WHITE CASTLE LUMBER SHINGLE COMPANY AND JEANERETTE LUMBER SHINGLE CO v. SOUTHERN NATURAL GAS CO (2026)

Appellants, White Castle Lumber & Shingle Company, L.L.C. (“White Castle”) and Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Company, L.L.C. (“JLS”) (collectively, “Lumber Companies”), file this appeal contesting the trial court's judgment sustaining the peremptory exception of prescription filed by Appellee, Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C. (“SNG”), and dismissing all of the Appellants’ claims with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

The Lumber Companies own property throughout Iberville and Assumption Parishes. In 1952 each company granted SNG a right-of-way to construct a pipeline. Separate right-of-way agreements (“ROWs”) were entered into by each company with SNG, both containing nearly identical language. The 1952 ROWs specifically granted an easement or servitude of one hundred feet in width

to construct, maintain, operate, repair, replace, change the size of and remove pipe lines and appurtenances thereto, including the right to lay such pipe line or lines in open ditches or canals not to exceed forty feet in width, with the right to construct, maintain, operate, repair, replace and remove in connection with the conduct of said pipe line․

The 1952 ROWs also provided that

[t]he proposed canal will be dug to a minimum of minus six feet below mean low gulf level and will be not to exceed forty feet wide at the top with thirty feet of spoil area on each side of said canal․ In any event, the spoil shall be spread out evenly over the surface. The said spoil and the installation of all lines, works and structures shall be so arranged at [SNG's] expense as not in any way to interfere with or impede drainage of the adjacent lands.

The servitude was granted to SNG “so long as the rights and easements herein granted shall be used by [SNG] for the operation of a pipe line with ingress to and egress from the premises, for the purpose of constructing, inspecting, repairing, maintaining, and replacing the property of [SNG]․” After construction of the pipeline, the Lumber Companies reserved full use and enjoyment of their property, including the “right to use the ditch or canal proposed to be dug by [SNG] jointly with [SNG] for any purpose[.]”

In 1970, the Lumber Companies entered into modified ROWs (“1970 ROWs”), which recognized that pursuant to the 1952 ROWs, SNG had constructed a forty-foot wide canal and installed a pipeline to transport gas. The 1970 ROWs extended the provisions of the 1952 ROWs to a shifted easement area, shifting the centerline five feet with the easement width remaining at one hundred feet to permit the laying of a second thirty-inch pipeline. The 1970 ROWs also provided that the open canal dug by SNG “is hereby increased from 40 feet to 65 feet to enable [SNG] to widen the existing canal an additional 25 feet on the Eastern side thereof’ for the White Castle ROW and “an additional 20 feet on the Eastern side thereof’ for the JLS ROW.

On September 27, 2018, the Lumber Companies filed suit against SNG alleging that the manner in which SNG dredged canals and installed and constructed pipelines damaged their property. They claimed that SNG failed to maintain the canals, which resulted in the widening of the canals, erosion, and land loss that altered the hydrology, sedimentology, and drainage of the property. The Lumber Companies asserted claims of breach of contract, as well as tort, including allegations of negligence, nuisance, trespass, violation of Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act, La. R.S. 51:1401 et seq., and unjust enrichment.

SNG filed an exception of prescription, which was opposed by the Lumber Companies. The trial court held a hearing on March 17, 2025, wherein evidence was introduced by both parties. The trial court signed a judgment granting the exception of prescription and dismissing all claims on May 2, 2025, and issued written reasons the same day. On May 9, 2025, a Notice of Judgment was issued as to the May 2, 2025 Judgment. The Lumber Companies timely filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court on July 31, 2025. The Lumber Companies appealed.

In this appeal, the Lumber Companies contend that the trial court erred in concluding that their claims for breach of ongoing obligations and for continuing torts and trespass had prescribed. They further contend that the trial court erred in ignoring contra non valentem in ruling on SNG's exception.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, a party urging the exception of prescription bears the burden of proving the prescriptive period has elapsed. Scott Green Properties, LLC v. Ramsey, 2024-0695 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/13/25), 406 So.3d 609, 613. Parties may introduce evidence to support or controvert a prescription exception. See La. C.C.P. art. 931. The standard of review of a judgment pertaining to an exception of prescription turns on whether evidence is introduced at the hearing on the exception. Dumas v. Louisiana Board of Ethics, 2022-0994 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/24/23), 361 So.3d 1035, 1039, writ denied, 2023-00435 (La. 5/16/23), 360 So.3d 836. When evidence is introduced at the hearing, a court need not accept the allegations of the petition as true, and the lower court decisions are to be reviewed under a manifest error standard of review. Id. at 1039. If the findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. In re Succession of Landrum, 2007-1144 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/26/08), 985 So.2d 778, 780, writ denied, 2008-0896 (La. 6/20/08), 983 So.2d 1277. However, even when evidence is introduced, when there is no dispute regarding material facts, the reviewing court is to apply a de novo standard of review and give no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Wilson v. Whitfield, 2022-0488 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/24/23), 361 So.3d 512, 515.

For the reasons cited below pertaining to breach of contract, we apply a de novo standard of review.

DISCUSSION

I. Breach of Contract

Contracts have the effect of law for the parties, and the interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. La. C.C. arts. 1983 and 2045; Bonilla v. Verges Rome Architects, 2023-00928 (La. 3/22/24), 382 So.3d 62, 65. “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.” La. C.C. art. 2046. Common intent is determined, therefore, by the general, ordinary, plain, and popular meaning of the words used in the contract. Bonilla, 382 So.3d at 65. “Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.” La. C.C. art. 2050.

When the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, issues pertaining to its proper interpretation involve questions of law, which are reviewed utilizing the de novo standard of review. Gulf States Contractors, L.L.C. v. Davie Shoring, Inc., 2024-1315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/8/25), 418 So.3d 1106, 1112, writ denied, 2025-01136 (La. 11/19/25), 420 So.3d 1185. Further, the determination of whether a contract is clear or ambiguous is a question of law. Mandeville Partnership v. A Luxury Transportation, LLC, 2025-0286 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/29/26), 427 So.3d 1268, 1274 (citing Fontanille v. Robertson, 2019-1135 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/28/20), 2020 WL 2766072, *4 (unpublished)).

A. Prescription for Breach of Contract

Claims for breach of contract are subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. DePhillips v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish, 2019-01496 (La. 7/9/20), 340 So.3d 817, 821 (citing La. C.C. art. 3499). Generally, prescription on a breach of contract claim begins to run on the date the contract is allegedly breached. Roba, Inc. v. Courtney, 2009-0508 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/10/10), 47 So.3d 500, 507.

The Lumber Companies assert that SNG breached the right-of-way agreements by failing to maintain the pipeline canals and banks. They claim SNG failed and continues to fail to restore the property damaged by SNG's constructing, arranging, maintaining, and operating its pipeline canals, pipelines, and spoil in a manner that interferes with and impedes the drainage of the property. The Lumber Companies further allege that the ROWs are in full force and effect, so SNG's obligations are continuing.

SNG alleges that any breach of contract due to the canals’ width or due to SNG failing to arrange the spoil in a manner not to impede drainage occurred either when the canals were dug in 1953 or when they were extended in 1970. SNG presented evidence that it conducted no action on the property following the extension of the canals in 1970. Therefore, it maintains that any breach occurred in 1970 at the latest, which is the last time it took any action on the property, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Consequently, SNG asserts that because suit was filed on September 27, 2018, any alleged breached of contract occurring more than ten years prior has prescribed.

The Lumber Companies contend that SNG has not carried its burden of proof that the breach of contract claims are prescribed for two reasons: (1) a continuing obligation exists pursuant to the ROWs to maintain the canals, which includes the obligation to prevent erosion; and (2) when a predial servitude contract is ambiguous, the Louisiana Civil Code articles applicable to servitudes apply (referred to as “suppletive articles”). We address each claim separately.

B. Whether a Continuing Obligation Exists to Prevent Prescription

The Lumber Companies claim that a breach of a continuing obligation cannot trigger the running of prescription. They cite Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2009-2368 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So.3d 234 in support of their argument. In Marin, the plaintiffs sued Exxon for property damage created by oilfield waste seeping from unlined disposal pits. The plaintiffs brought both tort and contract claims. Id. at 241. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the tort claims had prescribed because the continuing tort theory did not apply since the pits had been closed and there was no continuing action on the part of Exxon even though there was continuing damage. Id. at 254-55. The Court then addressed contractual claims based on mineral and surface leases. At the time of trial, two leases were in effect and one lease was no longer in effect. The Court applied the ten-year prescriptive period and held that the obligations under the lease no longer in effect had prescribed. Id. at 256. Regarding the leases still in effect, Exxon argued that the restoration obligation was premature until the lease was terminated. The Court found that the Mineral Code and the Louisiana Civil Code governed a lessee's obligations under a mineral lease. Id. at 255. Specifically, the Court stated:

While La. C.C. art. 2683 contains obligations that only arise at the end of the lease, i.e., “to return the thing at the end of the lease in a condition ․,” there is absolutely no language to suggest that the other obligations imposed by these codal provisions are not operational until termination of the lease. These provisions continue throughout the term of the lease and a lessor need not wait until the end of the lease to sue a lessee for damage to his property.

Id. at 256. The Court held that a lessor may sue for contaminated property prior to the end of a mineral lease. Id.

The trial court in the present case found Marin distinguishable, and we agree. The plaintiffs in Marin sued for breach of mineral leases, and the Court noted that several Civil Code lease provisions mandate the lessee to perform certain restoration obligations at the end of the lease. Marin, 48 So.3d at 255. The lessee was statutorily required “[t]o return the thing at the end of the lease in a condition that is the same as it was when the thing was delivered to him․” La. C.C. art. 2683(3); Marin, 48 So.3d at 255-56. In the present case, the trial court determined that the obligations in Marin were subject to a suspensive term and unenforceable until a specific future event occurred. Because performance of the obligation to restore the property under La. C.C. art. 2683(3) is not due while the lease is in effect, the duty to restore leased property does not arise until the expiration of the lease. See Kinder Gas, Inc. v. Reynolds, 2011-1012 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2/1/12), 84 So.3d 695, 704 (noting that Marin does not alter the result that claims involving obligations to restore the land on which operations are ongoing are premature).

The Lumber Companies suggest that prescription cannot run for breach of contract during the existence of any contract. This court does not read Marin so broadly, and finds that Marin is distinguishable from the servitude contracts herein. The unprescribed obligations in Marin were to restore property that matured only at the lease termination. Here, there is no comparable unmatured, future-due obligation. Any breach of the ROWs occurred at the construction in 1953 and 1970. The Lumber Companies’ argument that prescription does not run during the existence of a contract would render meaningless the general rule that prescription on a breach of contract claim begins to run on the date the contract is allegedly breached. See Roba, 47 So.3d at 507. This theory would also render meaningless the second category of contra non valentem, which suspends prescription if “there was some condition coupled with the contract․ which prevented the creditor from suing or acting.” See Renfroe v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation & Development, 2001-1646 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 947, 953.

The Lumber Companies also rely on St. Martin v. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc., 224 F.3d 402, 409 n.8 (5th Cir. 2000), to assert that their contract action cannot prescribe as long as SNG's duty continues, which they contend is as long as the ROWs remain in effect. Mobil Exploration involved the appeal by defendant oil companies from a damage award for failing to adequately maintain spoil banks on canals operated by them, resulting in damage to marshland owned by Plaintiffs. The servitude agreement for the nature and use of the canals specifically provided, “Grantee further agrees to pay Grantor for any damages occasioned to Grantor's lands as a result of the construction, use and maintenance of the canal.” Id. at 409-410 (emphasis added). The court affirmed the district court's interpretation that the agreement imposed continuing maintenance and compensation obligations on the canal servitude holders. Id. at 410. Therefore, the court rejected the defendants’ assertion that the claims had prescribed ten years after the first observable damage had occurred. Id. at 409.

The language in the contracts in Mobil Exploration is different than the language in the present ROWs. The Mobil Exploration contracts placed a duty on the Grantee to pay for damages from the “construction, use and maintenance of the canal.” Mobil Exploration, 224 F.3d at 409-410 (emphasis added). As noted by the trial court in the present case, “[b]y contrast, here, no such provision exists in SNG's contracts. The Lumber Companies cannot demand a perpetual right to compensation for canal widening when the contracts do not grant it.”

The language in the present ROWs are more similar to those found in Ryan v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 879 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1989), and St. Martin v. Quintana Petroleum Corp., No. 98-2095, 2001 WL 175226, *1 (E.D. La. 2/21/01) (unpublished), aff'd, 32 F. App'x. 127 (5th Cir. 2002). The plaintiffs in Ryan argued that erosion had damaged their marshland as a result of a canal dug by SNG. The language of the servitude agreement permitted SNG to construct a canal, “[which canal or ditch is not to exceed 40 feet in width,] and which canal or ditch may, at [SNG's] option, be left open․” Ryan, 879 F.2d at 164.¹ The court in Ryan found that the plain language of the servitude agreement was “the law between the parties” and the plain words of the contract gave SNG the option to leave the canals open. Id. at 164. The plaintiffs argued that SNG's failure to dam the canal caused the widening of the canal. However, the court held that the option to leave the canal open gave SNG the right to refrain from damming the canals based on the plain language of the contract. Id.

Relying on Ryan, the court in Quintana granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment stating that “the plain and unambiguous terms of the contract” apply. Id., 2001 WL 175226, at *2. The terms of the servitude agreement permitted the grantee, Koch Gateway Pipeline (Koch), to maintain an “open” ditch or canal not to exceed forty feet in width for the purpose to lay a pipeline. Id. The language of the contract also provided that Koch pay damages resulting from the construction, maintenance, and operation of the pipelines and “a right of way and easement to construct, maintain, operate, repair, replace, change of the size thereof and remove pipe lines and appurtenances thereto․” Id. (emphasis in original). Approximately forty years after the canal was dredged, the canal had grown from a width of forty feet to seventy feet. The plaintiffs asserted that Koch had a continuing duty to maintain the canal at its original width of forty feet. The court found no such duty due to the fact that the contract required Koch to maintain the pipelines, but the damages at issue resulted from the canals which were permitted by contract to remain open. Id. at *3.

The court in Quintana also discussed the related case, Mobil Exploration, 224 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 2000),² noting that the parties could have, but chose not to, protect the dominant landowner rights with regard to widening of the canal. Quintana, 2001 WL 175226, at *3. In Mobil Exploration, the parties actually included language in the servitude agreement requiring the grantee to “pay Grantor for any damages occasioned to Grantors’ lands as a result of the construction, use and maintenance of the canal.” 224 F.3d at 409-410 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit held that the agreement imposed continuing maintenance and compensation on the holder of the canal servitudes. Id. at 410.

Quintana differentiated Mobil Exploration, which contained a specific provision to maintain the canals unlike the agreement in Quintana. The ROWs in the present case are more similar to the agreements in Ryan and Quintana since they provide a contractual obligation to maintain the pipeline, but no obligation to maintain the open canals. The ROWs at issue herein do not provide a continuing obligation to maintain the canals and/or prevent erosion.

C. Whether the Suppletive Civil Code Articles are Applicable

The Lumber Companies contend that the Louisiana Civil Code articles regarding servitudes, La. C.C. art. 697, et seq., are applicable to ROWs that do not explicitly dispose of issues such as whether there is a continuing duty to prevent erosion damage. Therefore, they maintain that even if SNG had no contractual continuing obligation to maintain the canal, it has a continuing duty to refrain from aggravating a servient estate.

The plaintiffs in Ryan also asserted that the suppletive articles applied and that La. C.C. art. 745 establishes a general duty by the servitude owner to avoid unreasonable damage. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and held that “[a]ny duty imposed on the servitude owner by article 745 is subject to the provisions of the written servitude agreement between the parties.” Ryan, 879 F.2d at 164 (citing La. C.C. art. 697).

The Lumber Companies rely on Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 F.3d 3 03 (5th Cir. 2002), which reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Koch Gateway Pipeline Company (Koch) and Columbia Gulf Transmission Company (Columbia Gulf), finding genuine issues of material fact with regard to prescription for both the tort and contractual claims made by the owner of a servient estate. Koch and Columbia Gulf were granted servitudes by Terrebonne Parish School Board. The servitude granted to Koch provided for

a right of way and easement one hundred feet in width to construct, maintain, operate, repair, replace, change the size of and remove pipe lines and appurtenances thereto, including the right at its election to lay such pipe line or lines in open ditches or canals not to exceed forty feet in width, which may be filled in or left open at the option of Grantee․

Id. at 308. The servitude to Columbia Gulf, which contained no specific canal width, provided for “a servitude, right of way and easement to construct, lay, maintain, operate, alter, repair, remove, change the size of, and replace a pipe line and appurtenances thereto, including but not limited to fittings, tie-overs, valves, corrosion control equipment and other apparatus․” Id.

Koch and Columbia Gulf argued that the plaintiff's claims had prescribed. The Fifth Circuit held that the servitude agreements did not determine whether Koch and Columbia Gulf had a “continuing duty to prevent marsh-erosion.” Id. at 315. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit applied the Louisiana Civil Code's suppletive articles for immovable property because the issues pertaining to such continuing duty were not “explicitly disposed of” by the agreements. Id. Louisiana Civil Code article 697 permits the creation of predial servitudes. It provides that “[t]he use and extent of such servitudes are regulated by the title by which they are created, and, in the absence of such regulation, by the following rules.” La. C.C. art. 697. The Fifth Circuit noted that “when the parties creating a conventional servitude do not specify the use and extent of that servitude, Louisiana's suppletive rules of property law apply.” Columbia Gulf, 290 F.3d at 315 (citing La. C.C. art. 697). One of those rules “is that ambiguity in a servitude agreement must be construed in favor of the servient estate.” Id. at 315-16 (citing La. C.C. art. 730). Another rule is that “the dominant estate owner ․ must not ‘aggravate’ the condition of the servient estate.” Id. at 316 (citing La. C.C. arts. 743, 745). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit noted that “the duty not to aggravate the servient estate is a continuing duty.” Id.

The Fifth Circuit in Columbia Gulf held that the servitude agreements at issue did not expressly impose on Koch and Columbia Gulf the duty to prevent erosion and widening of the canals. Id. at 325. However, the Court reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants holding “[w]hether, in the absence of an express contractual duty, the suppletive law of Louisiana might here impose such a duty remains to be resolved․” and found that genuine issues of material fact existed. Id. at 325-26.

The recent case of Bradish Johnson Co., Ltd. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC, No. 23-7363, 2026 WL 1893012 (E.D. La. 7/01/26), discussed the above-cited cases in connection with a motion for class certification. We agree with and find persuasive the reasoning of the Eastern District Court with regard to those cases. The plaintiff in Bradish Johnson argued that because the ROWs at issue were silent on the issue of the defendants’ obligations to perform canal maintenance, the Louisiana suppletive articles applied requiring an obligation not to injure or aggravate the servient estate, thereby requiring defendants to maintain the canals and prevent erosion. At issue were numerous different ROWs. The court recognized that many of the ROWs had allowed the canals to be “filled in or left open at the option of the Grantee.” Id. at *6. Relying on Ryan and Quintana, the court determined that the Fifth Circuit “has interpreted this language as precluding the pipeline company from having any duty to maintain the canals to prevent erosion.” Id. The court also determined that the Fifth Circuit in Columbia Gulf had ignored the “left open” language in the servitude agreement and had distinguished Ryan based on a “letter agreement” discussed by the district court in that case but not discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Ryan. Bradish Johnson, 2026 WL 1893012 at *6-7.

The Eastern District Court in Bradish Johnson specifically explained:

Plaintiff's reliance on Columbia Gulf is misplaced. Columbia Gulf's application to this case would not answer the duty question. Columbia Gulf did not hold that Louisiana suppletive law applied to the servitudes and imposed a duty on the pipeline companies to maintain the canals. Rather, the panel merely found that it was erroneous for the district court to grant summary judgment on the grounds that there was no duty. [Columbia Gulf, 290 F.3d] at 317. The Court analyzed the evidence just enough to find that the servitude language did not expressly dispose of the duty to maintain the canals. [Columbia Gulf, 290 F.3d] at 315. As the Court explained, “we view these provisions as being in internal conflict, to whatever extent they bear on the question” of whether the pipeline companies have a duty to maintain the canals. [Columbia Gulf, 290 F.3d] at 314. (emphasis added). The Court suggested that the answer to the duty question relies on the parties’ intent, which is a factually specific inquiry that goes beyond the servitude language. Accordingly, applying Columbia Gulf would not permit this Court to hold that Louisiana suppletive law imposes a uniform duty on Defendants to maintain the canals for every individual contract.

Bradish Johnson, 2026 WL 1893012 at *6 (internal footnote omitted; emphasis in original). Furthermore, the Eastern District Court recognized that Columbia Gulf's holding that the express “left open” language in the servitude agreement did not dispose of the of the duty to maintain the canal conflicted with and sought to overrule Ryan. However, the Eastern District Court noted that “[w]hen two panels conflict, ‘the earlier one controls’ and the later rendered opinion ‘may not overrule’ the other.” Bradish Johnson, at 2026 WL 1893012, *7. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit's later decision in Quintana found Ryan controlling. Therefore, the Eastern District Court in Bradish Johnson held that Columbia Gulf was not binding. Id. We also find that Columbia Gulf is not controlling here, as it did not hold that Louisiana's suppletive articles applied to the servitudes or that those articles imposed a duty to maintain the canals.

The Lumber Companies further rely on Lewis v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 532 So.2d 754 (La. 1988), which reversed a summary judgment previously affirmed by the appellate court and referred the exception of prescription to the merits. In the appellate court opinion, Lewis v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 528 So.2d 1084, 1085 (La. App. 3rd 1988), the plaintiff landowners claimed that the defendant had breached the servitude agreements because the canals eroded past the width of sixty-five feet permitted by the contract. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on prescription and provided evidence that any breach occurred by 1953, more than ten years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiffs contended that the duty did not begin to run in 1953 since the duty was continuing. The appellate court found that any breach of contract, if there was a breach, occurred by 1953. Id. at 1088. The appellate court also found that the doctrines of contra non valentem and continuing tort did not apply to the facts to prevent the running of prescription. Id. at 1089-90. With no explanation, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and referred the exception of prescription to the merits. Lewis, 532 So.2d 754.

The Lumber Companies direct this court to Columbia Gulf's interpretation of Lewis, 532 So.2d 754, discussing whether the suppletive articles apply, particularly the duty not to aggravate the servient estate provided in La. C.C. art. 745. The Fifth Circuit in Columbia Gulf stated:

Furthermore, the duty not to aggravate the servient estate is a continuing duty. This is the lesson of Lewis v. Sohio Petroleum Co., in which the Louisiana Supreme Court evidently found merit in a claim similar to the one advanced by the Board, tersely reversing a summary judgment that the plaintiff's causes of action had prescribed. Lewis involved a canal servitude agreement that provided that the canal “shall not be more than sixty-five feet wide.” In 1957, the canal exceeded its permissible width by thirty feet. When the landowner sued, in 1985, the intermediate appellate court affirmed summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's claims had prescribed. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari, reversed the summary judgment, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to refer the exception of prescription to the merits. From this result, we conclude that the life of the duty of a servitude owner not to aggravate the condition of the servient estate by allowing a canal to widen is coextensive with the life of the servitude. When such a duty exists, it is continuous.

290 F.3d at 316-17 (internal footnotes omitted). However, neither the appellate court nor the Louisiana Supreme Court in Lewis discussed whether the suppletive articles applied to the facts of the case. The appellate decision was based on whether a breach of contract occurred, when that breach occurred, contra non valentem, and the continuing tort theory. Lewis, 528 So.2d 1084. Additionally, Columbia Gulf ultimately held, “[w]hether, in the absence of an express contractual duty, the suppletive law of Louisiana might here impose such a duty remains to be resolved, as does the question whether such a duty might in turn render the failure to maintain canal banks a continuing tort.” 290 F. 3d. at 325-26.

Therefore, we do not read Columbia Gulf, as is urged by the Lumber Companies, to hold that because the ROWs in this matter did not provide expressly for a continuing maintenance duty the suppletive articles apply to provide a continuing duty that exists for the life of a servitude not to aggravate the servient estate.³ We further recognize that the ROWs at issue in this matter did address damages to be paid by SNG by including the specific language that “[SNG] hereby agrees to pay any damages which may arise to growing crops, wildlife, timber or fences as the result of its operation hereunder․” As reasoned by Conmaco/Rector L.P. v. L & A Contracting Co., No. 12-2337, 2014 WL 1796651, *12 (E.D. La. 5/6/14) (unpublished), the “imposition of certain obligations under [the contract] implies the exclusion of all other obligations.”

Applying Ryan and Quintana to the present case, this court finds that the suppletive articles are not applicable. Because the ROWs contain the “open language” and there is no express obligation for SNG to maintain the canals, the contracts are unambiguous. There is no continuing obligation found in the ROWs. Any duty owed as a result of La. C.C. art. 745 is subject to the provisions of the instrument creating the servitude. See Ryan, 879 F.2d at 164 (citing La. C.C. art. 697). There is no need to resort to the suppletive articles as contended by the Lumber Companies. Therefore, the claims for breach of contract were prescribed prior to the filing of the lawsuit.

II. Continuing Tort

The Lumber Companies also asserted various tort claims. Delictual actions that arise prior to July 1, 2024 are governed by a one-year prescriptive period and delictual actions to immovable property commence to run “from the day the owner of the immovable acquired, or should have acquired knowledge of the damage.” La. C.C. arts. 3492 and 3493 (Repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, § 2, eff. July 1, 2024). Delictual actions that arise on or after July 1, 2024 are governed by a two-year prescriptive period, La. C.C. art. 3493.1, including delictual actions to immovable property. La. C.C. art. 3493.2. Alternatively, the Lumber Companies argue that their claims for damages have not prescribed based on the continuing tort theory. The trial court held that the continuing tort theory did not apply and the tort claims in this matter are prescribed. We agree.

“A continuing tort is occasioned by continual unlawful acts and for there to be a continuing tort there must be a continuing duty owed to the plaintiff and a continuing breach of that duty by the defendant.” Crump v. Sabine River Auth., 98-2326 (La. 6/29/99), 737 So. 2d 720, 728. “Louisiana jurisprudence draws a distinction between damages caused by continuous, and those caused by discontinuous, operating causes[.]” Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009-2632 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So. 3d 991, 1002-03. Crump, a property damage case, clarified that “[a] continuing tort is occasioned by [continual] unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of an original, wrongful act.” Id. at 728. “The continuous conduct contemplated in a continuing tort must be tortious and must be the operating cause of the injury.” Id. at 729 n.7. For the continuing tort theory to apply, the tortfeasor's conduct must perpetuate the injury through overt, persistent, and ongoing acts. Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1003.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Marin, 48 So.3d 234, also rejected the continuing tort theory. The Court found that the operating cause of the injury sued upon was the defendant's depositing and storage of oilfield waste into unlined pits. Id. at 255. The conduct terminated when the pits were closed. Even though the contaminants continued to dissolve into the groundwater, there was no action by the defendant that resulted in a continuing tort. Id. at 254. The Court stated that in Hogg it similarly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the failure to contain or properly remediate the leakage constituted a continuing wrong as the failure to remediate was not the operating cause of their damage, the leakage was. Marin, 48 So.3d at 253-254 (citing Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1007). The Court in Marin reiterated its previous holding that “the breach of a duty to right an initial wrong simply cannot be a continuing wrong that suspends the running of prescription, as that is the purpose of every lawsuit and the obligation of every tortfeasor.” Marin, 48 So.3d at 253-254 (citing Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1007; Crump, 73 7 So.2d at 729). Therefore, any dissolution of the oilfield waste onto plaintiff's property was the resulting damage and not the result of a continuing tort. Marin, 48 So.3d at 255.

SNG presented evidence that it conducted no action on the property following the extension of the canals in 1970, and the Lumber Companies agreed they had no contrary evidence. Because the operating cause of the alleged damage was the excavation, any tortious conduct ceased at its completion at the latest in 1970. The continual damage of erosion resulting from the digging of the canals does not satisfy the requirement for continual unlawful acts. Therefore, the continuing tort theory does not apply to these facts and the tort claims are prescribed.

III. Contra Non Valentem

The Lumber Companies argue on appeal that they asserted the doctrine of contra non valentem, but the trial court “wholly omits any mention of the contra non valentem issue.” (Appellant Brief at pp. 24-25). We first note that appeals are taken from the judgment, not the written reasons for judgment. Bellard v. American Central Ins. Co., 2007-1335 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So.2d 654, 671. Secondly, we disagree that the trial court did not consider the doctrine of contra non valentem. Without specifically using those words, the trial court declined to apply the doctrine of contra non valentem based upon the evidence presented that the Lumber Companies visited the property frequently and knew of the alleged damages to their property in the 1970s when timber consultants prepared a report on their behalf. Additionally, as the parties asserting the benefit of contra non valentem, the Lumber Companies bore the burden of proof of its requisite elements and applicability. See Peak Performance Physical Therapy & Fitness, LLC v. Hibernia Corp., 2007-2206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/6/08), 992 So.2d 527, 531, writ denied, 2008-1478 (La. 10/3/08), 992 So.2d 1018.

Contra non valentem suspends the running of prescription in four situations. Marin, 48 So.3d at 245. The fourth category of contra non valentem is known as the “discovery rule” and suspends prescription until the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known of the damages. Id. However, the discovery rule should only be applied in extreme circumstances, Id., and has been applied in actions governed by both the ten-year and one-year prescriptive periods. See Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Development Co., Inc., 502 So.2d 1034, 1060-61 (La. 1987).

The Lumber Companies maintain that they did not know nor have occasion to know that the canals had eroded and the hydrology changed due to SNG's failures to maintain the spoil banks and canal widths until 2017 when experts were hired to examine the property. However, SNG presented evidence that the Lumber Companies had constructive knowledge of erosion problems on its property well before either the one-year or ten-year prescriptive periods ran. The Lumber Companies inspected the property after SNG constructed the canal in 1953, requested additional work, and four years later requested replacement gates for those removed. The routine practice of the Lumber Companies was to inspect the property by boat for decades. Furthermore, the Lumber Companies’ employees used the SNG canals to inspect the property. Based on aerial photography, the canal widths had expanded beyond the contractual limits by both 1957 and 1970. The Lumber Companies knew by 1960 that the original canal had expanded beyond the contractual forty-foot limit to fifty-three feet. After the second pipeline was built in 1970, the Lumber Companies inspected the banks of the canals and made no complaints regarding the spoils of the canals. The Lumber Companies allowed other companies to dredge canals on their land; were aware the canals could widen due to erosion; and included language in other contracts requiring the grantees to maintain the canals. Additionally, the Lumber Companies were aware of drainage problems on their property since the 1970s.

The Lumber Companies acknowledge that their employees may have inspected certain areas of the property, but a corporate representative for JLS testified that JLS employees could not make judgments regarding hydrology, drainage, spoil banks, canals, or breaches of the ROWs.

The discovery rule “will not exempt the plaintiff's claim from the running of prescription if his ignorance is attributable to his own willfulness or neglect; that is, a plaintiff will be deemed to know what he could have learned by reasonable diligence.” Alliance Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Esquivel, 2020-0807 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/24/21), 322 So.3d 253, 257 (citing Renfroe, 809 So.2d at 953). “When a party has enough information to incite curiosity, or to put a reasonably minded person on guard and call for inquiry, he has the constructive knowledge necessary to start the running of prescription.” Alliance Hospitality, 322 So.3d at 257 (citing Hunt Guillot and Assoc., LLC v. Clark, 53,434 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 4/22/20), 293 So.3d 1278, 1284-85; Williams v. The Library, 2012-0220 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/2/12), 111 So.3d 356, 359).

A plaintiff need not have actual knowledge of the conditions which might entitle him to bring suit, but only “constructive notice.” Terrel v. Perkins, 96-2629 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/7/97), 704 So.2d 35, 39. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the time when there is notice enough to call for inquiry about a claim, not from the time when the inquiry reveals facts or evidence sufficient to prove the claim. Id.

The trial court relied on Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Southdown, Inc., 2003-0402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/14/04), 887 So.2d 8, 13-14, which held that the plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of contra non valentem since the evidence made clear that plaintiff was advised many times as to the damage to its property. The evidence revealed that plaintiff had known for decades prior to filing suit that canals dredged on its property had caused erosion and drainage issues in the marshland. Id. at 13.

At the very least, the Lumber Companies had constructive knowledge of drainage issues and canal erosion that should have incited inquiry. Furthermore, as the party bearing the burden of proof on contra non valentem, the Lumber Companies presented no evidence that it could not reasonably have known of the erosion until 2017. Similar to the Southdown case, the evidence before us shows that the Lumber Companies had sufficient information and notice for decades prior to filing suit in 2018 to call for an inquiry regarding a claim for the damages they now seek. Therefore, they have not carried their burden of proof that the doctrine of contra non valentem applies.

IV. Recent Cases

The Lumber Companies argue there is “a plethora of recent Louisiana court decisions holding that pipeline defendants with canals through Louisiana wetland property have continuing contract duties to maintain the canals that they dredge through that property and to not aggravate the servient estates, and that their failure to do so constitutes ongoing breaches of continuing obligations that do not prescribe while the ROWs are in operation; and also constitute continuing trespasses under Louisiana tort law.” None of the cases cited contain such a broad holding.

In Adema v. Southern Natural Gas Co., L.L.C., 2023-0785 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1/31/24), 384 So.3d 904, 908, writ denied, 2024-00265 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 577, numerous ROWs were executed prior to 1970, which did not require the defendants to pay for property loss or damages associated with the construction of a canal. However, the 1970 ROW mandated the defendants to pay for property loss or damages “arising wholly or in part from or in connection with the existence, construction, maintenance, repair, operation, use, removal, alteration, reconstruction or removal of the aforesaid pipeline or canal ․” Id. at 908. The 1970 ROW also contained language regarding the prevention of “undue erosion.” Id. The court found genuine issues of material fact and reversed the summary judgment. Id. at 907.

The language in the ROWs in Adema is distinguishable from the language of the ROWs in the present case. In the case before us, the ROWs contain no provisions requiring the payment of property loss in connection with the canals and no provisions pertaining to the prevention of “undue erosion.”

The Lumber Companies also refer to the Louisiana Supreme Court writ denials in Adema v. Southern Natural Gas Co., L.L.C., 2025-00168 (La. 4/15/25), 406 So.3d 422, and 2025-00186 (La. 4/15/25), 406 So.3d 423. A writ denial by the Louisiana Supreme Court has no precedential value. See State v. Brown, 2016-0998 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 745, 833, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 886, 215 L.Ed.2d 404 (2023); see Bankers Insurance Company v. Donelon, 2023-0871 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/22/24), 388 So.3d 411, 416 n.3 (noting that “a writ denial by an appellate court or the supreme court is not precedential for any purpose”).

The Lumber Companies further direct this court to district court rulings in Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co., L.L.C. v. Texas Gas Transmission, LLC, 16th Judicial District Court, Section “F”, Docket No. 87262, including excerpts from a motion for summary judgment hearing, and Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co., L.L.C. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., L.L.C., 16th Judicial District Court, Section “H”, Docket No 87261, on motions for summary judgment and an exception of prescription. This court is not bound by district court rulings in unrelated cases, nor are we bound by decisions of another circuit. See Strachan v. Eichin, 2015-1431 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/15/16), 195 So.3d 61, 66.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's May 2, 2025 judgment maintaining the peremptory exception as to prescription filed on behalf of Southern Natural Gas Company, LLC. All costs of this appeal are assessed against plaintiffs, White Castle Lumber & Shingle Company, L.L.C, and Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co., L.L.C.

AFFIRMED.

SNG's rights and obligations regarding maintenance of the right-of-way remain operational and enforceable during the life of the agreement. The contract clearly contemplates continued maintenance operations and provides remedies associated with defects and failures in the undertaking. These obligations are distinguishable from the duty to restore, which is rooted in the Louisiana Civil Code and is associated with the expiration of mineral leases. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2009-2368 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So. 3d 234, 259-60. Still, a limitation on the personal servitude of right of use, in this case the pipeline, is provided in La. C.C. art. 642, which states, “A right of use includes the rights contemplated or necessary to enjoyment at the time of its creation as well as rights that may later become necessary, provided that a greater burden is not imposed on the property unless otherwise stipulated in the title.” Further, a right of use is regulated by application of the rules governing usufruct and predial servitudes to the extent that their application is compatible with the rules governing a right of use servitude. La. C.C. art. 645.

Here, the Lumber Companies allege a greater burden in that SNG's continuing failure to maintain the canals and banks has caused an expanding encroachment upon, and damage to, the servient estate beyond the boundaries of the right-of-way. The Lumber Companies’ allegation that SNG is failing to properly maintain the right-of-way is not pinned to the original construction of the canal and the associated distribution of the spoil. The Lumber Companies assert that through time the canal has widened in such a way, perhaps through subsistence and erosion, that the hydrology, sedimentology, and drainage of the property has been altered and the footprint has expanded from that which existed upon the creation of the canal and establishment of the right-of-way. In deciding if and when SNG failed to maintain the right-of-way, I believe the majority takes an unnecessarily static view of SNG's obligation. By narrowing its focus to the outset of the project, the majority effectively frees SNG from its ongoing duty to maintain the servitude.

This litigation comes before us in the context of an exception of prescription. While this procedural posture allows for the presentation of evidence and the resolution of certain factual disputes, the matter has not been put through the ringer of a frill trial on the merits. See La. C.C.P. art. 931. Therefore, the assertion that SNG has failed to properly maintain the right-of-way has not been fully vetted. Additionally, doubt as to the existence, extent, or manner of exercise of a predial servitude shall be resolved in favor of the servient estate. La. C.C. art. 730. The trial court's ruling does not determine whether alterations to the hydrology and enlargement of the canal have been demonstrated such as to create a greater burden on the servient estates. Finally, the “when” and “where” of SNG's alleged maintenance failures are not established in the record before us. As such, I would remand the case to the trial court with instructions to refer the exception of prescription to the merits. See La. C.C.P. art. 929; see also Lewis v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 532 So. 2d 754 (La. 1988).

FOOTNOTES

1.   The specific language omitted by the Fifth Circuit is found at Ryan v. Southern Natural Gas Co., No. 86-794, 1987 WL 19044, *2 (E.D. La. 10/27/87) (unpublished), amended, No. 86-794, 1987 WL 25610 (E.D. La. 12/3/87) (unpublished).

2.   The court in Quintana actually cited to the district court opinion, No. 95-4128, 1998 WL 474211 (E.D. La. 8/12/98) (unpublished), which was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.

3.   The Lumber Companies also cite to Morgan City Land & Fur Co., L.L.C. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., LLC, 2020-0676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 4/21/21), 319 So.3d 437, aff'd in part, vacated in part, 2021-00704 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So.3d 1051 (per curiam), and Vintage Assets, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 2018-30688, 2018 WL 6264375 (5th Cir. 2018) (unpublished), (remanding District Court case, No. 16-713, 2017 WL 3601215, *1 (E.D. La. 8/22/17) (unpublished), to the 25th Judicial District Court, Parish of Plaquemines, Louisiana). The Lumber Companies cite to the language of the United States District Court in Vintage Assets, which is not valid law given that the United States Fifth Circuit remanded the case due to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Morgan City Land & Fur vacated the appellate court's discussion as to the existence of an implied duty and finding that the suppletive articles imposed a duty not to aggravate a servient estate given the factual issues which precluded the granting of summary judgment. 325 So.3d 1051. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not hold that the suppletive articles applied to impose a duty not to aggravate a servient estate. Therefore, neither case supports the proposition that the suppletive articles apply to provide a continuing duty to a servient estate in the situation presented in this case.

WOLFE, J.