WALKER v. BLAKE (2026)

Trustee beneficiary, Jessica Gooden Walker, appeals the trial court's grant of a peremptory exception of prescription in favor of her uncle, Robert E. Blake, Jr., trustee of the trust created by his sister, Walker's mother, upon her death. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Wilma Letitia Blake Gooden died on January 25, 2003. Wilma's last will and testament named Blake the executor of the succession. The sole legatee of her will was a testamentary trust naming Blake trustee and Walker and her sister as equal principal and income beneficiaries. On September 15, 2013, Walker filed a petition for damages and declaratory relief against Blake urging violations of his duties as both succession administrator and as trustee. Walker alleged a number of real estate transactions amounted to self-dealing by Blake. The transactions related to the transfer of Wilma's portion of various properties in Rapides Parish comprising nearly 300 acres.

On October 8, 2013, Blake filed a peremptory exception of prescription and no cause of action and dilatory exceptions of vagueness or ambiguity. On January 16, 2014, Walker filed a first supplemental and amending petition. In it she claimed (emphasis added):

35.

The Succession's assets were transferred to the testamentary trust of which Plaintiff is a beneficiary pursuant to a petition and judgment of possession in the Succession proceedings dated June 25, 2005, which is a month after Mr. Blake had purchased the aforementioned immovable property from the Succession. Mr. Blake was discharged as the Succession Independent Executor on October 21, 2005.

36.

During his independent administration of the Succession, Mr. Blake provided no accountings or other information to the Plaintiff concerning the value of the Section 17, Section 8 and Red River Properties, his subsequent purchase of those properties, or the price paid by him for those properties.

37.

In July 2009, Plaintiff received a letter from Mr. Brent Pearson, Mr. Blake's then attorney attempting to obtain Plaintiff's signature to a document releasing Mr. Blake from any and all claims and discharging him as trustee. Those documents suggested that the aforementioned succession property described in Paragraph 11 was in the trust, with no indication that the property had been sold to Mr. Blake, and then resold or transferred to Mr. Blake's businesses. Jessica did not sign, or otherwise approve, the documents or proposed accounting.

38.

Plaintiff did not receive any substantive information from Mr. Blake regarding the Succession's sale of the aforementioned property to Mr. Blake, until September 2012, when Mr. Blake's attorney responded to a request for information from a CPA hired by Plaintiff to inquire about the Trust and its requirements.

39.

Thereafter, in or around November 2012, Plaintiff conducted a public records search and obtained documentation showing the sales between Mr. Blake as the Succession's Independent Executor and himself in his individual capacity.

Walker further asserted that the tolling of prescription pursuant to La.R.S. 9:5621 had yet to begin because no judgment homologating the final account was rendered and no final accounting was ever filed. Thus, Walker urged that her petition was timely pursuant to the ten year prescriptive period for misappropriation or, alternatively, the two year period had not yet begun because there was no homologation.

On February 18, 2014, Blake filed exceptions and an answer asserting peremptory exceptions of no right of action, of prescription, and peremption under La.R.S. 9:2234, or alternatively La.R.S. 9:5621. Attached to the exceptions were numerous documents as follows:

• A July 13, 2009 letter to Walker enclosing the “Petition Filing Final Accounting of Trustee” and the joint petition to appoint a new trustee (the petition is not attached).

• Exhibit B: the judgment of possession placing all succession assets in the trust to be administered by Blake which was filed on June 13, 2005. This document does not mention the properties at issue in this case but does list:

6. A promissory note in the amount of $104,534.00 for the sale of certain immovable property listed as Items 3(e) and 3(f) of the other miscellaneous property on the Detailed Descriptive List of Assets, which was sold prior to the filing of the Petition for Possession.

• A “Petition Filing Final Accounting by Trustee” which has unfilled blanks for the civil suit and division number, unsigned signature line of W. Brent Pearson, attorney, and no filing stamp evidencing a date filed in the records. The document purports to be a final accounting for the period of June 13, 2005 through June 30, 2009. The verification naming Blake which follows is unsigned and bears no notary public signature in the blank provided.

• A typed letter follows and is marked “Exhibit B” titled “Jessica Gooden Walker Trust 6-14-2006,” with the initials REB typed and which states in part:

Your trust includes an interest in several assets owned by your mother's testamentary trust including mutual funds investments, bank certificates of deposit, a fractional ownership investment in Emfield Development Corp. and a bank checking account. Emfield is simply a group of people who jointly won [own] 200 acres of Rapides Parish real estate.

• Documents entitled “Financial Position Report” dated 12/31/09 and 12/31/2011 (this one is signed by Walker), 12/31/2012 (signed by Walker on 2/25/13), setting forth trust distributions for an unknown period.

• Checking account statements and Investment statements.

• Exhibit C is the “Petition for Discharge of Succession Representative” filed October 20, 2005.

• A “Receipt of Legacy and Waiver of Accounting” signed by Blake follows, stating in part that the Trust was placed in possession of “all remaining assets comprising Decedent's estate, including the proceeds from sales of property of the succession by the executor thereof․”

• The judgment discharging Blake as succession representative filed October 21, 2005.

• Exhibit D filed May 26, 2005, is an “Act of Exchange” between Blake and the Succession exchanging six shares of common stock of Emfield Development Corporation:

Appearer acknowledges that the value of the six (6) shares of stock is $33,000.00 and that the value of the immovable property described on the attached Exhibit A and hereby transferred to BLAKE, is only $6,450.00. In order to maintain a fair and equitable transfer and exchange as contemplate herein, the parties hereto agree that GOODEN [the Succession] shall tender an equalizing payment unto BLAKE in the amount of Twenty-Six Thousand, Five Hundred Fifty and No/100ths Dollars ($26,550.00).

Attached to the Act of Exchange was the description of two tracts of land.

• Exhibit E is a “Sale and Mortgage” filed May 26, 2005, transferring from the succession to Blake the tracts of land at issue here for $104,534.00 including Tract A (20.833% interest) and Tract B (25% interest).

Walker filed an opposition to the exceptions. On September 15, 2017, Blake filed a motion for instructions with respect to the trust instrument so that the trust would pay his attorney fees. The trust terminated by its own terms on this day (Walker's thirty-fifth birthday) and Blake, as trustee, was to distribute all remaining trust assets to Walker.

Following an October 16, 2017 hearing, the trial court ordered Blake to immediately distribute the trust assets less any legal fees and litigation expenses incurred to that point. However, it did not rule on the propriety of Blake's use of trust funds for legal expenses.

Following an October 9, 2023 hearing, the trial court rendered a judgment filed May 30, 2024, denying Blake's peremptory exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action, granting the peremptory exception of prescription regarding the racketeering act, granting the peremptory exception of prescription in regard to any action against Blake under the Trust Code, and denying the peremptory exception of prescription against Blake and allowing Walker's claims under succession law to proceed to trial.

Walker filed a motion for new trial on June 11, 2024, pertaining to the trial court's ruling on the exceptions of prescription under the trust code and racketeering act.

A trial was held on March 25 and 26, 2025, but the record was left open for the deposition of Mr. Glen Stephens.¹ At the conclusion of the trial, on March 31, 2025, Blake reurged his peremptory exceptions of prescription and peremption pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2234, peremptory exception of no right of action, peremptory exception of no cause of action under the racketeering act, and peremptory exception of prescription under the racketeering act. The trial court signed a final judgment on June 9, 2025, granting all of Blake's exceptions and awarding Walker $10,000.00 for the untimely distribution of the trust assets. Costs were assessed to Blake. Walker timely appealed and Blake answered the appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing all claims but that for Blake's failure timely to distribute trust assets as time barred.

2. The trial court further erred as a matter of law in failing to hold Blake liable to Mrs. Walker for breach of his fiduciary duties as executor of his sister's succession and trustee and violation of the Louisiana's Racketeering Act.

3. The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to award Mrs. Walker damages in the amount Blake profited from his malfeasance as executor and trustee, pursuant to the Trust Code, Succession Law and Louisiana's Racketeering Act, plus treble damages, with interest compounded annually from the date of his breach of duty, May 5, 2005, until paid, and in failing to recognize Mrs. Walker's entitlement to disgorgement of Blake's legal fees paid from trust assets, and recovery of her own attorney fees and expenses.

Blake answered the appeal and assigns as error:

1. The trial court erred as a matter of law, when it granted $10,000.00 in damages and costs for the untimely distribution of trust assets on termination of the trust.

DISCUSSION

All of Walker's assignments of error relate to prescription of claims against a trustee, a succession representative, and under the Louisiana Racketeering Act. They will be discussed under those subheadings rather than assignment numbers.

On appeal, we review a trial court's findings regarding prescription with the following principles in mind:

“Although evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any objection of prescription pleaded, in the absence of evidence, an objection of prescription must be decided upon the facts alleged in the petition with all allegations accepted as true. La. C.C.P. art. 931.” Harney v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Co., 12–177, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/27/12), 106 So.3d 193, 198, writs denied, 13–258, 13–260 (La.4/1/13), 110 So.3d 584.

In reviewing a peremptory exception of prescription, the standard of review requires an appellate court to determine whether the trial court's finding of fact was manifestly erroneous. Jurisprudence provides that statutes involving prescription are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished. On the issue of prescription, the mover bears the burden of proving prescription. However, if the petition is prescribed on its face, then the burden of proof shifts to the Plaintiff to negate the presumption by establishing a suspension or interruption.

Taranto v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 10–105, p. 5 (La.3/15/11), 62 So.3d 721, 726 (citations omitted). “In reviewing a peremptory exception of prescription, the standard of review requires an appellate court to determine whether the trial court's finding of fact was manifestly erroneous. Although the factfinder is afforded deference, appellate courts have a duty to review the facts.” Herrera v. Gallegos, 13–204, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/9/13), 128 So.3d 306, 308–09 (citations omitted).

Estate of Goss v. Estate of Goss, 15-960, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/16), 187 So.3d 570, 573, writ denied, 16-660 (La. 5/27/16), 192 So.3d 743.

The trial court stated in its reasons for judgment stated (emphasis added):

Okay, the Court reviewed all the Motions and Memos in Support of the Exceptions, and all Opposing Memoranda. And the Court is of the opinion that La.R.S. 9:2234 is the applicable provision. According to D, it says, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all actions brought in the state against any trustee,” - and all these actions were brought against Mr. Blake, based upon him being the Trustee – and it says, “The prescriptive and peremptive period shall be governed exclusively by this Section.” And under this Section, the peremptive periods are two and three years (2 and 3 yrs).

And Mrs. – the plaintiff in this matter, Mrs. Jessica Gooden Walker, definitely had information in 2009. She did go and seek assistance. And for whatever reasons, she got the Final Accounting in 2009, and she went to seek the assistance of Mr. Graves. Then, for whatever reason, no suit was filed until 2013. So it was after the three-year period. Because – and the statute says that “under no circumstances.” I mean, the three-year is the, the max, so. It says, “The two-year and three-year periods that are in this Section are peremptive.”

Under Section C, it says that they are “peremptive, and they may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended.”

Walker's counsel asked:

Okay, I just want to make sure, Your Honor. You're saying that, that he's also not liable for his actions as Executor?

BY THE COURT:

It says, “All claims brought.” His – all ․

BY MR. VEAZEY:

Okay.

BY THE COURT:

․ these claims are brought against him because he was the Trustee. That's the way the Court understands it. And this statute says “exclusive,” so I'm dismissing the case.

Thus, the issue before us is whether the trial court manifestly erred in finding that the claims against Blake as trustee were prescribed, whether any of Walker's allegations against Blake arose when Blake was executor of the succession, whether Walker's claims under the racketeering act are prescribed, and/or if all of Walker's claims emanate from Blake's role as trustee as the trial court found. The applicable prescriptive period depends on the capacity in which the person was acting when the claim arose. Thus, we must determine which role governed the conduct complained of in Walker's petition and the evidence submitted into the record.

Prescriptive Period Applicable to Trustees

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2234 provides for the prescriptive period against a trustee and states (emphasis added):

A. An action for damages by a beneficiary against a trustee for any act, omission, or breach of duty shall be brought within two years of the date that the trustee renders, by actual delivery or mail to the beneficiary, or if the beneficiary lacks legal capacity, the beneficiary's legal representative, to the last known address of the beneficiary and that of the legal representative if any, an accounting for the accounting period in which the alleged act, omission, or breach of duty arising out of the matters disclosed therein occurred. However, such actions shall in all events, even as to actions within two years of disclosure, be filed within three years of the date that the trustee renders an accounting for the accounting period in which the alleged act, omission, or breach of duty occurred. If a beneficiary is a minor when a trustee's accounting for the accounting period in which the alleged act, omission, or breach of duty occurred is rendered, the prescriptive period of two years begins to run from the day he reaches the age of eighteen years.

B. Any action by a beneficiary against a trustee other than those described on Subsection A of this Section is prescribed by two years beginning from the date that the trustee renders his final account to the beneficiary.

C. The provisions of this Section are remedial and apply to all causes of action for damages without regard to the date when the alleged act, omission, or breach of duty occurred. The two-year and three-year periods of limitation provided for in this Section are peremptive periods within the meaning of Civil Code Article 3458, and in accordance with Civil Code Article 3461 may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a beneficiary shall have one year from July 9, 1999, to bring an action for damages against a trustee arising out of an act, omission, or breach of duty for a transaction disclosed in any prior accounting.

D. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all actions brought in the state against any trustee, the prescriptive and peremptive period shall be governed exclusively by this Section.

Walker filed suit on September 15, 2013. The trust's final accounting was rendered June 30, 2009, and Walker's own testimony reveals she received same. Thus, we find no manifest error in the trial court's determination that Walker's claims against Blake as trustee are prescribed.

Prescriptive Period Applicable to Succession Representatives

A testamentary execut[or] is a succession representative. La.Code Civ.P. arts. 3081-3083. [ ][H]e owes a fiduciary duty to the succession, “shall have the duty of collecting, preserving, and managing the property of the succession,” and “shall act at all times as a prudent administrator, and shall be personally responsible for all damages resulting from [his] failure so to act.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 3191(A). As a fiduciary, the execut[or] may not place h[is] own interests above that of the succession. Succession of Mangle, 452 So.2d 197 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 452 So.2d 1176 (La. 1984). The execut[or] is required to file annual accountings and a final accounting. La.Code Civ.P. arts. 3331, 3332. The execut[or] also has the duty “to close the succession as soon as advisable.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 3197.

A claim for breach of the execut[or]’s fiduciary duty or other act as succession representative is subject to a two-year prescriptive period that commences to run from the day of the judgment homologating the final accounting, except in actions for recovery of misappropriated property or funds or for non-payment of funds shown in the final accounting. La.R.S. 9:5621. Actions for recovery of misappropriated property or funds are personal obligations subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. Succession of Granger v. Worthington, 02-433 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/02), 829 So.2d 1108; La.Code Civ.P. art. 3499.

Succession of Mosing, 21-9, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/21), 331 So.3d 1013, 1017-18 (emphasis added).

In instances of misappropriation, the ten year prescriptive period applies since the duty of the administrat[or] to account to the succession is a personal obligation governed by La.Civ.Code art. 3499. Succession of Moore, 97–1668, 97–1669 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/1/98), 737 So.2d 749, writ denied, 99–0781 (La.4/30/99), 743 So.2d 207; see also Ellias v. Ellias, 94–1049 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/95), 651 So.2d 939, writ denied, 95–0832 (La.5/5/95), 654 So.2d 333.

It is of no moment that the misappropriation occurred prior to Worthington's appointment as administrat[or] since [his] “fiduciary duty as the [administrator] encompassed any previous misappropriation undertaken even [if] it were not concealed and occurred before [he] became [administrator] because of [his] duty to recover the succession property.” Succession of Moore, 737 So.2d at 756.

Succession of Granger v. Worthington, 02-433, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/02), 829 So.2d 1108, 1110-11.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5621(emphasis added) provides the prescriptive period for acts of a succession representative and states:

Actions against any person who has served as curator of a vacant succession or as administrator, testamentary executor, or dative testamentary executor of a succession in this state, or against the surety on his bond, arising out of any act the succession representative, as such, may have done or failed to do, are prescribed by two years, reckoning from the day of the judgment homologating the final account.

This prescription shall not be suspended or interrupted because of the incapacity of the person who might bring the action, reserving to him his recourse against his tutor or curator.

This prescription does not apply to actions for the recovery of any funds or other property misappropriated by the succession representative nor to actions for any amount not paid in accordance with the proposed payments shown on the final account.

While we find no error in the trial court's finding that Blake's acts as trustee are prescribed, we find the trial court erred in finding Walker's claims against Blake as succession executor prescribed. The evidence supports that Blake sold succession property to himself, sold it for significantly more shortly thereafter, and did not disclose the sales to his various entities to Walker.

Moreover, we find merit to Walker's claim that homologation never occurred because homologation cannot be waived by the executor; thus, the prescriptive period had not begun. While the heirs can waive homologation, the executor of a succession who is also the trustee of the trust that inherits the succession assets, cannot due to the obvious conflict. While there does not appear to be any cases addressing this particular issue, we can find no better reason to have judicial approval of the final accounting than when the executor and the trustee are the same person. Had the waiver been executed by Walker and her sister we may have reached a different result. Nevertheless, even if we found Blake was capable of waiving homologation, the ten-year prescriptive period for misappropriation would still apply.

We find the case of Succession of Aymond, 25-1101 (La. 11/25/25), 422 So.3d 288, in which the daughter of decedent was a usufructuary, succession representative, and trustee, instructive in examining the relationship between one person serving in multiple roles. The dispute was whether the daughter, Chantel, could sell immovable property as executrix of the succession. The supreme court held that an independent executrix, trustee, and usufructuary held “distinct roles” and “each of those roles came with distinct rights and obligations.” Id. at 289-290. Thus, the fact that the executrix was also the trustee “did not curtail the duties and rights she had as Independent Executrix․” Id. at 291.

The supreme court cites in a footnote Elizabeth R. Carter, Fiduciary Litigation in Louisiana: Mandataries, Succession Representatives, and Trustees, 80 La.L.Rev. 661 (2020), in which the author extensively discusses these various roles and notes the challenges of potential conflicts of an executor who is also the trustee. In the section titled “SUCCESSION REPRESENTATIVES,” the author states:

Many of the rules governing succession representatives are derived from the rules regulating tutors and curators. Like other fiduciaries, the succession representative must “act at all times as a prudent administrator.” The fiduciary responsibility of the succession representative is, however, somewhat different than the responsibility of other fiduciaries because his fiduciary obligations are owed to both creditors and heirs or legatees. Adding to potential complexity, the succession representative may serve dual roles: It is common for the succession representative to also be a creditor, heir, or legatee of the decedent. If heirs, legatees, or creditors believe that the succession representative's performance is deficient, they have a variety of remedies.

A. Parties to Litigation Against a Succession Representative

1. Plaintiff

Any party with an interest in the decedent's estate as an heir, legatee, trust beneficiary, trustee, or creditor might be a plaintiff in an action against an executor or administrator, depending on the facts and circumstances.

․

2. Demanding an Accounting

The succession representative's obligations of good faith and prudent administration require him to identify interested parties and to keep them apprised of the administration of the succession․

․

The term “interested person” generally refers to any person with an interest in the decedent's property, such as an heir, legatee, creditor, trustee, or beneficiary of a trust. Given that a court could also raise the issue on its own motion, courts ought to give the term a broad and liberal construction.

Id. at 696-703 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

The article then addresses instances in which a succession representative has mismanaged an estate and references several cases in which the executor sells or values succession property below market value for his or her own benefit warranting his or her removal. While removal of the executor is not at issue in this case, these cases illustrate that transactions by the succession executor may be a breach of fiduciary duty depending on the facts and circumstances. One such case is Succession of LaFleur, 99-1100 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/99), 752 So.2d 237, writ denied, 00-446 (La. 3/31/00), 759 So.2d 74. In Lafleur, an executor was removed for mismanagement and breaching his fiduciary duty by self-dealing after he failed to disclose his association with the family-owned corporation that he sold a portion of the estate to at a heavily discounted rate. The trial court noted that it would not expect the executor to sue himself personally for mismanagement.

In Succession of Dunham, 408 So.2d 888 (La.1981), a case relied upon by Walker, the succession representative was removed for mismanagement relating to conflicts of interest between her position as succession representative and as a director and officer of a related corporation. The removal of the executrix was warranted when a property was valued on the corporate books at $1,392,000.00 when she knew it was worth at least $5,000,000.00. The executrix was also a co-trustee and her removal was affirmed by the supreme court. The executrix had delayed accepting the trust until after stock redemption inuring to her benefit had occurred, thereby causing the succession and trust to “sustain a substantial injury.” Id. at 901. Thus, the court found that the executrix breached her fiduciary duties as executrix and trustee because she allowed succession property to be sold to the corporation for much less than market value.

The law review article goes on to discuss remedies owed for the breach of fiduciary duties related to an executor's disposal of succession property at less than market value:

A succession representative can be held liable for failing to accurately value succession property. As a prudent administrator, the succession representative “is required to obtain knowledge of the value of the assets of the succession for various purposes.” In particular, “[a] succession representative has a legal obligation to secure the best price reasonably available as consideration for the conveyance of succession property.” In Scurria v. Hodge,[31,207 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/30/98), 720 So.2d 460, writ denied, 99-11 (La. 3/19/99), 739 So.2d 782], the succession representatives sold succession property for less than fair market value and were held liable for the discrepancy between the price of the sale and the actual fair market value of the property. Similarly, in Succession of Irving, [436 So.2d 1263 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 442 So.2d 452 (La.1983)], the succession representative was held “liable for the difference in the market values at the time of the respective sales and the actual sales prices.” [Id. at 1265].

Carter, 80 La.L.Rev. 661 at 713-14 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added).

The Supreme Court clearly distinguishes between a person's role as usufructuary, executor, and trustee. Pursuant to this reasoning, we find claims against executors for breach of fiduciary duties and against trustees to be separate and distinct. Walker alleged significant claims of misappropriation to support the ten-year prescriptive period. Blake sold succession property to himself and various entities on May 25, 2005, placed the trust in possession of the estate on June 13, 2005, obtained a discharge as succession representative in October 2005, and sold the aforementioned properties and timber at a substantial profit in late January 2006 and May 2007. There is no dispute that rather than paying the succession cash for the properties, Blake provided a promissory note and exchanged stock in one of his corporations for an amount owed to him. Numerous other transactions relating to the property that financially benefited Blake followed. While these transactions may not have been a breach of his fiduciary duties, they are sufficient to warrant reversal of the trial court's grant of exception of prescription in Blake's favor.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2234(D) does not apply to Blake's acts as executor because he was also the trustee. This section of the statute refers to claims against a party relating to their trustee duties. Just as this provision would not be applicable to an executor who was not the trustee, this section will not prohibit an action against an executor who also happens to be the trustee.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3191(A) provides:

A succession representative is a fiduciary with respect to the succession, and shall have the duty of collecting, preserving, and managing the property of the succession in accordance with law. He shall act at all times as a prudent administrator, and shall be personally responsible for all damages resulting from his failure so to act.

A fiduciary may not place his own interests before the succession interest. Succession of Mosing, 331 So.3d 1013. In brief, Blake argues that “Jessica was not a legatee under her mother's testament․ Accordingly, Jessica has no right of action against Blake for his actions as a succession representative.” We disagree. It is true that Walker is not a legatee because the only legatee was the trust. While many cases refer to a succession executor's fiduciary duty extending to legatees, heirs, and creditors of the succession, fiduciary obligations are owed to all interested parties.² See Succession of Mangle, 452 So.2d 197. Walker, as the co-beneficiary of the trust that Blake was the trustee of, certainly had an interest in the administration of the succession for it is that corpus that becomes what is held in trust and relies on proper administration of the succession.

The jurisprudence cited above notes trust beneficiaries as an interested party in a succession executor's proper administration of his fiduciary duties. If an executor has unfettered and unlimited power because a trust is the only heir in a will, trust beneficiaries would have no recourse against an executor who breaches his fiduciary duties. The decedent would not have created a trust for her daughters if she had no intention of anything from her succession being placed in it. To claim that trust beneficiaries have no interest in the administration of the succession, particularly when the executor and the trustee are the same person, is contrary to law and common sense.

Whether Blake was acting for the benefit of the succession or breached his fiduciary duties is a question of fact that must be determined on remand. Due to the unusual procedural nature of these proceedings, we find a trial on the merits of Walker's misappropriation claims is warranted. While there was a “trial” and evidence was submitted in a variety of sometimes unusual ways, and Walker requests that we render judgment on the record, the trial court made no factual findings regarding the evidence, only prescription. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164; Geiger v. State ex rel. Dep't. of Health and Hosp., 01-2206 (La. 4/12/02), 815 So.2d 80. Accordingly, we remand the matter for further proceedings.

The Racketeering Act

Although the trial court provided no reasoning for granting the exceptions related to the Louisiana Racketeering Act, it appears that it found that these claims arose out of Blake's role as trustee. The Louisiana Racketeering Act is found in La.R.S. 15:1351-56. Walker argues that Blake's theft on May 25, 2005, the date he sold Wilma's portion of the estate to himself, constituted theft under La.R.S. 15:1352(A)(37). She argues the “pattern” requirement of the racketeering act is met because there were two acts of sale. The racketeering act prohibits certain activities:

A. It is unlawful for any person who has knowingly received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of such proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in immovable property or in the establishment or operation of any enterprise.

B. It is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity, knowingly to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise or immovable property.

C. It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise knowingly to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.

D. It is unlawful for any person to conspire or attempt to violate any of the provisions of Subsections A, B, or C of this Section.

La.R.S. 15:1353. The racketeering act provides for a prescriptive period, found in La.R.S. 15:1356(H):

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under this Chapter may be commenced at any time within five years after the conduct in violation of a provision of this Chapter terminates or the cause of action accrues. If a criminal prosecution or civil action is brought under the provisions of this Chapter, the running of the period prescribed by this Section with respect to any cause of action arising under Subsection E of this Section which is based in whole or in part upon any matter complained of in any such prosecution or action shall be suspended during the pendency of such prosecution or action and for two years following its termination.

Walker essentially argues that Blake's misappropriation is ongoing because he continues to profit from the “theft.” We are unaware of any successful claim involving the racketeering act and a succession executor and/or trustee. This novel approach to circumventing prescriptive periods is unnecessary when the claims Walker complains of, including mismanagement via investment of improperly derived proceeds, arise out of a breach of fiduciary duties through misappropriation that is subject to the ten-year prescriptive period authorized by La.R.S. 9:5621. This assignment of error is without merit.

Award for Failure to Timely Distribute Trust Funds

Blake argues the trial court erroneously awarded Walker $10,000.00 in damages for failing to timely distribute the trust assets because she did not prove she suffered any damages, the funds remained invested, and Blake did not “remove the funds for his own personal use or investment or move the assets away from the historical investment vehicles used in the trust administration.” One-half of Walker's portion of the trust assets were due on September 15, 2012, and the remainder on September 15, 2017. The trial court found they were not timely distributed, and we find no error in that finding based on our review of the record. However, our review of the record provides no basis for awarding $10,000.00.³ Walker notes such in her reply brief:

Mrs. Walker's damages from Blake's recalcitrance is not precisely quantifiable but Mrs. Walker was entitled to receive trust assets when required by the will, to invest or otherwise use as she, not Blake, saw fit. The Court was authorized to award nominal damages for this element of Mrs. Walker's claim.

Accordingly, we vacate the award and instruct the trial court to issue reasons for its award following a hearing.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court granting defendant, Robert E. Blake, Jr.’s, exceptions regarding trust and racketeering claims are affirmed. The award of $10,000.00 to plaintiff, Jessica Walker Gooden, is vacated. The trial court's judgment dismissing Walker's claims against Blake as executor are reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At oral argument of the matter before this court on October 1, 2026, the parties jointly moved to supplement the record with the deposition of Glen Stephens. The supplement was due October 16, 2026, but does not appear in the record in this court. The addition of the deposition is rendered moot by our findings.

2.   See also La.Code Civ.P. art. 3182 regarding removal of a succession representative that authorizes the court “on motion of any interested party” to “order the succession representative sought to be removed to show cause why he should not be removed from office.”

3.   We note that untimely trust distributions have been found to be breaches of a trustee's fiduciary duty that deprive the beneficiary of the use of the funds. See Chouest v. Chouest, 18-1484 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/19/19), 292 So.3d 68.

GREMILLION, Judge.