BOBBY HAMPTON v. GOVERNOR JEFF LANDRY LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS SECRETARY GARY WESTCOTT ATTORNEY GENERAL ELIZABETH LIZ MURRILL DARREL VANNOY AND JOHN DOES 100 (2026)

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated on death row at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana (“LSP”), appeals a district court judgment sustaining, in part, the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action filed by the state actors named as defendants in Plaintiff's lawsuit. The judgment on appeal is interlocutory, and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Bobby Hampton, is incarcerated at LSP and is on death row. On February 26, 2025, Mr. Hampton filed a petition for injunction and declaratory relief in which he named various state actors as defendants: Governor Jeff Landry, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”), DPSC Secretary Gary Westcott, Attorney General Elizabeth “Liz” Murrill, LSP Warden Darrel Vannoy, and “John Does 1-100[,]” who Mr. Hampton defines as unidentified “individuals involved in the implementation of DPSC's execution protocols” (collectively “Defendants”). In his petition, Mr. Hampton challenged the constitutionality and legality of the 2024 amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:569, which authorized additional methods of execution. Mr. Hampton's causes of action raised in his petition are as follows ¹ :

Cause I: Execution by nitrogen gas or electrocution would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Louisiana Constitution Execution because those execution methods are less humane and more painful than execution by lethal injection.

Cause II: The Louisiana Legislature impermissibly delegated its power to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) when it enacted La. [R.S.] 15:569, which provides DPSC the unfettered discretion to select the method of execution.

Cause III: La. [R.S.] 15:569 violates Mr. Hampton's due process rights because it is unconstitutionally vague as it contains little to no explanation or minimal objective guidelines as to the means of executing the death sentence.

[Cause] IV: Execution by electrocution would violate Mr. Hampton's right to be free of euthanasia, torture, or cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.

[Cause] V: Execution by nitrogen gas would violate Mr. Hampton's right to be free of euthanasia, torture, or cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.

[Cause] VI: Execution by lethal injection would violate Mr. Hampton's right to be free of euthanasia, torture, or cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.

Cause VII: Appellees cannot execute Mr. Hampton by electrocution or forced nitrogen gassing because retroactive application of La. [R.S.] 15:569 would violate the presumption against retroactivity, and La. [R.S.] 15:569 fails to expressly provide for retroactivity.

On June 4, 2025, Defendants filed peremptory exceptions to Mr. Hampton's petition, including the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no cause of action. In their exception raising the objection of no cause of action, Defendants sought dismissal of Causes I, II, III, V, and VIL Mr. Hampton filed a memorandum in opposition to the exceptions on July 14, 2025.

The district court held a hearing on Defendants’ exceptions on October 7, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court sustained the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action as to Causes I, II, III, and VII and overruled the exception in all other respects. The district court signed a “Partial Judgment” on November 6, 2025, in which it memorialized its October 7, 2025 in-court rulings and dismissed Causes I, II, III, and VIL The district court designated the November 6, 2025 judgment as a “final partial judgment” based on its determination that there was “no just reasons for delay.”

Mr. Hampton timely filed a motion for devolutive appeal or alternatively a supervisory writ of review of the November 6, 2025 judgment. The district court signed the order granting Mr. Hampton a devolutive appeal of the judgment on December 3, 2025, and Mr. Hampton filed a separate supervisory writ application at this court on December 12, 2025.

On March 18, 2026, a three-judge panel of this court granted Mr. Hampton's writ application and reversed the district court's ruling as to Causes I, II, III, and VII. See Hampton v. Landry, 2025-1267 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/18/26), 2026 WL 820991 (unpublished). Shortly thereafter, this court granted rehearing ex proprio motu and denied the writ application by a majority of a five-judge panel. See Hampton v. Landry, 2025-1267 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/26), 2026 WL 852444 (unpublished). Mr. Hampton filed a writ of certiorari with the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was also denied. See Hampton v. Landry, 2026-00523 (La. 9/16/26), --- So.3d ---, 2026 WL 2871133.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on April 22, 2026. Defendants argued that “[t]his [c]ourt has seen this case before” when it was presented with Mr. Hampton's supervisory writ application “and [this court] already reached the right result.” In addition, Defendants argued Mr. Hampton's appeal must be dismissed because it constitutes an appeal from an interlocutory judgment, over which this court lacks jurisdiction.

Mr. Hampton opposed the motion to dismiss, asserting that this court may consider the appeal because the district court certified the November 6, 2025 judgment as final pursuant to former Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915(B). In addition, Mr. Hampton noted that this court's prior writ denial action “is not precedential for any purposes; it is merely a statement that the court is declining to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to review the issues addressed at that time.” See Bankers Ins. Co. v. Donelon, 2023-0871 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/22/24), 388 So.3d 411, 416 n.3.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

This court's appellate jurisdiction extends only to final judgments and to interlocutory judgments made expressly appealable by law. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1841 & 2083. A final judgment is one that determines the merits of a controversy, in whole or in part. La. C.C.P. art. 1841. In contrast, an interlocutory judgment does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the course of an action. La. C.C.P. art. 1841. Whether the judgment before us is appealable is determined by examining the requirements of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915. Bias v. Haley, 2023-0281 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 383 So.3d 175, 181.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915 was recently amended and reenacted by La. Acts 2025, No. 250, § 3 (effective Aug. 1, 2025), largely to restore Article 1915 to its pre-1997 form. See La. C.C.P. art. 1915—2025 Comments, cmt. (a). The revisions remove from Article 1915(B) the authority of the district court to designate a judgment as final and appealable after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. As a result, Article 1915(A) now provides a list of judgments from which an appeal may be taken. Succession of Overton, 2024-0119 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/17/25), 423 So.3d 1114, 1120 n.4. The language of Paragraph C of Article 1915 is new and states, “Except as otherwise provided by law, when a court ․ sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims, ․ that judgment is an interlocutory judgment.” See La. C.C.P. art. 1915(C); Succession of Overton, 423 So.3d at 1120 n.4.

The 2025 amendments to Article 1915 have prospective application only and shall not apply to appeals and supervisory writs filed prior to August 1, 2025, the effective date of the Act. Succession of Overton, 423 So.3d at 1120 n.4 (citing La. Acts 2025, No. 250, § 6). In this case, the judgment from which Mr. Hampton appeals was signed after the effective date of the amendments to Article 1915. Therefore, we will apply the amended version of Article 1915.

Since the November 6, 2025 judgment sustains the peremptory exception in part, as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims, the judgment is interlocutory. See La. C.C.P. art. 1915(C). The proper procedural vehicle to contest an interlocutory judgment is by an application for supervisory writs filed within 30 days of the interlocutory judgment. Savoy v. State through Louisiana Department of Health, 2025-0203 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/19/26), — So.3d —, 2026 WL 1407839, *6. This court has discretion to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writs if the appeal would have been timely had it been filed as a supervisory writ application. See Savoy, --- So.3d ---, 2026 WL 1407839 at *6. Nevertheless, the factors enumerated in Herlitz Construction Co., Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 (La. 1981) (per curiam) limit our discretionary authority to consider this matter as a supervisory writ application. We find the Herlitz factors are not met in this case. Thus, we decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction over the November 6, 2025 judgment. Appellate relief may be available once a final judgment has been rendered. See La. C.C.P. art. 2083.

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal and deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiff, Bobby Hampton.

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED AS MOOT.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Generally, the allegations of the petition control review of an exception raising the objection of no cause of action. See La. C.C.P. art. 931. Here, we refer to Mr. Hampton's appellate brief for a more succinct iteration of the causes of action raised in his petition for ease of reading.

EDWARDS, J.