JAMES VEILLON v. PAMELA BRIGNAC ET AL (2026)

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-308

JAMES VEILLON

VERSUS

PAMELA BRIGNAC, ET AL.

Judgment rendered and mailed to all parties or counsel on November 12, 2026 Applications for rehearing may be filed within the delays allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922.

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20254123 HONORABLE CYNTHIA S. SPADONI, DISTRICT JUDGE

CGP

JWP

GJO

GARY J. ORTEGO JUDGE

Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Jonathan W. Perry, and Gary J. Ortego, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-308

JAMES VEILLON

VERSUS

PAMELA BRIGNAC, ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20254123 HONORABLE CYNTHIA S. SPADONI, DISTRICT JUDGE

GARY J. ORTEGO JUDGE

Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Jonathan W. Perry, and Gary J. Ortego, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Jeffrey A. Rhoades Swift & Rhoades P. O. Box 53107 Lafayette, LA 70502-3107 (337) 572-9877 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Cynthia R. Brignac

Mark C. Carver Kaufman Dolowich, LLP 3900 N Causeway Blvd., Suite 670 Metairie, LA 70002 (504) 252-9877 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Atain Specialty Insurance Company

Michael A. Domingue, Jr. Kevin W. Fouquier, II Jessica R. Reaux Domingue Law Firm, LLC 109 Stewart St. Lafayette, LA 70501 (337) 484-1001 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: James Veillon

Kevin C. Ellis Robert M. Kallam Mary-Claire Holier Kean Miller LLP 600 Jefferson St., Suite 1101 Lafayette, LA 70501 (337) 235-2232 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: River Stone Condominium Association, Inc.

Pamela Brignac Pro Se 3121 Johnston Street, Apt. 213 Lafayette, LA 70503 (337) 554-5560 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Pamela Brignac

ORTEGO, Judge.

Plaintiff/Appellant, James Veillon (“Veillon”), appeals a judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, River Stone Condominium Association, Inc., dismissing his claims against it with prejudice.

Veillon was injured when a dog owned by another condominium resident bit his hand. Veillon contends that River Stone may be liable because it failed to enforce its rules governing pets and argues the trial court heard the motion before he had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In this personal injury action, Veillon alleges that a dog bit him on the hand while exiting his residence at River Stone Condominiums on June 20, 2024. The dog was owned by another resident, Pamela Brignac.

On June 17, 2025, Veillon filed suit against Pamela Brignac (“Brignac”) (as dog owner), Cynthia R. Brignac (as the owner of the unit in which Pamela Brignac resided), and River Stone Condominium Association (“River Stone”), and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, as his insurer.

River Stone answered on September 19, 2025, and moved for summary judgment on October 15, 2025. River Stone maintained that it did not own the dog and had no prior knowledge that the dog had exhibited vicious or violent behavior. The hearing was initially set for November 17, 2025. Veillon sought a continuance, which was granted on November 10, 2025, and the hearing was reset for January 20, 2026. Veillon served interrogatories and requests for production on November 12, 2025, and River Stone filed a motion to quash the discovery on December 12, 2025.

Following the hearing on January 20, 2026, the trial court granted River Stone's motion for summary judgment. Once the court granted summary judgment, it denied River Stone's motion to quash as moot. A judgment dismissing Veillon's claims against River Stone with prejudice was signed on February 25, 2026. Veillon appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Veillon asserts that the trial court erred by (1) considering River Stone's motion for summary judgment before adequate discovery had been conducted; (2) finding no genuine issue of material fact concerning River Stone's knowledge of the dog's presence and alleged history of violent behavior; and (3) finding no genuine issue of material fact concerning River Stone's alleged failure to enforce its pet rules and regulations.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's decision to proceed with a summary judgment hearing despite a request for additional discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Laforge v. Golden Nugget Lake Charles, LLC, 20-110 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/20), 307 So.3d 266. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same criteria governing the trial court's determination. Field v. Lafayette Par. Sch. Bd., 16-495 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/9/16), 205 So.3d 986, writ denied, 16-2141 (La. 1/13/17), 215 So.3d 256.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

In his first assignment of error, Veillon argues that the trial court prematurely considered River Stone's motion for summary judgment because he had not been afforded adequate time to complete discovery.

The law does not require that there be adequate discovery, rather there must be the opportunity for adequate discovery. “There is no absolute right to delay action on a motion for summary judgment until discovery is completed.” Simoneaux v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 483 So.2d 908, 912 (La.1986).

In the case before us, River Stone moved for summary judgment shortly after answering Veillon's petition. The hearing was initially set for November 17, 2025. Veillon then sought a continuance, which the trial court granted, and the hearing was reset for January 20, 2026, allowing Veillon an additional two months for additional discovery. During that period, Veillon served River Stone with written discovery. In its opposition, River Stone argued that it complied with all discovery requests, and that Veillon had an additional 60 days for discovery but failed to find any evidence to support why River Stone should be held liable.

Although Veillon now contends that more discovery was necessary, the record contains no subsequent motion to continue, no opposition to River Stone's motion to quash, or any additional summary judgment evidence establishing material fact(s) on which the issue of liability would be at issue. Additionally, Veillon has failed to identify any specific additional discovery that he sought to pursue and how it would affect or bear upon a material element of his claim.

After review, we find that Veillon has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in proceeding with the rescheduled hearing. Given the above, we find no merit to this assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

Veillon's principal contention is that River Stone's rules regulating pets imposed a duty to protect residents from the dog. Under La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3), summary judgment shall be granted after an opportunity for adequate discovery when the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The mover bears the initial burden of proof. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). When the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial, however, the mover need not negate every essential element of the adverse party's claim but may point out an absence of factual support for one or more essential elements. Id. The burden then shifts to the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

Here, River Stone's condominium rules limited household pets to twenty-five pounds, prohibited animals that constituted a nuisance or danger, required leashes and control in common areas, and required submission of vaccination records identifying breed and weight. Veillon argues that proper enforcement of these provisions would have disclosed the dog's presence and size and that further discovery was necessary to determine what knowledge River Stone had as to Brignac's dog.

Knowledge that a dog resides on the premises is not the same as knowledge that the dog has dangerous propensities. Further, a landlord is not required to investigate the disposition of a pet. In Turnbow v. Wye Electric, Inc. the second circuit affirmed the trial court, finding that just because the defendant “knew that one or more dogs were on the rented premises, a duty was not created to inspect and determine the disposition of the animals”. Turnbow v. Wye Elec., Inc., 38,948, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/22/04), 883 So.2d 469, 472. In Parr v. Head, the fifth circuit declined to hold a landlord liable for harm caused by a dog under a premises liability theory, finding an inspection would only have revealed the presence of the dog, not its disposition. Parr v. Head, 442 So.2d 1234 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1983).

There is no dispute that River Stone was not the owner or custodian of Brignac's dog. River Stone alleges that the trial court's judgment is correct as the only evidence submitted showed that it had no indication that the dog possessed a vicious propensity or violent nature prior to the subject bite. River Stone argued that it complied with all discovery requests, and that James Veillon had an additional 60 days for discovery but failed to find any evidence to support why River Stone should be held liable. River Stone further argued that the law “doesn't distinguish between a 25-pound dog, an 80-pound dog, or a 300-pound dog” and that the “responsibility of a non-dog owner remains the same” – that there be no prior knowledge that the dog had a violent tendency or a likelihood of attacking a person.

River Stone provided summary judgment evidence showing that it had no notice of prior incidents involving this dog. Additionally, a review of the record shows that Veillon failed to identify and provide any evidence of a prior bite, aggressive conduct by the dog, a prior complaint, or other circumstances that would establish that River Stone had any prior or requisite knowledge of any dangerous propensity of Brignac's dog. Thus, by law, River Stone's status as the condominium property owner, standing alone, does not render it liable for injuries caused by another resident's dog.

Even assuming that River Stone knew or should have known that the dog was present in violation of the weight restriction, that fact is not equivalent to knowledge that this particular dog was dangerous. The association's pet rules do not, without more, establish the factual and legal basis necessary to impose liability for the bite suffered by Veillon. Nor does the mere presence of a resident's dog constitute a vice or defect of the premises for purposes of the theory Veillon advances under La.Civ.Code arts. 2317 and 2317.1. See: Coburn v. Dixon, 15-1095 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/27/16), 190 So.3d 816, writ denied, 16-1022 (La. 9/16/16), 206 So.3d 211; and Dupre v. Miller, 571 So.2d 228 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1990).

Thus, we find this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE

In his third assignment of error, Veillon argues that River Stone breached its own rules and regulations by failing to properly vet the dog before allowing it to remain on the property. Specifically, Veillon points to provisions limiting the weight of household pets to twenty-five pounds and requiring owners or tenants to submit veterinary records identifying the animal's breed and weight. Veillon contends that River Stone's failure to enforce these requirements creates a genuine issue of material fact as to its liability. Veillon argues that enforcement of those requirements would have revealed the dog's presence and size and that River Stone's failure to enforce them supports liability.

Again, even assuming River Stone knew the dog resided on the premises and exceeded the weight limit, those circumstances do not, without additional evidence, show that River Stone knew of any prior aggressive behavior or dangerous propensity of this particular dog. Information about the dog's presence, breed, or weight is different from information that the dog had previously behaved dangerously. As previously stated, Veillon identifies no competent summary judgment evidence of a prior bite, aggressive incident, complaint, or other circumstances that would have placed River Stone on notice of such behavior, create a duty, or any possible liability.

Here, the alleged failure to enforce the pet rules does not alter Veillon's failure to provide any proper contradictory evidence in his opposition to River Stone's motion. Even if Brignac had failed to provide River Stone with the required veterinary records or the enforcement of its weight restriction, a violation of an association's rule does not automatically establish all elements necessary for Veillon's negligence claim arising from a dog bite. The question is whether the alleged failure or violation supports a duty recognized by law, a breach of that duty, and a causal connection to Veillon's injuries. Whether a landlord is responsible for injuries caused by tenant's animal is governed by a negligence analysis in which there must be a violation of duty that is a cause-in-fact of the injuries sustained. Thus, Veillon has not produced any, much less, sufficient evidence to establish the required basis for imposing liability on River Stone for this dog's conduct.

Additionally, and as stated in Assignment Number Two, River Stone's status as the condominium property owner, standing alone, does not legally render it liable for injuries caused by another resident's dog. To the extent Veillon relies on a premises-defect theory under La.Civ.Code arts. 2317 and 2317.1, the mere presence of a resident's dog does not itself establish a vice or defect in the premises. See Coburn v. Dixon, 190 So.3d 816; Dupre v. Miller, 571 So.2d 228.

After review, we find that neither the asserted factual dispute about River Stone's knowledge of the dog's presence nor its alleged failure to enforce its pet rules establishes a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment under the governing liability standard. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

ANCILLARY MATTER

River Stone additionally argues that Veillon cited Article 2317.1 for the first time on appeal. Because the premises-defect theory fails on the merits, even if considered, we need not resolve that preservation argument.

CONCLUSION

James Veillon raises three assignments of error. We find no merit in any assignment raised. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to James Veillon.

AFFIRMED.