STATE OF LOUISIANA v. PERCY CAGE III (2026)

The defendant, Percy Cage, was charged by grand jury indictment with manslaughter, a violation of La. R.S. 14:31, and pled not guilty. Following a three-day jury trial, a twelve-person jury unanimously convicted the defendant as charged. He was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He now appeals, challenging the exclusion of black prospective jurors during voir dire, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the excessiveness of the sentence imposed. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

On New Year's Eve 2021, the defendant attacked the victim, Rodney Knighten, after they left the home of Paula White located at the intersection of Zion Street and North Acadian Thruway in Baton Rouge. Knighten died on April 2, 2022, approximately four months later, as a result of the injuries he suffered in the incident.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In assignment of error number three, the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for manslaughter because the State failed to prove he did not act in self-defense. He argues the surveillance video played at trial proved he was not the “initial aggressor.” He further argues that consideration of his failure to retreat is prohibited by Louisiana's stand-your-ground law, La. R.S. 14:19(C) and (D) and La. RS. 14:20(C) and (D).¹

The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, as enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and adopted by the Louisiana Legislature in enacting La. Code Crim. P. art. 821, requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Jackson standard of review is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the trier of fact must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Clark, 2023-0756 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/19/24), 2024 WL 1295663, at *1 (unpublished).

Manslaughter includes “[a] homicide committed, without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm ․ [w]hen the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in [La. R.S. 14:30 or 31], or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person[.]” La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(a). The State's position is that the defendant unintentionally killed the victim while in the commission of a second-degree battery. In pertinent part, battery “is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another[.]” La. R.S. 14:33. “Second-degree battery is a battery when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury[.]” La. R.S. 14:34.1(A). Serious bodily injury is a “bodily injury which involves unconsciousness; extreme physical pain; protracted and obvious disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or a substantial risk of death.” La. R.S. 14:2(C).

Second-degree battery requires specific criminal intent. Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Such state of mind can be formed in an instant. Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant. The existence of specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Dickerson, 2016-1336 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 633, 638, writ denied, 2017-1147 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 1062.

A defendant in a homicide prosecution who asserts that he acted in self-defense does not have the burden of proof on that issue because the State bears the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not perpetrated in self-defense. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 390(A)² ; State v. Little, 24-82 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/24), 398 So.3d 846, 856 (where the crime was committed prior to the enactment of La. Code Crim. P. art. 390(A), the trial court held the State had the burden of proving the homicide was not committed in self-defense). Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:20(A)(l) provides: “A homicide is justifiable ․ [w]hen committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.” However, an aggressor or one who brings on conflict, as a general rule, cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and indicates his intention of abandoning the difficulty. See La. R.S. 14:21. The relevant inquiry on appeal is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense. Clark, 2024 WL 1295663, at *2.

The incident in this matter was captured on video surveillance without audio. The video shows that Knighten and the defendant exited the same house less than ten seconds apart. The defendant's car was parked on the road in front of the house. Knighten turned to his right and walked away on the sidewalk holding a white bag and wearing a white hat. Less than ten seconds later, Knighten turned around after the lights on the defendant's vehicle turned on and the defendant opened the driver's side door, but did not enter the vehicle. Knighten approached the defendant, walking in the middle of the road. The defendant walked away from his vehicle and met Knighten in the middle of the road. The defendant struck Knighten with his right hand, knocking Knighten's hat off and causing him to stumble backwards until he landed on his back in the road near the defendant's vehicle. Thereafter, the defendant punched, kicked, and stamped on Knighten's upper body for approximately fifteen to twenty seconds. The defendant ultimately went to his vehicle but returned to move Knighten's body out of the road before driving away. Knighten never raised a hand to the defendant during the incident.

The trial court accepted Dr. Yen Van Vo, East Baton Rouge Parish Deputy Coroner and a forensic pathologist, as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Vo performed the autopsy on Knighten. Knighten died on April 2, 2022 from sequelae of blunt force injuries of the head. Dr. Vo defined “sequelae” as “sequence of events,” i.e., the cause of Knighten's death was the sequence resulting from blunt force injuries he sustained. Dr. Vo concluded that Knighten's manner of death was homicide. Knighten suffered from atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease and had a twenty-five percent blockage of his left anterior descending coronary artery. According to Dr. Vo, this degree of blockage was “pretty minor” for someone of Knighten's age and any blockage less than seventy-five percent was not considered life threatening.³ Dr. Vo had no reason to believe Knighten's atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease caused his death.

Knighten was continuously under medical care from December 31, 2021 until the time of his death on April 2, 2022. Dr. Vo stated the Glasgow coma scale measured alertness and orientation. The scale went from one to fifteen, with three assigned to unresponsive deep coma/death and fifteen indicating alertness and orientation to place and time. When Knighten was admitted to the hospital, he was unconscious and was a three on the Glasgow coma scale. He also had an abrasion on his scalp, a laceration on his face, swollen ears, fractured bones in his face and skull, a subarachnoid hemorrhage (brain bleed), and diffuse axonal injury (brain damage). He was unable to either breathe or eat on his own.

After spending a month in the hospital, Knighten was moved to long-term care. His neurological function was very poor, but his family decided to place him in long-term rather than end-of-life care. As a result of his breathing and swallowing problems, acid in Knighten's stomach irritated and inflamed his lungs, resulting in aspirational pneumonia. Knighten subsequently died from respiratory distress. According to Dr. Vo, Knighten developed aspirational pneumonia because he could neither breathe nor swallow on his own. Dr. Vo stated Knighten's inability to breathe and swallow without assistance was a result of his brain injury, which itself resulted from the blunt force trauma Knighten suffered to his head in the incident.

Dr. Vo testified a single fall could not have contributed to the blunt force trauma to Knighten's head because he suffered impact on different areas of his head. Dr. Vo also rejected the suggestion that lack of supervision at the long-term care facility caused Knighten's aspirational pneumonia, noting the risk for the condition was independent of the care Knighten received; specifically, Knighten was inherently at risk for aspirational pneumonia because he needed feeding and breathing tubes and had poor control of his esophagus and stomach.

Baton Rouge Police Detective Travis Norman testified that in his eleven years as a police officer, he had investigated between thirty and fifty fights. He looked at the actions of each participant in the fight to determine who was the aggressor. He stated if one person continued attacking the other person after the other person was no longer a threat, then, at that point, the attacking person was the aggressor.

Detective Norman determined that the defendant was the aggressor in the incident. Nothing in Detective Norman's investigation of the instant case caused him to believe that Knighten was the aggressor. According to Detective Norman, at most, the defendant attacked Knighten following a verbal dispute. Detective Norman testified that his examination of the surveillance video convinced him the defendant repeatedly kicked Knighten in the head after he was on the ground.

On January 19, 2022, Detective Norman interviewed the defendant following his advice of and the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights.⁴ Detective Norman testified that the defendant stated he had an on-again, off-again, relationship with Paula White. According to the defendant, Knighten was at White's house when he visited her shortly before the incident. The defendant stated he decided to leave when Knighten left. The defendant claimed Knighten approached him outside of White's house, they had a verbal exchange about whether White was Knighten's girlfriend or the defendant's girlfriend, Knighten “douched” (dowsed) him with beer, and Knighten hit him with a beer bottle. The defendant stated he punched Knighten “once, maybe twice” because he “feared for himself.” Lastly, the defendant stated he kept punching and kicking Knighten to make sure he was out of his way.

Detective Norman told the defendant the video surveillance did not show Knighten either pouring beer on the defendant or hitting him with a beer bottle. The defendant answered that Knighten had a beer bottle in the white bag and he was glad Detective Norman could see what had happened.

In a body-camera recording of the interview, the defendant claimed Knighten had “charged” him and had given him a cut above his eye with a blow from the beer bottle. The surveillance video, however, showed Knighten slowly approaching the defendant. Further, Detective Norman saw no cuts or scabs on the defendant's face during the interview.

At trial, the defendant testified he had two convictions for simple battery, two convictions for felony theft, a conviction for possession of a firearm with a controlled dangerous substance, and a conviction for aggravated flight. He provided a new account of Knighten's alleged comments as he approached, claiming Knighten approached him aggressively, called him racial slurs, and threatened to “come get on [his] ass” and “kill [his] ․ ass.” The defendant testified he knew Knighten carried a revolver and a knife.⁵ However, in his earlier recorded interview, the defendant stated he did not know Knighten's name and “just knew him from around.” The defendant stated, after he felt liquid on his face, he struck Knighten. The defendant admitted he struck Knighten while he was on the ground, explaining “I just hurried up and tried to get a couple licks. So he wouldn't move, so I could get back to my car.” He also claimed he hit Knighten while he was down, because he thought Knighten had a weapon and would pull it out and “pop” the defendant while he was going to his car. Further, he testified that he was intoxicated when Detective Norman interviewed him and conceded he may have “exaggerated barely” in stating Knighten struck him with a bottle.

After reviewing the trial transcript, we conclude the defendant's reliance on the “stand-your-ground law” is misplaced. In Louisiana, a person using force in response to entry or attempted entry into their dwelling or vehicle need not believe they are in danger of losing their life; rather, they need only reasonably believe the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent an intruder's unlawful entry or to compel an intruder to leave a protected place. See La. R.S. 14:20(A)(4)(a); State v. Coutee, 2023-01549 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 408, 411 (per curiam).

In a “stand your ground” scenario, La. R.S. 14:20(B) creates a legal presumption that:

a person lawfully inside [the] dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle held a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent unlawful entry thereto, or to compel an unlawful intruder to leave the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle when the conflict began, if both of the following occur:

(1) The person against whom deadly force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.

(2) The person who used deadly force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred.

La. R.S. 14:20 further provides:

C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force as provided for in this Section, and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.

D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a violent or forcible felony involving life or great bodily harm or to prevent the unlawful entry.

The defendant was neither “lawfully inside a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle” nor was Knighten attempting to make an unlawful entry into a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle at the time of the incident. Thus, neither the presumption of La. R.S. 14:20(B) nor the protections of La. R.S. 14:20(C) and (D) apply to the defendant's or Knighten's conduct.

Any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's fatal second-degree battery of Knighten was not committed in self-defense. In finding the defendant guilty, the jury rejected his claim of self-defense and concluded that the use of deadly force under the particular facts of this case was neither reasonable nor necessary. The defendant argued his attack on Knighten was necessary to protect himself. To the contrary, the State argued any threat posed by Knighten was over, and the defendant became the aggressor, after he delivered the first blow rendering Knighten helpless. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant's own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. See Clark, 2024 WL 1295663, at *4. No such alternate hypothesis exists in the instant case.

The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of guilt. We are constitutionally precluded from acting as a “thirteenth juror” in assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal cases. See Clark, 2024 WL 1295663, at *4. It is the function of the jury to determine which witnesses are credible. State v. Sorina, 2022-0545 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 354 So.3d 704, 709.

Video surveillance and the defendant's own testimony established that he continued to strike, kick, and stamp on Knighten after he was on the ground. “A person who is the aggressor ․ cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.” La. R.S. 14:21; Clark, 2024 WL 1295663, at *2. The defendant's claims that Knighten charged at him and hit him with a bottle or threw beer on him during the incident were inconsistent with the video surveillance, which also showed that the defendant left Knighten to die on the side of the road and drove away. Flight and attempt to avoid apprehension indicate consciousness of guilt, and therefore, are circumstances from which a juror may infer guilt. Lying or purposeful misrepresentations reasonably raise the inference of a “guilty mind” and has been recognized as indicative of an awareness of wrongdoing. State v. Alonso-Llerena, 2024-1063 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/13/26), 43 8 So.3d 786, 800. The verdict returned in this matter indicates the jury found that the State carried its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's killing of Knighten was not committed in self-defense. In reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662; Clark, 2024 WL 1295663, at *4 (evidence supported jury's rejection of justifiable homicide where the defendant “sucker punched” the victim with a sock containing a padlock and repeatedly “stomped his head”); State v. Pittman, 1993-0892 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/94), 636 So.2d 299, 303 (evidence supported jury's rejection of justifiable homicide where the defendant continued beating the victim, who appeared unconscious, indicating that “the defendant was clearly in control of the situation, the victim was completely defenseless, and a continued beating was unnecessary”); State v. Jones, 598 So.2d 511, 514 n.1 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992) (evidence supported jury's rejection of justifiable homicide where the defendant kicked or stomped an unconscious victim and had to be physically restrained by a friend).

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). By accepting a hypothesis of innocence that was reasonably rejected by the fact finder, a court of appeal impinges on a fact finder's discretion beyond the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. See State v. Mire, 2014-2295 (La. 1/27/16), 269 So.3d 698, 703 (per curiam).

This assignment of error is without merit.

BATSON

In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenges to the State's peremptory strikes, which resulted in the complete exclusion of black jurors from the deliberating jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). He argues that after the State exercised its final four peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors, the trial court failed to conduct a comparative juror analysis contrary to Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). Lastly, he argues the court failed to comply with Pitchford v. Cain, 608 U.S. 391, 146 S.Ct. 1345, 225 L.Ed.2d 11 (2026).

Peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial. The right to a peremptory challenge may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2358, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992). A Batson challenge is an equal protection claim based upon an infringement of a prospective juror's rights, which a party to the suit has third-party standing to raise. State v. Austin, 2011-2150 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/8/12), 2012 WL 2061531, at *9 (unpublished), writ denied, 2012-1595 (La. 2/8/13), 108 So.3d 77 (citing Georgia, 505 U.S. at 45-55, 112 S.Ct. at 2352-57).

Batson requires a three-step analysis to determine whether the constitutional rights of a defendant or prospective jurors have been infringed by impermissible discriminatory practices: First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. At this second step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam); Austin, 2012 WL 2061531, at *9.

In Pitchford, the Supreme Court held the United States District court correctly granted habeas corpus relief following the petitioner's Mississippi capital murder conviction and death sentence. Pitchford, 608 U.S. at 401, 146 S.Ct. at 1353. The Pitchford Court addressed whether the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established Batson precedents and unreasonably determined that the defendant had waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons at Batson's third step. Pitchford, 608 U.S. at 398, 146 S.Ct. at 1351. In regard to Batson, the Pitchford Court held:

After a prosecutor asserts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike, the defense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue that the asserted race-neutral reasons were not the actual reasons - that is, the reasons were pretextual. Then, the trial court can determine whether those asserted reasons were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual. In this case, whether due to confusion, oversight, an overly hurried jury selection process, or some other cause, things broke down, and the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving Batson claims at step three never occurred - notwithstanding the repeated efforts of Pitchford's counsel to pursue and preserve the Batson objection.

Pitchford, 608 U.S. at 400-01, 146 S.Ct. at 1353.

The Pitchford Court found the trial court violated Batson by “pivot[ing] immediately to the defense's peremptory strikes” after the prosecutor stated his explanation for his last peremptory strike against a black potential juror. Pitchford, 608 U.S. at 396, 146 S.Ct. at 1350. The Court noted the trial court “twice cut off defense counsel and ended the inquiry before counsel could try and rebut as pretextual the race-neutral reasons articulated by the prosecution[.]” Pitchford, 608 U.S. at 396, 146 S.Ct. at 13 50.

In the instant case, the defendant first objected under Batson after the State exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 79, a black male prospective juror on panel three. The trial court noted the State had previously exercised: a peremptory challenge against a black male prospective juror; a peremptory challenge against a white female prospective juror; a peremptory challenge against a black female prospective juror; and a peremptory challenge against a white female prospective juror. Thereafter, the trial court denied the Batson challenge “on its face,” i.e., the court found the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the State exercised the peremptory challenge against Juror No. 79 on the basis of race.

In order to establish a prima facie showing under Batson, the defendant must demonstrate:

(1) the prosecutor's challenge was directed at a member of a cognizable group; (2) the challenge was peremptory rather than for cause; and (3) circumstances sufficient to raise an inference the prosecutor struck the prospective juror on the basis of his being a member of that cognizable group. The defendant may offer any facts relevant to the question of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent, including a pattern of strikes by a prosecutor against members of a suspect class, statements or actions of the prosecutor during voir dire that support an inference that the exercise of peremptory strikes was motivated by impermissible considerations, the composition of the venire and of the jury finally empaneled, and any other disparate impact upon the suspect class that is alleged to be the victim of purposeful discrimination. Without an inference that the prospective jurors were stricken because of their membership in a targeted group, the defendant is unable to make a prima facie case of purposefill discrimination, and his Batson challenge expires at the threshold.

State v. Griffin, 2023-1353 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/24), 2024 WL 2967991, at *2 (unpublished), writ denied, 2024-00843 (La. 11/6/24), 395 So.3d 1175.

Thus, while a prima facie case of discrimination can be made by offering a wide variety of evidence, the sum of the proffered facts must give “rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 163, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2413, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1712) (footnote omitted). The mere invocation of Batson when minority prospective jurors are peremptorily challenged does not present sufficient evidence to lead to an inference of purposeful discrimination. Griffin, 2024 WL 2967991, at *3.

In the instant case, the defendant offered no evidence in support of his Batson objection to the State's exercise of a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 79. While a pattern of strikes is not required to satisfy the prima facie requirements under Batson, the defendant must come forward with facts, not numbers alone, when asking the trial court to find a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. See Griffin, 2024 WL 2967991, at *3.

A thorough review of the record reveals the trial court, State, and the defendant were all actively engaged in a full and complete voir dire. The State used the same questions throughout its voir dire, and there is no indication any particular prospective jurors were “targeted” for more questioning in an attempt to provoke a certain response. Absent any other indicia of discriminatory intent, the trial court could not have inferred the State challenged Juror No. 79 because he was a member of a targeted group. An analysis of the voir dire as a whole convinces us the trial court was correct in its determination that the defendant did not make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in his Batson objection with respect to Juror No. 79. See Griffin, 2024 WL 2967991, at *4.

The defense re-urged its Batson objection after the State exercised peremptory challenges to strike: Juror No. 17, a black male prospective juror on panel three; Juror No. 125, a black female prospective juror on panel three; Juror No. 270, a black female prospective juror on panel three; and Juror No. 95, a black female prospective juror on panel three. The trial court asked the State to provide race-neutral reasons for the challenged peremptory strikes.

The State set forth that neither Juror No. 17, Juror No. 125, nor Juror No. 270 had raised their hands when it presented their panel with a scenario about manslaughter and “connecting the dots.” The State noted it had to explain “multiple times” and was concerned about the challenged prospective jurors’ understanding of the case.⁶ In regard to Juror No. 95, the State set forth it disliked her response that “being threatened” validated self-defense.⁷ The court noted, “somebody could take issue with those four as it could look like four in a row,” but accepted the explanations for the challenged peremptory strikes.

Once the prosecutor offered race-neutral explanations for his peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination became moot. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); Austin, 2012 WL 2061531, at * 11. The inference of the trial court's denial of the Batson challenges was that the defendant did not meet his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. The inquiry, thus, is whether the trial court erred in determining there was no discriminatory intent when weighing the defendant's proof and prosecutor's race-neutral reasons. Austin, 2012 WL 2061531, at *11.

The Austin court explained:

A reviewing court owes the trial court's evaluations of discriminatory intent great deference and should not reverse them unless they are clearly erroneous. The Batson explanation does not need to be persuasive, and unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the party raising the challenge to prove purposeful discrimination.

Austin, 2012 WL 2061531, at *12.

Citing State v. Turner, 2016-1841 (La. 12/05/18), 263 So.3d 337, cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1080, 140 S.Ct. 555, 205 L.Ed.2d 355 (2019), the defendant argues statistical disparity in the use of peremptory challenges can be evidence of discriminatory intent. In Turner, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted, “[t]he [S]tate's use of six of seven strikes exercised against black jurors, or roughly 85% of its challenges, could support a conclusion that the trial judge did abuse his discretion in finding that the defense had failed to pass Batson's first step.” Turner, 263 So.3d at 386. Thereafter, the Turner Court continued, “[t]his Court has held, however, that bare statistics alone are insufficient to show a prima facie case of discrimination.” Turner, 263 So.3d at 386. Rather, as noted in Griffin and in Turner, “it is important for a defendant to come forward with facts, not numbers alone, when asking the trial judge to find a prima facie case.” Turner, 263 So.3d at 386. Herein, our review of the State's explanations for the peremptory challenges against Juror No. 17, Juror No. 125, Juror No. 270, and Juror No. 95 reveals no discriminatory intent. The explanations were reasonable and had some basis in trial strategy.

Under Batson, the trial court is to consider all relevant circumstances in addressing the question of discriminatory intent, which requires close scrutiny of the challenged strikes when compared with the treatment of panel members who expressed similar views or shared similar circumstances in their backgrounds. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. at 2325-26; Austin, 2012 WL 2061531, at * 12.

The trial court did not deny the defendant the opportunity to “rebut as pretextual the race-neutral reasons articulated by the prosecution[.]” Pitchford, 608 U.S. at 396, 146 S.Ct. at 1350. Rather, the defendant simply offered no facts or circumstances supporting an inference that the State exercised the challenged strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. Thus, the defendant's argument, when weighed against the State's race-neutral reasons, was not sufficient to prove the existence of discriminatory intent. See Austin, 2012 WL 2061531, at *13. Further, a review of the entire voir dire transcript fails to reveal any evidence that the State's use of the challenged peremptory strikes was motivated by impermissible considerations. Lastly, even if prospective jurors with similar backgrounds who gave similar responses to the challenged prospective jurors were accepted by the State, that fact does not in itself show that the explanation for excusing Juror No. 17, Juror No. 125, Juror No. 270, and Juror No. 95 was a pretext for discrimination. The accepted jurors may have exhibited traits that the State reasonably could have believed would have made them desirable as jurors. Austin, 2012 WL 2061531, at *12.

This assignment of error is without merit.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In assignment of error number two, the defendant contends the trial court imposed a constitutionally excessive sentence of thirty-five years imprisonment at hard labor for a spontaneous sixteen-second altercation and failed to adequately consider the mitigating circumstances of the offense. We note patent error which causes us to pretermit consideration of this assignment of error.

In accordance with La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. However, the penalty provision of the applicable statute, La. R.S. 14:31(B), does not authorize such a restriction on the defendant's parole eligibility. Thus, the parole restriction rendered the sentence illegal. In State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 802, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that this court has the authority to correct an illegal sentence despite the failure of either party to raise the issue in the district court or on appeal if the correction is ministerial. La. Code Crim. P. art. 882(A).

However, in State v. Haynes, 2004-1893 (La. 12/10/04), 889 So.2d 224 (per curiam), the Court admonished, “[t]o the extent that the amendment of defendant's sentence entails more than a ministerial correction of a sentencing error, the decision in [Williams] does not sanction the sua sponte correction made by the court of appeal on defendant's appeal of his conviction and sentence.” See also La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.4(A) (“If the appellate court finds that a sentence must be set aside on any ground, the court shall remand for resentence by the trial court.”). Here, the correction to the defendant's sentence is more than ministerial. Accordingly, we must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. See State v. Duhon, 2018-0593 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/18), 270 So.3d 597, 609, writ denied, 2019-0124 (La. 5/28/19), 273 So.3d315.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

FOOTNOTES

1.   When issues are raised on appeal contesting the sufficiency of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted, and alleging one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992); State v. Duhon, 2018-0593 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/18), 270 So.3d 597, 609, writ denied, 2019-0124 (La. 5/28/19), 273 So.3d 315. The reason for reviewing sufficiency first is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43, 101 S.Ct. 970, 972, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accordance with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not reasonably conclude that all of the essential elements of the offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Hearold, 603 So.2d at 734; Duhon, 270 So.3d at 609. When the entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted, is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to that crime, and any discussion of trial error issues as to that crime would be pure dicta since those issues are moot. However, when the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the other assignments of error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial. If the reviewing court determines that there has been trial error (which was not harmless) in cases in which the entirety of the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, then the accused must be granted a new trial, but is not entitled to an acquittal, even though the admissible evidence, considered alone, was insufficient. Hearold, 603 So.2d at 734; see Duhon, 270 So.3d at 609.

2.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 390(A) was enacted after the date of the commission of the crime herein. See 2024 La. Acts No. 729, § 2 (eff. Aug. 1, 2024).

3.   Knighten was sixty-three years old at the time of his death.

4.   Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

5.   Baton Rouge Police Officer Xavier Barge testified that first responders discarded a pocketknife after finding it in Knighten's pocket. The surveillance video did not show Knighten either reaching into his pockets or brandishing the knife during the incident.

6.   The male prosecutor presented a hypothetical to panel three in which his driving in a rage caused the female prosecutor to lose control of her car and suffer major injuries requiring surgery. The male prosecutor asked if he was any less guilty of manslaughter if the female prosecutor died from septic shock following surgery. Not all of the prospective jurors agreed that the male prosecutor would still be guilty of manslaughter. Juror No. 125 stated she would need more information concerning whether or not “something that happened at the hospital” caused the female prosecutor's condition to worsen. The male prosecutor asked Juror No. 17, Juror No. 125, and Juror No. 270 if they could return a manslaughter verdict if he could “point to the first event and connect each dot along that chain to the [eventual] death of [the female prosecutor].” Juror No. 17 replied, “[I]f all the facts are there.” Juror No. 125 did not answer. Juror No. 270 answered, “Yes, if the dots connect.”

7.   Defense counsel asked Juror No. 95 to give an example of being in imminent danger, but not necessarily in a life-threatening situation. Juror No. 95 replied, “[b]eing threatened and they don't go through with it.”

THERIOT, J.

Edwards, J. concurs w/out reasons