ANNE TREME MCQUEEN v. JOHN BLACKSHEAR MCQUEEN (2026)

Appellant, Anne McQueen (“Anne”), appeals the March 4, 2026 judgment sustaining the exception of res judicata filed by John McQueen (“John”) and dismissing her motion to partition. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Anne and John married on October 20, 2001. Before the marriage, John acquired 10,000 preferred shares in Lloyd Bartlett, Inc., a corporation formed by Todd Graves in connection with the restaurant venture that became Raising Cane's. Thus, the original Lloyd Bartlett shares were John's interest in a corporation associated with the Raising Cane's enterprise.

During the marriage, the business structure was reorganized. New LB, Inc. was formed in November 2001 to facilitate the transaction and reorganization of the Raising Cane's entities. Under the merger plan, the original Lloyd Bartlett, Inc. merged into New LB, Inc. New LB survived and, when the merger became effective on December 31, 2001, changed its name to Lloyd Bartlett, Inc. The three Raising Cane's companies – Raising Cane's Restaurants, LLC; Raising Cane's USA, LLC; and Raising Cane's Franchising, LLC – were separate Louisiana limited liability companies in the enterprise; they were not the corporations merged together. As part of the merger transaction, John's 10,000 preferred shares in the original Lloyd Bartlett were exchanged for shares in the surviving, renamed corporation and membership interests in each of the three LLCs. The record describes the resulting interests as 2% of the corporation and 1% in each LLC at the time of the exchange. However, John's later affidavit reports 0.495% in each LLC.

Anne filed for divorce on November 9, 2006, and the divorce was finalized by judgment signed September 4, 2007. After the divorce, on October 24, 2007, the parties obtained a consent judgment addressing community property in the divorce docket. The consent judgment recognized Anne's ownership of the former family home and provided, in pertinent part:

[E]ach party shall retain, as sole owner, any and all property in the possession of that party, titled in the name of that party, or attributable to the work and/or employment of that party, including but not limited to motor vehicles, bank accounts, investment accounts, retirement assets, intellectual property, and personal property.

The consent judgment further provided that each party waived “any and all claims” concerning community property, including claims for accounting and reimbursement. However, the consent judgment neither identified a Raising Cane's entity by name nor listed and valued the parties’ assets.

On May 28, 2025, Anne moved to partition property she alleged remained unpartitioned, including John's interests in Lloyd Bartlett, Inc. and the Raising Cane's entities. John filed an exception of res judicata on September 16, 2025, arguing that the 2007 consent judgment's title-and-possession provision and mutual waiver encompassed the disputed property.

During this partition, the parties disputed how much Anne knew about the interests before the consent judgment. Anne's testimony revealed that she knew John had some ownership connection to Raising Cane's, but that she did not know the nature or extent of the interests later revealed in discovery. Additionally, Anne brought up an email exchange between John and his divorce counsel dated July 31, 2007, concerning the Raising Cane's interests. In the exchange, John wrote that he would follow counsel's advice and that “the less she has to sign and be involved with this particular matter, the better.” The email was proffered and was not admitted as evidence.

After hearings, the district court sustained the exception on February 24, 2026, and dismissed Anne's partition motion with prejudice. The district court signed its judgment on March 4, 2026. Anne filed a motion for devolutive appeal on March 13, 2026, and the district court signed the order granting the appeal on March 24, 2026. This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The standard of review of a peremptory exception of res judicata requires an appellate court to determine if the trial court's decision is legally correct.” Fletchinger v. Fletchinger, 2010-0474, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/19/11), 56 So. 3d 403, 405 (citing Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. La. Power & Light Co., 2008-1315, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/4/09), 10 So. 3d 264, 267). The party urging res judicata bears the burden of proving its essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence, and doubt is resolved against application of the doctrine. Ortiz v. Ortiz, 2001-1252, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So. 2d 35, 37-38. The interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is a question of law. Elliott v. Elliott, 2022-789, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/18/23), 372 So. 3d 447, 450.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Anne asserts two assignments of error. First, she argues that La. R.S. 13:4232(B)¹ limits res judicata in a divorce matter to causes of action actually adjudicated and that the Raising Cane's interests were not adjudicated in the prior proceeding. Second, she argues that the district court erred by excluding the July 31, 2007 email before resolving the pending protective-order and privilege issues, thereby impairing her ability to oppose the exception.

Assignment of Error No. 1: Res Judicata

As her first assignment of error, Anne contends that La. R.S. 13:4232(B) applies because she filed an action for divorce under La. C.C. art. 102, and the statute limits res judicata to causes of action actually adjudicated. She argues that the 2007 consent judgment did not adjudicate the disputed interests because: (1) it did not identify the Raising Cane's entities, their ownership interests, or their value; (2) no descriptive list or other divorce-court filing placed those interests at issue; and (3) the parties did not litigate or negotiate their classification or allocation. In her view, John's general awareness argument and the judgment's broad language cannot substitute for actual adjudication. John responds that the statutory exception does not apply absent a judicial partition under La. R.S. 9:2801 and that, in any event, the consent judgment was a binding contractual partition. He relies on its express award of property in each party's possession or titled in that party's name, including investment accounts, and its mutual waiver of further claims. The initial issue presented here is whether La. R.S. 13:4232(B) applies. We find it does. This case was commenced as a divorce action under La. C.C. art. 102. In the divorce action, the parties entered into a consent judgment on community property. By its terms, La. R.S. 13:4232(B) applies here because this is “an action for divorce under Civil Code Article 102.” Given this statute applies, the next issue we must address is whether the Consent Judgment “actually adjudicated” the claim Anne now asserts regarding the Raising Canes’ property.

“[I]n a contest concerning the res judicata effect of a community property partition judgment, the res judicata effect, or the authority of the thing adjudged, takes place only with respect to what was the object of the judgment.” Ortiz, 2001-1252, p. 4, 821 So. 2d at 37 (emphasis provided). “By its very nature, a consent or compromise judgment is a bilateral contract wherein the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent, thereby putting an end to litigation (or anticipated litigation) with each party balancing the hope of gain against the fear of loss.” Westcott v. Westcott, 2008-1339, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/17/09), 11 So. 3d 45, 51 (citing Braning v. Braning, 449 So. 2d 670, 672 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984)). A compromise extends only to matters the parties intended to settle and may not be enlarged by implication. La. C.C. art. 3076. Thus, neither a general waiver nor silence about a particular asset decides the issue in isolation. We examine what the parties affirmatively allocated and whether the disputed claim falls within that allocation.

The consent judgment provides that each party “shall retain, as sole owner, any and all property in the possession of that party, titled in the name of that party, or attributable to the work and/or employment of that party” and gives nonexclusive examples that include “bank accounts, investment accounts, retirement assets, intellectual property, and personal property.” The record identifies John as the holder of the disputed corporate shares and membership interests. Therefore, those interests fall within the judgment's express title-based category. Further, the specific examples of investment and retirement assets confirm that the allocation was not confined to household goods or other tangible property. The agreement need not name every account or investment separately to allocate property by a defined criterion that the record shows the property satisfies.

Anne's reliance on Robinson v. Robinson, 1999-3097 (La. 1/17/01), 778 So. 2d 1105, and Jennings v. Turner, 2001-0631 (La. 1/25/02), 803 So. 2d 963, identifies an important limit but does not resolve this case in her favor. Those decisions reject the proposition that general release or divestiture language, standing alone, necessarily transfers a spouse's rights in a particular pension that the parties did not address. They caution against using boilerplate to enlarge a compromise beyond the parties’ intent. Here, however, the consent judgment does not rest only on a waiver of claims or an abstract statement that the community has been settled. The consent judgment affirmatively allocates sole ownership of property meeting specified possession, title, or employment-related criteria and expressly includes investment accounts among its examples. Applying that operative allocation to property titled in John's name gives effect to the agreement's terms; it does not infer that the parties intended to settle every asset merely because they signed a general release. Nor do we treat Anne's awareness of the Raising Cane's brand, by itself, as proof that she knowingly waived a claim to a particular interest.

Ortiz and the cases applying its omitted-property principle likewise require attention to the particular judgment and record. Anne identifies the specific interests she seeks to partition, unlike a party who fails to identify any allegedly omitted property. Nevertheless, the fact that an asset was not individually named is not conclusive when the agreement affirmatively allocates property through a general category that encompasses it. The Third Circuit, in Riche v. Riche, considered the settlement's language and surrounding circumstances in determining that a later claim to a business interest was barred although the compromise did not separately name the interest. 2009-1354, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 34 So. 3d 1004, 1008-09. On the other hand, in Leblanc v. Elam, the First Circuit explained that a later partition remains available if the original contractual partition did not include the disputed item. 2018-0552, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/2/18), 266 So. 3d 935, 938. We agree with that distinction. The question is not whether a contractual partition can omit property; it can. In the matter herein, the question is whether this agreement's express title-and-possession allocation included these interests.

The Fletchinger case illustrates why the agreement and the record must be considered together. In Fletchinger, this Court upheld res judicata as to an investment account under a consent judgment described as a global settlement. 2010-0474, pp. 5-6, 56 So. 3d at 406. The account appeared on the parties’ descriptive lists; the parties had reviewed investment records and verified account balances; the consent judgment addressed investment accounts, reimbursement, and accounting; and the allocation included an equalizing payment. Id. Notably, this Court did not treat the global settlement language as automatically sweeping in every unmentioned asset. We separately held that res judicata did not bar the claim to oriental rugs because the same consent judgment had expressly directed that rugs be allocated through binding arbitration, and the confirmed arbitration award treated them as items distinct from the business awarded to the husband. Id. at pp. 8-9, 56 So. 3d at 407-08. The rugs were therefore governed by a specific, uncompleted allocation mechanism; they were not simply absorbed into the global settlement. Thus, Fletchinger supports examining the operative terms asset by asset. Here, unlike the rugs in Fletchinger, the consent judgment contains no separate reservation or allocation process for John's interests. Rather, its operative text expressly allocates property by title and possession and identifies investment assets as examples. Although the Raising Cane's interests were not individually listed, as they were not in the account schedules in Fletchinger, the defined title-based category supplies the contractual basis for preclusion in this case.

The record does not require us to decide whether John's interests remained his separate property or acquired a community component during the marriage. John maintains that the interests derive from his premarital investment. Anne disputes that characterization and points to the 2001 reorganization and her lack of knowledge of the particular ownership structure and documents. Her testimony that she knew of John's connection to Raising Cane's does not, standing alone, establish that she understood the interests’ structure or intended to release a community claim. The corporate records and spouse-consent documents are relevant circumstances, but we do not treat them as proof of informed waiver. The point is narrower: whatever the interests’ ultimate classification or value, the consent judgment allocated to John property titled in his name, expressly including investment interests, and reserved no separate process for these holdings.

Because the disputed shares and membership interests fall within the consent judgment's express title-based allocation, the consent judgment resolved the claim Anne now seeks to pursue. Our conclusion rests on that operative allocation, not on the mutual waiver alone, on Anne's general awareness of the enterprise, or on a determination that the interests were John's separate property. Accordingly, we find that Anne's first assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 2: July 31, 2007 Email

As her second assignment of error, Anne asserts that the district court erred by excluding the July 31, 2007 email without first ruling on the pending motion for protective order or identifying a legal basis for exclusion. She maintains that the correspondence is probative of whether the disputed interests were disclosed, concealed, or addressed before the consent judgment and that its exclusion affected the res judicata analysis.

The district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Medine v. Roniger, 2003-3436, p. 6 (La. 7/2/04), 879 So. 2d 706, 711. In reviewing an evidentiary ruling, an appellate court first determines whether the district court erred and, if so, then considers whether the error affected a substantial right; absent such prejudice, reversal is not warranted. Pierre v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 2024-0236, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/24), 400 So. 3d 223, 233; La. C.E. art. 103(A). The record shows that, at the January 27, 2026 hearing, the district court deferred use of the email pending the protective order proceeding and allowed Anne to proffer it. At the February 24, 2026 hearing, the district court granted the exception before turning to the protective order matter. The privilege issue was then paused for in-camera review and was not decided in the record before us. Therefore, we do not treat the email as admitted evidence or decide whether it is privileged.

Even assuming the email should have been considered before the res judicata ruling, its exclusion does not require reversal. John's message to counsel reflects his individual preference that Anne have as little involvement as possible in the Raising Cane's matter. While this message may bear on his subjective intent, it does not show a mutual agreement to reserve the interests from the consent judgment. The email does not alter the consent judgment's text, which allocates all property titled in either party's name, or identify any reservation inconsistent with that allocation. Examining the consent judgment within the context of the record before this Court, the proffer does not demonstrate that its consideration would have changed the res judicata result. Anne has not shown prejudice to a substantial right. See La. C.E. art. 103(A). As a result, we find that her second assignment of error is meritless.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the March 4, 2026 judgment sustaining John's exception of res judicata and dismissing Anne's motion to partition unpartitioned property with prejudice is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4232(B) states, “In an action for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 or 103, in an action for determination of incidental matters under Civil Code Article 105, in an action for contributions to a spouse's education or training under Civil Code Article 121, and in an action for partition of community property and settlement of claims between spouses under R.S. 9:2801, the judgment has the effect of res judicata only as to causes of action actually adjudicated.” (Emphasis provided).

Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott