUR L. STILES JUDGE

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Wilbur L. Stiles, and Clayton Davis, Judges.

SJG

WLS

CD

AFFIRMED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-84

MARLA ANN THOMAS THIGPEN

VERSUS

RONALD WAYNE THIGPEN

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2024-4681 HONORABLE LAURIE A. HULIN, DISTRICT JUDGE

WILBUR L. STILES JUDGE

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Wilbur L. Stiles, and Clayton Davis, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

G. Andrew Veazey Bradford H. Felder Michael S. Sewell Veazey Felder, LLC Post Office Box 80948 Lafayette, LA 70598-0948 (337) 234-5350 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Marla Ann Thomas Thigpen

W. Alan Pesnell Alan Pesnell Lawyer, LLC 720 Murray St. Alexandria, LA 71301 (318) 704-0979 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Kristina Thigpen Rushing, Administrator of the Succession of Ronald Wayne Thigpen

STILES, Judge.

The trial court sustained an exception of no cause of action filed on behalf of Marla Ann Thomas Thigpen (“Marla”) in response to a Motion for Judgment of Divorce and Amended Motion for Judgment of Divorce filed on behalf of Kristina Thigpen Rushing (“Kristina”). In sustaining the exception of no cause of action, the trial court ruled that the marriage and community of acquets and gains between Marla and Ronald Wayne Thigpen (“Ronald”) terminated upon Ronald's death and dismissed with prejudice all claims seeking entry of a Judgment of Divorce. The trial court further reserved unto Kristina and Marla the right to assert any claims involving the partition, accounting, and reimbursement concerning the community of acquets and gains between Marla and Ronald's estate in the succession proceeding. Kristina appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Marla and Ronald Thigpen were married on October 5, 2015. On July 30, 2024, Marla filed a petition for divorce pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 102 based on living separate and apart for 180 days. Included in Marla's petition for divorce were requests for spousal support; the use of a community vehicle; the termination of the community of acquets and gains that existed between the parties, effective retroactively to the date the petition for divorce was filed; claims for reimbursement against Ronald; a judicial partition of the community property between the parties; and an injunction prohibiting Ronald from disposing or encumbering any of the community assets during the pendency of the divorce proceedings, including changing the beneficiary designation on life insurance and retirement plans owned by the community or in which the community had an interest.

On October 23, 2024, Ronald filed his Answer to Petition for Divorce. A Judgment was rendered by the trial court on November 11, 2024, adopting the October 17, 2024 Hearing Officer Recommendations as no objection had been filed thereto. Included in those recommendations was a preliminary injunction issued against both Marla and Ronald:

restraining, enjoining and prohibiting [Marla and Ronald], their agents, employees, and all other persons, firms, or corporations acting or claiming to act on the party(ies) behalf, from disposing of, alienating, or encumbering any of the property owned by the community of acquets and gains existing between the parties, and further, from withdrawing, converting, or disposing of any of the community funds on deposit at any bank or trust company in the name of either or both parties.

It is noted that no injunction was issued against either party prohibiting them from changing the beneficiary designation on any life insurance policy in which the community had an interest.

Ronald died unexpectedly on February 25, 2025. At the time of his death, no motion for a judgment of divorce had been filed by either party; thus, there was no judgment of divorce either pending or finalized at the time of his death.

Kristina, the only child of Ronald, was appointed the administratrix of the Succession of Ronald Wayne Thigpen, which was filed in the Fifteenth Judicial District, Parish of Lafayette, State of Louisiana. On March 25, 2025, Kristina, as administratrix of Ronald's succession, was substituted for Ronald in the divorce action. She then filed on April 17, 2025, a Motion for Judgment of Divorce asserting that as Ronald's successor she was allowed to continue litigating his divorce because property rights purportedly involved in the divorce proceedings affected the ownership of property. Kristina asked the trial court to grant a judgment of divorce between Ronald and Marla, terminate the legal regime of community of acquets and gains retroactively to the date of the filing of Marla's petition for divorce on July 20, 2024, award Kristina costs and reasonable attorney's fees to be satisfied from the community property owned by the parties, and reserve unto the parties the right to a partition of community property and settlement of the claims of the spouses arising from the matrimonial regime.

In response to Kristina's Motion for Judgment of Divorce, Marla filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action arguing the following:

9.

Kristina has no cause of action because by operation of law, the marriage between Marla and Ronnie terminated upon Ronnie's death and no further action or judgment is needed to terminate the matrimonial regime.

10.

Kristina also has no cause of action because the community property regime that existed between Marla and Ronnie was extinguished upon Ronnie's death on February 24, 2025.

․

16.

The pending divorce proceeding was an action personal to Marla and Ronnie, and Kristina has no right of action. Despite any pendency of their action for divorce, dissolution of their marriage occurred upon the death of Ronnie and is final.

Based on the above assertions, Marla requested that the trial court dismiss Kristina's motion for judgment of divorce.

On June 17, 2025, Kristina filed an Amended Motion for Judgment of Divorce. In her motion, she included jurisprudence which she maintained supported her argument that a successor may be allowed to continue the litigation of a decedent's divorce after his death, specifically when the case involves rights affecting the ownership of property. Kristina asserted that Marla's request to terminate the community property regime as of the date of the filing of her petition for divorce was still pending.

On August 18, 2025, the trial court heard arguments on Marla's exception of no cause of action. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it agreed with the argument of Marla's counsel that “by operation of law the marriage and the community property terminated as of the death of Mr. Thigpen by statute.” Specifically, the trial court stated:

I really don't see how you get around that. Once he dies, it's done. The marriage is terminated. I don't see how I can get around that.

․

I mean, I'm reading the case law and I'm trying to - - trying to see if this is an analogous situation and I cannot get past that termination by operation of law. That's it. E to finite [sic]․ I mean, I don't see the necessity of having to go back and litigate the divorce. I mean, who's to say they would've reconciled? I don't know, but that's not before the court. It's whether or not when the marriage was terminated and that for me [is by] operation of [law] so I'm going to sustain the exceptions.

Counsel for both parties then stated for the record that the property issues would be deferred to the succession proceedings.

A final judgment was issued on August 19, 2025, ordering the following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Marla] Thigpen's Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action against [Kristina] Rushing in response to the Motion for Judgment of Divorce be sustained, and the marriage and community of acquets and gains between Thigpen and the Decedent terminated upon the Decedent's death on February 24, 2025 by operation of law under La.Civ.Code arts. 101 and 2356.

Following the Court's Ruling sustaining Thigpen's Exceptions, Thigpen and Rushing, through their counsel of record, further stipulated in open court that any claims involving the partition, accounting and reimbursement concerning the community of acquets and gains between Thigpen and Decedent's estate are hereby referred to and shall be asserted and adjudicated in the Succession Proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDED AND DECREED that in accordance with La.Code Civ.P. art. 1918, there be judgment in favor of Thigpen, against Rushing, dismissing with prejudice all claims seeking entry of a Judgment of Divorce, as all such claims have abated, reserving unto Rushing and Thigpen the right to assert any claims involving the partition, accounting and reimbursement concerning the community of acquets and gains between Thigpen and the Decedent's estate in the Succession Proceeding.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Kristina appealed the final judgment of the trial court asserting two assignments of error:

1. The Trial Court committed legal error in granting the peremptory exception of no cause of action and dismissing the motion for judgment of divorce, as amended.

2. The Trial Court committed an error of law and manifest error in ruling that Kristina had no cause of action for divorce and that the divorce action was abated.

DISCUSSION

Exception of No Cause of Action and Standard of Review

In Christian D. Chesson, PLC v. Gandy, 25-57, pp. 9–10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/13/25), 419 So.3d 814, 822–823, (footnote omitted), writ denied, 25-1389 (La. 1/21/26), 424 So.3d 1100, this court succinctly addressed the law applicable to an exception of no cause of action, as well as the standard of review to be applied by appellate courts:

“The function of the peremptory exception is to have the plaintiff's action declared legally nonexistent, or barred by effect of law, and hence this exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 923. The peremptory exception of no cause of action examines the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy under the facts alleged. Hayes v. Univ. Health Shreveport, 21-1601 (La. 1/7/22), 332 So.3d 1163. “A cause of action, when used in the context of the peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant.” Wederstrandt v. Kol, 22-1570, p. 4 (La. 6/27/23), 366 So.3d 47, 51.

“No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 931.

The purpose of an exception of no cause of action is to determine the sufficiency in law of the petition. The exception is triable on the face of the papers and for the purposes of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well pleaded facts must be accepted as true.

City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-690, p. 2 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 241. “The burden of demonstrating that no cause of action has been stated is upon the mover or exceptor.” Id. at 253.

Consequently, we conduct a de novo review because the peremptory exception of no cause of action “raises a question of law and the lower court's decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the petition.” Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, pp. 7-8 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 119. “The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiff's behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief.” Id.

Assignments of Error Numbers One and Two

In Kristina's first assignment of error, she asserts that the trial court erred in granting the exception of no cause of action and dismissing her motion for judgment of divorce, whereas in her second assignment of error, Kristina asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that she had no cause of action because the divorce action abated. These two assignments are related in that they both assert that the trial court erred in granting the exception of no cause of action and dismissing the motion for judgment of divorce, with the second assignment specifying that the trial court found the divorce action was abated. We therefore address these assignments as one as they both assert that the trial court erred in granting the exception of no cause of action.

Kristina's argument in support of her motion for judgment of divorce centers on her assertions that there are “substantial property issues that hinge on the finalization of a divorce in this case, establishing the date of the termination of the community, and having effect over collateral federal interpleader proceedings concerning the proceeds of a life insurance policy.” 1 Kristina cites several cases which she maintains stand for the principle that the death of a spouse does not cause the abatement of a divorce action when property interests are involved and there is a pending claim for the partition of community property. See McCann v. McCann, 11-2434 (La. 5/8/12), 93 So.3d 544; LaRocca v. LaRocca, 597 So.2d 1000 (La.1992); Succession of Buhler, 17-49 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/22/18), 243 So.3d 39; Cannatella v. Cannatella, 11-618 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/13/12), 91 So.3d 393; In re Succession of Ricks, 03-2580 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/10/04), 893 So.2d 98. According to Kristina, the beneficiary designation in the life insurance policy and all property claims in the divorce action remain pending. Thus, the divorce action between Ronald and Marla did not abate upon Ronald's death, and, as the administratrix of Ronald's succession, she is the proper party to seek a final judgment of divorce.

In response, Marla argues that the trial court properly found that the marriage and the legal regime of community property both terminated upon Ronald's death by operation of law. La.Civ.Code arts. 101 and 2356. She further cites La.Code Civ.P. art. 428, which provides that an action to enforce a right or obligation which is strictly personal abates upon the death of party. Thus, as the right to seek a divorce was personal to Marla and Ronald, as parties to the marriage, the divorce action abated upon Ronald's death. Marla maintains that as a result of the marriage and community property regime terminating upon the death of Ronald and the divorce action abating, Kristina does not have a cause of action to pursue a judgment of divorce on behalf of Ronald's succession. Thus, the trial court correctly granted the exception of no cause of action.

At the center of this appeal is whether a cause of action existed in Kristina's motion for judgment of divorce. As the administratrix of Ronald's succession, did the law afford Kristina the remedy to continue the divorce action on the behalf of Ronald?

Marriage is defined in La.Civ.Code art. 86 as “a legal relationship between a man and a woman that is created by civil contract.” Married people owe to each other the mutual duties of fidelity, support, and assistance. La.Civ.Code art. 98. Louisiana Civil Code Article 1766 provides that “[a]n obligation is strictly personal when its performance can be enforced only by the obligee, or only against the obligor.” Thus, the duties imposed upon two married people by La.Civ.Code art. 98 are strictly personal obligations as the performance of fidelity, support, and assistance can only be enforced by a husband against his wife or vice versa. La.Civ.Code art. 1766, comment (c).

The death of either spouse terminates a marriage. La.Civ.Code art. 101. Just as the death of a spouse terminates the marriage, it also terminates the legal regime of community property existing between the married couple. See La.Civ.Code art. 2356. Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 428, “an action to enforce a right or obligation which is strictly personal” abates upon the death of a party.

The abatement of a divorce action upon the death of a party was discussed in Draper v. Draper, 554 So.2d 79 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1989), in which the second circuit ruled that the action for divorce in that case abated upon the death of the husband.

Louisiana law does not favor abatement of actions. Under [La.Code Civ.P. art.] 428, an action does not abate on the death of a party unless the action is one to enforce a right or obligation which is strictly personal. This article was adopted in order to abrogate jurisprudential rules favoring abatement of actions on the death of a party. [La.Code Civ.P. art.] 428, comment (a). Comment (a) notes that the intent of the redactors in drafting the twin codes of 1825 was to prevent judicial acceptance by Louisiana of the common law rules of abatement. Despite the efforts of the redactors, Louisiana courts had misinterpreted the codal provisions. Thus, [La.Code Civ.P. art.] 428 reinstated the intent of the redactors of the 1825 codes.

Because Louisiana strongly favors the continuation of actions on the death of a party, the exceptions to the rule against abatement are limited by [La.Code Civ.P. art.] 428 to actions to enforce rights or obligations which are strictly personal. [Louisiana Civil Code Article] 1766 provides that “[a]n obligation is strictly personal when its performance can be enforced only by the obligee, or only against the obligor.”

In Arceneaux v. Arceneaux, 232 La. 494, 94 So.2d 449 (1957), a case almost on point with the instant situation, the court found that the divorce action brought by the husband had abated on his death. As in the present case, a preliminary default taken by the husband was confirmed. Four days after the judgment granting the divorce was signed, he died. Mrs. Arceneaux then filed a suspensive appeal and asked the court to substitute the plaintiff's minor son by a previous marriage as plaintiff and to appoint a curator ad hoc to represent the minor. The curator ad hoc filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the question of divorce was personal and had become moot on the plaintiff's death.

The court agreed that the question of divorce between the parties had become moot because of the death of the plaintiff and dismissed the appeal.

Although Arceneaux was decided prior to the adoption of [La.Code Civ.P. art.] 428 and at a time when the courts presumably were more likely to find that actions had abated, we find that the result reached in Arceneaux should be the same result under today's code of civil procedure. In fact, as one of the exceptions to the rule against abatement of actions, comment (c) to [La.Code Civ.P. art.] 428 cites an action for divorce.

Id. at 81 (footnote omitted).

In the case before us, neither party had moved for a judgment of divorce at the time of Ronald's death, much less been granted such a judgment. We find that this fact situation strongly supports a ruling that the divorce action abated upon Ronald's death.

In the cases cited by Kristina, judgments of divorce had been rendered prior to the death of a spouse and issues remained as to the designation of property owned by the parties based on allegations of fault in the divorce proceedings or the revocation of certain testamentary provisions and donations. See Succession of Buhler, 243 So.3d 39; Cannatella, 91 So.3d 393; and LaRocca, 597 So.2d 1000. We find these cases distinguishable from the one currently before us.

First and foremost, at the time of Ronald's death neither party had filed a motion for judgment of divorce, and no such judgment had been rendered. We therefore do not need to address the validity of a judgment or the delays for an appeal. Secondly, Marla filed her petition for divorce pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 102 stating that the parties intended to live separate and apart for 180 days. Therefore, as neither party was accused of being at fault for the dissolution of the marriage, there are no issues of how to designate community property based on allegations of fault.

Kristina has argued that at stake is the designation of beneficiary for the life insurance policy issued to Ronald by Protective Life Insurance Company in the amount of $100,000.00. We are not swayed by Kristina's argument that the question of who shall be the beneficiary of the life insurance policy is significant enough to instill in her the right to continue Ronald's divorce action, which is a strictly personal right.

Pursuant to the statutes and jurisprudence which we have cited above, we find that the marriage and the legal regime of community property between Marla and Ronald terminated upon Ronald's death. See La.Civ.Code arts. 101 and 2356; see also Draper, 554 So.2d 79. Additionally, as the obligations of marriage are strictly personal to the spouses, the divorce action abated upon Ronald's death. See La.Civ.Code art. 1766 and La.Code Civ.P. art. 428. There were no pending motions seeking a judgment of divorce, nor was there a judgment of divorce awaiting finalization. Additionally, as noted by the trial court, there is no way to know if Ronald fully intended to go through with the divorce and partition the community property accordingly.

Kristina's motion for judgment of divorce and amended motion for judgment of divorce both state that Ronald died February 24, 2025, and that no judgment of divorce had been granted. As we have found that Marla and Ronald's marriage and their legal regime of community property terminated upon Ronald's death and the divorce action has abated, we accordingly find that the trial court was correct in granting Marla's exception of no cause of action as the law does not afford a remedy under the facts alleged in Kristina's motion and amended motion for judgment of divorce. Christian D. Cesson, PLC, 419 So.3d 814. As ordered in the final judgment rendered in this matter on August 19, 2025, Marla and Kristina may assert any claims concerning the partition of Marla and Ronald's community property and any related reimbursement claims in Ronald's succession proceeding.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's Final Judgment Sustaining Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause and No Right of Action and Stipulation on Claims Involving Community Property Partition, Accounting and Reimbursement Claims, issued on August 19, 2025. Costs are assessed to Kristina Thigpen Rushing.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The federal court proceedings to which Kristina refers involve a Complaint-In-Interpleader filed on behalf of Protective Life Insurance Company in the United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette Division. A life insurance policy was issued to Ronald in the amount of $100,000.00 in 1999. In 2016, Ronald designated Marla, his wife, as the primary beneficiary of the policy. After Ronald's death, Kristina contacted Protective Life Ins. Co. advising it that at the time of his death, Ronald was involved in divorce proceedings with Marla. Through this Complaint-In-Interpleader, Protective Life Ins. Co. has placed the proceeds of the policy into the registry of the court pending an adjudication of who is entitled to the proceeds.