STONEBRIDGE HEALTH SYSTEMS LLC v. LOWER CAMERON HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT (2026)

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

P.O. Box 16577

Lake Charles, LA. 70616

(337) 433-9403

Alan K. Breaud

Breaud & Meyers

P. O. Box 51365

Lafayette, LA 70503-1365

Timothy Wayne Basden

Breaud & Meyers

P.O. Box 51365

Lafayette, LA 70503-1365

Jordan S. Varnado

Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson

301 Main Stree, Floor 23

Baton Rouge, LA 70821

Hon. H. Ward Fontenot

Judge

4215 Waterwood Drive

Lake Charles, LA 70605

Carroll Devillier, Jr.

Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson

301 Main Street, Ste. 2300

Baton Rouge, LA 70821-3197

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

November 4, 2026

Docket Number: CA 26-309

STONEBRIDGE HEALTH SYSTEMS, LLC

VERSUS

LOWER CAMERON HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

Stonebridge Health Systems, LLC, appeals a judgment of the trial court that granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the Lower Cameron Hospital Service District and dismissed Stonebridge's claims with prejudice.

FACTS

The Lower Cameron Hospital Service District (HSD) is a political subdivision of the state with the authority to levy and collect tax revenue for the purpose of providing health services to the residents of south Cameron Parish, Louisiana. It was created pursuant to La.R.S. 46:1051, et seq. The HSD owns South Cameron Memorial Hospital (SCMH) in Cameron Parish. Effective January 1, 2014, Stonebridge began operating SCMH pursuant to a Cooperative Endeavor Lease Agreement (CELA) with the HSD. Section 4.12 of the CELA required the HSD to pay Stonebridge an initial payment of $330,000.00 for the first three month, then $110,000.00 per month for months four through twelve, or $1,300,000.00 per year:

Lessor, subject to its ability to fund from its resources, shall provide to Lessee certain financial support to ensure that the emergency room and hospital operations of the Hospital Facilities remain available to residents of lower Cameron Parish during the term hereof, to help defray the losses that will be incurred by Lessee in connection with Lessee's operation of the Hospital Facilities located at the Premises as Cameron Parish reestablishes its infrastructure and population from the devastation caused by Hurricanes Rita, Gustav and Ike. During the first year of the Initial Term, Lessor shall provide to Lessee a subsidy payment in the amount of One Million Three Hundred Thousand and no/100 ($1,300,000.00) Dollars, or such lesser amount as may be generated by tax revenues collected by Lessor.

Pursuant to the agreement, the payment of funds was contingent on the collection of sufficient tax revenue. This section also included a duty for the parties to negotiate in good faith each year to determine the total subsidy payment and the frequency of payments to Stonebridge.

Faced with declining tax revenue, the HSD voted to amend the CELA with Stonebridge in October 2018. The agreement amending the CELA with Stonebridge was executed on October 8, 2018, and the entirety of Section 4.12 was deleted from the CELA. Instead of providing direct subsidy payments to Stonebridge, the HSD began participating in a state and federal program of intergovernmental transfers (IGT). The HSD deposited money with the state and that money was matched through government grant programs. The operator of the hospital, Stonebridge, received enhanced Medicaid payments from this Supplemental Payment Program.

In August 2020, Hurricanes Laura and Delta impacted Cameron Parish, causing catastrophic damage to SCMH. Stonebridge continued to operate SCMH in temporary facilities on site, though the services were limited. In March 2021, the HSD and Stonebridge learned that the Supplemental Pay Program would end, and in August 2021 the last payment from that program was made. Stonebridge alleges that it continued to operate the hospital while losing money after August 2021 because they were assured by the board of the HSD that the subsidy payments would resume. When the board failed to take action to resume the payments, Stonebridge gave notice on January 31, 2023, that it would terminate the CELA effective March 2, 2023.

On January 4, 2024, Stonebridge filed a Petition for Damages alleging that the HSD had an obligation to pay subsidy payments from August 21, 2021, through the termination of the CELA in March 2023. On December 3, 2025, the HSD filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Stonebridge would be unable to prove any written obligation undertaken by the HSD to provide payments to Stonebridge pursuant to the CELA after August 2021. In its opposition to the summary judgment motion, Stonebridge alleged for the first time several legal theories of recovery, including “breach of a verbal contract, detrimental reliance, unjust enrichment (quantum meruit), and management of affairs.”

The hearing on the motion for summary judgment was originally set for January 28, 2026, but was reset for February 11, 2026. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the HSD's motion for summary judgment:

As a general rule, a public body like the lower Cameron hospital service district cannot be held to a contract, unless that contract was entered in through the formal proceedings of a meeting, a vote, adoption in accordance with the law.

And although counsel didn't -- could never admit that such a resolution does not exist, I can conclude from what's been presented to me today that no resolution like that exists. So the only way that it could combine -- excuse me -- commit the board would be through one of their theories, as we've mentioned, under the terms of either a detrimental reliance or unjust enrichment.

The affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment does not present any -- does not suggest any other evidence that would suggest the elements of a detrimental reliance.

Stonebridge didn't take any -- have any action or change its position or anything that's been alleged in this supplement affidavit of Leslie Trahan. And we can't just speculate that maybe that there was - - there's just something that would have to be positively brought to our attention to begin building the case for a detrimental reliance.

And what I was saying on that also applies to unjust enrichment theories. One missing thing is that I do not accept that patient care for Cameron residents somehow is an enrichment to the board, that's unjust.

So consequently, I reject both of those theories, which leads us to the fact that there was never a basis for filing this petition to reinstitute subsidies from the hospital service district to Stonebridge. So consequently, I'm going to grant the motion for summary judgment and dismiss the case with prejudice.

The trial court signed a judgment in conformity with its oral ruling on March 5, 2026. Stonebridge appeals from that judgment.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Stonebridge asserts seven assignments of error:

1. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment and dismissing Stonebridge's detrimental reliance claim.

2. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment and dismissing Stonebridge's quantum meruit claim.

3. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment and dismissing Stonebridge's enrichment without cause claim.

4. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by shifting the burden of proof to Stonebridge to show genuine issues of material fact without requiring the movant in summary judgment, the HSD, to first put on evidence to negate any essential elements of the above-referenced causes of action.

5. The Trial Court erred by finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact relevant to Stonebridge's claims and that the HSD is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

6. The Trial Court abused its discretion by denying the Motion to Continue the Motion for Summary Judgment, despite late production of voluminous electronic records, pending discovery, and Stonebridge's pending request to depose the HSD's corporate representative, and without hearing evidence of inadequate discovery.

7. The Trial Court abused its discretion by excluding evidence on the Motion to Continue based on an antecedent decision to deny the Motion to Continue, which evidence was proffered.

DISCUSSION

The Motion to Continue

We first address the final two assignments of error raised. Stonebridge alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) denying a motion to continue the February 11, 2026, hearing, and (2) refusing to consider the evidence proffered by Stonebridge, including documents and the live testimony of Mr. DuPont.

This court has explained that the trial court has vast discretion in deciding to grant a continuance:

“[A] continuance may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1601. The trial court has great discretion in granting or denying a motion for a continuance, and denial of a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court is shown to have abused its discretion. Jackson v. Royal Ins. Co., 97–723 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/17/97), 704 So.2d 424. Whether a trial court should grant or deny a continuance depends on the particular facts of each case. Some factors to consider are diligence, good faith, and reasonable grounds. Demopulos v. Jackson, 33,560 (La.App. 2 Cir.6/21/00), 765 So.2d 480. Fairness to both parties and the need for orderly administration of justice are additional considerations in deciding whether to grant or deny a continuance. Gilcrease v. Bacarisse, 26,318 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/7/94), 647 So.2d 1219, writ denied, 95–421 (La.3/30/95), 651 So.2d 845.

Ardoin v. Bourgeois, 04–1663 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 916 So.2d 329, 332.

In Burlison v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 22–194, p. 7–8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/21/22), 354 So.3d 272, 278, writ denied, 23–71 (La. 4/12/23), 359 So. 3d 21, this court stated:

Delaying hearing a summary-judgment motion for additional discovery is not necessary, and the decision to do so lies in the discretion of the trial court:

It is not an abuse of a trial court's wide discretion to entertain a motion for summary judgment before discovery has been completed. Christakis v. Clipper Constr., LLC, 12-1638 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/26/13), 117 So.3d 168, 171, writ denied, 13-1913 (La. 11/8/13), 125 So.3d 454. The trial court has discretion to render summary judgment if appropriate or to allow further discovery. Id. Although the parties must be given the opportunity to conduct “adequate discovery” to present their claims, see La. C.C.P. art. 966C(1), there is no absolute right to delay action on a motion for summary judgment until discovery is complete. The only limit to the trial court's discretion is that the parties must be given a fair opportunity to present their claims. Id.

Ellis [v. La. Bd. of Ethics, 14–112 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/30/14),] 168 So.3d [714,] 725 [, writ denied, 15-208 (La. 4/17/15), 168 So.3d 400.]

In this case, the motion for summary judgment was originally set for January 28, 2026. Stonebridge filed a motion to continue that hearing, alleging there was outstanding discovery. Stonebridge specifically claimed that it had not had an opportunity to inspect the Hospital District's electronic records and it had not had an opportunity to conduct a corporate deposition of the HSD. On the date set for that hearing, the trial court made the following statement on the record:

Okay, after extensive pre-trial discussions or let's call it in-chamber discussions, we have decided to continue the motion for summary judgment until February the 11th, at 10:00. And to continue the motion to quash until the same time.

In the interim, the Court has suggested to defense counsel that they contact Mr. Tim Dupont and attempt to have him available for a 1442 deposition by the plaintiffs sometime during the first week of February. And to facilitate that plaintiffs will, of course, compile their statement of interest to be communicated to [defense counsel] as promptly as possible.

When Stonebridge sought to introduce evidence to support its motion to continue, the trial court stated “Well, you know, the Court is sort of doing this on its own motion to continue, so you don't need to have any attachments to it.”

The HSD produced the electronic records sought by Stonebridge on February 3, 2026. At the hearing on February 11, Stonebridge re-urged its motion to continue, alleging that it needed more time to inspect the volume of the records produced. Stonebridge sought to introduce documentary evidence to support its motion to continue, as well as the testimony of Mr. Dupont. With respect to the testimony of Mr. Dupont, the following exchange occurred:

MR. VARNADO [Counsel for Stonebridge]:

There are numerous documents that reference a subsidy obligation being recognized by the hospital district, and invoices, minutes, transcripts, Your Honor, of board meetings. And we have case law to back that up as capable of creating a binding obligation that can be recovered upon.

So we do have evidence to dispute their motion for summary judgment. It's only because we have not been given an opportunity to conduct a -- a deposition of their corporate representative that we cannot authenticate those documents on a motion for summary judgment.

They are capable, however, of being considered and taken into evidence on a motion to continue, because unlike a motion for summary judgment, a motion to continue can be considered along with live witness testimony. And we're prepared to give that today, Your Honor.

We expect Mr. Tim Dupont to arrive here at the Court today in, I believe, 30 to 45 minutes, Your Honor. He had a prior appointment that prohibited him from being here at 10 a.m.

And I understand there's another -- a matter on the docket today. If - -

THE COURT:

You want to call him -- a live testimony on the motion to continue?

MR. VARNADO:

Yes, Your Honor, for the purpose of getting into evidence the documents that were produced by opposing counsel last week, which are from the time period in which Mr. Dupont was the chairman of the hospital district.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. VARNADO:

He's more than capable of authenticating those documents.

THE COURT:

Oh.

MR. BREAUD [Counsel for the HSD]:

Excuse me, Your Honor. Could I be heard on that?

THE COURT:

No. No. Because I'm going to deny the motion to continue.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. The trial court had previously granted a continuance and explained that Stonebridge needed to be prepared to take Mr. Dupont's deposition before the February 11, 2026, hearing. In its argument to the trial court, Stonebridge argued that it had found evidence in the documents produced by Stonebridge on February 3, 2026, to support its position in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. They had, however, been unable to authenticate those documents for the purpose of having them considered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Their proposed solution was to introduce Mr. Dupont's testimony on the motion to continue so that those documents could be introduced for the trial court's consideration.

This court explained in Cutler v. McGee, 12–317, p. 8–9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/14/12), 103 So.3d 1215, 1220–21:

[T]he Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be decided upon “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B). Accordingly, the courts of this state have long held that “[t]estimony should neither be received nor considered, even with consent of counsel, to decide a motion for summary judgment.” Urban Mgmt. Corp. v. Burns, 427 So.2d 1310 (La.App. 2 Cir.1983), 427 So.2d 1310, 1311.

Further, one of the proffered documents was attached to the HSD's December 2, 2025, Motion for Summary Judgment and the memorandum in support of the motion. (Cf. Stonebridge's Proffer 4 and Exhibit G to Julie Trahan's deposition). Stonebridge also proffered the minutes from the October 26, 2022, meeting of the HSD. (Stonebridge Proffer 7). The full written transcript of the October 26, 2022, meeting is attached to the motion for summary judgment. Further, during the deposition of Stephanie Rodrigue, conducted on November 19, 2025, the transcript of which is also attached to the motion for summary judgment, counsel for Stonebridge played an audio recording of the minutes of the October 26, 2022, meeting of the HSD.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider Stonebridge's evidence on the motion to continue and by denying the motion to continue.

Detrimental reliance

We review summary judgments de novo using the same criteria as the trial court to determine if summary judgment should be granted. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La. 1991). The party who has moved for summary judgment bears the burden of proof. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). “[S]ummary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3). If the mover does not bear the burden of proof at a trial on the merits, the mover must only “point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim” rather than negating “all essential elements of the adverse party's claim[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). If the mover is successful in doing showing the absence of factual support for an element essential to the opposing party's claim, the burden shifts to “the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

In its first assignment of error, Stonebridge argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing its claim for detrimental reliance. The source of the cause of action for detrimental reliance is found in La.Civ.Code art. 1967:

Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself.

A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.

“To establish detrimental reliance, a party must prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one's detriment because of the reliance.” Suire v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't, 04-1459, p. 31 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So. 2d 37, 59.

In an affidavit attached to its opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Stonebridge attached the affidavit of Leslie Trahan, the CEO of Stonebridge, which stated in pertinent part:

12. I personally attended meetings of the Hospital District's Board, where the Hospital District's obligation to resume payment of subsidies was discussed. Based on representations from members of the Board that a reconciliation of past due subsidy obligations would be calculated, and that a plan to repay them to Stonebridge would be discussed, I directed Stonebridge to continue providing health care services for the benefit of Cameron Parish, particularly to allow health care access to its indigent population.

13. During the period of August 2021 to March 2, 2023, I personally attended meetings of the Hospital District's Board in which the Board passed resolutions that allowed Stonebridge to continue operating its health care services in a temporary shelter, for the benefit of Cameron Parish and its residents.

14. Beginning effectively in August 2021, Stonebridge stopped receiving additional funding for health care services as a direct result of the Hospital District's failure to fund subsidy payments.

15. During the period of August 2021 to March 2, 2023, Stonebridge continued to provide health care services at a loss as a direct result of the Hospital District's failure to fund subsidy payments.

16. During the period of January 1, 2014, until the CEA was terminated on March 2, 2023, Stonebridge complied with its obligations to provide health care services under the CEA.

In her supplemental affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Leslie Trahan made the following statements regarding the subsidy payments:

4. During the period of August 2021 to March 2, 2023, a representative of Stonebridge was present at every regular meeting of the Hospital District's Board of Directors to present a management report on the financial status of Stonebridge's operations.

5. I personally attended a regular meeting of the Hospital District's Board of Directors on May 20, 2020, at which Joey Breaux, the Hospital District's retained accountant, gave a report regarding his calculation of the amount of a nest egg for the Hospital District to be used. in part, to pay Stonebridge's future subsidy payments once the Supplemental Payment Program (IGT) was exhausted.

6. I personally attended a regular meeting of the Hospital District's Board of Directors oil March 24, 2021, at which I reported to the Board that the Supplemental Payment Program (IGT) that the Hospital had been involved in had been shut down, and that alternative funding methods would be necessary to restore Hospital operations. On a motion by Margaret Jones, seconded by Tredale Boudreaux, Tim Dupont was appointed as the Board's representative with authority to negotiate alternative funding methods.

7. In July of 2022, Tim Dupont directed Joey Breaux to calculate a reconciliation of subsidy payments owed by the Hospital District to Stonebridge.

8. I personally attended a regular meeting of the Hospital District's Board of Directors on September 28, 2022, at which Tim Dupont stated that Joey Breaux was in negotiations with Stonebridge to determine the amount for a reconciliation of subsidies owed to Stonebridge.

9. On October 11. 2022, 1 personally met with Joey Breaux and Braden Ryder to discuss Mr. Breaux's calculation of the subsidy reconciliation.

10. I personally attended a regular meeting of the Hospital District's Board of Directors on November 3, 2022, at which Joey Breaux presented his reconciliation calculation to the Board and proposed terms of payment.

In Cott Index v. Jagneaux, 96-860, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/26/96), 685 So.2d 656, 659, writ denied, 97-254 (La. 3/21/97), 691 So.2d 85, this court stated:

Police juries are creatures and subordinate political subdivisions of the state, possessing only those powers conferred upon them by the State's constitution and statutes, unless the parish has adopted a home rule charter or has been empowered with the right to exercise any power not denied by its charter or by state law. Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So.2d 1127 (La.1979). Either way, police juries execute their powers through the passage of local ordinances and resolutions. State v. Haltom, 462 So.2d 662 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984). A police jury can not be bound absent its consent or authority. Guillory v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 410 So.2d 1213 (La.App. 3 Cir.1982). “A police jury may not contract outside of the authority of an enabling resolution or ordinance properly passed before that body.” Dobson v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 298 So.2d 110, 114 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 302 So.2d 24 (La.1974).

The Lower Cameron Hospital Service District is a political subdivision of the state created by the Cameron Parish Police Jury pursuant to La.R.S. 46:1051, et seq. See also La.R.S. 46:1064. The HSD is governed by a Board of Commissioners, and the powers and duties of the commission are set forth in La.R.S. 46:1055. Just as no individual police juror has the authority to legally bind the police jury, no individual member of the Board of Commissioners can perfect a legal obligation without consent of the entire board. Neither can the board's accountant, Joey Breaux.

The trial court correctly found that the only means by which the HSD could obligate itself to make payments to Stonebridge was by a resolution adopted by a majority of the members of the board at a validly called open meeting. After the October 2018 amendment approved by the board of the HSD and signed by Leslie Trahan on behalf of Stonebridge, the CELA governing the parties was silent on the issue of subsidy payments. Discussion or promises of negotiations would be insufficient to create any obligation. Counsel for Stonebridge indicated at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that he was not prepared to say that he had access to all of the minutes from the meetings of the board of the HSD, but that Leslie Trahan would probably admit she did not sign an amendment to the CELA resuming subsidy payments. The record is clear, including in the arguments made to this court in a writ application regarding discovery, that Stonebridge had access to all the physical records of the HSD. In fact, Stonebridge argued that the HSD produced too much discovery, not too little.

In her deposition, Leslie Trahan admitted that there was no written document requiring the HSD to resume paying subsidies after August 2021, only conversations. Thus, we find that Stonebridge failed to present any evidence that it could justifiably rely on any representation by the board of the HSD in the absence of a resolution of the entire board. The trial court properly granted summary judgment dismissing Stonebridge's claim for detrimental reliance.

Quantum meruit

In its second assignment of error, Stonebridge argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its claim under the theory of quantum meruit. Stonebridge argues that it provided services under the CELA, and the HSD was enriched by those services. Stonebridge argues that it is immaterial that the contract between the parties was not amended after the IGT payments ceased. Citing Morphy, Makofsky & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So.2d 569 (La.1989), Stonebridge argues that if a party provides valuable services under a contract that is silent as to payment, the law implies a payment obligation that was the cause of the performance.

In Morphy, the supreme court found a subcontractor entered into a valid contract with an engineering firm to provide services. That oral contract was silent as to compensation, but the court found that the value of those services was measured by the amounts invoiced by the subcontractor. The court explained that it was deciding the case on the principles of contract interpretation under the civil code articles on obligations, where a person is entitled to a reasonable fee for work performed. The court differentiated this from the common law action known as quantum meruit, in which the proper valuation of damages is the amount by which the person receiving the services was enriched. (In civilian law, this type of action is called an action in rem verso.)

It is true that the contract in this case was silent as to the amount Stonebridge should be compensated under the terms of its lease of SCMH after October 2018. But that is because the parties mutually agreed to delete Section 4.12 from the CELA. Besides its claim that Stonebridge operated at a loss from August 2021 until it terminated the agreement in March 2023, Stonebridge presented no evidence to show the reasonable value of the services it provided. Instead, they seek to enforce Section 4.12, which was deleted primarily because the HSD's tax revenue was insufficient to meet the obligation. Further, the uncontested evidence is that Hurricanes Laura and Delta rendered the hospital building unusable. The services rendered by Stonebridge in a tent set up on the parking lot were significantly different from the services rendered in a functioning hospital building with twenty-five beds and an emergency department.

Because there was no agreement by the board of the HSD, and because Stonebridge failed to prove the value of any unjust enrichment of the HSD caused by Stonebridge's continuation of service, we find no error in the trial court's judgment dismissing the claim under the theory of quantum meruit.

Enrichment without cause

In its third assignment of error, Stonebridge argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the issue of enrichment without cause based on La.Civ.Code art 2298. By its own language, that article limits the scope of its application, stating, “The term ‘without cause’ is used in this context to exclude cases in which the enrichment results from a valid juridical act or the law.” Here, there was a valid contract between Stonebridge and the HSD. The contract was silent as to any subsidy due to Stonebridge only because the parties mutually agreed to remove the clause that provided subsidies to Stonebridge from the CELA. We find La.Civ.Code art. 2298 is inapplicable in this case. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Burden of proof

In its fourth and fifth assignments of error, Stonebridge argues the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and granted summary judgment despite genuine issues of material fact. We find the trial court properly required the HSD to prove the absence of an essential element of the claims raised by Stonebridge. The trial court then properly shifted the burden to Stonebridge to prove a genuine issue of material fact or that the HSD is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stonebridge's fourth and fifth assignments of error are without merit.

CONCLUSION

After reviewing the evidence submitted and the applicable law, we agree with the judgment of the trial court. The judgement of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Stonebridge Health Systems, LLC.

AFFIRMED.

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT CHIEF JUDGE