ARDOIN LLC AND HENRY FAMILY LLC v. ALLIANCE ASSET TRADING GROUP LLC AND ALLIANCE MARINE LLC (2026)

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-207

ARDOIN, LLC AND L.R. HENRY FAMILY, LLC

VERSUS

ALLIANCE ASSET TRADING GROUP, LLC AND ALLIANCE MARINE, LLC

Judgment rendered and mailed to all parties or counsel on November 12, 2026. Applications for rehearing may be filed within the delays allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CAMERON, NO. 1021252 HONORABLE PENELOPE QUINN RICHARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

CHARLES G. FITZGERALD JUDGE

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Ledricka J. Thierry, Judges.

CGF

LJT

DECEMBER 29, 2025 JUDGMENT VACATED; DECEMBER 18, 2025 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; SEPTEMBER 9, 2025 JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

Pickett, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-207

ARDOIN, LLC AND L.R. HENRY FAMILY, LLC

VERSUS

ALLIANCE ASSET TRADING GROUP, LLC AND ALLIANCE MARINE, LLC

APPEAL FROM THE THIRTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CAMERON, NO. 1021252 HONORABLE PENELOPE QUINN RICHARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

CHARLES G. FITZGERALD JUDGE

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Ledricka J. Thierry, Judges.

DECEMBER 29, 2025 JUDGMENT VACATED; DECEMBER 18, 2025 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; SEPTEMBER 9, 2025 JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

Pickett, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.

S. Ault Hootsell, III Joshua G. McDiarmid Butler Snow LLP 445 North Boulevard, Suite 300 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802 (225) 325-8700 Counsel for Defendants/Appellants: Alliance Asset Trading Group, LLC and Alliance Marine, LLC

Christopher P. Ieyoub Peyton N. Robertson Plauché, Smith & Nieset Post Office Drawer 1705 Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602 (337) 463-0522 Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees: Ardoin, LLC and L.R. Henry Family, LLC

FITZGERALD, Judge.

In this appeal, we are asked to annul three trial court judgments.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2016, Plaintiffs, Ardoin LLC and L.R. Henry Family LLC, and Defendants, Alliance Asset Trading Group LLC and Alliance Marine LLC (collectively “Alliance”), entered into a commercial lease of waterfront property located in Cameron Parish. The lease was amended in November 2023.

Nineteen months later, in July 2025, Plaintiffs filed suit to evict Alliance from the leased property for breach of contract. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Alliance had failed to initiate engineering plans for wharf and dock work, failed to “fence and secure” the premises, and failed “to maintain the integrity of the leased waterfront property[.]”

The eviction hearing was held in August 2025. Following the testimony of Plaintiffs’ first witness, the parties requested a brief recess to discuss settlement. When the hearing resumed a few hours later, respective counsel recited settlement terms on the record in open court. Those terms were later reduced to a written final Judgment of Eviction, which was signed by the trial court on September 9, 2025. Alliance, in turn, filed a motion for new trial, arguing that it did not consent to the judgment.

The hearing on Alliance's motion was held in early December 2025. At the close of evidence, the trial court ruled from the bench. The trial court's ruling is memorialized in the Amended Judgment of Eviction dated December 18, 2025. In essence, the Amended Judgment of Eviction did two things: first, it denied Alliance's motion for new trial. And second, it amended the original judgment by adding a conditional obligation.

Eleven days later, on December 29, 2025, the trial court signed a Final Judgment of Eviction. That judgment evicted Alliance from the leased property because the conditional obligation in the amended judgment had not been satisfied. Alliance appealed the Final Judgment of Eviction.

On appeal, Alliance asserts four assignments of error:

1. The Trial Court erred in rendering the September 9, 2025 Judgment of Eviction, denying [Alliance's] Motion for New Trial, rendering the December 18, 2025 Amended Judgment of Eviction, and rendering the December 29, 2025 Final Judgment of Eviction, because the uncontroverted evidence shows that [Alliance] did not consent to take an eviction, the key term of the purported settlement.

2. The Trial Court erred in rendering the September 9, 2025 Judgment of Eviction and denying [Alliance's] Motion for New Trial, because no meeting of the minds existed as to the material terms of the purported settlement agreement, including the amount of the escrow, and thus, there was no meeting of the minds.

3. The Trial Court erred in rendering the December 18, 2025 Amended Judgment of Eviction, which added new substantive terms to the purported settlement that were not agreed to by the parties or supported by the evidence.

4. The Trial Court erred in rendering the December 29, 2025 Final Judgment of Eviction, which was based on the unenforceable purported settlement and [Alliance's] failure to comply with new substantive terms improperly added to the Amended Judgment of Eviction.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Our analysis below begins by reviewing Alliance's third assignment of error. Next, we turn our attention to its fourth assignment of error. And finally, we address the first and second assignments together.

Third Assignment of Error

In this assignment, Alliance asserts that the Amended Judgment of Eviction dated December 18, 2025, is an absolute nullity because it substantively changed the original Judgment of Eviction. We agree.

As to the appropriate standard of appellate review, questions of law— including whether a judgment was substantively amended—are reviewed de novo. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541, 97-577 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731.

The trial court here signed the original Judgment of Eviction on September 9, 2025. The substantive provisions of that judgment run this way:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that in accordance with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 4732, Defendants, ALLIANCE ASSET TRADING GROUP, LLC and ALLIANCE MARINE, LLC, immediately vacate the leased immovable property situated in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, and remove all of Defendants’ movable and personal property located thereon, and that upon Defendants’ failure to do so within twenty-four (24) hours, the Cameron Parish Sheriff shall eject ALLIANCE ASSET TRADING GROUP, LLC and ALLIANCE MARINE, LLC and all of Defendants’ movable and personal property located thereon in accordance with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 4733.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that in accordance with the agreement of the parties, the eviction and requirement to vacate the leased premises ordered herein are hereby suspended pending Defendants’ compliance with the terms of the settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendants. In the event that the settlement should fall through for any reason, the Court shall be notified that the suspension is lifted, in which event Plaintiffs shall have the immediate right to enforce this Judgment subject to Defendants’ right to appeal this Judgment in accordance with the applicable appeal delays set forth in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants, ALLIANCE ASSET TRADING GROUP, LLC and ALLIANCE MARINE, LLC, pay all costs of these proceedings.

Notice of the Judgment of Eviction was mailed by the clerk of the trial court on October 17, 2025. In response, on October 28, 2025, Alliance filed a motion for new trial. The hearing was fixed for December 3, 2025.

At that hearing, Alliance argued that a new trial was warranted because it had not consented to the stipulated Judgment of Eviction: there was no meeting of the minds. According to Alliance, it never agreed to be evicted; it therefore never consented to the principal cause of the settlement. The trial court denied Alliance's motion from the bench. But the transcribed reasons then show this:

So the Court is going to amend the previous judgment to add that the defendants are ordered to place into escrow $10 million by December 19, 2025, by 4 p.m. The Court believes that the defendants will comply with this requirement. But in the event that they do not, upon notice to the Court of the defendants’ nonperformance, then the eviction will take place without further court proceedings.

So the constructive eviction is suspended upon the special condition of the $10 million funds placed in an escrow account by December 19, 2025, at 4 p.m.

The trial court's ruling was reduced to a written Amended Judgment of Eviction signed on December 18, 2025.¹ That judgment is the subject of this assignment of error. And the issue before us is whether that judgment substantively changed the original Judgment of Eviction in violation of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951.

In relevant part, La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951 states: “[A] final judgment may be amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment or to correct deficiencies in the decretal language or errors of calculation․ A final judgment may not be amended under this Article to change its substance.”

The application of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951 was addressed in Bourgeois v. Kost, 02-2785 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 692. There, the supreme court provided the following statement of law:

It is well settled under our jurisprudence that a judgment which has been signed cannot be altered, amended, or revised by the judge who rendered the same, except in the manner provided by law. The trial judge cannot, on his own motion or on the motion of any party, change a judgment which has been so signed, notwithstanding it was signed in error. Without a specific statutory grant of authority, the trial court is limited to the general authorization for amending final judgments provided in Code of Civil Procedure Article 1951. As stated above, Article 1951 limits the amendment of judgments to the correction of errors in calculation and alteration of phraseology, but does not authorize a trial court to make substantive amendments to final judgments. Courts have uniformly held substantive amendments to judgments made without recourse to the proper procedures, i.e. by way of a timely motion for a new trial or by appeal, to be absolute nullities.

Id. at 696 (citations omitted).

In addition, as explained by the fourth circuit in Internal Revenue Federal Credit Union v. Johnson, 612 So.2d 746, 748 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992): “When a judgment has been substantively amended without the granting of a new trial, the amended judgment is invalid and is not within the purview of [Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure] Article 1951.”

Here, the trial court amended the original Judgment of Eviction by imposing a conditional obligation on Alliance. There is no question that this is a substantive amendment contrary to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951. Once the trial court denied the motion for new trial, it lacked the authority to change the substance of the original judgment.

As stated earlier, the Amended Judgment of Eviction did two things. First, it denied Alliance's motion for new trial. That part of the judgment remains valid. And second, it substantively amended the original Judgment of Eviction. That part of the judgment is an absolute nullity.

Fourth Assignment of Error

On December 29, 2025, the trial court signed a Final Judgment of Eviction, evicting Alliance from the leased property for failing to timely deposit the sum of $10 million. In this assignment of error, Alliance contends that the Final Judgment of Eviction is an absolute nullity. And here too, we agree.

Again, the Amended Judgment of Eviction altered the substance of the original judgment by requiring Alliance to make a deposit of $10 million. This substantive amendment contravened La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951, thereby rendering that part of the amended judgment absolutely null. The trial court compounded this error by evicting Alliance from the leased property for failing to timely deposit the $10 million. In other words, the trial court evicted Alliance for failing to satisfy a conditional obligation that the court had no authority to create.

As a matter of law, an amended judgment that makes substantive changes in violation of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951 is null and void ab initio. Hebert v. Hebert, 96-2155 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/19/97), 700 So.2d 958. Thus, because the December 18, 2025 amended judgment is deemed never to have existed, it cannot serve as the basis for the December 29, 2025 Final Judgment of Eviction. For this reason, the Final Judgment of Eviction is also an absolute nullity.

First and Second Assignments of Error

In its first assignment, Alliance seeks to annul the original Judgment of Eviction dated September 9, 2025, based on a vice of consent. And in its second assignment, Alliance contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for new trial. Before going further, we need to address our subject matter jurisdiction.

Significantly, Alliance appealed only the Final Judgment of Eviction. That judgment is an absolute nullity. So too is the Amended Judgment of Eviction. And even though Alliance did not appeal the Amended Judgment of Eviction, we have jurisdiction to review that judgment because absolutely null judgments can be collaterally attacked on appeal. LaBove v. Theriot, 597 So.2d 1007, 1011 (La.1992) (“[T]he absolute nullity of a judgment may be raised at any time and in any proceeding where the validity of such a judgment is asserted[.]”).

By contrast, the original Judgment of Eviction is being attacked as a relative nullity. The original judgment is a consent or stipulated final judgment. As explained in Horrigan v. Horrigan, 10-1377, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/14/11), 70 So.3d 111, 114, writ denied, 11-1596 (La. 10/7/11), 71 So.3d 325:

A consent judgment is a bilateral contract between the parties by which the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent, with each party balancing his hope of gain against his fear of loss. Hebert v. Drewitz, 09–0798, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/27/09) 29 So.3d 607, 608. See also LSA–C.C. art. 3071. A consent judgment, as opposed to other final judgments rendered against a party without their consent, may be annulled or rescinded for an error of fact or of the principal cause of the agreement. Stroscher v. Stroscher, 01–2769, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 518, 524. See also LSA–C.C. arts. 3082 and 1948, et seq.

Here, Alliance seeks to annul the original Judgment of Eviction based on a vice of consent. As touched on above, a consent judgment may be rescinded or declared a relative nullity based on a vice of consent. Santillo v. Santillo, 21-602 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/20/22), 344 So.3d 727, writ denied, 22-1287 (La. 11/16/22), 349 So.3d 1004; Morgan v. Foster, 20-363 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/7/21), 347 So.3d 963. See also La.Civ.Code arts. 1948 and 2031. But unlike an absolute nullity, a judgment that is a relative nullity cannot be collaterally attacked. Altemus v. Boudreaux, 15-725 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/15), 184 So.3d 142, writ denied, 16-157 (La. 3/24/16), 190 So.3d 1197.

Had Alliance taken an unrestricted appeal of the original Judgment of Eviction, we would have jurisdiction to review both the judgment and the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial. Yet instead of appealing the original judgment, Alliance is attempting to collaterally attack that judgment in this appeal.

To sum up, Alliance seeks to annul the original Judgment of Eviction as a relative nullity. This challenge is premised on a vice of consent. But Alliance did not appeal the original judgment, and Alliance cannot now collaterally attack that judgment in this appeal. We simply do not have appellate jurisdiction to review the original Judgment of Eviction. Nor do we have jurisdiction to review the trial court's ruling on the motion for new trial.

DISPOSITION

The trial court's Final Judgment of Eviction dated December 29, 2025, is vacated. The Amended Judgment of Eviction dated December 18, 2025, is affirmed to the extent that it denied Defendants’ motion for new trial; the Amended Judgment of Eviction is vacated in all other respects. The original Judgment of Eviction dated September 9, 2025, is reinstated.

The costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to Plaintiffs and one-half to Defendants.

DECEMBER 29, 2025 JUDGMENT VACATED; DECEMBER 18, 2025 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; SEPTEMBER 9, 2025 JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-207

ARDOIN, LLC AND L.R. HENRY FAMILY, LLC

VERSUS

ALLIANCE ASSET TRADING GROUP, LLC AND ALLIANCE MARINE, LLC

PICKETT, Chief Judge, concurs in the result and assigns reasons.

While I disagree with the reasoning of the majority opinion, because I find that the trial court's final judgment of December 29, 2026 evicting the defendants from the plaintiffs’ property was correct, I concur in the result.

I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the September 9, 2025, judgment is a final judgment. “A judgment that determines the merits in whole is a final judgment.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1841(B)(1). That judgment, by its own terms, immediately evicted the defendants in the first operative paragraph and then suspended the eviction subject to some uncertain condition (“compliance with the terms of the settlement between the parties”). If that uncertain condition was not met, the plaintiffs could notify the court that the suspension is lifted and enforce the judgment. While the colloquy in open court mentions an escrow account be created for certain purposes, the record does not disclose the amount, the specific purposes, or how long the defendant had to set up this escrow account. I acknowledge that this is a consent judgment between the parties, but its effect must be clear for it to be a final judgment. Clearly there were issues between the parties which still needed to be resolved. I find the inclusion of a reservation of the defendants’ right to appeal the judgment supports this conclusion.

As explained by the fourth circuit in Joseph v. Wasserman, 17-603, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/10/18), 237 So.3d 14, 18:

Although Louisiana courts require no particular form for a valid final judgment, they require that it be “precise, definite and certain.” 1960 Revision Comment (a) to La. C.C.P. 1918. Indeed, this Court has noted that “ ‘[a] valid judgment must be precise, definite and certain’ ” and that “ ‘[t]he quality of definiteness is essential to a proper judgment.” Board of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Mid City Holdings, L.L.C., 14-0506, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/15/14), 151 So.3d 908, 910 (quoting Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson Greatbatch, Techs., Inc., 10-477, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10), 52 So.3d 909, 915–16) (citations omitted). Generally, “a conditional judgment, order, or decree, the finality of which depends on certain contingencies which may or may not occur, is not final for the purpose of appeal.” 44 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 144.

The evidence presented indicates the parties continued to negotiate terms after the hearing and until the notice of the judgment was sent on October 17, 2025. Because the September 9th judgment is an interlocutory judgment and not a final judgment, the trial court maintained jurisdiction to consider the subsequent motion filed by Alliance. While styled as a “Motion for a New Trial,” the motion argued that Alliance did not consent to the judgment. At the hearing on the motion on December 3, 2025, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial, finding the defendants did consent to certain conditions in order to avoid eviction. The trial court amended the September 9th judgment in open court to specify the conditions with which the defendants had to comply in order to avoid eviction. A judgment in conformity with the ruling was signed on December 18, 2025. Reviewing the evidence and law, I find no error in that judgment. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the December 18th judgment was an absolute nullity. While this second judgment did substantively amend the September 9th judgment, I find that La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951 is not implicated because the trial court amended an interlocutory judgment, not a final judgment.

For the same reason, I disagree with the majority that the December 29, 2025, judgment is an absolute nullity. In that judgment, the trial court made executory the eviction of the defendants from the property of the plaintiffs because the defendants failed to comply with the conditions set out in the December 18th judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Curiously, the written amended judgment changes the place of deposit from an escrow account to the registry of the trial court; it also extends the delay for performing until December 22, 2025, at 2:00 p.m.